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The Constitution Project is a national watchdog group that advances bipartisan, consensus-
based solutions to some of  most difficult constitutional challenges of  our time.  For more than 
15 years, we have developed a reputation for bringing together independent groups of  policy 
experts and legal practitioners from across the political and ideological spectrums to issue 
reports and recommendations that safeguard our nation’s founding charter.  
The Constitution Project’s blue-ribbon Task Force on Detainee Treatment follows this 
successful model.  It is made up of  former high-ranking officials with distinguished careers in 
the judiciary, Congress, the diplomatic service, law enforcement, the military, and other parts 
of  the executive branch, as well as recognized experts in law, medicine and ethics. The group 
includes conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats. (Brief  biographies of  the 11 
members follow.)  The Task Force was charged with providing the American people with a 
broad understanding of  what is known — and what may still be unknown — about the past and 
current treatment of  suspected terrorists detained by the U.S. government during the Clinton, 
Bush and Obama administrations.   
This report is the product of  more than two years of  research, analysis and deliberation by 
the Task Force members and staff.  It is based on a thorough examination of  available public 
records and interviews with more than 100 people, including former detainees, military and 
intelligence officers, interrogators and policymakers.  We believe it is the most comprehensive 
record of  detainee treatment across multiple administrations and multiple geographic theatres 
— Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo and the so-called “black sites” — yet published.
The Constitution Project is enormously grateful to the members of  the Task Force for their 
diligence and dedication in completing this report.  They all contributed their remarkable 
expertise, and staked their considerable personal and professional reputations, to produce this 
document. The American public owes them a debt of  gratitude.
The Constitution Project also thanks the Task Force staff, which assembled, organized and 
analyzed the material you hold in your hands.  Acting under the extremely capable leadership 
of  its executive director, Neil A. Lewis, the Task Force staff  consisted of: Kent A. Eiler, 
counsel; Jacob A. Gillig, administrator; Katherine Hawkins, investigator; and Alka Pradhan, 
counsel.  The staff, and the report, benefited immensely from the assistance of: Adam Clymer, 
senior consultant; Nino Guruli, senior researcher; and research consultants David O’Brien 
and Rita Siemion.  Annie Brinkmann, Jessica Kamish, Kathleen Liu, Brieann Peterson, Evan 
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St. John and Michael Wu all served as interns.  At various times in the process of  developing 
the report, Charles Martel served as staff  director; Aram Roston as senior investigator; and 
Chrystie Swiney as counsel.
This report was supported, in part, by grants from The Atlantic Philanthropies, Nathan 
Cummings Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Open Society Policy Center, Park 
Foundation, Proteus Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and The Security & Rights 
Collaborative Rights Pooled Fund, a Proteus Fund Initiative.
The Constitution Project is grateful to the following law firms for providing pro bono assistance 
and/or other in-kind support for this project: Arnold & Porter LLP; Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore LLP; Holland & Knight LLP; Jenner & Block; King & Spalding; Lewis Baach PLLC; 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP; Mayer Brown LLP; Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP; 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Steptoe & Johnson LLP; Wiley Rein LLP; and, 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.  The Constitution Project also appreciates the 
pro bono communications assistance provided by Dutko Grayling and ReThink Media.
Karol A. Keane, of  Keane Design and Communications, did the design and layout for the 
book, Randy P. Auerbach provided line-editing and indexing, and Kreative Keystrokes 
developed the accompanying website, all to exacting standards under incredibly tight 
deadlines. TCP’s communications coordinator, Hannah White, directed their efforts.
Finally, The Constitution Project gratefully acknowledges all the organizations, interviewees 
and individuals, too numerous to name, who shared their experience, insights and frustrations 
– both formally and informally, on-the-record and off  – with Task Force members and staff.  
Without their contributions, this report would not have been possible. 
The accompanying website, www.detaineetaskforce.org, provides electronic versions of  this report 
and additional supporting information.
The Task Force makes a number of  specific findings and recommendations.  Some seem like 
common sense; others will undoubtedly generate controversy.  Some can be implemented by 
executive action alone; others will require legislation.  Regardless, we urge policymakers to 
give this report and these recommendations their full and immediate consideration.
Virginia E. Sloan
President, The Constitution Project
April 16, 2013
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Asa Hutchinson is a senior partner in the Asa Hutchinson Law Group in Rogers, Arkansas, 
specializing in white collar criminal defense, complex litigation, international export controls 
and sanctions, corporate international relations, homeland security, and corporate investigations 
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Secretary for Border and Transportation Security at the Department of  Homeland Security 
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housed in such agencies as the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border 
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center.  He was Administrator of  the Drug Enforcement Administration from 2001 to 2003.
Prior to joining the Bush Administration, Hutchinson represented the 3rd District of  Arkansas 
as a Republican Congressman, first winning election in 1996.  Hutchinson served on the House 
Judiciary Committee along with the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
In 1982, he was appointed as United States Attorney by President Ronald Reagan, at the time 
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new, cooperative efforts to combat drug trafficking. He also assisted U.S. businesses with 
commercial ventures in Mexico.
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he was Chairman of  the House Budget Committee for four years and a ranking Member of  
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well as Chairman and CEO of  the American Stock Exchange in New York (1989-1993).  He 
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A former President of  the American Bar Association (1991-92), Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte 
was appointed President of  Florida State University in 1993, serving in that capacity through 
January 2003.  Prior to that, from 1984 to 1989, he served as Dean of  Florida State University 
College of  Law. 
A member of  the American Law Institute, D’Alemberte also served as President of  the 
American Judicature Society (1982-84).  He has won numerous national awards for his 
contributions to the profession.  He is the author of  The Florida Constitution. D’Alemberte served 
as a member of  the Florida House of  Representatives from 1966 to1972. 
He is currently a partner of  D’Alemberte & Palmer, a Tallahassee firm specializing in appellate 
work.  He continues to teach as a member of  the University faculty at the FSU College of  Law.  
He remains an active member of  many legal and higher educational committees and boards.  
D’Alemberte received his juris doctor with honors from the University of  Florida in 1962, and 
he has received nine honorary degrees.  
Richard A. Epstein
Richard A. Epstein is the inaugural Laurence A. Tisch Professor of  Law at New York University 
School of  Law. He has served as the Peter and Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover 
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Law Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of  Chicago, where he has taught since 1972. 
Prior to joining the University of  Chicago Law School faculty, he taught law at the University of  
Southern California from 1968 to 1972. 
He has published numerous books and articles on a wide range of  legal and interdisciplinary 
subjects, and has taught courses in administrative law, civil procedure, constitutional law, and 
criminal law, among many others. He served as editor of  the Journal of  Legal Studies from 1981 to 
1991, and of  the Journal of  Law and Economics from 1991 to 2001. From 2001 to 2010 he was a 
director of  the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of  Chicago.  
He has been a member of  the American Academy of  Arts and Sciences since 1985 and has been 
a Senior Fellow of  the Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of  Chicago Medical 
School since 1983.  He received an LLD from the University of  Ghent in 2003.
David P. Gushee
Dr. David P. Gushee is the Distinguished University Professor of  Christian Ethics and Director 
of  the Center for Theology and Public Life at Mercer University. Gushee teaches at McAfee 
School of  Theology and throughout Mercer University in his specialty, Christian ethics.  As 
Director of  the Center for Theology and Public Life, he organizes events and courses to 
advance quality conversations about major issues arising at the intersection of  theology, ethics, 
and public policy. Gushee came to Mercer in 2007 from Union University, where he served for 
11 years, ultimately as Graves Professor of  Moral Philosophy.
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Gushee has published fifteen books, with four more in development, and many hundreds of  
essays, book chapters, articles, reviews, and opinion pieces.  He is a columnist for the Huffington 
Post and a contributing editor for Christianity Today, as well as an active voice on social media.  He 
also currently serves on the board of  directors of  the Society of  Christian Ethics, his primary 
professional association, and on the Ethics, Religion, and the Holocaust Committee of  the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, where he has also taught a faculty seminar course.
He earned his Bachelor of  Arts at the College of  William and Mary (1984), Master of  Divinity 
at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (1987) and both the Master of  Philosophy (1990) and 
Doctor of  Philosophy (1993) in Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary in New York. 
Azizah Y. al-Hibri
Dr. Azizah Y. al-Hibri is a professor emerita at the T. C. Williams School of  Law, University 
of  Richmond, having served on the faculty from 1992 until her retirement in 2012. She is also 
a founding editor of  “Hypatia: a Journal of  Feminist Philosophy,” and the founder and chair 
[president] of  KARAMAH: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights.
For the last two decades, al-Hibri has written extensively on issues of  Muslim women’s rights, 
Islam and democracy, and human rights in Islam. She has published in a number of  legal 
publications, and authored several book chapters. Al-Hibri has also traveled extensively 
throughout the Muslim world in support of  Muslim women’s rights. She has visited fourteen 
Muslim countries and met with religious, political and feminist leaders, as well as legal scholars, 
on issues of  importance to Muslim women. 
In 2011, al-Hibri was appointed by President Obama to serve as a commissioner on the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom. She is the recipient of  the Virginia First 
Freedom Award, presented in 2007 by the Council for America’s First Freedom, the Lifetime 
Achievement Award, presented in 2009 by the Journal of  Law and Religion, and the Dr. Betty 
Shabazz Recognition Award, presented by Women in Islam in 2006. She earned a Ph.D. in 
Philosophy from the University of  Pennsylvania in 1975 and a J.D. from the University of  
Pennsylvania Law School in 1985.  She was also named a Fulbright Scholar in 2001.
David R. Irvine
David Irvine is a Salt Lake City attorney in private practice, a former Republican state 
legislator, and a retired Army brigadier general.  
Irvine enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1962, and received a direct commission in 1967 as 
a strategic intelligence officer.  He maintained a faculty assignment for 18 years with the Sixth 
U.S. Army Intelligence School, teaching prisoner of  war interrogation and military law. He was 
the Deputy Commander for the 96th Regional Readiness Command.  He served four terms in 
the Utah House of  Representatives.
Claudia Kennedy
Claudia J. Kennedy is the first woman to achieve the rank of  three-star general in the United 
States Army, taking her from the Women’s Army Corps in the late 1960’s to the position 
of  Deputy Chief  of  Staff  for Army Intelligence in 1997-2000.  She oversaw policies and 
operations affecting 45,000 people stationed worldwide with a budget of  nearly $1 billion. 
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performance of  outstanding services and achievements.” 
She is the Chair of  Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. She has consulted for 
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CNN and as a guest on Larry King Live, Aaron Brown, Wolf  Blitzer and ABC’s Good Morning 
America among others.  Kennedy holds a B.A. degree in Philosophy from Rhodes College.
Thomas R. Pickering
Thomas R. Pickering is vice chairman of  Hills & Company, an international consulting firm 
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1989 to 1992, he was Ambassador and Representative to the United Nations.  In a diplomatic 
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and Research of  the State Department, in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and from 
1962 to 1964 in Geneva as political adviser to the U.S. delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament 
Conference.  He earned the personal rank of  Career Ambassador, the highest in the U.S. Foreign 
Service. Most recently, he helped lead an independent State Department panel charged with 
investigating the attacks on the mission in Benghazi.
Pickering entered on active duty in the U.S. Navy from 1956-1959, and later served in 
the Naval Reserve to the grade of  Lieutenant Commander. He earned a Master’s degree 
from the Fletcher School of  Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Upon graduation 
from Tufts, he was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship and attended the University of  
Melbourne in Australia where he received a second master’s degree in 1956.  He is also the 
recipient of  12 honorary degrees.
William S. Sessions
William S. Sessions served three United States presidents as the Director of  the Federal Bureau 
of  Investigation, earning a reputation for modernizing the FBI by initiating and developing the 
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and minorities for service in the FBI. He initiated the “Winners Don’t Use Drugs” program for 
combating drug usage by young people.  
Prior to joining the FBI, Sessions was the chief  judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of  Texas, where he had previously served as United States Attorney.  He also served 
on the Board of  the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C., and on committees of  both 
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A Word on Reading This Report
For those who desire a quick read, the essence of  the report can be gleaned by reading the 
Statement of  the Task Force (p. 1) and the Findings and Recommendations (p. 9). Two of  the 
most important findings, those that concern the questions as to whether torture occurred and 
whether senior U.S. leaders bear some responsibility, are accompanied by thorough memos 
(provided as appendices at the end of  the report) that detail the foundations for the Task Force’s 
deliberations and conclusions on those two issues. 
Each of  the chapters on subjects such as Guantánamo, the Obama administration, the role 
of  the medical community, etc., is preceded by a brief  summary and commentary in italics. 
These chapters combine previously reported material with new information gathered by the 
Task Force and its staff. One may, for example, read the italicized introduction to the chapter on 
Guantánamo to get a quick sense of  the rest of  the chapter. 
In addition, this report contains a handful of  sketches of  individuals whose stories have not 
fully been told before. The Task Force believes the accounts of  these people provide some 
special understanding of  the history and consequences of  the U.S. interrogation and detention 
program since September 11, 2001. 
The sketches are of  Albert Shimkus (the first commander of  the detainee hospital at 
Guantánamo), Christophe Girod (an early representative of  the International Committee of  the 
Red Cross at Guantánamo), and three Libyans who helped lead the insurgency in their country 
against Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafi. One Libyan, Abdel Hakim Belhadj, had earlier been 
rendered by U.S. forces to el-Gaddafi’s custody and apparently tortured there. Belhadj’s story is 
told along with those of  other Libyans who suffered the same fate. In one of  its most important 
findings, the Task Force concluded that the extraordinary rendition program — which has 
inherent problems with human rights and international legal standards — was extended, and 
thus abused, to deal with people like the Libyans, who had nothing to do with Al Qaeda or 
the September 11 attacks. The ramifications of  these transfers with no apparent connection to 
September 11 are outlined in Chapter 8, discussing the (mostly unintended) consequences of  
U.S. policy.
There are several features that are not included in the printed version but are available at    
www.detaineetaskforce.org, including transcripts of  many of  the interviews conducted by Task 
Force staff. In addition, the detainee task force website has a master timeline of  important events.
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1The Constitution Project
Statement of the Task Force
This report of  The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment is the result of  
almost two years of  intensive study, investigation and deliberation.
The project was undertaken with the belief  that it was important to provide an accurate and 
authoritative account of  how the United States treated people its forces held in custody as the 
nation mobilized to deal with a global terrorist theat. 
The events examined in this report are unprecedented in U.S. history. In the course of  the 
nation’s many previous conflicts, there is little doubt that some U.S. personnel committed brutal 
acts against captives, as have armies and governments throughout history. 
But there is no evidence there had ever before been the kind of  considered and detailed 
discussions that occurred after September 11, directly involving a president and his top 
advisers on the wisdom, propriety and legality of  inflicting pain and torment on some 
detainees in our custody. 
Despite this extraordinary aspect, the Obama administration declined, as a matter of  policy, 
to undertake or commission an official study of  what happened, saying it was unproductive to 
“look backwards” rather than forward.
In Congress, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy of  Vermont introduced legislation to establish a “Truth 
Commission” to look into the U.S. behavior in the years following the September 11 attacks. 
The concept, successful in South Africa, Guatemala and several other countries, is predicated 
on recognizing the paramount value to a nation of  an accurate accounting of  its history, 
especially in the aftermath of  an extraordinary episode or period of  crisis. But as at the White 
House, Congress showed little appetite for delving into the past. 
These responses were dismaying to the many people who believed it was important for a great 
democracy like the United States to help its citizens understand, albeit with appropriate limits 
for legitimate security concerns, what had been done in their name. 
Our report rests, in part, on the belief  that all societies behave differently under stress; at 
those times, they may even take actions that conflict with their essential character and values. 
American history has its share of  such episodes, like the internment of  Japanese-Americans 
during World War II, that may have seemed widely acceptable at the time they occurred, 
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but years later are viewed in a starkly different light. What was once generally taken to be 
understandable and justifiable behavior can later become a case of  historical regret.
Task Force members believe that having as thorough as possible an understanding of  what 
occurred during this period of  serious threat — and a willingness to acknowledge any 
shortcomings — strengthens the nation, and equips us to better cope with the next crisis and 
ones after that. Moving on without such a reckoning weakens our ability to claim our place as 
an exemplary practitioner of  the rule of  law. 
In the absence of  government action or initiative, The Constitution Project, a nonpartisan public-
interest organization devoted to the rule of  law principle, set out to address this situation. It gathered 
a Task Force of  experienced former officials who had worked at the highest levels of  the judiciary, 
Congress, the diplomatic service, law enforcement, the military, and parts of  the executive branch. 
Recognized experts in law, medicine and ethical behavior were added to the group to help ensure a 
serious and fair examination of  how detention policies came to be made and implemented. 
The Task Force members include Democrats and Republicans; those who are thought to be 
conservatives and those thought to be liberals; people with experience in and sensitivity to 
national security issues and those who have an understanding that the government’s reach 
and authority is subject to both tradition and law to appropriate limits. The Task Force 
members also were able to bring to the project a keen collective understanding of  how 
government decisions are made. 
Although the report covers actions taken during three different administrations beginning 
with that of  President Bill Clinton and ending with that of  President Barack Obama, 
most of  the activity studied here occurred during the administration of  President George 
W. Bush. This is unavoidable as Bush was president when the horrific attacks on U.S. soil 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and thus had the burden of  responding quickly and 
decisively to the situation. 
While the report deals largely with the period of  the Bush administration’s response to the 
attacks, the investigation was neither a partisan undertaking nor should its conclusions be taken as 
anything other than an effort to understand what happened at many levels of  U.S. policymaking. 
There is no way of  knowing how the government would have responded if  a Democratic 
administration were in power at the time of  the September 11 attacks and had to bear the 
same responsibilities. Indeed, one of  the controversial methods examined here — capture and 
rendition of  terror suspects to foreign governments known to abuse people in their custody — 
had its first significant use during the Clinton administration, well before September 11.
Any effort to understand how extraordinary decisions were reached on approving harsh 
treatment of  detainees must begin with a recognition of  the extraordinary anxiety that 
enveloped the nation after September 11. The greatest fears of  Americans and their leaders in 
that period were of  further attacks from those who had demonstrated that they were capable 
of  wreaking havoc in New York and Washington. The abstract problems that might come with 
unchecked executive power were not a priority or an immediate concern for most Americans 
inside and outside of  government.
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Those already-intense anxieties were further stoked by the anthrax scares that played out in the 
following months.
Philip D. Zelikow, a historian at the University of  Virginia who served as counselor in the State 
Department during the Bush administration and as executive director of  the 9/11 Commission, 
said that following the collective national trauma of  the attacks, “Officials tried to do everything they 
could think of, improvising frantically, making many mistakes while getting some things right.”
These officials were guided by a simple and compelling mandate from the president that was, 
by itself, worthy — but may have affected the way some decisions were made. President Bush’s 
order was to do whatever was necessary to prevent another such attack. 
Task Force members generally understand that those officials whose decisions and actions may 
have contributed to charges of  abuse, with harmful consequences for the United States’ standing 
in the world, undertook those measures as their best efforts to protect their fellow citizens. 
Task Force members also believe, however, that those good intentions did not relieve them of  their 
obligations to comply with existing treaties and laws. The need to respect legal and moral codes 
designed to maintain minimum standards of  human rights is especially great in times of  crisis. 
It is encouraging to note that when misguided policies were implemented in an excess of  zeal 
or emotion, there was sometimes a cadre of  officials who raised their voices in dissent, however 
unavailing those efforts.
Perhaps the most important or notable finding of  this panel is that it is 
indisputable that the United States engaged in the practice of  torture. 
This finding, offered without reservation, is not based on any impressionistic approach to the 
issue. No member of  the Task Force made this decision because the techniques “seemed like 
torture to me,” or “I would regard that as torture.”
Instead, this conclusion is grounded in a thorough and detailed examination of  what constitutes 
torture in many contexts, notably historical and legal. The Task Force examined court cases 
in which torture was deemed to have occurred both inside and outside the country and, 
tellingly, in instances in which the United States has leveled the charge of  torture against other 
governments. The United States may not declare a nation guilty of  engaging in torture and 
then exempt itself  from being so labeled for similar if  not identical conduct. 
The extensive research that led to the conclusion that the United States engaged in torture is 
contained in a detailed legal memorandum attached to this report. It should be noted that the 
conclusion that torture was used means it occurred in many instances and across a wide range of  
theaters. This judgment is not restricted to or dependent on the three cases in which detainees of  
the CIA were subjected to waterboarding, which had been approved at the highest levels.
The question as to whether U.S. forces and agents engaged in torture has been complicated 
by the existence of  two vocal camps in the public debate. This has been particularly vexing for 
traditional journalists who are trained and accustomed to recording the arguments of  both sides 
in a dispute without declaring one right and the other wrong. The public may simply perceive 
that there is no right side, as there are two equally fervent views held views on a subject, with 
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substantially credentialed people on both sides. In this case, the problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that among those who insist that the United States did not engage in torture are figures who 
served at the highest levels of  government, including Vice President Dick Cheney.
But this Task Force is not bound by this convention. 
The members, coming from a wide political spectrum, believe that arguments that the nation 
did not engage in torture and that much of  what occurred should be defined as something less 
than torture are not credible. 
The second notable conclusion of  the Task Force is that the nation’s highest officials 
bear some responsibility for allowing and contributing to the spread of  torture. 
The evidence for this finding about responsibility is contained throughout the report, but it is 
distilled in a detailed memo showing the widespread responsibility for torture among civilian 
and military leaders. [See Appendix 2] The most important element may have been to declare 
that the Geneva Conventions, a venerable instrument for ensuring humane treatment in time 
of  war, did not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban captives in Afghanistan or Guantánamo. The 
administration never specified what rules would apply instead.
The other major factor was President Bush’s authorization of  brutal techniques by the CIA for 
selected detainees. 
The CIA also created its own detention and interrogation facilities — at several locations 
in Afghanistan, and even more secretive “black sites” in Thailand, Poland, Romania and 
Lithuania, where the highest value captives were interrogated. 
The consequence of  these official actions and statements are now clear: many lower-level troops 
said they believed that “the gloves were off ” regarding treatment of  prisoners. By the end of  
2002, at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, interrogators began routinely depriving detainees 
of  sleep by means of  shackling them to the ceiling. Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
later approved interrogation techniques in Guantánamo that included sleep deprivation, stress 
positions, nudity, sensory deprivation and threatening detainees with dogs. Many of  the same 
techniques were later used in Iraq. 
Much of  the torture that occurred in Guantánamo, Afghanistan and Iraq was never explicitly 
authorized. But the authorization of  the CIA’s techniques depended on setting aside the 
traditional legal rules that protected captives. And as retired Marine generals Charles Krulak 
and Joseph Hoar have said, “any degree of  ‘flexibility’ about torture at the top drops down the 
chain of  command like a stone — the rare exception fast becoming the rule.” 
The scope of  this study encompasses a vast amount of  information, analysis and events; 
geographically speaking, much of  the activity studied occurred in three locations outside the 
continental United States, two of  them war zones. Fact-finding was conducted on the ground 
in all three places — Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba — by Task Force staff. 
Task Force members were directly involved in some of  the information-gathering phase of  the 
investigation, traveling abroad to meet former detainees and foreign officials to discuss the U.S. 
program of  rendition. 
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As the Task Force is a nongovernmental body with no authority in law, the investigation 
proceeded without the advantages of  subpoena power or the obligation of  the government to 
provide access to classified information.
Nonetheless, there is an enormous amount of  information already developed and Task Force 
staff  and members have interviewed dozens of  people over the course of  the past few months; the 
passage of  time seems to have made some people more willing to speak candidly about events. 
The Task Force and its staff  have surveyed the vast number of  reports on the subject generated 
by the government, news media, independent writers and nongovernmental organizations, some 
more credible than others. The Task Force has attempted to assess the credibility of  the many 
assertions of  brutal treatment as far as possible. For example, accounts by former detainees, either 
previously reported or in interviews with Task Force staff, may be measured against the accounts 
of  interrogators and guards who now speak more openly than they did at the time — or against 
such credible reports as those provided by the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and the Senate Armed Services Committee, both of  which had access to confidential information 
not available to the public.
The architects of  the detention and interrogation regimes sought and were given crucial support 
from people in the medical and legal fields. This implicated profound ethical questions for both 
professions and this report attempts to address those issues.
Apart from the ethical aspects, there were significant, even crucial mistakes made by both legal 
and medical advisers at the highest levels. 
On the medical side, policymakers eagerly accepted a proposal presented by a small group 
of  behavioral psychologists to use the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape program 
(SERE) as the basis to fashion a harsh interrogation regime for people captured in the new 
war against terrorism. 
The use of  the SERE program was a single example of  flawed decision-making at many levels 
— with serious consequences. The SERE program was developed to help U.S. troops resist 
interrogation techniques that had been used to extract false confessions from downed U.S. 
airmen during the Korean War. Its promoters had no experience in interrogation, the ability to 
extract truthful and usable information from captives.
Lawyers in the Justice Department provided legal guidance, in the aftermath of  the attacks, 
that seemed to go to great lengths to allow treatment that amounted to torture. To deal with the 
regime of  laws and treaties designed to prohibit and prevent torture, the lawyers provided novel, 
if  not acrobatic interpretations to allow the mistreatment of  prisoners.
Those early memoranda that defined torture narrowly would engender widespread and 
withering criticism once they became public. The successors of  those government lawyers 
would eventually move to overturn those legal memoranda. Even though the initial memoranda 
were disowned, the memorable language — limiting the definition of  torture to those acts 
that might implicate organ failure — remain a stain on the image of  the United States, and 
the memos are a potential aid to repressive regimes elsewhere when they seek approval or 
justification for their own acts. 
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The early legal opinions had something in common with the advice from psychologists about 
how to manipulate detainees during interrogation: they both seemed to be aimed primarily 
at giving the client — in this case, administration officials — what they wanted to hear. 
Information or arguments that contravened the advice were ignored, minimized or suppressed.
The Task Force report also includes important new details of  the astonishing account — first 
uncovered by Human Rights Watch — of  how some U.S. authorities used the machinery of  the 
“war on terror” to abuse a handful of  Libyan Islamists involved in a national struggle against 
Libyan dictator Muammar el-Gaddafi, in an effort to win favor with el-Gaddafi’s regime. The 
same Libyans suddenly became allies as they fought with NATO to topple el-Gaddafi a few 
short years later. 
Task Force staff  also learned that procedures in place in Afghanistan to evaluate prisoners for 
release are not as independent as they have been presented. Decisions of  review boards, in some 
cases, are subject to review by a Pentagon agency that often consults with members of  Congress 
as to whether to release prisoners from Bagram.
Stepping back from the close-quarters study of  detention policies, some significant, historical 
themes may be discerned. The first is a striking example of  the interplay of  checks and balances 
in our system, in which the three branches of  government can be seen, understandably, to move 
at different speeds in responding to a crisis. Following the September 11 attacks, the immediate 
responsibility for action fell appropriately on the executive branch, which has direct control of  
the vast machinery of  the government. It encompasses not only the nation’s military might but 
the president himself  as the embodiment of  the nation’s leadership and thus the individual best 
positioned to articulate the nation’s anger, grief  and considered response.
The other branches of  government had little impact in the early years on the policies put 
in place by the Bush administration. The judiciary, the “least-dangerous branch” as noted 
by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, is designed to be more deliberate in its 
involvement; courts cannot constitutionally pronounce on policies until they are presented with 
a “case or controversy” on which they may render judgments. Thus, in those first few years, the 
executive branch was essentially unimpeded in its actions in regard to treatment of  detainees.
That would change. When cases involving U.S. detention policies slowly made their way into 
the judicial system, a handful of  judges began to push back against administration actions. 
Decisions ultimately handed down by the Supreme Court overturned some of  the basic 
premises of  the administration in establishing its detention regime. Officials had counted 
on courts accepting that the U.S. Naval base at Guantánamo, Cuba, was outside the legal 
jurisdiction of  the United States. As such, the officials also reasoned that detainees there would 
have no access to the right of  habeas corpus, that is, the ability to petition courts to investigate and 
judge the sufficiency of  reasons for detention.
The Supreme Court upset both assumptions.
But the limits of  judicial authority soon became evident. As various judges issued rulings based 
on the Supreme Court pronouncements, both the courts and the administration engaged 
warily. While often in direct disagreement, both judges and executive branch officials seemed 
to be always sensitive to the potential for constitutional confrontation and sought to avoid 
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outright conflict. Courts, ever anxious about the possibility of  defiance undermining their 
authority, generally allowed the administration to delay action. The administration, for its part, 
often worked to make cases moot, sometimes even freeing prisoners who were the subject of  
litigation, even though officials had once described those very detainees as highly dangerous.
Congress proved even slower than the courts to take any action that would create a 
confrontation with the White House. That would change, however, with the election of  
President Obama. 
Another evident trend is that the detention policies of  the Bush administration may be, in a 
loose sense, divided into two different periods. The aggressive “forward-leaning” approach 
in the early years changed, notably beginning in the period for 2005 to 2006. There were, no 
doubt, many reasons for this, probably including the limited pushback of  the courts. 
A full explanation of  how the aggressiveness of  the detention policies was altered in this period 
would involve an examination of  the apparent changes in the thinking of  President Bush, a 
difficult task and generally beyond the scope of  this report. One factor, however, was certainly 
the disclosure of  the atrocities at Abu Ghraib in 2004 and the ensuing condemnation both at 
home and abroad accompanied by feelings of  — and there is no better word for it — shame 
among Americans, who rightly hold higher expectations of  the men and women we send to war.
Over the course of  this study, it became ever more apparent that the disclosures about Abu Ghraib 
had an enormous impact on policy. The public revulsion as to those disclosures contributed to a 
change in direction on many fronts; those in the government who had argued there was a need for 
extraordinary measures to protect the nation soon saw the initiative shift to those who objected to 
harsh tactics. Task Force investigators and members believe it is difficult to overstate the effect of  
the Abu Ghraib disclosures on the direction of  U.S. policies on detainee treatment.
The Task Force also believes there may have been another opportunity to effect a shift in 
momentum that was lost. That involved an internal debate at the highest levels of  the ICRC as 
to how aggressive the Geneva-based group should be with U.S. policymakers. The ICRC, by 
tradition, does not speak publicly about what its people learn about detention situations. But some 
officials were so offended by their discoveries at Guantánamo that they argued the group had to be 
more forceful in confronting the Defense Department. This report details for the first time some of  
the debate inside the ICRC over that issue. 
In the end, the top leadership of  the ICRC decided against confrontation and a valuable 
opportunity may have been missed.
Another observation is that President Obama came to quickly discover that his promised sweeping 
reform of  the detention regime could not be so easily implemented. A major reason for this was that 
Congress, when finally engaged in the issue, resisted. The opposition to President Obama’s plans 
was sometimes bipartisan, notably to those proposals to close Guantánamo and bring some of  the 
detainees onto U.S. soil for trial. Many believe President Obama and his aides did not move swiftly 
enough, thus allowing opposition to build in Congress. 
This report is aimed, in par,t at learning from errors and improving detention and interrogation 
policies in the future. At the time of  this writing, the United States is still detaining people it 
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regards as dangerous. But in some instances the treatment of  supposed high-value foes has been 
transformed in significant ways. 
The U.S. military, learning from its experience, has vastly improved its procedures for 
screening captives and no longer engages in large-scale coercive interrogation techniques. Just 
as importantly, the regime of  capture and detention has been overtaken by technology and 
supplanted in large measure by the use of  drones. If  presumed enemy leaders — high-value 
targets — are killed outright by drones, the troublesome issues of  how to conduct detention and 
interrogation operations are minimized and may even become moot. 
The appropriateness of  the United States using drones, however, will continue to be the subject 
of  significant debate — indeed, it was recently the subject of  the ninth-longest filibuster in U.S. 
history — and will probably not completely eliminate traditional combat methods in counter-
terror and counter-insurgency operations in the foreseeable future. As we have seen, any 
combat situation can generate prisoners and the problems associated with their detention and 
interrogation. As 2012 ended, the U.S. military was believed to still be taking in about 100 new 
prisoners each month at the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan, most of  them seized in 
night raids around the country. But interviews by Task Force staff  with recent prisoners appear 
to show a stark change in their treatment from the harsh methods used in the early years of  U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan.
While authoritative as far as it goes, this report should not be the final word on how events 
played out in the detention and interrogation arena. 
The members of  the Task Force believe there may be more to be learned, perhaps from 
renewed interest in the executive or legislative branches of  our government, which can bring to 
bear tools unavailable to this investigation — namely subpoena power to compel testimony and 
the capability to review classified materials. 
Even though the story might not yet be complete, the Task Force has developed a number of  
recommendations to change how the nation goes about the business of  detaining people in 
a national-security context, and they are included in this report. We hope the executive and 




General Findings and Recommendations 
Finding #1 
U.S. forces, in many instances, used interrogation techniques on detainees that 
constitute torture. American personnel conducted an even larger number of 
interrogations that involved “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment. Both 
categories of actions violate U.S. laws and international treaties. Such conduct was 
directly counter to values of the Constitution and our nation. 
The Task Force believes there was no justification for the responsible government 
and military leaders to have allowed those lines to be crossed. Doing so damaged the 
standing of  our nation, reduced our capacity to convey moral censure when necessary 
and potentially increased the danger to U.S. military personnel taken captive. 
Democracy and torture cannot peacefully coexist in the same body politic.
The Task Force also believes and hopes that publicly acknowledging this grave error, 
however belatedly, may mitigate some of  those consequences and help undo some of  
the damage to our reputation at home and abroad. 
[This report includes a detailed memorandum outlining the factual basis of  this finding. The memorandum 
cites instances in which the United States has asserted that torture was used in other cases, judicial findings 
in both domestic and international cases and citations to international law. See Appendix 1]
Finding #2 
The nation’s most senior officials, through some of  their actions and failures to 
act in the months and years immediately following the September 11 attacks, bear 
ultimate responsibility for allowing and contributing to the spread of  illegal and 
improper interrogation techniques used by some U.S. personnel on detainees in 
several theaters. Responsibility also falls on other government officials and certain 
military leaders. 
[This report includes a detailed memorandum outlining the factual basis of  this finding. See Appendix 2] 
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Recommendations
(1) Regardless of  political party, the leaders of  this country should acknowledge that the 
authorization and practice of  torture and cruelty after September 11 was a grave error, 
and take the steps necessary to ensure that it cannot be repeated. Torture and “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment” are incompatible not only with U.S. law, but with 
the country’s founding values. No government can be trusted with the power to inflict 
torment on captives.
(2) U.S. intelligence professionals and service members in harm’s way need clear orders 
on the treatment of  detainees, requiring, at a minimum, compliance with Common 
Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions. Civilian leaders and military commanders have an 
affirmative responsibility to ensure that their subordinates comply with the laws of  war. 
(3) Congress and the president should strengthen the criminal prohibitions against torture 
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by:
a.    amending the Torture Statute and War Crimes Act’s definition of  “torture” to mean 
“an intentional act committed by a person acting under the color of  law that inflicts 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to 
lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.”
b.    amending the War Crimes Act’s definition of  “cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment” to make clear that cruel and inhuman treatment of  detainees is a federal 
crime even if  it falls short of  torture and regardless of  the location or circumstances 
in which detainees are held or the state’s interest in obtaining information from 
detainees.’’
c.    amending the Uniform Code of  Military Justice to define specific offenses of  torture, 
cruel and inhuman treatment, and war crimes, whose definitions and sentences track 
those in the U.S. Code.
Finding #3
There is no firm or persuasive evidence that the widespread use of harsh interro-
gation techniques by U.S. forces produced significant information of value. There 
is substantial evidence that much of the information adduced from the use of such 
techniques was not useful or reliable.
There are, nonetheless, strong assertions by some former senior government officials 
that the use of  those techniques did, in fact, yield valuable intelligence that resulted 
in operational and strategic successes. But those officials say that the evidence of  such 
success may not be disclosed for reasons of  national security. 
The Task Force appreciates this concern and understands it must be taken into account in 
attempting to resolve this question. Nonetheless, the Task Force believes those who make 
this argument still bear the burden of  demonstrating its factual basis. History shows that 




any resolution of  this issue based largely on the exhortations of  former officials who say, in 
essence, “Trust us” or “If  you knew what we know but cannot tell you.”
In addition, those who make the argument in favor of  the efficacy of  coercive 
interrogations face some inherent credibility issues. One of  the most significant is that 
they generally include those people who authorized and implemented the very practices 
that they now assert to have been valuable tools in fighting terrorism. As the techniques 
were and remain highly controversial, it is reasonable to note that those former officials 
have a substantial reputational stake in their claim being accepted. Were it to be shown 
that the United States gained little or no benefit from practices that arguably violated 
domestic and international law, history would render a harsh verdict on those who set 
us on that course.
On the question as to whether coercive interrogation techniques were valuable in 
locating Osama bin Laden,  the Task Force is inclined to accept the assertions of  
leading members of  the Senate Intelligence Committee that their examination of  the 
largest body of  classified documents relating to this shows that there was no noteworthy 
connection between information gained from such interrogations and the finding of  
Osama bin Laden.
The Task Force does not take any unequivocal position on the efficacy of  torture because 
of  the limits of  its knowledge about classified information. But the Task Force believes it 
is important to recognize that to say torture is ineffective does not require a belief  that it 
never works; a person subjected to torture might well divulge useful information.
The argument that torture is ineffective as an interrogation technique also rests on 
other factors. One is the idea that it also produces false information and it is difficult 
and time-consuming for interrogators and analysts to distinguish what may be true and 
usable from that which is false and misleading.
The other element in the argument as to torture’s ineffectiveness is that there may 
be superior methods of  extracting reliable information from subjects, specifically the 
rapport-building techniques that were favored by some. It cannot be said that torture 
always produces truthful information, just as it cannot be said that it will never produce 
untruthful information. The centuries-old history of  torture provides example of  each, 
as well as many instances where torture victims submit to death rather than confess to 
anything, and there are such instances in the American experience since 2001.
The Task Force has found no clear evidence in the public record that torture produced 
more useful intelligence than conventional methods of  interrogation, or that it saved lives. 
Conventional, lawful interrogation methods have been used successfully by the United 
States throughout its history and the Task Force has seen no evidence that continued 
reliance on them would have jeopardized national security thereafter. 
Recommendations
(1) Given that much of  the information is going on 10 years old, the Task Force believes the 
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president should direct the CIA to declassify the evidence necessary for the American 
public to better evaluate these claims. To the extent that the efficacy of  these methods is 
a relevant question, it should be examined as fully as possible in a time of  relative calm so 
as to have a considered view before another event that could raise the issue again.
(2) If  any such information exists to demonstrate significant success in using harsh 
interrogation techniques that may not be disclosed without risk to national security, the 
Task Force believes that information should be presented in some official forum or body 
that would both be neutral and credible in its assessment of  that claim and be able to 
maintain confidentiality to protect any sources or methods. If  needed for these reasons, 
the Task Force favors the creation of  some official study group or commission with 
appropriate high-level security clearances and stature to lend weight to any judgment on 
this question.
(3) If  the members of  the Senate Intelligence Committee deem that the information in their 
possession on this subject does not endanger national security, committee members should 
move to disclose that information.
Finding #4
The continued indefinite detention of many prisoners at Guantánamo should be 
addressed.
Recommendations
The Task Force was unable to agree on a unanimous recommendation on the issues of  ending indefinite 
detention of  prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and closing the detention facility there. 
As President Obama has said that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn and the war in Afghanistan will 
be over by the end of  next year, a majority of  the Task Force members favored moving swiftly to deal 
with all of  the prisoners currently held in Guantánamo and closing the detention facility in accordance 
with a cessation of  hostilities by the end of  2014, as the law of  war will no longer be applicable. The 
details of  that proposal, shown below, would have some prisoners tried in U.S. courts or in military 
commissions that followed the same procedures as Article III civilian courts. Other prisoners would be 
transferred to countries where the U.S. could be certain that they would not be subject to torture. Those 
prisoners who are deemed to still be a threat to the safety of  the U.S. and its citizens and who would be 
difficult (a) to prosecute because they were subjected to torture or the relevant criminal laws did not apply 
overseas at the time of  their conduct; or (b) to transfer due to lack of  suitable receiving country, would 
be brought to the mainland United States and held in custody until a suitable place to transfer them was 
found. Their cases would be subject to periodic review.
A minority1 of  the Task Force does not agree with those prescriptions. Those members believe that as 
troubling as indefinite detention might be, there are currently no good or feasible alternatives. Those 
prisoners who are deemed to be a continuing threat to the United States and for whom a trial is not 
currently feasible, and where there is no other suitable country that will accept them, should remain in 
detention for the foreseeable future. They should not be brought to the U.S., and Guantánamo remains 
the best location to hold them. 




The majority of  the Task Force believes that the situation of  indefinite detention is abhorrent 
and intolerable. The majority recommends: 
(1) The administration, using authority it currently has, should move swiftly to release or 
transfer those detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility who have been cleared 
for release or transfer. 
(2) To facilitate dealing with the remaining detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Congress should lift 
its prohibition on any of  them being brought to the mainland United States. The Task Force 
believes that no one should doubt that U.S. authorities are capable of  holding them securely.
(3) Following the release or transfer of  cleared detainees, the remaining detainees held at 
Guantánamo Bay should be:
a. Tried wherever possible by a U.S. Article III court as a matter of  preference. If  
Congress does not lift its ban on bringing Guantánamo detainees to the mainland 
United States, a U.S. district court should be designated to sit or set up at 
Guantánamo to clear as many remaining cases as practicable;
b. Should the above process fail to be capable of  or sufficient to handle all remaining 
detainees, a military commission based on standards fully parallel if  not identical to 
those applied by Article III courts should be used to clear any remaining cases;
c. Any remaining detainees who are deemed a threat to U.S. security, but cannot be 
tried as above, either because of  a lack of  evidence or tainted evidence — or where 
there is no adequate legal basis under which they may be tried in the U.S. — should 
be treated as follows, in the order noted below:
1.  U.S. authorities should seek a foreign country willing to try the detainees 
with the best commitments and processes the United States can obtain (in 
keeping with the appropriate recommendations of  this Task Force) against 
any use of  torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
2.    In the absence of  finding such a state, the detainees should be released 
to a state willing to receive them and with the best commitments and 
processes the United States can obtain (in keeping with the appropriate 
recommendations of  this Task Force) against any use of  torture or detention 
without trial and which is prepared to provide them an opportunity to live 
free of  the threat of  detention without trial for any known or presumed past 
actions for which sufficient untainted evidence cannot be produced;
3.    Failing the above, the detainees should be returned to a state of  
citizenship or nationality or former citizenship or nationality with the best 
commitments and processes the United States can obtain (in keeping with 
the appropriate recommendations of  this Task Force) against any use of  
torture or detention without trial;
4.    Failing that, the detainees may be brought to the United States and kept in 
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the custody of  the Department of  Homeland Security under appropriate 
immigration statutes and regulations until such time as a suitable place to 
deport them is found. They would be subject to semiannual reviews under 
conditions and standards to be determined by the executive branch. 
(4) There should be a U.S. declaration of  cessation of  hostilities with respect to Afghanistan 
by the end of  2014. If  there is no such formal declaration, legal authorities should 
recognize the situation to be the same as existed in Iraq with the withdrawal of  U.S. forces 
by the end of  2011, thereby providing for recognition of  a de facto cessation of  hostilities.
(5)  Following a cessation of  hostilities and clearing of  all detainee cases at Guantánamo Bay 
in accordance with the above process, the detention facility there should be closed, and 
under no circumstances later than the end of  2014.
Finding #5
The United States has not sufficiently followed the recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission to “engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach 
toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists.” 
In the 8 ½ years since the release of  the 9/11 Commission Report, the United 
States has failed to take meaningful, permanent steps to develop a common coalition 
approach toward the humane treatment and detention of  suspected terrorists. As the 
9/11 Commission found, so too does the Task Force find that such steps should “draw 
upon Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions on the law of  armed conflict. That article 
was specifically designed for those cases in which the usual laws of  war did not apply. 
Its minimum standards are generally accepted throughout the world as customary 
international law.” With the passage of  time, the United States’ failure to take 
meaningful, permanent action in this regard has put our nation’s security at greater risk.
Recommendation
(1)  The Task Force fully endorses the implementation of  the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation on the necessity of  a common coalition approach toward the detention 
and humane treatment of  suspected terrorists consistent with the rule of  law and our values.
Legal Findings and Recommendations
Finding #6
Lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) repeatedly gave 
erroneous legal sanction to certain activities that amounted to torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of U.S. and international law, and in 





Since September 11, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
failed, at times, to give sufficient weight to the input of many at the Department of 
Defense, the FBI, and the State Department with extensive and relevant expertise 
on legal matters pertaining to detainee treatment.
Recommendation
(1)  The OLC should always consult with, and be counseled by, agencies affected by its legal 
advice and those agencies’ subject-matter experts. When providing legal advice contrary 
to the views of  agency subject-matter experts, the OLC should include and clearly outline 
opposing legal views to its own, the legal support (if  any) and reasoning for those opposing 
views, and the basis for why the OLC chose not to adopt those views.  
Finding #8
Since the Carter administration, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has published 
some opinions, a practice that continues to this day. Transparency is vital to the 
effective functioning of a democracy. It is also vital that the president, during his 
or her presidency, be able to rely on confidential legal advice.
Recommendations
(1) To balance the need for transparency and the need of  the president to receive confidential 
legal advice, the American people should be notified when a classified opinion is issued. 
The OLC should periodically review earlier confidential opinions to determine if  they 
may be declassified and released. If  any and all opinions from the OLC might someday, 
at the appropriate time, be disclosed, OLC attorneys would be more mindful of  their 
responsibility to act in an impartial manner on behalf  of  the nation and less likely to 
engage in advocacy that could later prove to have been misguided.
(2) Congress should amend the attorney general’s current notification requirement to 
Congress found at 28 U.S.C. § 530D and extend it beyond those cases in which the 
executive branch acknowledges it is refusing to comply with a statute. The Justice 
Department (DOJ) should have to explain not only when it determines a statute is 
unconstitutional, and need not be enforced, but also whenever it concludes that a certain 
construction of  a statute is required to avoid constitutional concerns under Article II of  
the Constitution or separation-of-powers principles. We support efforts that have been 
proposed in the past but failed to come to fruition, such as the OLC Reform Act of  2008, 
sponsored by Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Russ Feingold, to ensure Congress is notified 
when the DOJ determines that the executive branch is not bound by a statute.
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Extraordinary Rendition Findings and Recommendations
Finding #9
It is the view of the Task Force that the United States has violated its international 
legal obligations in its practice of the enforced disappearances and arbitrary 
detention of terror suspects in secret prisons abroad. 
After September 11, 2001, the extraordinary rendition program consisted of  
individuals being captured in one part of  the world and transferred extrajudicially 
to another location for the purpose of  interrogation rather than legal process. The 
U.S. officials involved did not notify the detainees’ families of  their whereabouts, or 
provide the detainees with legal representation in any locations operated by the CIA 
as “black sites” or for proxy detention. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, to which the United States is a party, states at Article 9(1): “Everyone 
has the right to liberty and security of  person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of  his liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.” Additionally, the 
practice of  enforced disappearance violates international humanitarian law in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts, according to the first and fourth 
Geneva Conventions. The International Convention for the Protection of  All Persons 
Against Enforced Disappearances, to which the United States is not a party but which 
codifies binding customary international law, states that “[t]he widespread or systematic 
practice of  enforced disappearance constitutes a crime against humanity.” 
Recommendations
(1) The Task Force urges the Department of  State (DOS), Department of  Defense (DOD), 
and the CIA to expeditiously declassify and release information pertaining to any secret 
proxy detention (upon U.S. authority or pursuant to U.S. official requests) occurring 
abroad. The Task Force also recommends that DOS, DOD and the CIA ensure that 
any detainees still held in such circumstances are allowed access to the International 
Committee of  the Red Cross as required by international law.
(2) In order to ensure uniform treatment and the guarantee of  rights for individuals 
under the control of  the United States, the U.S. government must clarify that the U.S. 
interpretation of  Article 3 of  the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Article 2(1) 
of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes both 
individuals within U.S. territory and individuals under U.S. jurisdiction extraterritorially, 
in accordance with the treaty bodies’ interpretations of  the CAT and the ICCPR. Such 
clarification would prohibit arbitrary detention by U.S. forces outside of  U.S. territory.
Finding #10 
The Task Force finds that “diplomatic assurances” that suspects would not 
be tortured by the receiving countries proved unreliable in several notable 




unknown. The Task Force believes that ample evidence existed regarding the 
practices of the receiving countries that rendered individuals were “more likely 
than not” to be tortured.
In conducting detainee transfers subsequent to receiving inadequate and unenforceable 
diplomatic assurances, the United States violated its legal obligations under the 
Convention Against Torture, which was drafted in part by the United States and which 
states at Article 3(1): “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”), or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of  being subjected to torture.” This obligation attaches when an individual 
“is more likely than not’’ to be tortured. Under the administrations of  President Bill 
Clinton and President George W. Bush, the extraordinary rendition program often 
involved transfers of  terror suspects to countries where there existed a documented 
high likelihood of  torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. U.S. officials were 
sometimes involved in the interrogations of  transferred detainees or received notice of  
detainees’ allegations regarding torture in proxy detention, and were therefore aware of  
conditions and treatment in the receiving countries. 
Recommendation
(1 )  The Task Force recommends that diplomatic assurances must not be the sole or 
dispositive factor for U.S. satisfaction of  its obligation under CAT Article 3(1) that “[n]
o State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”), or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of  being subjected 
to torture.” Legislation should be enacted that establishes diplomatic assurances as only 
one of  several factors informing the likelihood of  torture in a receiving state, with State 
Department’s Human Rights Reports serving as key indicators of  future conduct by 
host nations. Additionally, diplomatic assurances should be accompanied by guarantees 
of  a right to monitor, a right to interview and, potentially, a right to retake custody of  
the individual if  the United States determines that transferred individuals are tortured 
or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. When a transfer involves an 
individual with ties of  nationality or residence to a third state, the U.S. should, wherever 
feasible, consult with the third state regarding our common interest in the above 
guarantees from the receiving state.  
Finding #11
The Task Force finds that U.S. officials involved with detention in the black sites 
committed acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Ample evidence of  this treatment is found in the December 2004 CIA Inspector 
General’s Report on Counterterrorism, Detention, and Interrogation Activities, as 
well as the testimony of  former detainees. The use of  torture and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment has long been considered war crimes and violations of  customary 
international law, as well as being prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and 
denounced by the United States when practiced by other states.
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Recommendation
(1)   Due to the growing legal and political consequences of  the CIA’s rendition program and 
network of  secret prisons, and the fact that officials credibly assert that both programs 
have been discontinued, the Task Force recommends that the United States fully comply 
with its legal obligations under the Convention Against Torture in cooperating with 
pending investigations and lawsuits in the United States and abroad. 
Medical Findings and Recommendations
Finding #12 
After September 11, 2001, psychologists affiliated with U.S. intelligence agencies 
helped create interrogation techniques for use in questioning detainees. The 
methods were judged to be legal by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), but the Task Force has found that many of them constituted 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Finding #13 
Medical professionals, including physicians and psychologists, in accordance with 
Department of Defense and intelligence agency operating policies, participated 
variously in interrogations by monitoring certain interrogations, providing or 
allowing to be provided medical information on detainees to interrogators, and not 
reporting abuses.
Finding #14
Prior to September 11, 2001, ethical principles and standards of conduct for U.S. 
physicians regarding military detainees included prohibition against involvement 
in torture, monitoring or being present during torture, or providing medical 
care to facilitate torture. From 2006 to 2008, after information was available on 
the treatment of detainees, additional medical professional ethical principles 
and guidance were established by medical associations, including the duty to 
report abuses and prohibitions against conducting or participating in or being 
present during interrogations, and providing detainees’ medical information to 
interrogators. 
Finding #15: 
After September 11, 2001, military psychologists and physicians were instructed 
that they were relieved of the obligation to comply with nonmilitary ethical 
principles, and in some cases their military roles were redefined as non-health-
professional combatants. 
Rules, regulations and operating procedures were altered to guide and instruct 




the provision of  detainees’ medical information to interrogators, being present or 
monitoring interrogations, engaging in medically and ethically improper practices in 
dealing with hunger strikers, and not reporting abuses.
Recommendations 
(1) The Department of  Defense (DOD) and CIA should ensure adherence to health 
professional principles of  ethics by using standards of  conduct for health professionals 
that are in accordance with established professional standards of  conduct, including 
the prohibition of  physicians from conducting, being present, monitoring or otherwise 
participating in interrogations – including developing or evaluating interrogation strategies, 
or providing medical information to interrogators. In addition, physicians should be 
required to report abuses to authorities. The DOD should discontinue classifications of  
health professionals as non-health-professional combatants. It should also adopt standards 
with respect to confidentiality of  detainee medical and psychological information that 
prohibit the use of  medical information, whether obtained in clinical treatment or through 
an assessment for any other purpose, from being shared with interrogators. 
(2) Standard periodic military reviews of  the conduct and performance of  health 
professionals should be based on their compliance with military detention standards, 
regulations and operating procedures that are in accord with professional ethical 
principles and standards established by U.S. medical associations. Violations should be 
dealt with under the Code of  Military Justice and the findings shared with existing civilian 
agencies for action, including the National Practitioner Data Bank, state licensing boards, 
medical associations, and specialty certifying boards. 
(3) The Department of  Justice should formally prohibit the Office of  Legal Counsel from 
approving interrogation techniques based on representations that health providers will monitor 
the techniques and regulate the degree of  physical and mental harm that interrogators may 
inflict. Health professionals cannot ethically condone any deliberate infliction of  pain and 
suffering on detainees, even if  it falls short of  torture or cruel treatment. 
Finding #16
For detainee hunger strikers, DOD operating procedures called for practices and 
actions by medical professionals that were contrary to established medical and 
professional ethical standards, including improper coercive involuntary feedings early 
in the course of hunger strikes that, when resisted, were accomplished by physically 
forced nasogastric tube feedings of detainees who were completely restrained.
Recommendations
(1)     Forced feeding of  detainees is a form of  abuse and must end.
(2)      The United States should adopt standards of  care, policies and procedures regarding 
detainees engaged in hunger strikes that are in keeping with established medical 
professional ethical and care standards set forth as guidelines for the management of  
hunger strikers in the 1991 World Medical Association Declaration of  Malta on Hunger 
Strikes (revised 1992 and 2006), including affirmation that force-feeding is prohibited 
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and that physicians should be responsible for evaluating, providing care for and advising 
detainees engaged in hunger strikes. Physicians should follow professional ethical 
standards including: the use of  their independent medical judgment in assessing detainee 
competence to make decisions; the maintenance of  confidentiality between detainee and 
physician; the provision of  advice to detainees that is consistent with professional ethics 
and standards; and, the use of  advance directives.
(3)      The Task Force recognizes that as a matter of  public policy the United States has a 
legitimate interest regarding detainees whom it is holding to prevent them from starving to 
death. In doing so, it should respect the findings and processes reflected in the above-noted 
standards and recommendations.
Consequences Findings and Recommendations
Finding #17
It is the view of the Task Force that it is harmful for the United States to release 
detainees without clear policies or practices in place for the re-introduction of 
those individuals into the societies of the countries of release. 
Detainees held at Guantánamo Bay and abroad are released to home countries 
or third countries, in many cases, without contacts or the means to support 
themselves, and suffering from mental and physical problems resulting from 
their time in U.S. detention. Such prolonged physical and mental effects 
have the potential to manifest in acts of  recidivism for those detainees who 
previously fought against U.S. forces, or in increasing anti-U.S. sentiment in a 
vulnerable population. 
Recommendation
(1)  The United States should establish agreements with all countries receiving detainees 
upon release to establish standard procedures by which those without family or other 
means may be properly monitored on their ability to secure housing, medical and other 
necessities in order to fully integrate them into society. 
Recidivism Findings and Recommendations
Finding #18
The Task Force finds a large discrepancy between the recidivism figures 
published by government agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and 
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on 
Armed Services, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the New 
America Foundation. The Task Force believes that it is not possible to determine 
an accurate rate of re-engagement (or engagement for the first time) in terrorist 
activity without systematic and detailed data indicating whether each particular 





(1)  The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency disclose all criteria used 
to make determinations on whether individuals fall into the “confirmed” or “suspected” 
categories, including clear guidelines on acts that constitute each category. The Task Force 
notes that Pentagon spokesman Todd Breasseale said in March 2012 that individuals on 
the “suspected” list may pose no threat to national security. The Task Force therefore 
recommends that the DIA issue separate numbers for the categories of  “confirmed” and 
“suspected” recidivists, establishing the rate of  recidivism based solely on the “confirmed” 
numbers for greater accuracy. Finally, the Task Force recommends that the DIA publish a 
list of  “confirmed” recidivists with details of  their terror-related activities.
Obama Administration Findings and Recommendations
Finding #19
The high level of secrecy surrounding the rendition and torture of detainees since 
September 11 cannot continue to be justified on the basis of national security. 
The black sites have apparently been shut down, and the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” have been ended. The authorized “enhanced” techniques have been 
publicly disclosed, and the CIA has approved its former employees’ publication of  
detailed accounts of  individual interrogations. Unauthorized, additional mistreatment 
of  detainees has been widely reported in the press and by human rights groups. 
Ongoing classification of  these practices serves only to conceal evidence of  wrongdoing 
and make its repetition more likely. As concerns the military commissions at 
Guantánamo, it also jeopardizes the public’s First Amendment right of  access to those 
proceedings, the detainees’ right to counsel, and counsel’s First Amendment rights. 
Recommendations
(1) Apart from redactions needed to protect specific individuals and to honor specific 
diplomatic agreements, the executive branch should declassify evidence regarding the 
CIA’s and military’s abuse and torture of  captives, including, but not limited to:
• The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA’s treatment of  detainees.
• The Report of  the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies.
• The CIA Office of  the Inspector General (OIG) reports on the deaths of  Gul Rahman, 
Manadel al-Jamadi, and Abed Hamed Mowhoush; the rendition of  Khaled El-Masri; the 
non-registration of  “ghost” detainees; the use of  unauthorized techniques at CIA facilities; 
and all OIG reports on the CIA’s interrogation, detention and transfer of  detainees.
• Investigations by the Armed Forces’ criminal investigative divisions, the chain of  
command, and the Department of  Defense into abuses of  detainees by Joint Special 
Operations Command Special Mission Unit Task Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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(2) Apart from any steps needed to prevent security threats against individual intelligence 
agents, the executive branch should cease its attempts to prevent detainees from providing 
evidence about their treatment in CIA custody. Guantánamo detainees obviously hold no 
security clearances and have never signed nondisclosure agreements with the United States 
government, and were exposed to “intelligence sources and methods” only involuntarily.
 (3) Congress should pass legislation that makes clear that acts of  torture, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity are not legitimate “intelligence sources and methods” under the 
National Security Act, and evidence of  these acts cannot be properly classified, unless 
their disclosure would endanger specific individuals or violate specific, valid, agreements 
with foreign countries.
Finding #20
The Convention Against Torture, in addition to prohibiting all acts of torture, 
requires that states ensure in their “legal system that the victim of an act of torture 
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.” 
The United States has not complied with this requirement, in large part because of 
the government’s repeated, successful invocation of the state-secrets privilege in 
lawsuits brought by torture victims.
Recommendation
(1)  The state-secrets privilege should not be invoked to dismiss lawsuits at the pleadings stage. 
Invocations of  the privilege should be subjected to independent judicial review, which do 
not automatically defer to the executive’s conclusions on the need for secrecy. Instead, 
courts should be able to evaluate the evidence (in camera where appropriate) and restrict 
invocation of  the privilege to cases where it is necessary to guard against specific, non-
speculative harms to national security.
Finding #21
The Convention Against Torture requires each state party to “[c]riminalize all 
acts of torture, attempts to commit torture, or complicity or participation in 
torture,” and “proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there 
is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.” The United States cannot be said to have complied 
with this requirement. 
No CIA personnel have been convicted or even charged for numerous instances of  
torture in CIA custody — including cases where interrogators exceeded what was 
authorized by the Office of  Legal Counsel, and cases where detainees were tortured 
to death. Many acts of  unauthorized torture by military forces have also been 





(1)  Congress should amend the War Crimes Act and the Torture Statute to make clear that 
in the future, in situations where a person of  ordinary sense and understanding would 
know that their treatment of  a detainee inflicts or is likely to result in severe or serious 
physical or mental pain or suffering, reliance on advice of  counsel that their actions do 
not constitute torture or war crimes shall not be a complete defense.
Finding #22
The Obama administration’s standards for interrogation are set forth in the Army 
Field Manual on Interrogation. In 2006, a small handful of changes were introduced 
to the Manual that weakened some of its key legal protections. 
For over 50 years, the Army Field Manual has been an invaluable document guiding 
American soldiers away from abusing prisoners, with its clear prohibitions on cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment and torture. However, the 2006 version deleted 
language that explicitly prohibited the use of  sleep deprivation and stress positions, and 
its Appendix M authorizes an interrogation technique called “separation,” which could 
inflict significant physical and mental anguish on a detainee.
Under Appendix M, a combatant commander could arguably authorize a detainee 
to be interrogated for 40 consecutive hours with four-hour rest periods at either end. 
Appendix M also takes off  the table a valuable interrogation approach, noncoercive 
separation, and puts it out of  reach in situations where it could be employed humanely 
and effectively.
Recommendation
(1)  The Army Field Manual on Interrogation should be amended so as to eliminate 
Appendix M, which permits the use of  abusive tactics and to allow for the legitimate use 
of  noncoercive separation. Language prohibiting the use of  stress positions and abnormal 
sleep manipulation that was removed in 2006 should be restored. 
Finding #23
Detainees’ transfer from United States custody to the custody of the National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan has resulted in their torture. The 
United States has a legal obligation under Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture not to transfer detainees to NDS custody unless it can verify that they are 
not likely to be tortured as a result. 
Recommendations
(1) The executive branch and Congress should clarify that Article 3 of  the Convention 
Against Torture is legally binding on the U.S. government even for transfers occurring 
outside of  U.S. territory.
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(2) The United States should ensure that transfers of  detainees to Afghan custody by U.S. 
special operations forces and intelligence agencies are subjected to the same limitations 
as transfers by the military, including ongoing monitoring by both U.S. personnel and the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
(3) Intelligence appropriations should be subject to the limitations of  the “Leahy Law,” which 
restricts U.S. funds to 
any unit of  the security forces of  a foreign country if  the Secretary of  State has 
credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of  human rights, 
unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations 
that the government of  such country is taking effective measures to bring the 
responsible members of  the security forces unit to justice.
The Director of  National Intelligence should have the authority to waive this restriction 
if  “extraordinary circumstances” require it, just as the Secretary of  Defense does under 
existing law. The Director of  National Intelligence should be required to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on the extraordinary circumstances and the human 
rights violations that necessitate such a waiver.
Finding #24
The available evidence suggests that the Obama administration has dramatically 
improved the process of notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) of detainees’ status, and providing access to detainees. 
Ensuring that detainees cannot be “disappeared” is a crucial part of  preventing them 
from being subjected to torture and cruel treatment. However, because these changes 
have only been announced in anonymous leaks to the press, it is unclear whether they 
will bind future administrations. 
Recommendations
(1) The administration should publicly confirm its requirements for ICRC notification and 
access. 
(2) If  it has not already done so, the United States should formally adopt regulations regarding 
ICRC notification and access for individuals detained pursuant to armed conflict.
(3) The United States should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Protection 




Soon after September 11, Guantánamo Bay became the most prominent public stage for many of  the 
nation’s detention policies, which were then played out before attentive audiences in America and the rest 
of  the world. Once Guantánamo became the nation’s designated jail for suspected terrorists, it came to 
serve many symbolic and actual roles.
It was a major testing ground for the government’s policy of  engaging in highly coercive interrogation 
techniques, practices designed to visit torment on detainees in the expectation or hope they would give up 
important and usable intelligence to help fight the new style of  war in which the United States found itself. 
It was the principal place where the government’s mostly unannounced shift in policy from detention for 
prosecution to detention for interrogation occurred. The initial pledges of  senior government officials that 
the horrific events of  September 11 would be avenged by bringing terrorists to swift justice in the courts 
or military tribunals was quietly replaced with a new model. Detainees would not be brought quickly 
before some tribunal. Instead, they would be held at length for another purpose — interrogation. The 
view of  the detainees as an intelligence resource to be mined contributed to the rapid escalation of  the 
coercive techniques deemed acceptable. 
(Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson told the Task Force that his boss, Secretary of  State Colin Powell, 
wondered aloud why many of  the detainees couldn’t just be repatriated to places in which they could be 
held securely. He said that he and Powell eventually came to understand that senior officials wanted to 
retain custody because they did not want to risk losing an opportunity to interrogate someone who might 
divulge some information. He said those officials, especially Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
were eager to be the ones who could bring the president some new piece of  intelligence, especially about 
the subject in which he was most interested: some connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq.)
Guantánamo was the epicenter of  what became the de facto U.S. posture that it was permissible, even 
preferable, to detain any and all people who conceivably might have connections to our enemies. Under 
this approach, there were few reservations about the fact that this necessarily meant that many people 
who had no role in September 11 or in fighting against allied forces would remain in custody under 
conditions of  extreme privation for long periods. Although never stated explicitly, senior officials thought 
it better to detain any number of  innocent people than to run the risk of  setting free anyone who might be 
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a threat. This approach turned on its head a traditional notion of  justice (better to let many guilty go free 
than imprison one innocent person), which many policymakers justified because they believed the nation 
was facing an existential threat. For them, the situation was extraordinary enough to set aside many of  
the nation’s venerable values and legal principles. 
While that may have been an understandable response to the situation following the shock of  September 
11, this approach would eventually be taken to an extreme and generate serious problems. It ensured 
that Guantánamo would become a symbol of  the willingness of  the United States to detain significant 
numbers of  innocent people (along with the guilty) and subject them to serious and prolonged privation 
and mistreatment, even torture. There can be no argument today about the fact that many people were 
held in custody for no reasonable security reason. The notion that Guantánamo was a place where 
the United States willingly held many innocent people has proved a powerful tool for the nation’s 
enemies and a source of  criticism from many friends. This problem has never been fully mitigated, as 
the underlying situation persists today: There are still a significant number in Guantánamo who are 
deserving of  release — a judgment contested by no serious person —but who nonetheless remain in 
custody, victims of  the complex legal and geopolitical politics the detention situation has produced. 
 As a legal matter, Guantánamo — what it represented, whether it was within reach of  U.S. law, and 
what it said about the extent of  the powers of  the executive branch of  government — also produced 
major litigation culminating in landmark rulings across the judiciary, including the Supreme Court.
We begin our discussion of  Guantánamo with one of  the handful of  personal sketches in this report, 
this one of  retired Navy Captain Albert Shimkus, who commanded the detention medical center at 
Guantánamo from January 2002 to July 2003. Captain Shimkus served as an important spokesman 
for Guantánamo to the outside world in those early days, attesting convincingly to the humane treatment 
afforded inmates there. Much later, he said, he discovered that the story he was tasked with telling the 
public — and which he did with enthusiasm — was untrue. He spoke to the Task Force about his deep 
remorse for the role he played. 
Captain Shimkus, now a faculty member at the U.S. Naval War College, provides a special perspective 
on how military authorities who believed it was permissible to engage in coercive techniques that could 
fairly be deemed torture nonetheless sought to hide their activities. They understood that what they 
apparently thought was justified and necessary could not withstand any public scrutiny. 
The report moves next to a brief  discussion of  how prisoners were collected at the beginning of  the war 
after the U.S. invasion of  Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the initial and largest source of  the detainees 
who were sent to the detention center in Cuba. After the early successes on the battlefields of  Afghanistan, 
commanders in the field found themselves suddenly dealing with more prisoners than they could handle 
while still trying to win the war. We examine who those initial detainees were, how they were selected for 
transfer to Guantánamo, and the exigencies under which hard-pressed U.S. forces operated when dealing 
with detainees. 
Beyond those circumstances of  collecting the initial prisoners, the report, in a later chapter, contains a 
far broader discussion of  the role of  Afghanistan. The collection of  prisoners in the war in Afghanistan 
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set off  a search among high-level policymakers for an appropriate place to keep them. The 
report details how this search was undertaken and describes a process that became a version 
of  an old geography game: “Where in the world can we imprison Carmen Sandiego (if  we 
believed Carmen Sandiego was a terrorist)?”
Once Guantánamo was chosen, policymakers then turned their attention to finding the best 
ways to extract intelligence from those in custody. There was limited practical expertise in 
interrogation practices for this situation. The CIA did not have the skills. The military had a 
set of  venerable interrogation practices, but many leaders thought them inappropriate and too 
gentle for the new circumstances, a decision that would prove controversial and consequential.
We discuss here and in another chapter, on the role of  medical personnel, how policymakers quickly 
seized on — or were sold on — the SERE program as the answer. The SERE (Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape) program subjected military personnel to harsh conditions to prepare them to 
resist torture. The program was developed after the Korean War as a training technique to teach selected 
categories of  U.S. military personnel, such as pilots, how to resist coercive treatment (and torture), which 
was expected to be inflicted on American prisoners of  war in an effort to obtain false confessions of  war 
crimes and other propaganda-related admissions. U.S. intelligence doctrine did not consider the SERE 
model to be Geneva Conventions-compliant, nor, until 2001, a means of  obtaining reliable information. 
In hindsight, it seems apparent that the SERE program was an especially unsuitable model upon which 
to craft an interrogation program aimed at getting true answers. But that view was also apparent to 
several people at the time, whose advice was brushed away as SERE was eagerly embraced by senior 
officials who were looking for an interrogation method approved by some psychologists, thus lending the 
trappings of  scholarship and authority to their recommendations.
But the application of  those techniques fostered dissension among those on the ground. The most 
important example involved members of  the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), under 
the leadership of  David Brant and Mark Fallon, who witnessed and were appalled by some of  the 
techniques being used. Word of  the new techniques also troubled Alberto Mora, the general counsel of  
the Navy. Mora persistently sought to raise objections and was persistently rebuffed. The report details 
his interactions with senior Pentagon officials, who responded by trying to work around him. By then, the 
JAGs (Judge Advocate General’s Corps) from the uniformed services (the top career military lawyers), 
had also adopted Mora’s stance. The service JAGs were vociferously united in their belief  that using 
coercive techniques would prove a disastrous mistake, would place the U.S. military on the wrong side of  
history and the law, and would endanger American forces. 
Another arc in the Guantánamo story involves the change from a closed system — from which all 
information as to what was happening there emanated from the military — to one in which the Defense 
Department no longer was in exclusive control of  the accounts that reached the public. The Pentagon 
seemed to have proceeded from a belief  that it could maintain a complete atmosphere of  secrecy as to how 
the detention and interrogation regime was being run. But it is a fundamental truth, if  one chronically 
elusive to policymakers, that few such ventures can remain secret if  they involve the participation of  







would be hurt if 
they had legal 
representation.” 
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there were eventually news reports based on accounts of  former guards and translators who had returned 
home after their tours of  duty. But the dam finally broke after Supreme Court rulings ensuring that defense 
lawyers would be able to visit Guantánamo and actually speak to detainees as clients.
The accounts resulting from news leaks and, then, the visits of  defense lawyers produced a set of  
competing narratives to the military’s. Until that point, defense officials had been offering an account 
of  admirably humane treatment; now, defense lawyers presented starkly different accounts, some even 
complaining of  atrocities against detainees. The Department of  Defense reacted strongly. One of  its 
senior lawyers, Charles “Cully” Stimson, grew so exasperated that he blasted the lawyers representing 
detainees and called for U.S. corporations to end their associations with the top law firms involved.1
Former detainees from Guantánamo recalled to Task Force members that they were told by officials at 
Guantánamo that their attorneys were Jewish, gay, or secretly working for the government, in an attempt 
to discredit the lawyers.2 Thomas Wilner, an attorney representing 12 Kuwaitis at Guantánamo, 
reported to The New York Times similar treatment of  his clients. “The government should not be trying 
to come between these people and their lawyers. … And I’m especially offended that they tried to use the 
fact that I’m Jewish to do it,” he said. 3A spokesman for the joint task force at Guantánamo denied the 
accusation.4 Bisher al-Rawi, a former detainee, was inaccurately told that his attorney, Clive Stafford 
Smith, was Jewish: “They spread rumors about him that he is a Jew and that you shouldn’t trust him. 
And that was a standard thing in GTMO, really standard.” 5Distrust from their clients also became 
a common problem for the lawyers representing detainees who were told their chances of  favorable 
treatment, and possible release, would be hurt if  they had legal representation.6
Even when the defense attorneys managed to gain their clients’ trust, further interrogations followed their 
visits. Moazzam Begg met with an attorney named Gita Gutierrez in August 2004. He remembers her 
efforts to establish trust and what followed: “[S]he’d come to my cell in Camp Echo and [had] gone to 
great pains to meet with my father and others and get things that only he would have known about my 
childhood so that she related to me, so I could trust her. And she managed to establish that. So [within 
20 minutes of  her leaving] the interrogators came along first asking all about her, who is she and 
whatever and then they suggested that she is really just one of  us anyway.” 7
Journalists who had been a captive audience of  the military in its tightly controlled tours in the early 
stages began to learn of  and report some of  what was really occurring. For example, The New York 
Times reported a relatively benign version of  what the camp was like, based on what its journalists had 
been shown on an early tour, albeit with appropriate caveats as to the restrictions. But eventually, the 
newspaper and others began to report on some of  the cruel and common practices that base commanders 
had sought to conceal. Tracking down sources across the country, typically former translators, guards 
and interrogators, the Times reported how prisoners were made to strip down, were shackled, the air-
conditioning turned up, all the while being forced to listen to loud music and endure flashing strobe lights. 
Those who cooperated were sometimes rewarded with a visit to a place called “the love shack,” where the 
detainees were given access to magazines, soft-core porn movies, books, and were allowed to relax while 
smoking aromatic tobacco from Middle Eastern water pipes.8 
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Further, several emails between FBI agents at Guantánamo and their superiors in Washington, which 
were disclosed in a military investigation, contained reports of  detainees left shackled for hours and a 
detainee soiling himself  and pulling out his hair.9 Some of  the techniques with which the FBI took 
issue were officially sanctioned. The FBI also reported agents refusing to participate in interrogations, 
most notably the interrogation of  Abu Zubaydah, because the techniques were “borderline torture.” 10 
The FBI director, Robert Mueller, instructed his agents “not [to] participate in interrogations involving 
techniques the FBI did not normally use in the United States, even though the [Office of  Legal Counsel] 
had determined such techniques were legal.” 11
Profile: Albert Shimkus
By early 2003, Guantánamo was attracting increased public attention, and U.S. policymakers 
decided there was a pressing need for some new and favorable public exposure for the detention 
facility on Cuba’s southeastern tip. One impetus to showcase Guantánamo was the authorities’ 
frustration with its depiction in press; when international media referred to Guantánamo, they 
often used photos of  blindfolded and shackled detainees, clad in orange jumpsuits, kneeling 
in what appeared to be outdoor cages.12 Those photos were of  Camp X-Ray, the primitive 
detention facility initially used to house the first detainees. Camp X-Ray was in operation only 
for the first four months of  the detention operation and the stark, even brutal images became 
quickly outdated.13 
However, those photos were the only images that the media had obtained of  the Guantánamo 
detention facility. They had been allowed to be taken at a time closer to September 11, when 
little thought was given to the idea that images of  thoroughly abased, kneeling prisoners might 
be seen as unacceptable or needlessly harsh. After all, these people were described as and 
understood by most Americans to be those who contributed to the heinous acts of  September 
11. But attitudes were changing and questions were being raised as to who was at Guantánamo 
and what was happening there. That, the authorities decided, made it time for a large-scale 
image initiative.14 
In 2002, the military had built Camp Delta. Although grim in its own right, Delta was an 
improvement over X-Ray in many ways.15 The ventilated, prefabricated structures built from 
material for metal shipping containers afforded each detainee an individual cell with a sleeping 
platform topped by a thin mattress, a toilet, decent shelter from the weather, occasional showers 
and tiny recreation areas.16 The military began offering organized tours to small, select groups 
of  journalists and congressional delegations.17 These were tightly controlled events; visitors were 
shown only what authorities chose to put before them. No one was permitted to come in contact 
with or speak to any detainees.18 By then, authorities had also provided most detainees with 
some personal toilet items, marked the cell floors with arrows to show the direction of  Mecca 
to aid them in their daily prayers and provided each a copy of  the Koran.19 To keep the holy 
book off  the floor — there was no table or surface space in the cell — each inmate was given a 
surgical mask that could be rigged as a sling; the book would be cradled in the mouth portion 
and the ends would be tied to the metal grates of  the cell walls to hold the book off  the floor.20 
The tours of  Camp Delta were carefully designed to show the facility at its best and to portray 
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conditions as admirably humane. (Over the next few years, when photos of  Camp Delta 
were widely available, authorities would complain, with justification, that some media outlets 
continued to use the photos of  X-Ray.21) But as would later be evident, the facility exhibited to 
visitors resembled a village whose construction could have been overseen by Count Potemkin, 
Catherine the Great’s clever courtier. Perhaps the most impressive element of  the tour was the 
visit to the detainee clinic/hospital in the middle of  Camp Delta. It was clearly a clean and 
modern facility.22 
The tour of  the hospital was conducted by Captain Albert Shimkus of  the U.S. Naval Medical 
Corps, who was in charge of  the facility. Captain Shimkus, amiable and articulate, evinced 
considerable pride as he described to visitors the medical treatment given and available to the 
detainees at Guantánamo.23 His descriptions made the detainees appear almost fortunate — at 
least in regard to their medical treatment — to have been shipped halfway across the world 
to the remote prison. They were, he enthusiastically asserted, receiving care equivalent to 
that given to America’s own fighting men and women. It was a remarkable demonstration of  
civilized behavior, even generosity, to one’s presumed mortal enemies in time of  war.24
Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld had decreed that no matter the medical situation of  
a detainee, none was to be taken off  the base for medical treatment. That meant, Captain 
Shimkus said, he had the authority to summon quickly from the mainland any specialized 
expertise for problems that could not be treated optimally by the resident staff  of  about a 
dozen doctors. Shimkus, originally trained as a military nurse, told the visitors that on several 
occasions he had brought to the base hospital highly skilled surgeons for operations like placing 
stents in some detainees’ coronary arteries, a procedure far beyond that which they could have 
expected in their home countries. He proudly noted that he had also established a psychiatric 
unit inside the hospital.25
Captain Shimkus would be remembered by many of  those early visitors as one of  the 
most effective boosters of  Guantánamo as an exemplary, humane place, a showcase of  the 
kind of  decency that separated U.S. forces from the behavior of  most other militaries and 
governments.26
But in a few years, Shimkus would become deeply embarrassed and contrite about the role he 
had played in selling Guantánamo to the public. By that time, he said, he had begun to learn from 
articles in the media about the systematic abuse of  many prisoners that had been occurring during 
his tenure there. He said he now believes that the commanders to whom he reported wanted to 
wall him off  from that dimension, to use him as a spokesman about the virtues of  Guantánamo. 
They were, he said, successful in keeping the interrogation regime out of  his view. He was, he said, 
thus stunned and intensely chagrined to later discover that he had allowed himself  to have been 
enlisted in an effort to make the place seem humane and worthy of  pride.27
Shimkus, now retired from active service, is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College in 
Newport, R.I.28 His courses on leadership and medical ethics all include segments that touch 
upon his experience in Guantánamo. In an interview with Task Force staff  at the Naval War 
College, Shimkus said he has reflected at length “on what had gone on during my watch.” He 
came to the dismaying conclusion, he said, that he had been “used as a tool,” by those who 
wanted to convey a false impression of  the detention facility at Guantánamo.29 
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When he was a senior medical officer in Italy in 1999, Shimkus and his wife had gone on a tour 
with other top military officials of  the site of  the Auschwitz concentration and death camp in 
Poland. He said he was not only suitably horrified, but the experience made him determined to 
do whatever he could in his career to underline the difference in how U.S. forces behaved when 
involved in combat or conflict. Shimkus had left Guantánamo when he said he first learned 
about the coercive interrogation techniques that were used — first from leaked information 
appearing in press reports, and eventually in the military’s own investigations. He said he was 
stunned. “I was disappointed to discover that in our military there was a culture that would 
accept that kind of  behavior.” 30 He learned from those reports of  the observations of  disgusted 
FBI agents who reported seeing detainees in interrogation shackled unattended for so long that 
they had defecated on themselves and pulled their hair out in despair. 
There have been complaints that some detainees had medication withheld to motivate them to 
cooperate with interrogators. Two former detainees interviewed by Task Force members and staff  
in London in April 2012 gave detailed accounts as to how they had experienced this.31 Shimkus 
said that while he believes nothing like that happened at the hospital, he now realizes it is possible 
that interrogators could have persuaded low-ranking corpsmen, charged with distributing or 
administering the drugs, to cooperate with their efforts to break the detainees’ will.32
As he has looked back, Shimkus has pondered whether he could have or should have done 
anything differently. In response to a question from Task Force staff, he said that no detainee 
he came in contact with ever complained to him about abuse. He now realizes that some 
of  the symptoms he observed might well have been the result of  abusive interrogations, like 
dehydration and injuries such as cuts and bruises. But he said that he took the dehydration 
instances as natural in a tropical climate and thought nothing unusual about the minor injuries 
(the only injuries were minor during his time). Besides, it was understood that detainees could 
and would be roughed up permissibly when they refused to come out of  their cells and had to 
be forcibly extracted by teams of  soldiers wearing riot gear who went in with force. Shimkus 
said he believes that an important element in his ignorance as to what was occurring was that he 
wasn’t looking for any signs of  willful abuse. He had assumed there wouldn’t be any.33 
He is, as distinct from most other senior Guantánamo figures, contrite about his participation 
and acknowledges some responsibility as he has pondered his own behavior straightforwardly. 
As to those signs that might have been plainly in view, he said, “there were things I should have 
picked up on, but didn’t.” While he noted he was not a forensic practitioner, he said that “an 
astute person would have figured it out, perhaps. I did not.” Shimkus said he understands that 
because of  his role at Guantánamo, especially in serving as a spokesman and vouching for the 
place, he bears some continued measure of  responsibility. “I’m always going to be historically 
connected with this,” he said wistfully. “This is part of  my life now. Forever.” 34
So he relives it over and over in his courses, hoping it will benefit the senior officers who are his 
students at the Naval War College. Those chosen to attend the Naval War College are those 
who are predicted to rise in the Navy, perhaps achieving flag rank. Shimkus said he tells military 
medical personnel in his classes they must always be prepared to challenge superior officers; 
most importantly, they should raise questions at the smallest provocation. He tells the student-
officers that even if  it affects their careers, they bear an unavoidable obligation to do so. He 
recognizes such complaints and inquiries will probably not yield results. “But it will at least get 
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a second look at the situation,” he said. And, most importantly, even if  it affects your career, 
Shimkus tells the officers, they should insist on transparency as to how prisoners in their care are 
treated by others outside the medical setting.35
Among Shimkus’ continuing critics are some who have suggested he aided interrogators by 
approving and initiating a regime of  prescribing anti-malaria medication for all the detainees, 
at dosages far higher than those normally used for prevention rather than treatment of  malaria. 
The drug, mefloquine, had side effects that could include paranoia, hallucinations, and 
depression, theoretically making recipients more vulnerable to interrogation.36 But Shimkus 
denied that this was the purpose of  the anti-malarial medication, and the allegations that it was 
prescribed to assist in interrogation are speculative. Shimkus said he agreed with the medical 
decisions of  others, including senior military medical officers, to conduct the medication 
program, and had consulted with officials at the Centers for Disease Control. He said that no 
one involved in the interrogation regime had any role in the decision or discussed the matter 
with him.37 
According to press reports from February 2002, malaria was far more prevalent in Afghanistan 
than in Cuba, where it was largely eradicated, and Cuban doctors had raised the issue of  malaria 
prevention in meetings with Shimkus.38 In 2011, a Pentagon spokesperson told Stars and Stripes 
that the high doses of  medication were appropriate because “[t]he potential of  reintroducing the 
disease to an area that had previously been malaria-free represented a true public health concern. 
… Allowing the disease to spread would have been a public health disaster.” 39 
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Afghanistan: The Gateway to Guantánamo 
In response to the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush issued an ultimatum that was, 
in reality, a declaration of  war on a delayed fuse. He told the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan that it 
would face an invasion unless it handed over the members of  Al Qaeda who had used the country 
as a base from which to plan the attacks.40 No one expected the Taliban to comply.
On October 7, 2001, the U.S. military launched its invasion of  Afghanistan and found 
remarkably quick success in a country that had frustrated other great powers across two earlier 
centuries.41 For the British, the Russians and, more recently, the Russians again, this time under 
a Soviet banner, Afghanistan was a confounding place that was to become an unexpected 
graveyard for their soldiers and policies.42
But the United States, fighting a war with the overwhelming public support for military action, 
prevailed.43  Beginning with an air campaign and followed by a series of  combat victories — in 
which the Northern Alliance (a group of  loosely affiliated Afghan fighters who had been battling 
the Taliban since the mid-1990s) provided most ground forces — Operation Enduring Freedom 
routed the Taliban regime from power.44 
Afghanistan would become the birthplace of  the United States’ post–September 11 detention 
and interrogation practices. Most of  the detainees who would come to populate Guantánamo 
began their time in U.S. custody in Afghanistan. The notion that detainees could be treated 
brutally also first took root there, fertilized by the anger over the September 11 attacks.
Just exactly who were the people in Afghanistan who would become captives of  the United 
States and thus the source of  a stubborn problem that would have no easy solution and remain 
a vexing issue for U.S. commanders and policymakers for years? “Every one of  these guys says 
they went there to help some charity or to find a bride,” one official would later say with robust 
skepticism.45 Experienced law-enforcement officials know that the innocent and the guilty can 
proclaim their innocence with equal fervor. 
A glimpse of  the backgrounds of  most Guantánamo detainees yields a picture both less 
monstrous and more ambiguous than the initial description of  the inmates as “the worst of  the 
worst,” by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. A little-known study of  Guantánamo detainees’ 
accounts, conducted by the U.S. Army from 2003 to 2004, sought to uncover who these men 
were before September 11 and how they came to be in Afghanistan.46 The investigation 
portrayed a group of  mostly young men brought to Afghanistan by theologically laced 
propaganda that presented their journey as a sacred rite of  passage. For some, the spiritual 
appeal took hold through the universally prevalent socio-economic roots of  criminal behavior 
— specifically, unemployment and lack of  education.47 Once recruited, they were brought to 
training camps in Afghanistan by “facilitators,” a network of  supporters of  a radical jihadist 
view of  Islam scattered across Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa.48 During their 
journey the recruits gave up their identification and adopted aliases, a fact that would cost some 
of  them dearly. Many of  those with empty pasts were left to have the gaps filled in by the worst 
assumptions of  their captors.49 
After reaching the training camps in Afghanistan, the situation often took an unexpected turn 
for the worse. The recruits received no vaccinations and the training camps did not have medical 
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facilities, personnel, or supplies to care for the sick.50 The poor water quality and sanitation in 
Afghanistan led to a quarter of  the recruits falling ill. Being underprepared and under-informed 
permeated the experience of  the recruits who became detainees. Following September 11, the 
men were told by the elders in their training camps to applaud the victory of  their brethren and 
not to fear retaliation.51 When the U.S. forces began the air campaign in Afghanistan, the recruits 
were left to scatter and leave Afghanistan or risk being captured. Some were left in hospital beds, 
while others scattered and tried to flee Afghanistan. All those without proper identification quickly 
found themselves in the hands of  the Northern Alliance.52 They were dazed and confused in the 
initial days, and that condition persisted as they became detainees of  the U.S. forces. 
Dr. Najeef  bin Mohamad Ahmed al-Nauimi is a former justice minister in Qatar who 
nominally represented nearly 100 of  the detainees in the early months. While maintaining 
the innocence of  all his clients, he offered some clues as to how many came to be regarded 
suspiciously and detained. For the most part, he said, they were sympathizers with the Taliban 
and supported the idea of  a fundamentalist Islamic state. Most, he said, attended summer 
camps in Pakistan where leaders taught them how to use weapons and preached strong negative 
views of  the United States and Israel. “They learn to make jihad, yes,” he said in an interview. 
“But that’s not illegal.” 53 He said that going to the military camps was, for many in the Islamic 
world, a kind of  summer ritual, kind of  like going to an adventure camp.54 For many of  those 
who did fight, their jihad was against the Northern Alliance, not the United States. They were 
“protecting” Muslims from Ahmad Shah Massoud and General Abdul Rashid Dostum of  the 
Northern Alliance, he said. Prior to September 11, the United States was not an important 
factor in their thinking.55 
In late November 2001, the collapse of  the Taliban came suddenly: Kunduz, Kabul and 
Kandahar all fell within weeks of  each other.56 Though Special Forces and the CIA were all 
embedded with the Northern Alliance fighters as the Taliban fell, it would take some time 
before U.S. forces would implement an integrated detention system and policy. 
By Christmas of  2001, a month after the president’s military order authorizing detainee sites, 
detention facilities were open and running, and interrogations were taking place. 57 Afghanistan 
was, in the beginning, where prisoners were gathered and interrogated, not just from the war 
going on there, but those sent from Pakistan and other countries. Detainees from the Far East, 
from Africa, and from the Middle East were all transferred to detention facilities in Afghanistan, 
which became the entrance point for most on their path to Guantánamo.58 
It should be stressed that many who were detained were indeed acting against American forces. 
But it is also now clear that many of  those sent to Guantánamo were simply not a significant 
part of  the conflict, if  they were involved at all.59 Torin Nelson, an interrogator working at 
Guantánamo in the first few months “realized that a large majority of  the population just had 
no business being at Guantánamo.” 60 There were three categories of  prisoners who were sent 
directly to Guantánamo: “anyone on the FBI’s most wanted list; foreign (mainly Arab) fighters; 
and Taliban officials.” 61 Why these categories? Did they lead to the capture of  the “worst of  the 
worst”? In a review of  the written determinations of  the U.S. military prepared for the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals, only 8 percent of  Guantánamo detainees are identified as “fighters” 
for either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and 45 percent as having committed a hostile act against the 
United States or its allies.62 Hostile acts include fleeing from an area under bombardment by U.S. 
forces.63 Ninety-three percent of  the detainees were not captured by U.S. or coalition forces64; most 
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were handed over to the United States by Pakistani or authorities listed as “not stated” 
when the United States was offering a reward for terrorist suspects.65 All Arabs in 
custody in Afghanistan (i.e., non-Afghans) were sent to Guantánamo without exception, 
no matter what the interrogators personally thought after the interviews. “Every Arab 
was supposed to go,” writes Chris Mackey in The Interrogators, but “not every Arab 
should have been sent.” 66 There was mounting pressure to transfer detainees out of  
Kandahar airport facility to Guantánamo. Mackey described the intense curiosity 
with which Army personnel at Kandahar watched the progress on the construction of  
Camp Delta at Guantánamo, awaiting their reprieve.67 
Guantánamo as the Only Option 
By late 2001, commanders in Afghanistan thought they were reaching the saturation 
point in terms of  managing people taken captive on the battlefields. Policymakers 
in Washington began thinking about where best to imprison the prisoners who were 
now coming in a steady flow. The Defense Department and the State Department 
each established groups of  officials to brainstorm as to the ideal place for a military 
prison. Different places were tossed out, many of  them exotic. 
At the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  asked the general counsel’s office to take 
on the task. Richard Shiffrin, the Pentagon’s deputy counsel for intelligence, said that a small 
group in the office (“about three or four people”) tossed around names of  places. He said that the 
paramount consideration was security, but there was discussion about finding a place that would 
be free of  the jurisdiction of  federal courts. “Guantánamo was mentioned, but most of  them were 
in the Pacific,” he recalled of  locations that figured in the early discussions. The locations included 
Guam, Wake Island, the Commonwealth of  the Northern Mariana Islands, and even Johnson 
Atoll, a tiny (little more than one square mile) set of  coral islets so remote that it had been used in 
the 1960s to test atomic weapons.68 
The sites in the Pacific were eventually rejected. “They didn’t have the facilities and it would be 
too expensive to build new ones,” he said. Shiffrin had been a federal prosecutor in Miami and 
knew well that Guantánamo had been used to house large numbers of  illegal Haitian refugees. 
The process of  elimination, he said, made it pretty clear that when he spoke to the group about 
Guantánamo, it beat the other potential locations. 
The litigation involving the Haitians also provided some clues to the Pentagon lawyers as to how 
the courts would view the issue of  jurisdiction over a detention facility at Guantánamo. The 
lawyers considered whether detainees held at Guantánamo could avail themselves of  the writ of  
habeas corpus, that is, have federal courts inquire into the reasons for detention. The consensus, 
Shiffrin recalled, was that “habeas would not be available at Guantánamo.” That would turn 
out to be an incorrect presumption.69 
(In the first years of  Guantánamo’s use as a prison for detainees, visitors, including journalists 
and members of  Congress, were required to “clear customs” when returning to the United 
States even though they had only traveled between Guantánamo and the U.S. mainland. This 
charade was apparently an effort to underscore the contention that Guantánamo was outside 
the United States).70
“A glimpse of the 
backgrounds of 
most Guantánamo 
detainees yields a 
picture both less 
monstrous and 
more ambiguous 
than the initial 
description of 
the inmates as 
‘the worst of the 
worst...’” 
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At the State Department, a similar seminar involving geography and the law was taking place. 
Pierre-Richard Prosper, the ambassador-at-large for war crimes, was summoned back from 
his Thanksgiving holiday to find a suitable detention site. Prosper had been put in charge of  
an interagency group to consider legal issues about prisoners taken in combat in Afghanistan. 
But along with other senior government officials, he was stunned to learn that a small council 
of  officials actually wielded the influence on these issues. This group, which came to be called 
the “War Council,” included David Addington, a lawyer for Vice President Dick Cheney; 
John Yoo from the Justice Department’s Office of  Legal Counsel; and William “Jim” Haynes 
II, the Pentagon’s general counsel (and Shiffrin’s boss). Now, tasked with finding a place for 
the prisoners, Prosper began discussions with his group and recalled that one of  the younger 
lawyers, Dan Collins, said suddenly, “What about Guantánamo?” To everyone at the meeting, 
Guantánamo suddenly seemed the best choice.71 
Evolution of the Interrogation Techniques 
On December 27, 2001, Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the plan to open 
the naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as a detention center. Soon after the location was 
announced, though, another round of  debate began, this time over whether the detainees sent 
there would be protected by the Geneva Conventions. General Tommy Franks, the commander 
of  U.S. forces in Afghanistan, had ordered the military to apply the conventions’ requirements 
on October 17, 2001.72 But, as described in detail in Chapter 4, the Secretary of  Defense and 
President Bush overrode that decision, on the advice of  the Office of  Legal Counsel and over 
the objections of  the State Department. 
Brigadier General (now Major General) Michael Lehnert,73 the first commander of  the prison, 
and Colonel Manuel Supervielle, the lead military lawyer at SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern 
Command), had made repeated requests up the chain of  command to authorize the presence 
of  the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) in Cuba prior to the first transfer 
of  prisoners. With a request still pending, and the first transport of  prisoners set to leave 
Afghanistan, Supervielle simply called Geneva and invited the Red Cross himself. Department 
of  Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes later made clear that he disagreed with this decision, 
but Supervielle’s chain of  command decided it was too late to disinvite the ICRC. Supervielle 
also thoroughly analyzed each article of  the Third Geneva Convention, and recommended that 
U.S. troops comply fully with most of  them.74 
One of  Supervielle’s recommendations, that the United States conduct individual hearings to 
determine detainees’ status under Article 5 of  the Third Geneva Convention in case of  doubt, 
was rejected by his superiors.75 In an interview with Task Force staff, State Department Legal 
Advisor William H. Taft IV said that in addition to the legal arguments for Article 5 hearings, 
they would have had the additional benefit of  determining whether detainees were combatants 
at all, or whether “actually it just turns out that he’s a person the other person hates, just had a 
family feud. … [Y]ou should be a little careful about that.” 76 But no hearings were held. 
The first detainees to arrive at Guantánamo Bay in January 2002 were not preceded by 
biographies but were accompanied by hyperbole, and terrifying memories. Colonel Terry 
Carrico, head of  military police at Guantánamo at the time, recounted to Task Force staff  that 
all the military was given were the detainees’ “supposed names, and how many there were, 
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and whether they were in satisfactory health or not, just basic information … [n]ot 
the reason they were sent to GTMO. [The men] were scrawny, malnourished, and 
docile. Initial impression … I was struck by how small they were. They were as scared 
as anything else, because the security measures they had no sensory perception — 
headphones, blindfolds — when they stepped off  the plane into the heat.” 77 
The detainees were met with the methodical procedures prepared to handle 
dangerous prisoners, “people that would gnaw hydraulic lines” to bring down 
the plane transporting them, in the words of  one commander.78 Military police 
(MP) met the Air Force security police at the plane. Air Force police de-shackled the detainees 
from their seats and walked them down the ramp, off  the airplane. The MPs took control of  
the detainees and walked them over to the bus. Inside the bus, with the seats removed, three 
marines were positioned to shackle the detainees to the floor. The bus was surrounded by four 
Humvees and a reaction team, in the event a detainee tried to run. There were dogs positioned 
by the bus for added security.79 They traveled from the airstrip to Camp X-Ray blindfolded, 
ears covered by headphones, sitting with their legs crossed. Once they arrived at the camp, the 
detainees were placed in a holding area. With the eye and ear protection on, the detainees were 
made to kneel and await processing. They would move through eight or ten stations where 
they were disrobed, showered, deloused, fingerprinted, examined and reclothed. Finally, each 
detainee was led to his cell. “[W]e called them cells,” says Carrico, “but they were chain linked 
fences with a tin roof  on top and a concrete pad underneath.” 80 Carrico later characterized the 
wire-mesh cells as “essentially dog pens.” 81
Despite the conditions, Carrico stated that he told the troops under his command at that early 
stage to treat the detainees as prisoners of  war, and that MPs observed interrogations to ensure 
that there was no abuse.82 
I said fundamentally, the Geneva Conventions required that we treat people 
humanely and that’s what we are going to do, and I told my men that if  I 
got wind of  anyone mistreating a prisoner they would be disciplined. It was 
sensitive because some of  the reserve units had a couple of  soldiers that 
had their relatives die in the towers. At that time you know America was an 
emotional place to be, and this was no different. I just tried to say “we got a job 
to do whether we like it or not, but we have to do it.” 83 
In February 2002, the Department of  Defense set up a new task force, JTF-170, to run military 
interrogations at Guantánamo. The task force’s first commander was Major General Michael 
Dunlavey. Donald Rumsfeld had personally selected Dunlavey for the job, and told Dunlavey to 
report directly to him each week about the interrogations of  detainees Rumsfeld had described 
as “among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of  the earth.” 84 Dunlavey 
later told author Philippe Sands, “No one ever said to me ‘the gloves are off.’ But I didn’t need 
to talk about the Geneva Conventions, it was clear that they didn’t apply.” 85 
Dunlavey’s subordinates included Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer, JTF-170’s head of  
intelligence; David Becker, the head of  Guantánamo’s Interrogation and Control Element 
(ICE), and Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, his staff  judge advocate. 
During the summer of  2002, a military psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychiatric technician 
“Al Qahtani was 
interrogated for 
approximately 20 
hours a day for 
seven weeks...”
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were deployed to Guantánamo Bay, and told that they had been assigned to a Behavioral 
Science Consultation Team (BSCT or, colloquially, “biscuit team”) in support of  interrogations. 
In September, the three BSCT members and four interrogators received training in SERE 
techniques at Fort Bragg, N.C. On October 2, 2002, the BSCT team wrote a memo requesting 
authorization to use additional interrogation techniques. “Category II techniques” included 
stress positions; the use of  isolation for up to 30 days (with the possibility of  consecutive 30-day 
periods if  authorized by the chain of  command); deprivation of  food for 12 hours; handcuffing; 
hooding; and consecutive 20-hour interrogations once a week. “Category III” techniques 
included daily 20-hour interrogations; isolation without access to medical professionals or the 
ICRC; removal of  clothing; exposure to cold or cold water; and “the use of  scenarios designed 
to convince the detainee he might experience a painful or fatal outcome.” 86 While these and 
even harsher techniques had been authorized for use against high-value detainees in CIA 
custody, this would apply to a far larger population in military custody at Guantánamo. At its 
peak in 2003, the prison in Cuba held 680 inmates, with a total of  779 detainees being held 
there since 2001.87 
On October 11, 2002, General Dunlavey submitted a request to SOUTHCOM’s commanding 
general, James Hill, for authorization to use Category I, II and III techniques. In addition to the 
Category III techniques listed in the BSCT memo, there was another, which had been discussed 
at the October 2 meeting with the CIA: “use of  a wet towel and dripping water to induce 
the misperception of  suffocation.” 88 The list of  techniques stated, however, that Category III 
techniques were only intended for use against “exceptionally resistant detainees … less than 3%” 
of  the detainee population at Guantánamo,” 89 which at that time numbered close to 600.90
Dunlavey’s request was accompanied by a legal memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, 
who wrote that neither the Geneva Conventions nor the dictates of  the Army’s interrogation 
field manual were binding at Guantánamo. She wrote that the “enhanced” techniques would 
not violate the Torture Statute 
because there is a legitimate governmental objective in obtaining the 
information necessary … for the protection of  the national security of  the 
United States, its citizens, and allies. Furthermore, these methods would not be 
used for the “very malicious and sadistic purpose of  causing harm.” 91
Beaver acknowledged that the techniques might “technically” violate several articles of  the 
Uniform Code of  Military Justice (UCMJ). She nevertheless recommended that they be 
approved, and suggested that “it would be advisable to have permission or immunity in advance 
… for military members utilizing these methods.” 92 
Beaver’s analysis has been widely criticized, and she herself  has stated that she did not have 
adequate time to research it:
I wanted to get something in writing. That was my game plan. I had four days. 
Dunlavey gave me just four days. But I was in Guantánamo, there wasn’t access 
to much material, books and things.93
On October 25, General Hill forwarded Dunlavey’s request to General Richard Myers, 
chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, who sent it to the individual services for comment. JAGs 
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from all four services recommended against approval of  the techniques without 
more careful review. The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps JAGs warned 
that several techniques could subject service members to prosecution under the 
Torture Statute or the UCMJ. The Guantánamo Criminal Investigative Task 
Force (CITF), which carried out interrogations and conducted investigations of  
potential war crimes by detainees, had similar concerns.94 
Captain Jane Dalton, the legal counsel to the Joint Chiefs, began her own legal 
review, finding Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s analysis “woefully inadequate.” 95 
General Myers, however, instructed her to stop the review, telling Dalton that 
Haynes was concerned about too many people seeing the paper trail.96 On 
November 27, Haynes recommended to Rumsfeld that he approve all of  the 
Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique (noninjurious 
physical contact). Rumsfeld gave his sign-off  on December 2, adding the 
following handwritten note: “However, I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is 
standing limited to 4 hours?” 97
Haynes’s recommendation contained no legal analysis. Beaver later told Senate 
investigators that she was “shocked” that her opinion, which she expected the 
chain of  command to review thoroughly and independently, “would become the final word on 
interrogation policies and practices within the Department of  Defense.” 98
Before Rumsfeld approved them for more general use at Guantánamo, the techniques were 
being implemented against detainee number 63, Mohammed al Qahtani. Al Qahtani was 
suspected of  being the intended 20th hijacker in the September 11 attacks. In October 2002, 
he was interrogated with military dogs present, deprived of  sleep, and placed in stress positions, 
all while in isolation.99 When this failed to yield intelligence, JTF-170 halted the interrogation 
and began developing a new “Special Interrogation Plan.” Al Qahtani remained in isolation, 
however, and according to an FBI agent, by the end of  November he was “evidencing behavior 
consistent with extreme psychological trauma (talking to non-existent people, reportedly hearing 
voices, crouching in a corner of  the cell covered with a sheet for hours on end).” 100 
In November 2002, Task Force 160 and Task Force 170 were combined to form Joint Task 
Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO). Major General Geoffrey Miller was given command of  the 
new task force.
A publicly released interrogation log, dated from November 23, 2002, to January 11, 2003, 
shows that al Qahtani’s treatment only became harsher after Miller’s appointment.101 Al 
Qahtani was interrogated for approximately 20 hours a day for seven weeks; given strip 
searches, including in the presence of  female interrogators; forced to wear women’s underwear; 
forcibly injected with large quantities of  IV fluid and forced to urinate on himself; led around 
on a leash; made to bark like a dog; and subjected to cold temperatures. Not surprisingly, his 
condition deteriorated further. On December 7, 2002, al Qahtani’s heartbeat slowed to 35 beats 
per minute, and he had to be taken to the hospital for a CT scan of  his brain and ultrasound of  
a swollen leg to check for blood clots.102 
In August of  2003, Major General Miller visited detention facilities in Iraq, most notably Abu 
Ghraib, and delivered a series of  recommendations to reform detention operations. With a 
“Baker, a member 
of a military police 
unit from Kentucky, 
suffered traumatic 
brain injury from a 
beating administered 
during a training 
mission in January 
2003, when other 
MPs thought he 
was a Guantánamo 
detainee and not a 
U.S. soldier.”
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focus on enhancing intelligence-gathering meant to shore up counterinsurgency operations, the 
Miller Report emphasized a need to integrate detention and intelligence operations.103 General 
Miller’s advice called for the involvement of  military police in facilitating interrogations.104 The 
Abu Ghraib abuses took place starting in October of  2003. In a report of  the investigation into 
the detainee abuses conducted by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, the recommendation that 
guard forces “set the conditions” for interrogations was listed as a contributing factor.105 In April of  
2004, Miller was appointed deputy commander for detainee operations for Multinational Forces- 
Iraq and the command of  JTF-GTMO moved to Major General Jay W. Hood.106
The Schmidt-Furlow Report, the official Department of  Defense investigation into allegations 
of  abuse at Guantánamo, found that “every technique employed against [al Qahtani] was 
legally permissible under the existing guidance,” but “the creative, aggressive, and persistent 
interrogation of  [ al Qahtani] resulted in the cumulative effect being degrading and abusive.” 107 
It criticized Miller for failing to adequately supervise al Qahtani’s interrogators, which “allowed 
subordinates to make creative decisions.” The investigation nevertheless concluded that al 
Qahtani’s interrogation “did not rise to the level of  inhumane treatment.” 108
Others have strongly disagreed. Susan Crawford, the convening authority of  the 
Guantánamo military commissions during the latter part of  the Bush administration, told The 
Washington Post in January 2009 that “[w]e tortured Qahtani. … His treatment met the legal 
definition of  torture.” 109 
Al Qahtani was not the only detainee subjected to the cruel techniques. In an interview with 
Task Force staff, former detainee Sherif  El-Mashad said he still carries scars to this day from his 
treatment at Guantánamo: “The worst for me was being stripped naked and being beaten directly, 
being kept in solitary confinement, there are things left on my body to this day, marks.” 110 
Sami al-Hajj, a Sudanese journalist for Al Jazeera, recalled to Task Force staff  that “when I 
told them I don’t want to talk, they leave me like that, shackle me, and leave me for 18 hours 
like that.” 111 He recalled being kept awake for two days112 and the escalating brutality of  the 
procedures during cell extraction: “Sometime they say for you to lie down and if  you talk they 
use that spray, and if  you refuse definitely they use the spray in your eyes and then they come, 
about 5 to 7 people, they come beside you and they start beating you and shackle you and take 
you away. And during that they put your face inside your toilet.” 113 
Detainees’ allegations about guards’ use of  excessive force during cell extractions have been 
corroborated by the experience of  Specialist Sean Baker, a Gulf  War veteran who re-enlisted 
shortly after September 11. Baker, a member of  a military police unit from Kentucky, suffered a 
traumatic brain injury from a beating administered during a training mission in January 2003, 
when other MPs thought he was a Guantánamo detainee and not a U.S. soldier. “If  he was 
doing that to me, he was doing it to detainees,” Baker, in an interview with Task Force staff, 
said of  the guard who beat him.114 No one was ever charged for his abuse; an Army criminal 
investigative division investigation into the incident was opened in June 2004 and closed a year 
later.115 Baker was retired from the Army on 100 percent disability and still suffers seizures. 
He is unable to work but free of  bitterness; his deepest wish is to get back in the Army, in any 
capacity. “I will take the worst job in the worst assignment in the armpit of  the world for the rest 
of  my life if  they would allow it,” he said.116 
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The Battle Within the Pentagon Over 
Interrogation Techniques
“Do you want to hear more?” David Brant asked carefully.117 Brant was the 
head of  the Navy’s Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). He was standing in 
the Pentagon office suite of  Alberto Mora, the Navy’s general counsel. Brant 
had just finished telling Mora there were troubling reports of  detainee abuse 
coming from NCIS investigators at Guantánamo Bay. Brant’s investigators 
weren’t involved in the abuse but they were certain it was happening. It was 
December 17, 2002. Throughout the summer and fall of  2002, as plans for 
“enhanced” interrogations had taken shape, investigators from the Defense 
Department’s criminal investigation task force had objected.118 They had felt these 
new techniques were not only ineffective but illegal. By December 2002 however, 
the investigators knew these were no longer just plans and proposals. At the time 
of  Brant’s conversation with Mora in Mora’s office, Mohammed al Qahtani’s brutal interrogation 
at Guantánamo had been underway a little more than three weeks.119
Mora had been appointed as the Navy’s general counsel by President George W. Bush. He was 
an admirer of  President Reagan and had served in the administration of  George H.W. Bush. As 
Mora listened to Brant, he recognized Brant was giving him an opportunity to distance himself  
from these reports of  detainee abuse.120 Mora and Brant had a good working relationship. Mora 
was anxious. His parents, a Hungarian mother and a Cuban father, were familiar with harsh 
tactics that Mora only associated with abusive regimes. The Mora family itself  had narrowly 
escaped Cuba’s Castro. Mora’s answer to Brant was clear “I think I have to know more.” 121 Mora 
thought these actions had to be those of  a rogue operation. The next day Mora and Brant met 
again, along with Michael Gelles, the chief  psychologist for NCIS, and several other Pentagon 
officials. The rumor, according to Brant, was that these practices had been approved at high levels 
in Washington. As recounted by Mora in a later statement to the Navy’s inspector general,
[Gelles] believed that commanders [at Guantánamo] took no account of  
the dangerous phenomenon of  “force drift.” Any force utilized to extract 
information would continue to escalate, he said. If  a person being forced to 
stand for hours decided to lie down, it probably would take force to get him 
to stand up again and stay standing. … [T]he level of  force applied against an 
uncooperative witness tends to escalate such that, if  left unchecked, force levels, 
to include torture, could be reached.122 
Mora picked up the phone after their meeting and called his counterpart for the Army, Steven 
Morello, and asked him whether he’d heard about any of  these rumors.123 Yes, Morello had 
heard. “Come on down,” Morello instructed Mora, clearly not wanting to discuss the matter 
over the phone. Morello’s answer almost knocked Mora off  his chair.124 Morello met Mora in an 
out-of-the-way office at the Pentagon.125 “We tried to stop it, but were told to go away,” Morello 
told Mora, as he pushed toward Mora a copy of  Rumsfeld’s December 2 authorization of  
enhanced techniques.126 “Don’t tell anybody where you got this.” 127
As Mora went through the document he saw a handwritten note from Rumsfeld at the end (“I 
stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”). Mora thought it was probably 
“Though senior Bush 
administration and 
Pentagon officials 
had first raised 
the idea of military 
tribunals as a means 
of demonstrating 
swift justice, they 
were in no hurry to 
conduct them...”
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an off-the-cuff  remark — that the secretary had intended to be humorous — but it could be 
damaging. The document Rumsfeld had signed contained no limits on any of  the behaviors. Mora 
immediately thought the Defense Department general counsel, William J. Haynes, had “missed 
it” — it was a mistake. Haynes, Mora thought, had relied on subordinate attorneys to conduct 
the underlying legal research and had missed the memo’s incorrect conclusions, which could be 
read to allow techniques that amounted to torture. Convinced that the authorization signed by the 
Secretary of  Defense had been a gross oversight, Mora went to see Haynes the next day.128
Mora warned Haynes that the memo he had seen authorized torture. “No it doesn’t,” Haynes 
quickly replied. “What did some of  these things really mean?” Mora pressed him. What did 
“deprivation of  light and auditory stimuli” mean? Could a man be locked in darkness for a 
month? Could he be deprived of  light until he went blind or insane? With no limitations there 
were no boundaries, Mora argued. 129 As for Rumsfeld’s signature, it would be portrayed by 
defense attorneys at subsequent trials of  detainees as a nod and a wink to interrogators that the 
limitations listed in the memo could be ignored.
Haynes’s practice was to listen, and he was often hard to read when he was listening. When 
Mora had finished, Haynes nodded and thanked Mora for bringing this to his attention. Mora, 
as he left Haynes’ office that afternoon, thought Haynes was now in agreement, and was 
relieved. The mistaken memo would soon be withdrawn. Mora could now go on his planned 
vacation with his family to Florida over the holidays, free from concern.
In early January, halfway through his vacation, Mora’s phone rang. It was Brant. The abuse in 
Guantánamo was continuing. Mora was shocked. On January 9, 2003, Mora went back to see 
Haynes and told him flatly he was surprised and disappointed to hear the abuse was continuing. 
As Mora lobbied, it was again hard for him to read Haynes. Mora reiterated his concerns about 
the illegality of  the techniques and laid out the political implications as well. If  news of  these 
practices became public, allies might be reluctant to cooperate with the United States; it had the 
potential to scandalize and threaten Rumsfeld’s tenure as secretary of  defense, and it could even 
damage the president. “Jim, protect your client!” Mora told Haynes before he left.130 
Mora was relieved when, once again, it seemed Haynes was taking his concerns seriously. 
Haynes set up meetings between Mora and top lawyers at the Pentagon, offering Mora the 
opportunity to lobby for reconsideration of  the interrogation policy.131 Mora met with the 
legal counsel for the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  and the top military attorneys in the JAG Corps. In 
those meetings Mora reviewed the contents of  the Rumsfeld authorization and repeated the 
arguments he had given to Haynes about why the policy had to be rewritten.132
On Wednesday, January 15, Mora handed to his assistant an unsigned draft memo and asked her 
to take it to Haynes that morning. It contained all the objections he had presented previously to 
Haynes. Mora hadn’t yet signed the document; once he did, it would become an official record. 
Mora told Haynes he would be signing it later that day unless the interrogation techniques were 
suspended. Haynes asked Mora to come see him. “ ‘I don’t know what you’re trying to do with 
this memo,’ ” he said Haynes told him.133 Mora first thought “How dare you?” but then the next 
words out of  Haynes’s mouth were, “Surely you must know the impact your words have had on 
me.” 134 Mora laughed. “No, Jim. I don’t. I have no idea if  you agree with me totally, or disagree, 
or come out somewhere in the middle because you never say anything.” 135 Haynes informed 
Mora that Rumsfeld was considering suspending his authorization for the techniques later that 
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afternoon and Haynes would get back to him. The call from Haynes came just a 
few hours later. Rumsfeld had suspended the use of  the techniques.
At the same time, Rumsfeld created a task force, the “Detainee Interrogation 
Working Group,” within the Department of  Defense to examine the legal issues 
associated with detainee interrogation. The group consisted of  JAGs as well as 
civilian attorneys at the Pentagon. Mary Walker, the Air Force general counsel 
— Mora’s counterpart for the Air Force — had volunteered to lead the Working 
Group, which would ultimately produce a report with its findings. Rumsfeld 
wanted the work to be done quickly — the group had a tight deadline. 
Rather than solely rely on the Working Group’s process, Haynes reached out to 
John Yoo at the Justice Department’s Office of  Legal Counsel (DOJ OLC). When they spoke, 
Haynes asked Yoo if  he would “put together an analysis that defines the corners of  the box 
of  what’s legal.” 136 Yoo had already written memoranda in August 2002 that authorized the 
CIA to engage in “enhanced” interrogation techniques (EITs). Yoo’s memo for the Defense 
Department effectively mirrored the legal advice he provided to the CIA. [See Chapter 4]
Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Jack L. Rives recalled how, at the start of  the war in 
Afghanistan, he and his fellow uniformed lawyers, when discussing how the United States 
should deal with detainees, were comfortable with the idea of  using military commissions to try 
those captured in the fighting in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In February 2002 Rives, who had 
been promoted to be the deputy JAG for the Air Force, arrived in Washington asking questions 
about the lack of  progress with the commissions. He learned the Department of  Defense 
general counsel had kept the commissions under its control, rather than delegating them to one 
of  the Armed Services to conduct. Rives was aware of  how military commissions had been 
conducted throughout the country’s history and heard rumblings that concerned him. “They 
could have started right away.” Rives said “We didn’t need to be unfair. … [T]rials by military 
commission could have been very fair, conducted along the lines of  the Uniform Code of  
Military Justice.” 137
But events did not move quickly. Though senior Bush administration and Pentagon officials had 
first raised the idea of  military tribunals as a means of  demonstrating swift justice, they were in no 
hurry to conduct them.They would have to take second place behind what had come to be judged 
as a more important and immediate need: interrogating the prisoners to extract intelligence.
This was one of  the markers at the beginning of  an important divide in how the United States 
would treat its detainees. If  they were to be held, questioned, and detained with the purpose 
of  putting them on trial for possible crimes, they would have to be dealt with differently than if  
they were solely an intelligence source. This dichotomy runs through much of  law-enforcement 
and national-security theory and practice. But it is unclear how much of  this was appreciated at 
the time in the new reality of  fighting and capturing suspected terrorists.
As Bush administration officials rejected using the Uniform Code of  Military Justice for trying 
suspected terrorists — it was judged inappropriate and too lenient because of  its safeguards 
intended for U.S. service members — a new system had to be developed from the ground up.
In practice, this meant a laborious trial-and-error process of  creating new rules for a new legal 
“...decisions made 
about how captives 
were treated could 
potentially affect how 
U.S. personnel would 
be treated when they 
were captured.”
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proceeding. Declining to use the well-tested procedures for courts-martial, the Department 
of  Defense opted to ask some military lawyers, including some called back from retirement, 
to write rules regarding a huge array of  issues, including handling of  witnesses, evidence and 
classified information. In addition, the system had to deal with the composition of  the court, 
appeals and possible sentences. It was not unlike a fledgling nation developing its criminal 
justice system for the first time.
And because the proceedings were supposed to showcase the United States’ reliance on fair 
principles, it was all supposed to be done in public. The procedures were published, vetted and 
commented on, quite often very critically by lawyers and scholars. The first few proceedings 
were widely criticized. Many in uniform who were proud of  the military justice system were not 
happy with the ad hoc approach the Defense Department chose to pursue. Some military lawyers 
said outright they were embarrassed.
At the same time, the other regime for interrogation or intelligence-gathering was put into place 
relatively quickly, and was conducted largely out of  public view.
A draft of  a memorandum for the Pentagon from John Yoo — the lawyer from DOJ’s OLC — 
on interrogation was delivered to Mary Walker, the Working Group’s leader. The memo had 
been requested by Haynes, and Walker alone kept a copy of  the legal analysis. If  any of  the 
other Working Group members wanted to review the memo, they had to come to her office. 
The memo was kept in a safe in a secure room and, some of  those who came to read it were 
observed while doing so. Rives read the Yoo memo but, as with Mora and others who reviewed 
it, he could not make any copies of  it or even take notes. Nevertheless, Rives said his review 
was enough for him to report to his colleagues that it was deeply flawed in that it granted 
almost unlimited power to the executive. “I read an undated, unsigned document that had 
some remarkable things in it,” he recalled, “and I was not prepared to be bound by any draft 
document like that.” 138
The meetings of  the Working Group were contentious, and “Haynes was frustrated that he 
couldn’t make it just go away,” Rives recalled.139 Rives said he chose to take a more assertive 
role. “Things needed to be done,” he said, and the military lawyers were the ones to do it. 
Rives and his fellow JAGs were becoming concerned, especially as it became clear by late 
January 2003 that their consistently expressed objections in the Working Group were going to 
be ignored in the group’s final work product. Walker had proved to be an adamant supporter 
of  the harsh detention and interrogation regimes, and believed strongly that the JAGs were 
overstepping their bounds in pressing their objections.140
“JAGs don’t work for the general counsel,” Rives said. He said that some people in the 
Pentagon wanted to believe that the uniformed lawyers work for them, although they do not. 
Certain political appointees at the Pentagon were particularly disturbed by the independence 
of  the military lawyers, including Haynes and his mentor David Addington, former DOD 
general counsel who was now Vice President Dick Cheney’s counsel and chief  theoretician 
in developing a robust and legally uninhibited response to the post–September 11 threat. In 
January 2002, when the administration had been debating the applicability of  the Geneva 
Conventions to members of  the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Addington had made clear he did not 
want the JAGs involved.141 
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The Working Group was, Walker maintained, bound by the legal conclusions contained 
in the memo from John Yoo. Rives understood that the OLC where Yoo worked spoke for 
the executive branch. But Rives was adamant that he did not have to accept something in 
an undated, unsigned memo and was free to disagree with its conclusions. 142 JAGs had an 
independent obligation as lawyers to opine on the proposals, Rives argued; they were non-
political officers, schooled in the laws of  war and had in mind the interests of  U.S. service 
personnel, in that they were sensitive that decisions made about how captives were treated could 
potentially affect how U.S. personnel would be treated when they were captured.
Rives said that he and his fellow military lawyers objected not only to the policy but to the fact 
that, in the last draft of  the report the JAGs were ever shown, their objections and concerns had 
been excluded. “We had to lay down a marker,’’ he said. “It was hijacked. They totally ignored 
our inputs. … If  the Secretary of  Defense had been briefed by Jim Haynes and Mary Walker 
he wouldn’t have been told about [our] objections.” 143 On February 5, he drafted the first of  
his memoranda objecting to the Working Group’s approach and his fellow military lawyers in 
the Army, Navy and Marines concurred. Rives had his assistant walk his memo over to Walker’s 
office, “so I was sure it got delivered.” It produced a roiling fight with Mary Walker. “How can 
you say this?” she demanded over the telephone. Walker said that if  he had specific objections 
he should detail them. Rives wrote a second memo the following day, February 6, with greater 
specificity. Rives said he received “a blistering” email in return. Walker told him that he did not 
have the right to object to the policy and that he could not disagree with Yoo’s conclusions. He 
replied by email that Yoo and the other officials “don’t speak from Mt. Sinai” and that he was 
free to explain his disagreement. Navy JAG Admiral Michael Lohr documented his objections 
the same day, February 6.144 The Army’s top JAG, Major General Thomas Romig, and the 
Marine Corps’ Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler also memorialized, in writing, their 
objections.145
On February 10, Mora went to see Haynes. Haynes wanted Mora’s thoughts about the Working 
Group’s latest draft, the same one that had been shown to Rives six days earlier.146 Mora was not 
pleased. Every answer to every question posed to the Working Group was being dictated by Yoo’s 
memo. Mora had met with Yoo personally and challenged him if  he believed the conclusions 
of  his memo could be taken to their logical end. Mora asked Yoo whether the president could 
lawfully order a detainee to be tortured. Yes, the president could authorize torture, he said was 
Yoo’s response.147 Yoo said that whether the techniques should be used wasn’t a legal question, 
but rather it was a policy question. When Mora pressed him, where, precisely, were such policy 
questions supposed to be addressed and decided? Without hesitation, Yoo had replied “You know 
I don’t know — at the Pentagon, you guys are the experts on the law of  war.” 148
Neither Haynes nor Yoo responded to the Task Force’s requests for an interview.
When Haynes asked Mora his thoughts about the report, Mora said: 
Jim, Navy will not concur with this memorandum when it’s circulated for it 
is deficient in any number of  ways, permits the use of  cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, doesn’t adequately deal with the various issues under 
consideration, it’s just a bad piece of  work. Here’s my recommendation to you. 
I would call Mary into the room. I would shake her hand and thank her for 
her service to the country, then I would put the memorandum in my top desk 
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drawer and never let it see the light of  day again. You don’t want to do it and 
again, so you know, Naval will not concur.149
Haynes, as was his way, was quiet, Mora recalled. Haynes stood and shook Mora’s hand and 
thanked him for coming by.150
The Working Group report was finalized and issued on April 4, 2003.151 In addition to the Army 
Field Manual techniques, it recommended the approval of  hooding; isolation; “sleep adjustment”; 
20-hour interrogations; sleep deprivation “not to exceed four days in succession”; prolonged 
standing (not to exceed four hours); “mild physical contact”; “dietary manipulation”; “environmental 
manipulation” (which could include raising or lowering the cell temperature); “false flag” (convincing 
a detainee that individuals from another country were interrogating him); the threat of  transfer “to 
a third country…[that would] subject him to torture or death”; forcibly shaving detainees’ hair and 
beards; forcing detainees to exercise; slapping the detainee on the face or stomach (“limited to two 
slaps per application, no more than two applications per interrogation”); nudity; and “increasing 
anxiety by use of  aversions,” such as the presence of  a dog.152 
On April 16, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized a list of  techniques that included dietary 
manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, and isolation — 
although the last was authorized only if  the SOUTHCOM commander were to “specifically 
determine that military necessity requires its use and notify me in advance.” 153 Other additional 
techniques were available if  the commander sent a written request. Rumsfeld’s memorandum 
concluded by stating that “[n]othing in this memorandum in any way restricts your existing 
authority to maintain good order and discipline among detainees” — most likely a reference to 
the practices of  Guantánamo’s Extreme Reaction Force, which forcibly removed detainees from 
cells for disciplinary action and was repeatedly accused of  using excessive force.154
The final Working Group report was never sent to the lawyers who had objected to the 
techniques, nor had they even known it had been completed. None had seen a draft since early 
February, so Mora and the JAGs assumed their objections had ground the Working Group 
process to a halt. Throughout the spring of  2003, Mora had been waiting for the final report to 
emerge and planned to file a strong dissent.155 In June 2003, news reports began to emerge that 
detainees were being abused. Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy wrote a letter to National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice to express his concern over these reports. Haynes wrote a letter back 
to Sen. Leahy that became public. Haynes’ letter included the exact type of  language Mora had 
hoped to see in the Working Group’s report. The letter said the Pentagon’s policy had always 
been to never engage in torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Mora was relieved 
— Haynes had done the right thing, he thought, and shelved the Working Group’s report. Mora 
later sent an appreciative note to Haynes, saying he was glad to be on the team.156
In May 2004, as the images of  the Abu Ghraib scandal were splashed across the globe, Mora 
was saddened. The very thing he and his allies within the Pentagon had worked so hard to try 
to stop had come to pass. As Mora watched Senate hearings about Abu Ghraib on C-SPAN, 
a witness referenced the Working Group’s report, which had been provided to the military’s 
leaders in Iraq.157 Mora was stunned. This was the first he’d heard anything about the report 
since 2003, when he’d told Haynes it was deeply flawed and should be shoved in a drawer. It 
had been promulgated simply by going around the objectors — like himself. 
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Habeas, Hunger Strikes & Suicides
In June 2004, in Rasul v. Bush,158 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Guantánamo detainees had 
a right to challenge the legality of  their detention with a writ of  habeas corpus. Attorneys’ visits 
began later that year. Even before the lawyers came, though, the Department of  Defense began 
holding Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) for detainees. 
The CSRTs were the first hearings that Guantánamo inmates had, but they had clear 
procedural deficiencies. Detainees had no attorneys, and no means of  obtaining witnesses 
outside of  Guantánamo. Moreover, the evidence in favor of  detention was presumed to be 
reliable unless the detainee could disprove it — and virtually all of  the evidence was classified 
and withheld from detainees.159 In addition to allowing multiple levels of  hearsay, the CSRTs 
allowed, and at times relied on, evidence obtained under torture.160 In some cases, when the 
tribunal cleared a detainee — or rather, in DOD parlance, found him to be “no longer an 
enemy combatant” — a new panel of  officers was convened, and reversed the decision.161 The 
CSRTs led to few detainees being released from custody. 
In the summer of  2005, Guantánamo detainees began the largest and longest hunger strike 
since the prison opened. The press reported that as many as 200 detainees had gone on a 
hunger strike protesting their living conditions, the treatment at the hands of  the guards, and 
their indefinite detention. 
Hunger strikes had been used at Guantánamo before, most often to protest allegations of  
guards desecrating the Koran.162 According to Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedures, MPs are 
instructed to “avoid handling or touching the detainee’s Koran whenever possible” and may 
only do so when security requires it under strict guidelines which include the presence of  a 
chaplain or a Muslim interpreter.163 According to news reports, a Koran was kicked, withheld 
from detainees and put in a toilet. Sami al-Hajj told Task Force staff  of  his first hunger strike at 
Guantánamo as a protest, “We use[d] it for one day, two days when they do something bad for 
our holy Koran.” 164 He was not aware of  the hunger strike as a means of  peaceful resistance 
until a fellow Guantánamo inmate, Shaker Aamer, explained the history, meaning and power of  
the practice in Western culture.165 
At the time of  the 2005 hunger strike, the commander of  Guantánamo was Major General 
Jay Hood, who took over command after the Abu Ghraib scandal and public reports of  
“enhanced” interrogations at Guantánamo Bay. General Hood and Colonel Mike Bumgarner, 
the commander of  the Joint Detention Group, approached camp discipline with an explicit 
intent to move the procedures and treatment at the detention facility more in line with the 
Geneva Conventions. Bumgarner reached out to the detainees during the summer hunger 
strikes in an attempt to open dialogue and improve conditions at the camp. His efforts led to 
a change in meal plans; the abandonment of  the tiered system of  punishment and reward 
for an “all or nothing” approach (the tiered system was so complicated that to the detainees, 
the rewards and punishments appeared to be an arbitrary exercises of  power); and a brief  
establishment of  a council of  six detainees (headed by Aamer, the last British resident remaining 
at Guantánamo today despite being cleared for release since 2007), to discuss their grievances, 
and speak with him about what could be resolved.166 
During the second meeting of  the six detainees, the talks broke down. The council meeting was 
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brought to an end because the six detainees were trying to pass notes to each other in order to 
communicate in private.167 
After the talks fell apart, Hood extended benefits to the detainees who complied with the 
rules — for example, the detainees who did not disrupt the running of  the facility were 
given Gatorade and Power Bars during recreation periods. Conversely, the general tightened 
discipline in blocks where the disruptions continued and moved one of  the leaders involved in 
the talks, Shaker Aamer, to isolation.
As Hood prepared to hand over command to Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr. in March of  
2006, he was proud of  the changes that had come to Guantánamo during his tenure: 
We are going to establish the most world-class detention facilities, and we are 
going to show the world that we’re doing this right. … Every provision of  
the Geneva Conventions related to the safe custody of  the detainees is being 
adhered to. Today at Guantánamo — and, in fact, for a long time — the 
American people would be proud of  the discipline that is demonstrated here.168 
It is around this time that the Bush administration offered the first indications that it wished 
to close Guantánamo as a detention facility. In an interview with a German television station, 
President Bush said “I very much would like to end Guantánamo. I very much would like to get 
people to a court.” 169 [For more on the hunger strikes, see Chapter 6.]
A few weeks later, on June 9, 2006, three men died at Guantánamo.170 Mani Shaman al-Utaybi, 
Yasser Talal al-Zahrani and Salah Ahmed Al-Salami were found with cloth stuffed down 
their throats, hanging in their cells. The military ruled the deaths as suicides, although media 
speculation regarding the means of  death has continued for years.171 Admiral Harris characterized 
the suicides as another attack: “They are smart, they are creative, they are committed. … They 
have no regard for life, neither ours not their own. I believe this was not an act of  desperation, 
but an act of  asymmetrical warfare waged against us.” 172 The NCIS investigation of  the deaths 
found violations of  guard procedures, in part due to the evolving nature of  the standard operating 
procedures at the time, which led to gaps in coverage of  the cells.173 
Guantánamo Today 
In many ways, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay looks very different today than during the 
Bush administration. During a visit by Task Force staff  in February 2012, the commander of  JTF-
GTMO at the time, Rear Admiral David Woods, was quick to point out the facility’s motto: “Safe, 
Humane, Legal, Transparent.” 174 Detainees are mainly housed in three camps; Camp 5 for “high-
risk” detainees, Camp 6 for those considered compliant, and Camp 7 where former CIA detainees 
(including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and Walid bin Attash) are held.175 
The location of  Camp 7 is classified. Admiral Patrick Walsh, who visited Camp 7 in 2009, described 
conditions there as similar to a “SuperMax” prison.176 There is an annex on the ground of  Camp 5, 
referred to as Camp Five-Echo, which “serves as a disciplinary block for non-compliant detainees in 
Camps 5 and 6.” 177 This block has elicited complaints from detainee counsel who claim that their 
clients are held there in prolonged solitary confinement.178 Additionally, there is a small facility called 
Camp Iguana, originally used for juvenile detainees and which, at the time of  this report, was used to 
house the three remaining Uighur detainees, who have expanded privileges there.179
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After President Obama’s failure to close Guantánamo in his first year of  office, modifications 
were made to Camp 6 in a conscious attempt by military officials “to make Camp 6 feel more 
like a dorm and less like a SuperMax for the men, most held for eight years, all without charge 
or trial.” 180 Much touted during the Task Force staff  visit was detainee access to TV (including 
the occasional PlayStation console), educational lessons including language instruction, and 
socializing with other detainees in Camp 6.181 Conditions in Camp 5 are more severe, with special 
interrogation cells and a number of  detainees held in solitary confinement. According to Woods, 
interrogation across the detention facility is now voluntary, indicating the official recognition that 
they have exhausted any possible value from the detainees’ intelligence after as many as 10 years 
in prison.182 Woods said, in fact, that what he referred to as ongoing “interrogations’’ only cover 
camp conditions rather than anything associated with the battlefield. It is, in fact, the stark change 
in the mission at the Guantánamo detention center from what officials regarded as a potentially 
valuable source of  information to be mined, often through harsh methods, to its current role solely 
as a repository to hold people.
Guards described to Task Force staff  their regimen of  constant surveillance, which includes 
visually checking on each detainee every three minutes around the clock.183 It was in his isolation 
cell at Camp 5 that Yemeni detainee Adnan Latif  was found dead in September 2012. U.S. 
officials ruled his death a suicide, and an NCIS investigation is due to be completed in 2013.184 
Latif  had made several suicide attempts during his 10 years in U.S. custody.185 
During the visit, Task Force staff  were introduced to a representative from the International 
Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC), who appeared to have a positive relationship with senior 
members of  JTF-GTMO, including Woods.186 This marks a departure from the acrimony 
that had characterized relations between the ICRC and U.S. officials during the early years of  
detention at Guantánamo.187 In 2007, a confidential 2003 manual for Guantánamo operations 
detailed the policy of  barring access of  some detainees to ICRC monitors — a violation of  
international law — and ICRC spokesman Simon Schorno commented that between 2002 
and 2004, the ICRC was aware that it did not have access to all detainees at the facility.188 This 
time period coincides with some of  the worst reports of  abuse at the facility, and Schorno noted 
that the policy ran “counter to the manner in which the ICRC conducts its detention visits at 
Guantánamo Bay and around the world.” 189 Additionally, a confidential ICRC memo containing 
detailed allegations of  torture by U.S. forces at Guantánamo was leaked in 2004.190 Since 2007, 
ICRC statements confirm that relations have improved. ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger 
stated in 2009 that “the ICRC’s work to improve conditions of  detention and treatment has been 
enormous. … [W]e have been very tenacious and it wasn’t easy.” 191 A 2012 update from Schorno 
also briefly outlined specific initiatives undertaken by the ICRC at Guantánamo, including 
facilitating phone conversations between detainees and their families.192 
Despite the progress at Guantánamo, there remain troubling aspects of  detention policy. During 
his presentation, Woods described the continued practice of  force-feeding detainees who engage 
in hunger strikes, characterizing such hunger strikes as “a tool used by [detainees] to stay in the 
fight.” 193 A Defense Department official accompanying Task Force staff  commented that the 
tactic is “in the Manchester Manual (an alleged Al Qaeda training document)  — that’s why they 
do it.” 194 When asked to clarify whether any distinction is made between detainees who engage 
in hunger strikes to protest their indefinite detention and detainees who have been found to have 
links to Al Qaeda and the Manchester Manual, Woods said, “We consider anyone undertaking 
hunger strikes to be continuing the fight against the U.S. government.” 195
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As previously discussed, this generalization is outdated and based on the disproven premise 
that all Guantánamo detainees are affiliated with Al Qaeda or otherwise took up arms against 
the United States and are therefore “continuing” their fight.196 Woods’s statement, however, 
echoes a 2007 press document issued by JTF-GTMO that discusses the Manchester Manual 
and asserts that “[a]lthough many of  the detainees are illiterate and have not read the manual, 
a JTF source said there is a segment of  the detained population who were trainers in the various 
terrorist camps and that these trainers have either, by example or through different modes of  
communication, disseminated the document’s principles to the larger detainee population.” 197 The 
JTF release additionally acknowledges that “[a]lthough not all detainees held in detention centers 
here are directly associated with al Qaeda, the manual is believed to be intended as a guide for all 
extremist Islamic fighters engaged in paramilitary training. … [A JTF source added that] whether 
the detainees here are directly affiliated with al Qaeda or not is irrelevant. What is relevant, he said, 
is that they have paramilitary combat skills and the willingness to apply those skills when they are so 
inclined to use them.” 198 
Task Force staff  was also shown the legal facilities at Guantánamo, including the rooms in which 
detainees may meet with counsel. An emerging issue is the question of  detainee access to counsel 
once habeas corpus petitions have been resolved. In July 2012, attorney David Remes along with 
several other detainee counsel filed a motion before the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
arguing that the Department of  Justice (DOJ) has begun requiring counsel to sign a “highly 
restrictive” memorandum of  understanding (MOU) if  attorneys seek to continue contact with 
their clients.199 According to Remes, the MOU would negate the right to habeas conferred on 
Guantánamo detainees by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush.200 
Beyond giving JTF total [control over] attorney contacts with their detainee 
clients, the MOU appears calculated to prevent counsel from using information 
gleaned from the client to (1) continue to advocate the client’s release through the 
media, collaboration with human rights groups, or proceedings in other forums, 
(2) share such information with counsel for other detainees, or even use such 
information in the case of  another client, (3) discuss the client’s possible transfer 
with potential receiving countries, or, (4) apparently, even prepare for Privilege 
Review Board (PRB) and military commission proceedings. The MOU will also 
apparently prevent us from preparing adequately for new habeas petitions if  
circumstances change.” 201 
In its reply, the government argued that the MOU provided for continued detainee access to 
counsel. The lawyers would not, however, have access to classified documents prepared for the 
previous habeas cases without specific requests for such information which would be evaluated by 
the Department of  Defense.202 The government’s brief  acknowledged that counsel’s continued 
access to detainees and classified information would be at the “final and unreviewable” discretion 
of  the JTF-GTMO commander, as opposed to mandated by the judicial protective order 
governing detainee access to counsel that followed Boumediene.203
In a September 6, 2012 ruling, Judge Royce Lamberth agreed with detainee counsel, stating that 
In the case of  Guantánamo detainees, access to the courts means nothing without 
access to counsel. And it is undisputed that petitioners here have a continuing 
right to seek habeas relief. It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access 
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the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel. Therefore, the Government’s 
attempt to supersede the Court’s authority is an illegitimate exercise of  Executive 
power. The Court, whose duty it is to secure an individual’s liberty from 
unauthorized and illegal Executive confinement, cannot now tell a prisoner that 
he must beg leave of  the Executive’s grace before the Court will involve itself.204
On November 2, 2012, the Department of  Justice filed a notice of  appeal of  Lamberth’s ruling 
to the D..C.. Circuit Court of  Appeals — before which no Guantánamo detainee has ever won 
a habeas case205 — but the government reversed course six weeks later, asking the D.C. Circuit 
instead to dismiss the appeal.206
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of  Guantánamo today remains the indefinite nature of  
detention at the facility. Detainee counsel Joseph Margulies emphasizes that 
Guantánamo has changed. It is not that prison anymore. And when the 
administration — the Bush administration or the Obama administration 
— describe it as a very different facility, in significant respects they’re right. 
Guantánamo’s moral bankruptcy now is not that it’s built around the creation of  
debilitating despair. Its moral bankruptcy now is that these guys are held without 
ever having been charged or tried or convicted of  anything.207
Even those cleared for release are subject to continued detention due to the difficulty of  transfers 
from Guantánamo. As of  2012, the names of  30 Yemeni detainees who cannot be returned to 
Yemen (per President Obama’s suspension of  transfers to Yemen in 2010) and the names of  the 
46 detainees to be held indefinitely remained classified.208 Human rights advocates and detainee 
counsel have called for all detainee names to be declassified so that attorneys can publicly push 
for their transfers to third countries.209 It remains to be seen what, if  any, changes President 
Obama during his second term will make to this policy or to the continuation of  Guantánamo 
as a detention facility. 
Profile: The International Committee of the Red Cross                                             
and the Role of Christophe Girod
It is difficult to overstate the effect the revelations about Abu Ghraib prison, first publicized 
in April 2004, had on the entire detention and interrogation regime, not only in Iraq but 
at Guantánamo and elsewhere. 210 The revulsion unleashed by the photos of  abused and 
humiliated prisoners was perhaps the single most influential factor in shifting the momentum 
away from those within the government who advocated the appropriateness and necessity of  
coercive interrogation techniques and torture. 
The repugnant images from Abu Ghraib and accounts of  abuse at Guantánamo were not, 
however, a surprise to officials at the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC).211 The 
discovery of  those conditions led to an intense debate within the organization about its role and 
under what circumstances it should speak out publicly in such situations more frequently, despite 
a strong tradition of  not doing so.212 An examination of  the role of  the ICRC at Guantánamo 
and Abu Ghraib by the Task Force inevitably raises the question as to whether the abusive 
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techniques might have been halted earlier if  the group had departed from its usual practice and 
taken a more aggressive public stance. As the outrage over the Abu Ghraib photos had such an 
influence, another way of  expressing the question is whether more public condemnation from 
the ICRC would have had a similar, hastening effect on changing practices.
The ICRC has a strong reputation for acting without fear or favor in evaluating humanitarian 
conditions in wartime. Its heritage dates to more than 150 years ago when Henry Dunant, who 
cared for wounded soldiers at the Battle of  Solferino in 1859, lobbied for a treaty to protect 
all wounded soldiers in times of  war, regardless of  their allegiance.213 Typically, only the most 
autocratic regimes, those most likely to have obvious deficiencies in treatment of  prisoners, 
deny the Red Cross access to their detention facilities. (The ICRC recently even gained access 
to an Al Qaeda affiliate’s jail in Yemen.214) Moreover, the culture and history of  the ICRC hold 
that while its representatives generally have free access to detention conditions, they do not 
publicly disseminate any critical judgments they may make about humanitarian deficiencies. 
Instead, the Red Cross usually delivers its complaints about treatment privately to the involved 
government.215 It is, in effect, a trade-off: access for an agreement to keep findings confidential.
But in some rare circumstances ICRC officials will allow the publicizing of  problems they might 
find; they say they do so when they find the government has been notified of  the problems 
repeatedly and remains unresponsive to requests to make improvements. 
Some Red Cross officials concluded on several occasions between 2002 and 2005 that  they 
were forced to resort to suggesting publicly there were problems at Guantánamo.216 This was 
a decision not universally applauded within the tradition-bound ICRC. It resulted in intense 
internal debates over how to deal with the U.S. government.217 In those years, there were two 
levels of  interaction between the Red Cross and the United States, which has long been a 
major supporter of  the ICRC both philosophically and financially. At the operational level, the 
ICRC team based in Washington, who handled the visits to Guantánamo, had a difficult, even 
at times hostile relationship with authorities who ran the detention center there. There was a 
more formal diplomatic relationship between the senior officials of  the Red Cross in Geneva 
and administration officials, which was conducted in a quieter fashion.218 In the end, the latter 
faction prevailed in the internal ICRC debate as to whether to raise the level of  public criticism 
of  the U.S. treatment of  Guantánamo prisoners.
A major actor in the drama was Christophe Girod, the head of  the ICRC office in Washington 
at the time and a firm believer that the organization, with its well-founded reputation, had many 
cards to play. His efforts to push the ICRC would lead him into conflict with the organization’s 
senior managers and eventually result in his departure from the Red Cross.
The relationship between ICRC investigators who actually visited prisoners and the military 
and administration were fractious from the beginning, as recounted by several people in 
interviews. The first issue arose when ICRC officials were disturbed that the U.S. authorities 
were citing the fact of  the Red Cross visits as a kind of  seal of  approval of  the practices at the 
facilities. Whenever questions were raised about the treatment of  the Guantánamo prisoners, 
for example, the Pentagon would respond with a statement that everyone was being treated 
humanely, emphasizing that representatives of  the Red Cross regularly visited the facility.219 
This seemed to imply there were no problems with the conditions at Guantánamo. In fact, 
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it concealed the fact that the teams of  ICRC representatives had found many criticisms of  
what was occurring there but were generally inhibited from saying so publicly. It produced 
considerable annoyance on the part of  the Washington office of  the ICRC, which repeatedly 
insisted that the Defense Department not suggest that Red Cross visitation implied any 
approval. Red Cross officials notified some in the media of  this view.
Then, in October 2003, Girod had an especially contentious meeting in Guantánamo with the 
commander of  the base, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, according to several witnesses.220 
Voices were raised. Girod complained about the condition of  the detainees and said U.S. 
authorities were doing little to remedy issues brought to their attention. General Miller told 
Girod that he did not approve of  the Red Cross’ role — he had no use at all for the inspections 
— but he was obliged to endure the visits. Their body language when they emerged from a 
meeting was striking; reporters saw them walk out of  a building tight-lipped and angry.221
Girod then made a rare public statement about the treatment of  the detainees. He told The 
New York Times that conditions were unacceptable because the prisoners were being held 
indefinitely and their uncertainty was producing mental health problems.222 “One cannot keep 
these detainees in this pattern, this situation, indefinitely,” he said in an interview with The 
Times at the base in Guantánamo. He said it was intolerable that the complex was used as “an 
investigation center, not a detention center,” which was a hint about the mistreatment the Red 
Cross was learning about during interrogation sessions.223 “The open-endedness of  this situation 
and its impact on the mental health of  the population has become a major problem,” Girod 
continued. 224 He put a similar statement on the organization’s website that day.
Some officials at the ICRC’s headquarters in Geneva were troubled by Girod’s actions. 
They believed the ICRC should hew to its traditional stance of  refusing to disclose any of  its 
observations publicly and share such findings only with the U.S. government. 
At about the same time as Girod was battling Miller and beginning to take his case to the 
public, Red Cross inspectors in Iraq were so unsettled by what they found at the Abu Ghraib 
prison that they broke off  a visit abruptly and demanded an immediate explanation from the 
military prison authorities.225 In a report disclosed first by The Wall Street Journal, the ICRC had 
privately informed senior U.S. officials of  prisoner abuses in Iraq many months before the Abu 
Ghraib abuses became public.226 The Red Cross also said its president raised the issue with 
senior administration officials in January 2004, an assertion U.S. officials would come to dispute. 
In February, the ICRC sent the U.S. government a detailed 24-page report about problems at 
Abu Ghraib. It was based on interviews by ICRC inspectors of  prisoners in Iraq conducted 
between March and October 2003. Many of  those findings had been transmitted to U.S. 
military officials as they occurred, ICRC officials said.227 
However, there was no dispute as to whether the U.S. government had received the February 
report about Abu Ghraib. It said that prisoners were being kept “completely naked in totally 
empty concrete cells and in total darkness’’ for several days. The report, which was not made 
public by the Red Cross, also documented the kind of  behavior that produced a firestorm after 
the Abu Ghraib photographs were published. It cited “acts of  humiliation such as being made 
to stand naked against the wall of  the cell with arms raised or with women’s underwear over 
the heads for prolonged periods — while being laughed at by guards, including female guards, 
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and sometimes photographed in this position.’’228 The accounts of  when the Red Cross raised 
alarms contradicted several statements by senior Pentagon officials as to when they first learned 
of  potential abuses in Iraq. When the scandal erupted in May 2004 senior officials said they 
had no inkling of  the problems until a private at the prison turned over photos of  the abuse to 
Pentagon investigators on January 13.229 
Lieutenant General Lance Smith, the deputy commander of  the central command that 
oversaw Iraq, testified before Congress in May 2004 appeared, and was asked whether there 
were complaints about detainee treatment before January 13. 230 “There were reports there 
was trouble in those places, but not of  the character we’re talking about here,” he replied. He 
suggested prison officials were working quietly with the Red Cross to deal with the complaints.231
Back in Guantánamo, after a June 2004 visit by one of  its inspection teams, the ICRC charged 
in a confidential report to U.S. officials that the American military had engaged in intentional 
physical coercion that was “tantamount to torture.” 232 It was the first time the ICRC used that 
term in a physical sense.233 The report’s findings were rejected by administration and military 
officials, and the Red Cross, as is customary, did not make its complaints public. In November 
2004, The New York Times obtained a summary of  the ICRC report and wrote about its contents 
and the administration’s subsequent rejection of  its findings on the front page.234
The ICRC report stated that its investigators said they had discovered a system devised to 
break the will of  the prisoners and make them wholly dependent on their interrogators through 
“humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, used of  forced positions.” 235 The 
report said that Guantánamo “cannot be considered other than an intentional system of  cruel, 
unusual and degrading treatment and a form of  torture.” 236 In addition to persistent exposure 
to loud and persistent noise and prolonged cold, it said, detainees were subjected to some beatings.
The decision at the Red Cross was not to publicize or even confirm the report. Beatrice 
Megevand-Roggo, a senior ICRC official in Geneva, told The Times that the organization 
does not comment on the substance of  reports submitted to authorities. Megevand-Roggo 
acknowledged the issue of  confidentiality was a dilemma for the organization and that, “many 
people do not understand why we have these bilateral agreements of  confidentiality.” 237 
Girod was interviewed in April 2012 by Task Force staff  in Cyprus, where he was working in 
a humanitarian capacity for the United Nations. He said he felt strongly that in dealing with 
U.S. authorities, it would have been justifiable for the ICRC at times to have publicly expressed 
disappointment with inadequate efforts to address complaints about conditions.238 Public 
condemnation by the ICRC, used sparingly, can be important and can help reduce abuse and 
perhaps save lives, he said. 
“It’s different with the U.S.,” Girod said of  the potential influence of  the ICRC. For example, 
he said that “Assad [the Syrian leader] doesn’t care if  the ICRC condemns his behavior. It won’t 
bring change.” But U.S. leaders would be deeply reluctant to engage in behavior that could 
bring condemnation by the Red Cross.239
After The Times published a summary of  the confidential ICRC report in November 2004 
that said that what the military interrogators were doing at Guantánamo was “tantamount 
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to torture,” the organization hurriedly arranged a visit to Washington for its top official, Jakob 
Kellenberger.240 It appeared that Kellenberger would convey the group’s strong displeasure directly 
to senior policymakers. He met with Secretary of  State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser to the president. Although there 
had been considerable anticipation of  a kind of  showdown, there turned out to be little fanfare 
accompanying his visit; he came and went quietly, with little comment from either the government 
or the ICRC. Red Cross officials said that on earlier visits to Washington, Kellenberger would 
always pare down the list of  concerns he was given by ICRC staff  members to raise with the 
American officials. Kellenberger was known to have little appetite for confrontation.
The inspections by the ICRC’s staff  members under Girod made other discoveries; they found 
that medical personnel at Guantánamo were aiding interrogators in several ways. The memo 
discussed how some military psychologists were organized into Behavioral Science Consultation 
Teams (BSCT), known colloquially as “biscuits,’’ and that detainees’ medical files were often used 
to help them devise strategies for interrogators. The existence of  the “biscuits’’ was first disclosed 
to the public in The Times article about the ICRC report. The ICRC believed much of  what it 
found was a violation of  standard medical ethics practices.241
In his interview with Task Force staff, Girod described his meetings with U.S. officials as 
consistently frustrating. He said that he regularly met at the Pentagon with a Defense Department 
Task Force of  military officers to deliver criticisms and suggestions.242 “When we did so, there 
was no reaction whatsoever from them,” he said. “It seemed nobody would dare say anything. 
They were all looking at each other. … They would say ‘thank you’ and that was it.” 243 He never 
received any feedback or substantive acknowledgement of  any complaint. “They didn’t say, ‘we’ll 
take care of  it.’ Nothing like that. And we never got any feedback.” 244 
He described the experience of  ICRC inspectors at Guantánamo as difficult in the beginning. At 
first, he said, “detainees were in real fear of  what would happen to them [if  they talked to us].” 245 
Girod said that officials at Guantánamo tried to sow distrust of  the ICRC among the prisoners. 
“Some interrogators told the detainees that the ICRC works with the prison camp’s authorities 
and noted that the red cross of  their insignia was the same as U.S. medics wore.” 246 
Girod said that the revelations about Abu Ghraib had an enormous impact, including at 
Guantánamo. “After Abu Ghraib, everything changed,’’ he said. “It was an awakening, media-
wise and political-wise.” 247 
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Afghanistan was the birthplace of  post–September 11 detention and it continues there today over a 
decade later. In March 2012, the United States reached an agreement with the Karzai government 
on the custody of  the then-estimated 3,200 detainees in Afghanistan. The agreement called for an 
accelerated transfer of  detainees from U.S. to Afghan control, but it also provided Americans a veto over 
which detainees could be released. To some, the March 2012 custody agreement signaled the beginning 
of  the end of  the United States’ involvement in detainee affairs in Afghanistan. However, in September 
2012, The New York Times reported the U.S. military, over Afghan objections, would maintain control 
indefinitely over at least a few dozen foreign detainees in Afghanistan. Thus, there appears to be no clear 
end in sight to the U.S. role as a jailer in Afghanistan. 
It is unclear from the available evidence the degree to which instances of  illegal violence in Afghanistan 
can be attributed to the fog of  war, to individual bad actors, or to policy decisions of  senior leaders. 
The United States has had two detention programs in Afghanistan over the last 10 years — an 
officially acknowledged program and an unofficial, classified program. The official detention program 
has been run by the U.S. military during and following the invasion of  Afghanistan in the fall of  
2001. Estimates on the number of  detainees in that program at any one time over the last decade have 
varied, up to several thousand. The second detention program has involved a secret network of  jails, 
the existence of  which was long unacknowledged by U.S. officials, and is believed to have been used to 
detain only a small fraction of  those in the military’s detention program. In both programs detainees 
have been mistreated and some have died. In some instances abusive, illegal interrogation tactics utilized 
in Afghanistan later found their way to Iraq. Notoriously, two detainees died within a week of  each other 
at Bagram Air Base in December 2002 after they were interrogated by members of  the 519th Military 
Intelligence Battalion. The battalion left Afghanistan in the summer of  2003, went to Iraq, conducted 
interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison, and became the subject of  controversy when, months later, the 
infamous photographs of  the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison emerged. 
A review of  the United States’ experience in Afghanistan over the last decade demonstrates several 
different points of  failure in the nation’s post–September 11 detention process. Not only were detainees 
treated improperly and illegally at times, but the decision processes on whether to detain someone and 
whether to continue to do so were deeply flawed. Marine Major General Doug Stone, who in 2007–08 
significantly revised the U.S. detention program in Iraq, was sent to review the situation in Afghanistan. 
58
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
In 2009, he recommended that 400 of  the 600 detainees held at Bagram Air Base be released. He said 
their continued detention was counterproductive to the interests of  the United States.
Today, quietly, the United States seems to have learned at least some lessons from the last 11½ years in 
Afghanistan. Since May 2010, at the urging of  General David Petraeus, the detention sites operated by 
the military’s Joint Special Operations Command are reportedly open to inspection by Afghan officials 
and the International Committee of  the Red Cross. More generally, the Red Cross appears today to have 
an improved relationship with the Department of  Defense. 
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The Fog of War?
 
On the night of  October 7, 2001, the first night of  the Afghanistan war, an 
unmanned Predator drone (equipped with two Hellfire missiles) identified the 
Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, fleeing Kabul in a convoy.1 The 
drone’s infrared scanner tracked the convoy, but by the time the request to fire 
made its way to Central Command headquarters in Tampa Bay, Fla., Mullah 
Omar had managed to escape. 
The United States and its allies had precious little intelligence about who, precisely, 
they were fighting on the ground in Afghanistan in the first months of  the war. 
Overlap between Taliban and Al Qaeda members, many U.S. officials thought at 
the time, was high. After all, the Taliban had just jeopardized its hold on power 
throughout most of  Afghanistan in order to protect Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda. In truth, the overlap between the two organizations in 2001 was far smaller than 
believed.2 Osama bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after four years in Sudan. Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban mutually co-existed together throughout the late 1990s in Afghanistan, 
but there seems to have been little coordination between the two. “In 1996 it was non-existent, 
and by 2001, no more than 50 people [overlapped].” 3 
While it is true that thousands of  foreign fighters trained at Al Qaeda training camps, Mullah 
Omar was said to have maintained a parochial outlook, interested in the consolidation of  the 
Taliban’s power within Afghanistan, and was uneasy with bin Laden’s goal of  global jihad.4 
Omar was reported to be in talks to betray bin Laden to the Saudis until President Bill Clinton 
ordered air strikes against Afghanistan in 1998.5 After the U.S. attack on Afghan soil, Omar 
refused any deal.6 
The war against the Soviet occupation, and the ongoing Afghan civil war between the Taliban 
and the Afghan Northern Alliance, had brought many non-Afghans to Afghanistan over the 
years to fight with the Taliban to establish a “pure Islamic” state in Afghanistan. Additionally, 
Afghanistan, as a broken state in 2001, offered a variety of  militant Muslim groups a 
comparatively safe haven in which to conduct training operations. Uighur separatists, members 
of  an ethnic group who sought independence for their homeland in western China, operated 
there as did members of  the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which sought the removal 
of  Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafi from power. By 1998, the Libyan government had succeeded 
in crushing LIFG’s Libyan operations, and many of  its members had fled to Afghanistan.7 
While many non-Afghans in Afghanistan had been prepared to fight the Northern Alliance for 
the establishment of  a “pure Islamic” state, many of  them were not prepared for September 11 
and the ensuing U.S.-led invasion and “War on Terror,” in which many of  them would come to 
be seen as terrorists.8 Leonid Syukiainen, a Russian academic, suggested parallels between some 
of  the foreign fighters found in the aftermath of  the U.S. invasion and the idealistic Westerners 
who had moved to the Soviet Union, following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, to build a 
socialist society.9 “Of  course, there had to be a combination of  reasons for these people to flee to 
Afghanistan,” Professor Syukiainen said, “but I believe that their strongest motive was that they 
sincerely sought a fair Islamic society there.”10 One candidate that appeared to meet Professor 
Syukiainen’s description, a vagabond who sought to help build a theocratic Islamic state, was an 
American citizen — John Walker Lindh who earned the sobriquet “the American Taliban.’’
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Lindh was born in Washington, D.C., and his family had moved to California when he was 
10 years old. As a teenager, at a time of  great turmoil in his parent’s marriage, Lindh became 
deeply interested in Islam. He converted to the faith when he was 16. The following year, 
Lindh traveled to Yemen where he lived for 10 months studying Arabic and the Koran. After 
trips back and forth between the United States and Yemen, he left Yemen for Pakistan in 2000 
and studied at a madrassa until May of  2001 when, at 20 years old, he left Pakistan to join the 
Taliban. Lindh’s capture came in November 2001 after heavy fighting at Kunduz.
Lindh later said he had met Osama bin Laden while he was in Afghanistan but was only 
vaguely aware of  his reputation at the time.11 He claimed that prior to September 11 he had 
never heard of  Al Qaeda, which terrorism experts found plausible.12 “There were two kinds 
of  training at Al Farooq (the training camp in Afghanistan Lindh attended) — Al Qaeda 
training, to fight civilians, and military training, to fight the Northern Alliance,” explained 
Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at the Rand Corporation in Washington. “Lindh took 
only the military training. Seventy thousand people were trained in general warfare at these 
camps, but perhaps only a tenth received advanced terrorist training.” 13 Lindh claimed he was 
oblivious to terror plotting around him but admitted he had once been taken aside toward the 
end of  his training by an Egyptian official named Abu Mohammed al-Masri, later identified 
as a confirmed member of  Al Qaeda.14 “He asked me whether I’d like to do a martyrdom 
operation” in the United States or Israel, according to Lindh. “I said no, I’m not interested 
in that. I came to fight the Northern Alliance, not other countries.” 15 Al-Masri is said to have 
accepted Lindh’s demurral but warned him that, whatever else he did, he was not to mention 
their conversation to anyone.16
Lindh’s capture and detention is a useful, illustrative example of  the controversy and confusion 
surrounding detainee matters in the early stages of  the war. There were many foreign fighters 
in Afghanistan like Lindh. The collapse of  the Taliban had come suddenly: Kunduz, Kabul 
and Kandahar — all under the control of  the Taliban — had fallen to the United States and 
the Northern Alliance within just weeks of  one another.17 The light U.S. footprint designed for 
the military campaign by Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon embedded 
Special Forces and the CIA with the Northern Alliance’s fighters. Following the initial battles 
in Afghanistan, Special Forces conducted village raids, going house to house, and rounded up 
suspected insurgents.18 It was these elite U.S. forces and their allies who first dealt with prisoners 
taken from the battlefield.
Kunduz, where Lindh was captured, was the last city to fall in the north. Many Taliban and Al 
Qaeda soldiers, routed in other cities, had regrouped to Kunduz. Under relentless bombardment 
by the Americans and surrounded by the Northern Alliance, an estimated 450 foreign fighters 
agreed to surrender in Kunduz to the Northern Alliance warlord, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, 
who is today Afghanistan’s chief  of  staff  for the commander in chief  of  the Afghan army.19 
Afghan Taliban foot soldiers, most of  whom deserted when the war’s outcome became apparent, 
were welcomed by their counterparts on the other side. Senior Taliban leaders meanwhile, in 
many cases, were rescued by the Pakistani intelligence service, which had spent years supporting 
the Taliban.20 Left behind were foreigners like Lindh. Mullah Faisal, Lindh’s Taliban commander, 
had reached an agreement to pay Dostum around $500,000 in exchange for his unit’s safe passage 
out of  the country.21 Lindh had hoped to escape to Pakistan and then return to America. The 
foreign fighters at Kunduz, only after being disarmed, however, realized Mullah Faisal had been 
double-crossed and they were to be imprisoned rather than allowed to return to their home 
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countries. After a tense standoff, the prisoners were taken to Qala-i-Jangi, a prison fortress built in 
the 19th century. There, a CIA officer, Johnny “Mike” Spann interrogated Lindh briefly before a 
grisly prison riot broke out. Spann was killed in the ensuing riot. 
The events that followed in response to the prison riot have been called a massacre and human 
rights violation. After Spann’s death, the non-Afghan prisoners overpowered their guards and 
were said to have broken into the armory.22 Air strikes were called in against the prisoners. 
Twenty-four hours after the air strikes, oil was poured into the facility and set ablaze. The 
following day, as the clean-up of  corpses was underway, four shots rang out from the basement 
and two rescue workers were injured.23 Realizing people were still alive in the fortress, the 
Northern Alliance, along with the support of  American advisors, devised a plan to divert a local 
water supply to flood the basement and finish off  any remaining survivors. 
Remarkably, 86 detainees survived the air strikes, oil and water attacks at Qala-i-Jangi. As they 
slowly emerged, a guard called out their varied nationalities: “Uzbekistan! Arab! Pakistan! 
Yemen! Chechnya!” 24 Amongst the survivors there were early clues of  the complex issues each 
non-Afghan fighter would pose to his captors. One survivor of  Qala-i-Jangi told Luke Harding, 
a reporter for The Observer, “we wanted to surrender on Thursday. But there was a group of  
seven Arabs who wouldn’t let us.” 25 A Uighur survivor of  the riot at Qala-i-Jangi, told his 
Guantánamo Combatant Status Review Tribunial that a Uighur friend of  his was killed there 
during the riot, but “I did not participate in the riot. They dropped bombs and I was injured. I 
was not a soldier. I have nothing against the Americans. Why would I participate in the riot.” 26 
Of  the 86 survivors, at least 50, including 21 Saudis and nine Yemenis, would be transferred 
to Guantánamo, where their alleged participation in the prison riot was used to justify their 
continued detention.27 
As the uprising at Qala-i-Jangi was beginning, a far larger group of  Taliban soldiers, at least 
1,100 and possibly as many as 13,000 — together with an unknown number of  fleeing civilians 
— surrendered to General Dostum five miles west of  Kunduz, in the city in Yerghanek.28 Very 
few of  those from Yerghanek, perhaps 70 at most, were eventually transferred to Guantánamo. 
Many more might have wound up in Guantánamo had they survived. The trip from Yerghanek 
to Sheberghan, crowded into shippin containers without adequate ventilation or water.
According to the British journalist Andy Worthington, both the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance had previously used shipping containers as a means of  killing the other side’s prisoners. 
In 1997, a brutal Uzbek general for the Northern Alliance  murdered 1,250 Taliban prisoners 
by leaving them in containers without food, air or water.29 The Taliban had responded with 
similar behavior. Three British nationals, who would later come to be known as the “Tipton 
Three” because they all came from Tipton, England, survived their journey to Sheberghan 
from Yerghanek by licking the moisture from the sides of  their shipping container to get water. 
They described their ordeal after being released from Guantánamo in March 2004. The Tipton 
Three, two of  whom were 20 years old at the time of  their capture, would later successfully 
sue to have their right to challenge, in U.S. courts, their detention at Guantánamo Bay. That 
landmark case, Rasul v. Bush,30 was handed down by the Supreme Court in June 2004, three 
months after the Bush administration had already released Rasul and the other members of  the 
Tipton Three. 
The shipping container that took the Tipton Three from Yerghanek to Sheberghan arrived 
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at night, the whole spectacle allegedly illuminated by spotlights operated by U.S. Special Forces 
soldiers.31 Of  the 200 men originally in their container, according to the Tipton Three, only 20 
survived. Physicians for Human Rights conducted a forensic assessment of  the gravesites in early 
2002.32 It is unknown exactly how many hundreds or thousands of  detainees died in the convoy. 
What remains unclear is the participation of  U.S. Special Forces in these acts, in late November 
and early December of  2001, and the extent of  U.S. knowledge about the Northern Alliance’s 
actions. No investigation was ever undertaken to unravel these questions. Several U.S. officials 
told The New York Times that American officials were “reluctant to pursue an investigation — 
sought by the FBI, the State Department, the Red Cross and human right groups — because 
[General] Dostum was on the payroll of  the CIA and his militia worked closely with United 
States Special Forces in 2001.” Additionally, Dostum was still serving in the American-
supported government of  President Hamid Karzai.34 U.S. interrogators later became well aware 
of  what happened because the survivors, many of  whom ended up at Guantánamo, told them 
about the atrocities. As evidence mounted about the deaths, Secretary of  State Colin L. Powell 
assigned Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes, to look into them 
in 2002.35 Upon facing stiff  resistance from both U.S. and Afghan officials, Prosper dropped his 
inquiry. ‘‘They made it clear that this was going to cause a problem,’’ said Prosper, speaking in 
2009 of  the Afghan officials he dealt with in 2002. ‘‘They would say, ‘We have had decades of  
war crimes. Where do you start?’ ” 36 In a July 2009 CNN interview, President Barack Obama 
said he had authorized a preliminary probe into the matter: 
The indications that this had not been properly investigated just recently was 
brought to my attention. … So what I’ve asked my national security team to do 
is to collect the facts for me that are known, and we’ll probably make a decision 
in terms of  how to approach it once we have all of  the facts gathered up .37
Whether or not the White House ever indeed gathered facts about the alleged atrocities in the 
fall and winter of  2001, or whether it took any action, remains unknown. 
The Early Setup
On October 7, 2001, the U.S. military launched its invasion of  Afghanistan and found quick 
military success in a country that had frustrated other superpowers.38 On November 13, 2001, 
President George W. Bush issued an order authorizing the creation of  detainee sites by the 
U.S. military, and by Christmas of  2001 facilities were open, running, and interrogations were 
ongoing.39 The last Taliban city stronghold, Kandahar, fell December 6. There was a race to ready 
interrogation operations. The U.S. was collecting detainees fast. In late December there were 37 
detainees in U.S. custody at Kandahar.40 A month later, in late January 2002, the number was 
about 500. 41 On January 19, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld relayed to the Joint Chiefs that 
General Tommy Frank’s order to observe the Geneva Conventions, issued October 17, 2001, 
had been rescinded.42 There were a variety of  holding sites out in the field, often called DIFS 
(Division Internment Facilities) and BIFS (Brigade Internment Facilities), but there were two 
important military sites to which a detainee was eventually sent if  the detainee was to be kept in 
military custody in Afghanistan for any significant period of  time: the Kandahar airport facility43 
and a larger site at Bagram Air Base, first called Bagram Collection Point (BCP) and later called 
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility.44 The two sites became the first stop on the path to 
63
Chapter 2 - Afghanistan
The Constitution Project
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Of  the early detention operations at Bagram, retired General Stanley 
McChrystal later wrote in his memoir “I had been deeply unimpressed with the interrogation 
facilities at Bagram when I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002.” 45 
Army troops that dealt with detainees in Afghanistan fell into one of  two groups: military police 
and military intelligence. Military police (MP) were those troops responsible for detention 
operations whereas military intelligence (MI) interrogators were responsible for gaining 
intelligence from human intelligence (HUMINT) subjects. The Army’s Center for Law and 
Military Operations released a report in August of  2004 that found there was virtually no 
guidance on detainee operations or policy in Afghanistan through formal channels to the field 
until June 2002, when the Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), a corps-level headquarters, 
was established.46 On the interrogation side, the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion (202nd) 
established the initial interrogation operations in Afghanistan. The 202nd reportedly produced 
nearly 1,500 intelligence reports in just over seven months, in a reports database that was called 
“superb” at the time by the Army’s first task force director for counterintelligence and human 
intelligence in Afghanistan.47 Two military intelligence personnel from the 519th Military 
Intelligence Battalion (519th) were assigned to augment the 202nd. In August and September of  
2002, the 202nd was replaced by the 519th, and two members from the 202nd stayed and trained 
the 519th on the local practices developed by the 202nd.48
Conditions and treatment both in Kandahar and at Bagram were, by accounts from detainees 
and soldiers alike, brutal. Conditions were reported slightly better, though only comparatively 
so, at Kandahar compared with Bagram. In-processing of  detainees at both facilities was 
designed to shock new detainee arrivals in an effort to recreate “point of  capture” shock in the 
hope new captives would be more compliant. The behavior included yelling, nakedness, body 
cavity searches, alleged beatings, sleep deprivation and barking military dogs. The behavior 
toward detainees was exhibited across both military police and military interrogation units. 
Many of  these same techniques would later be found in Iraq and indeed several members of  
the 519th deployed to Iraq in the summer of  2003 to initiate interrogation operations there. Just 
as at Bagram, the 519th’s assistant operations officer, Captain Carolyn Wood, assumed duties as 
the interrogation officer in charge in Iraq.49 In the fallout of  the Abu Ghraib scandal, Captain 
Wood later told the Senate Armed Services Committee that interrogators had used sleep 
deprivation and stress positions in Afghanistan and that she “perceived the Iraq experience to 
be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan.” 50
Guidance to the field was lacking. The executive summary of  the Church Report, a report the 
secretary of  defense commissioned in May of  2004 to examine Department of  Defense (DOD) 
interrogation operations, found that the interrogators in Afghanistan, in the absence of  clear orders 
regarding interrogation,  had been forced to “fall back on their training and experience” and “rely on 
a broad interpretation” of  Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52.51 Notably, only the executive summary 
of  the Church Report is available to the public. However, in January 2011 an unclassified, public 
document filed in the United States military commission case against Noor Uthman Muhammed 
made several references to facts and findings supposedly contained within the complete Church 
Report that conflict with the public unclassified executive summary. While the Army Field Manual 
was theoretically in place according to the Church Report, unofficially, interrogators were pressured 
to utilize whatever tactics they could that were thought might gain intelligence.
Demand for information, demand for intel, we need raw intel we need this 
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information as soon as you can get it. Get it now, get it, get it, get it, get it, get 
it, get it. Great, how do you suggest we go about getting it? We don’t. Get it, 
get it, get it, get it. That’s all we got for like six months straight. We’re like — Is 
there anything else? …
Take the kid gloves off, stop playing nice. We were told get information, get it 
fast. It’s not like we were sitting there going, ok, you don’t want to talk to me, ok, 
have a nice day. It’s not like we could do that. It’s like every time you go to the 
interrogation room, you’ve got to go, ok, this guy knows information that could 
save a hundred of  my friends. How do we get that information out of  them?52
At Kandahar, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Keith Warman was in command at the detention facility 
in the days after the fall of  the Taliban.53 Kandahar was in crisis mode: space was inadequate, 
resources were inadequate, and there was constant pressure to empty cells. Detainees, as well as 
an interrogator, described how one interrogator at Kandahar always shouted the same question 
at arriving prisoners: “When did you last see Osama bin Laden?” 54 Sami al-Hajj, a cameraman 
for Al Jazeera who spent years in detention, first in Afghanistan and later at Guantánamo, says 
Kandahar seemed to him like a strategic collection site, as opposed to Bagram, where he was 
only ever asked about bin Laden.55 Amongst the indignities al-Hajj recalled were being beaten, 
deprived of  sleep, stripped naked, and being anally probed with an instrument when he was 
captured and brought to Kandahar.56
Anal cavity searches of  detainees were a common source of  complaint. The Australian David 
Hicks, who pleaded guilty to charges of  providing support for terrorism and was returned to his 
home in Australia in 2007, wrote of  the same experience. In his autobiography, Hicks described 
how he and a number of  other detainees were flown from the USS Bataan to Kandahar where 
they were met and then forced to lie down while a soldier walked on their backs, stepping on 
one detainee after the other. Hicks described how he was then shaved entirely before a medical 
inspection.57 Of  the rectal probe he wrote:
I was bent over and held down by two soldiers who were escorting me. The 
soldier at this station held a large piece of  white plastic and shoved it up my anus. 
As this was done, I heard a nearby soldier say, “Extra ribbed for your pleasure.” 58
On the practice of  full-body nudity and anal cavity searches, in June 2004 the Jacoby Report, 
an internal military investigation of  Afghanistan’s prisons launched in the wake of  the Abu 
Ghraib scandal, found there was no evidence rectal examinations were useful, either from a 
medical or a security standpoint.
There has been no evidence to reinforce the need for rectal or hernia 
examinations, and little or no justification for requiring full-body nudity as a 
part of  exams or inspections. Guidance removing these processes from our 
procedures has been issued as part of  this inspection.59
The practice was widespread enough that in January 2005, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz issued a policy statement memorandum and guidelines on body cavity searches 
of  detainees in DOD control. “The United States has a significant and legitimate interest in 
performing appropriate security searches and medical exams” the memo began. “However, 
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the use of  body cavity exams and searches may conflict with the customs of  some 
detainees.” 60 Body cavity searches were no longer to be routine and were only to 
be performed when there was a reasonable belief  an item would be concealed that 
presented a security risk.61
Why were these techniques used as a part of  in-processing? One interrogator said it 
appeared to many to have been a way to set the stage for later interrogation: 
What’s the best way to get someone to talk to you? The direct approach. 
Ask a question, get an answer. What’s the best way to put them in that 
frame of  mind? Fear! Of  the unknown. The best way is adrenaline 
pumping through your body. Your mind isn’t thinking clearly. So: dogs, 
loud music, lots of  light, no light, eyes covered. …
Again, you are trying to jack up their level of  aggravation. You are trying to 
create this balance between what they are frightened of  and what’s going on. 
Usually they are in the hood at the time so they couldn’t just stare around 
and block out the sound. You take out the ability to block the sound by taking 
another sense away. So they’ll be sitting there listening to this music they hate, 
it’s blaring at them, so their entire body’s adrenaline is rushing, their heart is 
pounding cause they are aggravated. You’d walk in, turn it off.62
Afghanistan’s Road to Guantánamo
Afghanistan was, in the beginning, where prisoners were gathered and interrogated, and not 
just those captured in Afghanistan. Detainees from the Far East, from Africa, and from the 
Middle East all found themselves transferred to Kandahar and/or Bagram. One such detainee 
was Moazzam Begg, a dual-citizen of  Great Britain and Pakistan who was apprehended at his 
rented home in Islamabad in early 2002. 
After his release from Guantánamo in 2005, Begg remained a controversial figure.63 In 
2010, a cable from the State Department praised Begg for his work in Europe persuading 
European governments to take in remaining detainees at Guantánamo.64 Begg was raised in 
an educated, middle-class family in Birmingham, and was sent to a Jewish elementary school.65 
Throughout the 1990s, Begg traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia, he said, to learn 
more about his heritage and to work with Muslim charities.66 Those travels included visits to 
Bosnian battle zones and to two Afghan training camps. While living in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
in 1998, Begg was suspected of  having met Khalil Deek, an associate of  Abu Zubaydah, and 
assisting him in crafting a CD-ROM version of  a terror manual.67 Begg acknowledged meeting 
Deek and collaborating on a business idea to sell traditional clothing, but says he never met 
Abu Zubaydah.68 Begg returned to the U.K. with his family in 1998 and opened an Islamic 
bookstore in Birmingham, which he described as a meeting place for young Muslims.69 The 
store was raided twice in 1999 and 2000 by British police, but Begg was never charged with a 
crime.70 Begg stated that he had believed the security establishment’s interest in his store was 
“a silly mistake or a fishing trip” until the second raid. In the summer of  2001, Begg moved his 
family to Kabul, where his stated plan was to start a girls’ school and oversee a project digging 
wells.71 After the September 11 attacks and the initiation of  the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Begg 
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evacuated his family to Pakistan.72 Begg’s 2004 Guantánamo habeas petition stated he was 
seized at his rented home by Pakistani officials on January 31, 2002.73 Begg claims he was first 
interrogated by Pakistani interrogators for several weeks before he was turned over to American 
CIA officers, who threw him into the trunk of  a car and took him to Bagram.74 
With the prisoners in their custody, interrogators faced a dilemma. In the face of  inadequate 
intelligence they had to make a decision in many cases whether detainees should be either 
repatriated or transferred to Guantánamo. Even in those instances where interrogators felt a 
detainee shouldn’t be transferred to Guantánamo, their recommendations were often overruled. 
Joshua Claus, one of  Moazzam Begg’s former interrogators said of  Begg, “Nicest guy who ever 
got screwed in his life!” 75 Claus pleaded guilty to assault, prisoner maltreatment, and lying to 
investigators in 2005 and was sentenced to five months in prison for detainee abuse and for his 
role in the death of  a detainee known by the single name of  Dilawar. When Claus was asked 
why Begg was sent to Guantánamo rather than repatriated, he told Task Force staff:
Because no one listens to us. No one listens to us. Our recommendations don’t 
mean shit. We told them, “Moazzam is a good guy. He got snatched up because 
he was in the wrong place [at] the wrong time and because he’s a London 
English speaker.” People were all bent out of  shape about him. They were just 
hard core: Moazzam had to be evil. They couldn’t prove it. That’s why he was 
there so long. And then finally they were saying: just send him with the crew! 
“Why? We’re telling you, send him home!” 76
Strong evidence suggests that at least some U.S. officials were aware public statements claiming 
that Guantánamo only housed “the worst of  the worst” were incorrect. An outside 2006 
review of  the military’s own data on detainees was striking in this regard. The study found only 
8 percent of  Guantánamo detainees were identified as “fighters” for Al Qaeda.77 Forty-five 
percent of  detainees were identified as having committed a hostile act against the United States 
or its allies.78 Hostile acts could include fleeing an area under bombardment by U.S. forces.79 
Ninety-three percent of  the detainees were not captured by U.S. or coalition forces.80 A majority 
were handed over to the United States by Pakistani or “not stated” authorities when the U.S. 
was still offering bounties for terrorist suspects.81 
Initially, all Arabs in custody in Afghanistan were sent to Guantánamo without exception. It 
did not matter what the interrogators personally thought after the interviews. “Every Arab 
was supposed to go,” wrote Chris Mackey in The Interrogators, but “not every Arab should have 
been sent.” 82 Torin Nelson, an interrogator working at Guantánamo in the first few months, 
“realized that a large majority of  the population just had no business being at Guantánamo.” 83 
In the spring of  2002, during a short lull in transfers to Guantánamo from Afghanistan, Major 
General Dunlavey, the head of  Guantánamo’s Task Force 170, visited Kandahar to demand 
changes. The prisoners being sent to Guantánamo from Kandahar, Dunlavey felt, weren’t “the 
worse of  the worst.” 84 Of  Dunlavey’s visit Mackey wrote, “Dunlavey complained Kandahar 
wasn’t being nearly selective enough in filling out its transfer lists.” 85 
Following Dunlavey’s visit, a few changes were made to the screening process. The 
process began with the interrogators making a recommendation about each detainee. The 
categories were: hold in Afghanistan, transfer to Guantánamo, or repatriate. After hearing a 
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recommendation, the operations officer would ask additional questions about the 
reasoning before presenting selected individuals at a weekly meeting.86 
Since many detainees had no identification or biographical information beyond 
what they themselves volunteered to the interrogators, a great deal of  uncertainty 
surrounded each detainee and each recommendation. Recruits had been brought 
to training camps in Afghanistan by “facilitators,” a network of  supporters aiding 
the militant cause in Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa. During their 
journey recruits gave up their identification and adopted aliases. Detainees with 
empty pasts were left to have the gaps filled in, often by the worst assumptions of  
their captors.87 As former United States ambassador-at-large for war crimes Pierre-
Richard Prosper explained “[w]hat people need to realize is that, in the fog of  war, you are 
picking up individuals who have literally nothing but litter in their pockets. Maybe scrap pieces 
of  paper. We have no idea who they are.” 88 Retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington recalled 
in an interview with Task Force staff  that, when he arrived at Guantánamo in 2002, he was 
told by interrogators they were uncertain if  they had the real names of  up to 60 percent of  the 
detainees who were there.
One of  the first men to be released from Guantánamo was a man by the name of  Faiz 
Mohammed. Faiz was later described by a fellow detainee:
He was a very old man. Two soldiers harshly dragged him into the tent and 
dropped him on the floor. He was ordered to stand but neither could he stand nor 
was he able to understand the men. … On the second day when he was called 
for interrogation and had to lie down to be tied up, he did not understand again. 
Soon the soldiers let their passions loose and kicked him to the ground … All the 
while the old man was shouting. He thought he was going to be slaughtered and 
screamed, “Infidels! Let me pray before you slaughter me!” …
When he came back I sat down to talk to him. He said he was from Uruzgan 
province and that he lived in Char Chino district. He told me he was 105 years old 
and eventually he was the first man to be released from the Hell of  Guantánamo.89
The New York Times described Faiz Mohammed after his 2002 release from Guantánamo.
One of  them, Faiz Mohammed, said he was 105. Babbling at times like a child, 
the partially deaf, shriveled old man was unable to answer simple questions. He 
struggled to complete sentences and strained to hear words that were shouted 
at him. His faded mind kept failing him. First he said that American soldiers 
took him away twelve months ago. Then he said he was five years old during 
the rule of  the Afghan King Amanullah, which would make him at least 78, 
and that he spent eight months in an American prison. He was asked if  he was 
angry at the American soldiers who arrested him. “I don’t mind,” he said, his 
face brightening. “They took my old clothes and gave me new clothes.” 90
Detentions were in many cases not just unjust, but especially counterproductive. Detainees 
in U.S. custody included former prisoners of  the Taliban itself, the very regime the U.S. had 
just overthrown. The Taliban had considered some of  its prisoners spies, but ironically, and 
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incomprehensibly, the arrival of  Western forces was little help to them, as they were not freed, 
but taken in as detainees, and, at least in some cases, taken to Guantánamo.91 
Ali Shah Mousavi was a Shiite from a prominent family in Gardez. He had been a doctor and 
was chosen as a representative for the Loya Jirga (an assembly of  regional leaders and tribal 
chiefs) in Kabul to help form the new Afghan government. Not only had he been an enemy 
of  the Taliban, but he had worked extensively with the Americans and Europeans. One day 
in 2002 he simply disappeared and no one knew he had been taken to Bagram and later to 
Guantánamo.92 Similarly Haji Rohullah Wakil, an important Afghan figure, was shipped to 
Guantánamo and released two years later.93 After his release, Wakil met frequently with Afghan 
president Hamid Karzai and other senior Afghan government leaders. 
As important as the road from Afghanistan to Guantánamo was for many detainees, there were 
at least some instances where non-Afghan detainees, captured overseas, were held at Bagram 
and not sent to Guantánamo. In 2006, habeas petitions were filed by three men at Bagram — one 
captured in Thailand, one in Dubai, and one in Pakistan — none of  whom was Afghan. 
The Deaths of Detainees Mullah Habibullah and 
Dilawar at Bagram in December 2002
Documented incidents of  abuse that took place in the detention process in the Afghan theater 
included: use of  “compliance blows” on restrained detainees, use of  pressure point control 
tactics to inflict pain, use of  loud music to disorient detainees, sleep deprivation, routine 
hooding, military working dogs, shackling of  detainees from their wrists to a ceiling to keep 
them standing so they couldn’t fall asleep, rough physical handling and medical exams during 
detainee in-processing, extended isolation, shackling for punishment, stress positions, male 
and female interrogators touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee in a sexual manner, 
physical assaults, and threats of  physical assault.94 
The Bagram Collection Point (BCP) was set up at the very beginning of  2002, in a giant old 
machine shop at Bagram. The uninterrupted space was vast, like a huge warehouse. It was 
more than 50 feet high and 300 feet long, with a cement floor. Detainees were held in what 
were essentially four to six pens, or cages, with each pen separated from one other by razor wire 
walls. Functionally, there were no walls, other than those of  the razor wire. The razor wire was 
manipulated to form doors.
The door space, called a sally port, was where the MPs interacted with the detainees. In some 
instances, detainees were sometimes chained in standing positions for days at the sally port. 
Claus described the place as “Orwellian”:
You can smell it about 10 feet before you open the door. … And then you open 
the door. We walked into a warehouse that stank worse than most people’s 
garbage cans that have been left out in the heat for three months. … You get hit 
by these waves of  stench. And then after three days you never notice it again.95 
For the first year that Bagram operated, detainees there were told to remain completely silent 
except when being interrogated, likely because interrogators were concerned that detainees 
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would collude with one another. The typical punishment for speaking to a fellow 
detainee in the pen would be various stress positions or standing. Al Jazeera 
cameraman Sami al-Hajj said he was beaten upon entry at Bagram in 2002 and 
stripped naked while dogs barked and soldiers yelled.96 He said he waited, for 10 
days, in the cage with other detainees, with whom he was forbidden to talk.
There were four interrogation rooms at the BCP, which weren’t soundproof, and 
there were several “isolation” rooms, where MPs could hold detainees for punitive 
measures or for isolation. The facility had no climate control and the windows were 
open so it was freezing cold in the winter and immensely hot in the summer. Toilets 
were 50-gallon drums cut in half  and laid at the rear of  each pen.97 Detainees were 
forbidden from using drinking water to wash their hands after using the toilets. 
Well-behaved detainees would, every few days, be forced to pick up the drums and 
carry them outside to mix the contents with diesel fuel for incineration as the MPs 
were, at times, understaffed.
December 2, 2002, was notable for several reasons. On that day, Secretary 
Rumsfeld had, in his office at the Pentagon, approved a controversial list of  
harsh interrogation tactics for use in Guantánamo and even scrawled a note that questioned 
why detainees were only forced to stand for four hours at a stretch while he, himself, would 
voluntarily stand for eight hours a day. On the same day at the BCP, Mullah Habibullah, an 
Afghan whose innocence or guilt was never known, was found dead, hanging by his shackled 
wrists in an isolation cell. Habibullah had, by many accounts of  his interrogators, been 
noncompliant. He had been disdainful of  his captors and disrespectful and as a result had made 
himself  a target of  their anger and frustration. Habibullah’s Army autopsy report indicated the 
cause of  death had been a pulmonary embolism caused by blunt force trauma.98 Most likely 
a blood clot, caused by severe injuries to his legs, had traveled to his heart blocking his blood 
flow. Less than a week later, another death occurred. Dilawar, the second man to die, had been 
held for days, and had, in fact, been approved for release. Dilawar was a 22-year-old Afghan 
taxi driver known by his single name. He had been picked up as he was driving passengers past 
a remote American base that had been under rocket attack just hours earlier. The members of  
the 377th MP Company would knee prisoners in their thighs for being unruly or disobedient, a 
powerful pressure point control tactic. By the time of  his final interrogation with Joshua Claus, 
Dilawar’s legs had been kicked mercilessly as he had hung from the doorway and he could 
barely walk. Dilawar was delirious, and believed his wife had died and that her ghost had come 
to the interrogation cell. Dilawar was so badly beaten that he could not adequately respond to 
questions, and Claus figured the inability to answer was an indication of  guilt. Claus believed 
Dilawar, who was subsequently demonstrated to be an innocent taxi driver, had been practicing 
what was taught in Al Qaeda’s training manual to resist interrogation techniques: 
At this point in the interrogation I thought he was reverting back to Al Qaeda’s 
training manual, of  how to avoid interrogation. Have you heard of  that? He 
did five out of  the six things. Almost in a row: can’t understand the interpreter, 
pretend you’re sick, ask for special things, pretend you can’t hear. He went 
through all those things. Turned out he got his ass beat and I didn’t know. 99
In 2001, investigators in Manchester, England, while searching the home of  a suspected Al Qaeda 
operative, had discovered a crude manual that sought to instruct Al Qaeda recruits on how to 
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avoid giving up intelligence during interrogations.100 To interrogators, and policymakers back in 
Washington, it was touted as a document of  immense significance, because it seemed to suggest 
Al Qaeda had developed techniques to resist what was in the Army Field Manual.101 As valuable 
as it may have seemed, there were troubling assumptions made based upon it. What would have 
ordinarily been taken as normal behavior by a detainee, like denials, requests for help, or lack of  
comprehension, could now be construed as incriminating indicators of  Al Qaeda membership.
After Claus finished his interrogation, Dilawar was taken away by MPs. As with Habibullah, 
he was found dead the next day, hanging by his shackled wrists in an isolation cell.102 An Army 
pathologist reported that Dilawar’s legs were beaten so badly they had been “pulpified;” his 
injuries were similar to those that would have resulted from being run over by a bus, and would 
have required amputation had he survived.103 For reasons that remain unclear, it was not 
until April 2004 — the same month that the garish photos from Abu Ghraib splashed across 
American television sets, 16 months after the two deaths — that investigators even began to 
question officers who had served on the command staff  at Bagram in late 2002.104 A June 2004 
Military Justice Field Report stated:
CPT was (and currently still is) the Company Commander of  the 377th MP 
Co, which was deployed to Afghanistan in the fall of  2002. In December 2002, 
at Bagram Detention Facility, 2 Afghan detainees died while in the custody and 
control of  US forces, specifically members of  the 377th MP Co and an active 
duty MI Company, A Co, 519th MI Bn. The deaths were determined to be a 
result of  blunt force trauma by various members of  the 377th and 519th.105
The captain referenced in the report was Captain Christopher M. Beiring. In a sworn statement 
Army JAG then-Major Jeff  A. Bovarnick recalled a November 26, 2002, meeting he had with 
captains Beiring and Wood, less than a week before Habibullah’s death, when Major Bovarnick 
directed changes:
I remember a lot of  friction between CPT Wood, MI Commander and myself  
and CPT Beiring, MP Commander, when I directed changes. CPT Beiring was 
a very weak commander, but he did not want responsibility for warming their 
food, getting them clean clothes, simple stuff  that made sense. He was very 
resistant to changing anything. I worked with a couple of  the MP Lieutenants, 
whose attitude was much better.106
Charges against Captain Beiring were later dropped.107 As for Captain Wood, while the Army 
did have an interrogation school at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, and a field manual governing 
interrogations, few of  the interrogators deployed to Bagram in Wood’s unit had ever been 
trained at that school.108 Even those who were trained were told to forget the Cold War–based 
training they had received and to forget what they knew when they arrived. Claus said:
Our first briefing was “this is nothing like you learned before! Everything you’ve 
learned is great basics, none of  it is going to actually work.” We were supposed 
to make interrogation books, you have different sections for you know, units 
information, things like that. We were told these things are absolutely useless 
don’t even bother bringing them.109
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The interrogators frequently forced detainees into stress positions, painful kneeling 
or squatting “daily” one later said in a sworn statement.110 Sleep deprivation, 
referred to as sleep adjustment, lasted for up to 72 hours.111 Coincidently, or 
perhaps not, the 72-hour time frame for sleep deprivation was the same that the 
CIA permitted for sleep deprivation in its secret facilities.112 The cruelest and most 
unusual part of  sleep deprivation at Bagram was that it was enforced by MPs 
who simply chained the detainees to the doorframes by their wrists. It was in this 
position that Habibullah and Dilawar were both discovered. Sleep deprivation had 
morphed into forced standing. Army criminal investigator Angela Birt, who began 
investigating the deaths in 2003, described it this way:
The MPs were brutal, and they were brutal, we believed, as a function of  
being the arm of  the MI [military interrogator] folks. The captain who 
was in charge of  the 377 at the facility, Christopher Beiring, was previously 
branched MI. He had just gone to MP officer school before he deployed but 
his familiarity and his comfort zone was with the Military Intelligence mission. 
So when Captain Wood came in, she had a very strong personality. She told 
him what she wanted and he was very familiar with the MI mission and not 
so familiar with the MP mission. Well she asked to keep these guys awake. … 
[T]hey were doing it at Kandahar in the STIF but they were not doing it by 
chaining people to the ceilings. They would just go by and say, hey, wake up. 
There was no physical violence. …
The 377th was just lazy: they wanted to be able to keep these guys awake 
so they chained them in a standing position. And doing that you can cause 
deep vein thrombosis, just like you can get on an aircraft, and that was one 
contributing thing that killed one of  the detainees. One of  them had very 
serious thrombosis in his lower legs.113
The initial investigation into the deaths was stillborn. Notably, the MPs had convinced the 
first set of  criminal investigators that the blows they had dealt to the legs of  Dilawar and 
Habibullah were completely authorized and routine. Angela Birt was shocked investigators 
didn’t pursue it:
I’ll be really candid [the investigators] drank the Kool-Aid. They wrote reports 
saying these were authorized use of  force and that these were accidental deaths. 
… They really believed it was authorized, and I could never understand where 
they got that from. So many people at the prison had told them that it was 
authorized that they believed it. …
To me it was a great big billboard: “Murder, Murder, Murder!” And it was on 
the death certificate: Homicide. And I didn’t understand how we got from there 
to “Oh, it was just an accident.” You don’t accidentally hang someone from a 
ceiling and beat them to death.114
Private William Brand was one of  the MPs who caused Dilawar’s death by kneeing him 
repeatedly in the thigh. His court-martial panel found him guilty of  maiming, assault, 
maltreatment and making a false statement, but the panel sentenced him to only a reduction 
“To me it was a 
great big billboard: 
‘Murder, Murder, 
Murder!’ You don’t 
accidentally hang 
someone from a 
ceiling and beat 
them to death.”
72
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
in rank. Brand was honorably discharged. Following the court-martial, a battalion commander 
who had sat on Brand’s jury had been asked how he had viewed the defendant.
This individual was an American citizen who had been called up. … He had 
volunteered, and when they called upon him to perform his duties in a time of  
war, he did it without question.115
One after one, military court-martial panels were reluctant to punish comrades who had been 
following the operating procedures in place and listening to the instructions of  their leadership. 
At the court-martial of  Private Damien Corsetti, Captain Wood, who had been granted 
prosecutorial immunity in exchange for her testimony, recounted constant efforts on her part to 
seek clarification on permissible interrogation techniques.116 Wood said that sleep deprivation 
and stress positions were authorized.117 Following the December 2002 deaths, in January 2003, 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cotell produced a memorandum describing “current and past” 
interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 interrogators that included up to 96 hours of  
isolation, the use of  female interrogators to create “discomfort” and gain more information, 
sleep adjustment, deprivation of  light and sound in living areas, the use of  a hood during 
interrogation, and mild physical contact.118 
Cotell’s memo approved the use of  those techniques and recommended use of  five additional 
techniques, including: “deprivation of  clothing” to put detainees in a “shameful, uncomfortable 
situation”; “food deprivation”; “sensory overload — loud music or temperature regulation”; 
“controlled fear through the use of  muzzled, trained, military working dogs”; and “use of  light 
and noise deprivation.” 119 Colonel Theodore Nicholos, Director of  Intelligence for the Army’s 
Task Force in Afghanistan, said in a sworn statement “I was aware of  [the practice of  shackling 
detainees] and observed at least one individual standing with his arms shackled and attached to 
the entrance door at waist level.” 120 Precisely how high up the chain of  command knowledge 
about the interrogation program went is unknown, but many of  the MPs and interrogators saw 
senior officials visit their site on a regular basis. According to Claus,
We had dignitaries, generals. If  anyone large came to Bagram they wanted to 
have a tour of  us. … And everyone’s saying [OK] and then walking out. I had 
people sit in interrogations because they wanted to see them. …
We would randomly see [Captain Wood] wandering through with eagles, stars, and 
in suits and ties. … So I don’t understand why people kept bitching at us saying we 
are evil. Everybody who was anybody in the world walked through that place.121
The Other Government Agency:
The CIA and The Salt Pit
The CIA had been granted sweeping new legal authority to hunt down, capture or kill 
suspected terrorists anywhere in the world in the wake of  September 11, but the agency 
had virtually no trained interrogators. On September 12, 2001, the CIA had numerous 
polygraphers, psychological profilers, and agents highly skilled in debriefing defectors, but ever 
since Vietnam, the CIA had stayed away from interrogation.122 An outside adviser to the CIA 
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said “they had very little experience with interrogation. When 9/11 hit, it was fifty-
two-card pick-up.” 123 
Many inside the CIA had misgivings. “A lot of  us knew this would be a can of  
worms,” according to a former operative who was involved. “It was going to get 
a lot uglier. We warned them, it’s going to be an atrocious mess. … What are you 
going to do with these people? The utility of  someone [like Abu Zubaydah] is at 
most six months to a year. You exhaust them. Then what?” 124 However, former 
CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo, who has spoken out in defense of  the 
agency’s program, and to whom John Yoo addressed one of  the now infamous 
Torture Memos, told Task Force staff  that never — not once — did any member 
of  the agency ever approach him to express concerns about its “enhanced 
interrogation program.” 
What sustained me, it was the people who were involved, the lifers, the career 
CIA people who were involved in this program believed in it. And they were 
not myopic, they knew as it was getting increasingly controversial, that they were 
likely going to wind up in investigation, and recriminations. … [T]hey knew all 
that. And yet they were steadfast in believing in the value of  the program.125
At least some within the CIA were uncomfortable, as internal complaints about the program 
trigged a highly critical 2004 report from the agency’s inspector general.
CIA detainee operations in Afghanistan must be examined separately from those run by the 
military. The CIA is believed to have operated under “different rules” and at a different site 
or sites, at least one of  which, based in Kabul, came to be called the “Salt Pit.” Initially CIA 
operations were disorganized and impromptu but later became more systematic. Accounts 
of  former detainees subjected to CIA renditions between the years 2002 and 2005 showed 
standardized treatment during transfer.126 
In most cases, the detainee was stripped of  his clothes, photographed naked, and 
administered a body cavity search (rectal examination). Some detainees described 
the insertion of  a suppository at that time. The detainee was then dressed in 
a diaper. His ears were plugged, headphones were placed on his head, he was 
blindfolded or provided black goggles, and his head was wrapped with bandages 
and adhesive tape. The detainee’s arms and legs were shackled and he was put 
into the transportation vehicle.127
Five former members of  the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) told Human Rights Watch 
they were detained in prisons run by the CIA in Afghanistan for between eight months and two 
years. Abuse there allegedly included
being chained to walls naked sometimes while diapered in pitch dark, 
windowless cells, for weeks or months at a time; being restrained in painful 
stress positions for long periods of  time, being forced into cramped spaces; 
being beaten and slammed into walls; being kept inside for nearly five months 
without the ability to bathe; being denied food and being denied sleep by 
continuous, deafeningly loud Western music.128
“So I don’t 
understand why 
people kept 
bitching at us 
saying we are evil. 
Everybody who 
was anybody in 
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Significantly, the Salt Pit appears to have been a hub of  the CIA program, and many high-value 
detainees transitioned through the Salt Pit, at one point or another. CIA detainees were often 
released and given to the military when the CIA was done with them or convinced they were 
not a threat. Often the CIA handed over detainees without information about the detainee. 
The military had to not only deal with detainees from the CIA, ubiquitously referred to as 
“Other Government Agency” or OGA, but also from their own special forces. Detainees from 
U.S. special forces were constantly dropped off, often times without disclosing their names or 
what they were doing there. “Capture tags” — tags that identified information about a detainee 
— were often missing. Military interrogators came to believe that many had been innocent “dirt 
farmers” and shouldn’t have been picked up in the first place. As to the actions of  any OGA, 
the Church Report executive summary sought to make clear the actions of  any such agency 
were beyond the scope of  its report:
[I]t was beyond the scope of  our tasking to investigate the existence, location 
or policies governing detention facilities that may be exclusively operated by 
OGAs, rather than by DoD however senior [DoD] officials expressed clear 
expectations that DoD-authorized interrogation policies would be followed 
during any interrogation conducted in a DoD facility.129 
As in the official military detention system, deaths occurred in the CIA’s program. At least one 
man died at the Salt Pit: Gul Rahman. a suspected Afghan militant, died on November 20, 
2002, three weeks before Dilawar and Habibullah were killed at Bagram. Rahman was kept 
in chains outside the Salt Pit overnight as temperatures near Kabul dipped to freezing. The 
subsequent forensic exam on Rahman determined he had frozen to death.130 
Rahman’s death is not the only known death in the CIA system. David Passaro, a CIA 
contractor, beat Abdul Wali at a U.S. base in Kunar Province until Wali died on June 21, 2003. 
Passaro was charged and convicted of  felony assault with a dangerous weapon and three counts 
of  misdemeanor assault, for which he was sentenced in 2006 to eight years and four months 
in prison. Passaro was assisted in his interrogation by nearby soldiers from the 82nd Airborne 
Division. While the beating and death of  Wali was not linked to the CIA’s approved “enhanced 
interrogation program,” the federal appeals court reviewing Passaro’s conviction described 
“Passaro’s brutal attack” “as including repeatedly throwing Wali to the ground, striking him 
open handed, hitting him on the arms and on the legs, with a heavy Maglite type flashlight.” 131 
The interrogation was videotaped by a soldier named “Sgt. Sellers” but the taping stopped, 
Sellers testified, when Passaro pushed Wali against a wall.132 Two days prior, Passaro had told 
the military guards “to maintain Wali in a series of  ‘stress positions’133 Significantly, Passaro 
“told the guards that while they could not strike Wali, he had different rules which permitted 
him to administer any force so long as it was not life threatening.” 134 On June 21, two days after 
Wali’s interrogation had begun, Wali collapsed. Passaro kicked him one final time while he lay 
there, and Wali was pronounced dead 20 minutes later.135 
Passaro remains the only individual affiliated with the CIA to have been charged for misconduct 
in connection with detainees. On August 30, 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder announced 
the completion of  an investigation into the deaths of  two individuals in U.S. custody overseas. 
The investigation, by Assistant U.S. Attorney John Durham, resulted in no subsequent 
prosecutions of  any CIA officials.136 
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The Development of the Counterinsurgent 
Strategy (COIN)
Following Abu Ghraib, a series of  examinations and reports were initiated. The Jacoby Report, 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, solely focused on Afghanistan. It recommended that only 
qualified school-trained interrogators (from Fort Huachuca) conduct interrogations. The 
report found allegations of  detainee abuse had been substantiated.137 It found that a  “lack 
of  thoroughly authorized, disseminated, and understood guidance and procedures create 
opportunities for detainee abuse and the loss of  intelligence value throughout the process.” 138 
The problem, as the report saw it, was with low-level troops: “While there was a near universal 
understanding in [the Combined Joint Task Force] that humane treatment was the standard 
by which detainees would be treated, guard awareness and application of  standard operating 
procedures (SOP) was lacking.” 139 The report also found:
Improved interrogation training leading to the certification of  all interrogators 
will improve intelligence gathering and dissemination of  actionable intelligence 
as well as improve the detainee screening process. Interrogators need training 
on Afghan culture, traditions and history to be able to get the most intelligence 
from detainees. Additionally, combat commanders at all levels need training on 
interrogation and detainee chain of  custody to ensure that unit actions do not 
interfere with or negatively affect the interrogation of  detainees.140
An enclosure to the Jacoby Report is a March 26, 2004, memorandum from CJTF-180 to 
an unknown distribution list. The subject line of  the memo read “CJTF-180 Authorized 
Interrogation Approaches and Strategies.” 141 The purpose of  the memo was to “identify 
approved interrogation techniques and strategies to be used at Battlefield Interrogation sites 
throughout the CJTF-180 AOR and at the Joint Interrogation Facility located in Bagram, 
Afghanistan.” 142 It referenced three sources: the Army Field Manual; a memo on counter-
resistance techniques in the “War on Terror” dated April 18, 2003; and “Working Group on 
Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),” dated January 15, 2003. 
The Jacoby Report’s enclosure demonstrates that the Pentagon’s Working Group memo, which 
had generated considerable controversy within the Pentagon [see Chapter 1], had indeed made 
its way to the troops in the field in Afghanistan. 
After 2004, treatment of  detainees improved at Bagram, though conditions remained primitive and 
legal processes and reviews remained largely inadequate. In March 2005, the Church Report was 
completed and released. Its focus was to investigate whether DOD had promulgated interrogation 
policies that had directed, sanctioned or encouraged the abuse of  detainees. At least in the public 
unclassified summary, the report found DOD had not done so; it “found no link between approved 
interrogation techniques and detainee abuse.” 143
Significantly, nothing in our investigation of  interrogation and detention 
operations in Afghanistan or Iraq suggested that the chaotic and abusive 
environment that existed at the Abu Ghraib prison in the fall of  2003 was 
repeated elsewhere.144
As discussed above, the complete report remains classified; however, references to the classified 
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report appear in other publicly available documents and it appears the classified report may, if  
not contradict, at least undermine, some of  the findings in the unclassified executive summary.
Even from the Church Report’s executive summary, it was clear interrogation policy was fluid 
and constantly changing. To that point however, the report nonetheless found that
[e]ven if  interrogators were “confused” by the issuance of  multiple interroga-
tion policies within a short span of  time, as some have hypothesized regarding 
Abu Ghraib, it is clear that none of  the approved policies — no matter which 
version the interrogators followed — would have permitted the types of  abuse 
that occurred.145
Of  pressure being placed on interrogators to gain actionable intelligence, the Church Report stated:
Finally, there has been much speculation regarding the notion that undue 
pressure for actionable intelligence contributed to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, 
and that such pressure also manifested itself  throughout Iraq. It is certainly 
true that “pressure” was applied in Iraq through the chain of  command, but a 
certain amount of  pressure is to be expected in a combat environment.146
The report didn’t find fault solely with individual actors. It also found blame with unit 
leadership: “there was a failure to react to early warning signs of  abuse” and “a breakdown 
of  good order and discipline in some units could account for other incidents of  abuse.” “As 
documented in previous reports (including MG Fay’s and MG Taguba’s investigations), 
stronger leadership and greater oversight would have lessened the likelihood of  abuse.” 147
After taking office, President Obama issued an executive order calling for review and reform 
of  detainee operations.148 In 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke 
invited Marine Major General Doug Stone to examine the Afghan detention system.149 
General Stone, as also discussed in Chapter 3, had been widely praised for changing 
the detention methods used in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, focusing on the rehabilitation 
and reintegration of  detainees in Iraq during “The Surge.” At Holbrooke’s request, 
Stone launched a review of  the Afghan system. In 2008, U.S. forces were struggling with 
transferring prisoners from the crude and overcrowded Bagram facility into Afghan prisons.150 
General Stone observed to Task Force staff  that Bagram was “inappropriate, there were 
supply cages packed with guys.” 151 
Moreover, Stone estimated that of  the 600 detainees at Bagram in 2009, two-thirds should 
not be in custody.152 Specifically, he reported that two out of  every three detainees were 
either innocent or posed no security threat. Stone provided an extensive report on suggested 
changes to the detention program in Afghanistan.
That same year a new facility replaced Bagram, called the Detention Facility at Parwan 
(DFIP), which is today considered a vast improvement, at least insofar as its physical plant and 
facilities are concerned. The new facility has large cells, temperature-controlled facilities, a 
soccer field, and classrooms.153 As of  the date of  this report, the volume of  detainees churning 
through DFIP remains large. In June 2011, it was estimated that over 1,700 detainees were in 
custody at Parwan, up from over 600 at the end of  the Bush administration.154 The numbers 
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increased from 1,100 detainees in September 2010 to 3,110 detainees in March 2012.155 By 
contrast, in 2004 there had been just 100 detainees at Bagram.156
In 2006 and 2007, both civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes and the detainee population 
in Afghanistan rose significantly,  which led to a backlash from the civilian population.157 An 
upsurge in arrests within a short period — giving the impression of  indiscriminate captures 
— continued to directly cause a decline in local support for the presence of  U.S. troops.158 
The crucial lesson was that detention facilities were inseparable from the kinetic battlefield. 
According to General Stone, the attacks on hotels and guesthouses in Afghanistan in October 
of  2009 (leading up to the presidential election on November 7 between Hamid Karzai and 
Abdullah Abdullah), were planned from within detention facilities.159 
They are planning operations from the inside. That actually clearly happens in Iraq 
prisons, [and certainly] in Afghan prisons. That was one of  the major observations 
that I made while over there, that most of  the operations, most of  the major 
bombings in the hotels, etc., were being planned for and run by detainees.” 160 
In his 2009 review of  Afghanistan operations, General McChrystal recognized detainee 
operations as a key component of  the U.S. strategy for success in Afghanistan. As to detainee 
operations, the report seemed to draw from the perceived lessons and successes of  General 
Petraeus and General Stone in Iraq. 
As always, the detention process must be effective in providing key intelligence 
and avoid ‘catch and release’ approaches that endanger coalition and [Afghan 
National Security Forces] ANSF. It is therefore imperative to evolve to a 
more holistic model centered on an Afghan-run system. This will require a 
comprehensive system that addresses the entire “life-cycle” and extends from 
point of  capture to eventual reintegration or prosecution.161
Currently, Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents represent more than 2,500 of  the 
14,500 inmates in the increasingly overcrowded Afghan Corrections System 
(ACS). These detainees are currently radicalizing non-insurgent inmates and 
worsening an already over-crowded prison system. Hardened, committed  
[I]slamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, 
and they are using the opportunity to radicalize and indoctrinate them. 
In effect, insurgents use the ACS as a sanctuary and base to conduct 
lethal operations against GIRoA [government of  the Islamic Republic of  
Afghanistan] and coalition forces (e.g., Serena Hotel bombing, GIRoA 
assassinations, governmental facility bombings). …
The U.S. came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven 
in 2001. They have gone from inaccessible mountain hideouts to recruiting and 
indoctrinating hiding in the open, [sic] in the ACS. There are more insurgents 
per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan.162
The report warned:
Detention operations, while critical to successful counterinsurgency operations, 
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also have the potential to become a strategic liability for the U.S. and ISAF 
[International Security Assistance Force]. With the drawdown in Iraq and 
the closing of  Guantánamo Bay, the focus on U.S. detention operations will 
turn to the U.S. Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF). Because of  the 
classification level of  the BTIF and the lack of  public transparency, the Afghan 
people see U.S. detention operations as secretive and lacking in due process.
The desired end-state, McChrystal reported,
is the turnover of  all detention operations in Afghanistan, to include the BTIF, 
to the Afghan government once they have developed the requisite sustainable 
capacity to run those detention systems in accordance with international 
and national law. This will empower the Afghan government, enable 
counterinsurgency operations, and restore the faith of  the Afghan people in 
their government’s ability to apply good governance and Rule of  Law with 
respect to corrections, detention, and justice.163
In his 2013 memoir, General McChrystal recalled his frustration and the steep learning curve 
that existed in managing detainee operations from the previous decade. 
I reemphasized my concern that we suffered from a shortage of  trained 
interrogators. … The interrogator shortage wasn’t [General] George Casey’s 
fault or a problem he could solve, and I knew that. Half  a dozen corners of  the 
military — from the Pentagon to the services to training centers — had a part 
in producing and fielding a professional interrogator. … On 9/11, our shortage 
was understandable. By 2005, it was indefensible.164
Of  his own inexperience in detainee operations, McChrystal recalled:
I was one of  the leaders who lacked experience in detainee custody and exploitation. I 
had studied history and understood the theory but had never done anything remotely 
like running a prison. My peers and subordinates were similarly positioned.165
McChrystal declined several invitations from the Task Force to be interviewed about 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
The military’s procedures for reviewing detention decisions in Afghanistan, the then-called 
Detainee Review Boards (DRBs), underwent a series of  changes in September 2009. The 
United States revamped release procedures of  the re-christened DRBs to hasten release of  
detainees from the swelling facilities.166 The DRBs had evolved since the beginning of  the war. 
From the beginning of  the war in Afghanistan until January of  2010, detention operations in 
Afghanistan were under the control of  tactical level command.167 The initial structure (from 
2002 to 2005) is sketched in the diagram below:168
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NO: 90 days to determine 
threat or intelligence value. If 
not recommended for release, 
held till annual review. 
Note: The decision to release had to be approved by the Commander of  CJTF-180, whereas no such requirement 
existed if  a detainee were held. Detainees were not present during, or notified of, the board review. 
In 2005, the boards were renamed Enemy Combatant Review Boards (ECRBs), and again 
in 2007 the review boards were re-branded Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards 
(UECRBs). 169 These cosmetic changes to the title of  the review boards, to polish and rebrand, 
were also accompanied by some structural and procedural advances. Detainees were notified 
of  their review. Detainees could attend the first review and read a statement to the board. 
They were still not questioned by board members, nor did they have a representative. Each 
case was to be reviewed every six months with the detainee invited only for the first meeting.170 
Those found to be Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLEC) would be referred to the Detainee 
Assessment Board for prosecution, if  there was sufficient evidence, through the Afghan criminal 
justice system. If  there was not sufficient evidence for a trial, the detainees continued to be held 
in U.S. interment facilities.171
The DRB’s post-2009 procedures govern detention operations under the U.S. military 
command, USFOR-A (U.S. Forces, Afghanistan), and not the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). USFOR-A is subject to the AUMF (Authorization for Use of  Military Force) and 
international laws of  war for its authority and accountability. While ISAF is authorized through 
a U.N. Security Council resolution and has 78,430 U.S. troops under its mandate, USFOR-A is 
the continuation of  Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and has 17,000 U.S. troops under its 
command.172 Along with the new procedures, the reform introduced a new command to control 
detention operations under USFOR-A, Joint Task Force 435 (or, more formally, Combined 
Joint Interagency Task Force-435) (CJIATF-435). Under the new procedures, detainees were 
given a representative throughout the process, received timely notifications, were able to attend 
hearings, call witnesses, and question government witnesses.173 Once captured, a detainee could 
be held for 14 days before being assigned an internment serial number (ISN) and the Red 
Cross given access. The DRB hearing had to take place within 60 days of  capture. A personal 
representative (PR) was to be assigned within 30 days and the PR was to meet with the detainee 
to explain the process and read the unclassified version of  the file.174 
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Conversely, combatants captured by ISAF had to be turned over to Afghan authorities within 
96 hours of  capture. However, U.S. forces under ISAF have extended their timeframe for 
transfer to within 14 days of  capture.175 The improved procedures were designed to reduce the 
detainee population and legitimize the surviving practices.176 One lieutenant colonel reviewing 
the new detention operations observed: “The considerable effort made to bring live witnesses to 
the DRBs, at least anecdotally, has also spread the word throughout Afghanistan that the DRB 
process is fair and legitimate and, perhaps more importantly in light of  past missteps, that the 
treatment of  the detainees in the new DFIP is exceptional.” 177
According to at least some human rights organizations with access to detention facilities, the 
procedures still have problems. While there have been substantial improvements, it is argued 
that detainees still lack a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them.178 
After observing several DRB sessions, Human Rights First reported: “Not a single witness was 
called to testify in any of  the hearings observed. In some cases, the evidence against the detainee 
appeared to be as thin as a mere claim by U.S. soldiers that they found bomb-making materials 
in a house nearby. No public evidence was presented connecting the individual detainee to that 
house.” 179 However, according to another study of  the DRBs, there were 411 live testimonies 
and 125 phone testimonies from March 6, 2010, through June 30, 2010, alone.180 The difference 
in these observations could be due to the fact that the majority of  the DRBs do not involve 
witness testimony. Another criticism is of  the “personal representatives” appointed for the 
detainees. Some allege these military officers, not attorneys, failed to effectively question the 
evidence presented through the detainees’ files. “The result, in cases we observed, is that these 
representatives appeared to do little or nothing on behalf  of  the detainees.” 181 While there is a 
classified portion of  the review, which neither the detainee nor human rights organizations can 
attend, the perception the public hearings create undermines the effort to establish legitimacy 
through the “rule of  law.” 182 There is a prohibition against using information obtained through 
torture; however, when the statements and identities of  witnesses are classified, there is no 
mechanism for discerning which statements are elicited through cruel and inhumane treatment, 
which statements are given because of  personal grudges, and which statements resulted from 
erroneous information. 
Finally, the Task Force has learned that there are a number of  detainees cleared for release 
by the DRBs who remain in detention because DRBs do not have the ultimate authority over 
releases.183 A Pentagon spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Todd Breasseale, told Task Force staff  
in an email exchange that if  a detainee is a third-country national, it is the deputy secretary of  
defense who has the authority to approve the transfer or release, following a thorough assessment 
of  the security and humanitarian conditions in the detainee’s home country and after receipt 
of  appropriate diplomatic assurances. In such cases, the Pentagon even consults with members 
of  Congress prior to release. According to Breasseale, members of  Congress are consulted “as 
appropriate” following release determinations made in the case of  third-country nationals.
General Stone’s other detention policies from Iraq migrated to Afghanistan at the same time 
changes occurred in the DRB process.184 First, determined to move away from mass housing in 
favor of  segregation of  hardliners from those who could be rehabilitated, Stone recommended 
overhauling release procedures aimed at increasing the rate of  release, thereby strengthening 
the rule of  law through transparency and engagement.185 Detention centers and commanders 
began to focus on distinguishing the irreconcilables, those constituting an ongoing threat, from 
individuals who could be rehabilitated. Detainees who could be de-radicalized were presented 
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with greater security and in-prison programs for rehabilitation. The release boards were 
revamped to allow for timely release in conformity with the rule of  law. Finally, the coalition 
forces invested in long-term development of  the local criminal justice mechanisms. The task was 
and remains enormous.
The prisoners would have access to vocational courses, be taught by local imams about 
moderate Islam, and be allowed visits by their family members.186 Additionally, the military 
introduced pay-for-work programs to provide a source of  income for detainees and develop 
their trade skills. These skills were a tool for reconstruction and a source of  economic security 
for the detainees upon their release.187
The social programs from Iraq extended to Afghanistan in 2009. An Afghan instructor, who 
taught the first class of  detainees at Parwan about health and identifying prevalent diseases, 
said “there was good communication between [them]” and that “the participants seemed very 
interested.” 188 The detainees were also instructed on geography, government, civics, and trade 
skills such as tailoring, agriculture and baking.189 The long-term success of  these programs 
has yet to be measured, and once the detainees are released and re-enter Afghan society, they 
may continue to face serious problems [see Chapter 8]. Dr. Sima Samar (chairperson of  the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission) said on the occasion of  the release of  
the Fifth Report on the Situation of  Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, “[Given] the 
volume of  assistance and commitments made by the Afghanistan government over the past 
several years, economic and social rights has not improved with satisfactory [sic] and even in 
some areas shows regression.” 190 However, the survey conducted by CJIATF-435 of  the first 
group of  Parwan detainees who went through the newly instituted programs found a recidivism 
rate of  just 1.2 percent. “CJIATF-435 assesses that reintegration programs are working to 
prevent previously detained individuals from rejoining the insurgency.” 191 The recidivism rate 
has dropped to below 1 percent, according to the 2012 report.192
The Future of Detention in Afghanistan 
and the U.S. Role
The ongoing insurgency continues to provide daunting challenges. As 2012 wound down, 
Washington was engaged in intense discussions as to what kind of  presence the U.S. would have 
in Afghanistan after the 2014 date for the withdrawal of  most American troops. The proposals 
ranged from having a large civilian (i.e., diplomatic), presence with a few thousand troops to as 
many as 14,000 troops.193 The Task Force sought to interview U.S. military officials in Afghanistan. 
Mid-level officials initially indicated we would be shown the Parwan facility as well as be briefed 
or even sit in on sessions of  a DRB hearing, which prisoners are afforded every six months to see 
if  they are eligible for release. But Lieutenant General Keith Huber, who commanded the military 
detention operations in Afghanistan in late 2012, formally declined to permit Task Force staff  to 
tour the Bagram facilities. Entreaties from two retired three-star generals asking him to reconsider 
were unavailing. A spokesman for Huber said the reason for denying the Task Force’s request was 
that the U.S. military was getting out of  the detention operation business, which was being turned 
over to Afghan military and government authorities. There exists considerable evidence that total 
disengagement by the United States from detention operations in Afghanistan is largely a fiction.
The insurgency provides a mechanism for dispute resolution and accountability, thereby 
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undermining efforts of  the official government of  Afghanistan. As General McChrystal noted 
in his 2009 assessment: “They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their 
performance, and replace them periodically. They establish a body to receive complaints 
against their own ‘officials’ and to act on them.” 194 One step toward realizing the sovereign 
rule of  the Afghan government was ISAF-mandated transfer of  prisoners to Afghan custody. 
Despite recognition of  the fundamental importance of  supporting the Afghan government 
as the primary, effective and legitimate sovereign in Afghanistan by means of  transferring 
responsibility of  detainee operations, efforts to reform the system met with resistance as ISAF 
attempted to overcome decades and decades of  entrenched, chronic problems.
In 2005, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report titled Afghanistan Security identified 
ongoing challenges in training and preparing Afghan forces to assume control:
A number of  difficult conditions hamper the effort to rebuild the police in 
Afghanistan. Newly trained police often return to community police stations 
staffed by poorly trained, illiterate conscripts or former militia members who 
have little loyalty to the central government. According to State/and Defense 
officials, many of  the untrained officers remain loyal to local militias in an 
environment dominated by ethnic loyalties. Working with untrained colleagues, 
newly trained policemen often find it difficult to apply the principles they 
learned during training. For example, according to several DynCorp trainers, 
some recently trained police were forced to give their new equipment to 
more senior police and were pressured by their commanders to participate in 
extorting money from truck drivers and travelers.195 
The two-week training program with limited follow-up visits in the field proved inadequate for 
the circumstances faced by the newly trained police.
In March of  2012, the Obama administration reached an agreement to transfer control of  the 
Parwan Detention Facility to Afghanistan. “It is a matter of  pride for us to acquire responsibility 
for the prison,” Nasrullah Stanikzai, the legal adviser to President Hamid Karzai said.196 The 
formal ceremony to mark the transfer of  control went ahead as scheduled on September 10, 
but the U.S. continued to control hundreds of  detainees in the facility.197 As of  September 2012: 
some 600 new detainees remained under U.S. control, along with nearly 30 of  those originally 
slated for transfer. The ongoing tension about the 30 or so originally slated for transfer stems 
from whether Afghans would continue to hold those 30 without trial, as the U.S. had demanded 
and stipulated under the transfer deal.198
The day after The New York Times reported that the United States would have a continuing role 
in Afghanistan detention operations after the planned September 2012 handover,199 a report 
from the Open Society Foundations suggested there had been fundamental misunderstandings 
between the two sides as to the detention relationship moving forward:
Though numerous Afghan officials have told Open Society Foundations 
researchers that they believe Afghan internment will come to an end in 
September 2012, when they assume the detention transition will be complete, 
U.S. statements and actions suggest otherwise. U.S. forces have continued to 
capture individuals in military operations and detain them on the “U.S. side” 
83
Chapter 2 - Afghanistan
The Constitution Project
or part of  the DFIP since the transition process began in March 2012, 
adding around 600 detainees to the facility. So even though they have almost 
completed the transfer of  the 3100 that were being held in March, these 
additional captures and detentions make it all but impossible for them to 
meet the Afghan government expectation of  a full handover of  the facility.200
The Afghan national security advisor, Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, has said: “We 
cannot allow allies and friendly countries to have detention centers here. This is 
illegal.” 201 The United States has used internment in Afghanistan for many years 
since September 11, detaining persons rather than accusing them of  a crime and 
placing them on trial. Afghanistan today remains an operational environment for 
American troops who continue to conduct raids and make arrests. There exists the 
risk that detainees could be freed only to come back and later stage attacks. The 
Afghan government, in cooperation with the United States, created its own internment regime, 
closely resembling the U.S. system in order to facilitate the transfer of  detainees interned by 
the U.S. military. Though the Afghan government has chosen to transfer many detainees to a 
criminal court, more than 50 are being held by the Afghan government without charge or trial 
through this new internment power. Senior Afghan officials told the Open Society Foundations 
they believed the new system was unconstitutional. 
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
While visiting Afghanistan in November 2012, sources told Task Force staff  that U.S. troops 
were continuing to arrest about 100 Taliban suspects a month in nighttime raids and bringing 
them to DFIP. Some journalists have refused to call the detention facility at Parwan by its 
“new” name because they say it was only created as an inventive way to try to disown the bad 
reputation that lingered from the BCP. The rate of  prisoners taken in the nighttime raids in 
November 2012 was about the as the same rate that has prevailed over the last two years. The 
raids have been a source of  great friction among the Afghan population.202 Task Force staff  
spoke with recent prisoners taken in nighttime raids and they offered a familiar story of  sudden 
and unjustified raids on their rural homes, after which they were taken by helicopter to Parwan. 
While these former prisoners complained about what happened, they did not say they were 
mistreated at the prison, a marked change from detainee accounts in earlier years.203
Additionally, adding to the complexity of  the political problem, concerns remain about 
the Afghan commitment to the legal rights of  prisoners held in Afghan-run facilities. An 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission report in March 2012 found evidence  
of  torture in nine separate Afghan NDS facilities.204 (The National Directorate 
 of  Security, or NDS, is Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.) Afghan prisoners were beaten, 
suspended from the ceiling, subjected to electric shock, and sexually abused in order to secure 
confessions or to elicit other information.205 In September 2012 Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai announced the appointment of  Asadullah Khalid as the new head of  the NDS. Khalid 
has been accused of  running an unauthorized secret prison in Kandahar where torture was 
routine.206 NATO forces had stopped transferring captured combatants to Afghan facilities in 
September 2011, following the U.N.’s findings of  systematic abuse and torture in those facilities. 
Transfers resumed on a conditional basis in February 2012, after NATO forces extended 
training and reform to Afghan facilities.207 A January 2013 report from the U.N. found “multiple 
credible and reliable incidents of  torture and ill-treatment” across different Afghan detention
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facilities.208 The report went on to say there existed “sufficiently credible and reliable evidence” 
that more than half  of  the 635 detainees interviewed for the report (326 detainees) had 
experienced torture and ill-treatment.” 209
Furthermore, non-Afghan detainees, third-country nationals, held at DFIP represent yet 
another major unresolved issue. Little is publicly known about the 50 or so third-country 
nationals currently held without charge at DFIP. The September 2012 Open Society 
Foundations report noted that “[g]iven the lack of  progress thus far in repatriating, releasing, or 
resettling these detainees, many are at risk of  falling into the kind of  indefinite detention limbo 
reminiscent of  Guantánamo Bay.” 210 President Obama in 2008 pledged to close Guantánamo, 
and while no detainees have been brought to Guantánamo since that time, it is unknown how 
many, if  any, of  the 50 or so third-country nationals currently at Parwan have been captured 
and kept at DFIP since transfers to Guantánamo became politically untenable in the United 
States. DFIP may have served, and may still be serving, as a Guantánamo Bay substitute, a 
place where individuals may be held indefinitely, since its completion in 2009. 
Domestic political sensitivities in the United States are still at play. Congress imposed restrictions 
on the Obama administration’s ability to transfer detainees from Guantánamo, and the U.S. 
military likely does not want its hands to be similarly tied in Afghanistan.211 Republican lawmakers 
recently criticized a decision to turn over to Iraqi custody a detainee accused of  helping to kill 
American troops during the Iraq war.212 The Republican chairmen of  the House Armed Services 
Committee and the House Judiciary Committee released a press statement on August 3, 2012, 
critical of  the administration’s decision to turn over the Iraqi to Iraq’s security forces before the 
withdrawal of  U.S. forces in Iraq, and urged the administration “to extend all efforts to ensure 
that this tragic mistake is not repeated with terrorists currently in U.S. custody in Afghanistan.” 213 
Sen. Lindsay Graham supported closing the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay in 2009, but no 
longer believes it is feasible to do so. As he told Task Force staff:
So I’ve embraced the fact that we’re not going to close GITMO; let’s use it. 
You’ve got people at Bagram — you got 52 third country nationals, something 
like that, somewhere around 50 third country nationals that are not Afghans, 
they gotta go somewhere. And all of  them are not gonna be repatriated back to 
their host country for different reasons. And Afghanistan is not going to be the 
U.S. jailer forever … so we need to do something with those folks.214
On November 19, 2012, Karzai ordered Afghan forces to take control of  the Parwan facility 
and accused American officials of  violating its agreement to hand over the facility.215 In March 
2013, Karzai announced that his government might unilaterally act to take control of  the 
prison if  here were further delays in the Parwan handover. Karzai later agreed to give the 
United States another week. Given the repeated missed deadline as of  the writing of  this report, 
there appears to be no end in sight to the U.S. role as a jailer in Afghanistan. Unresolved, the 
continued detention of  “enemy combatants” in Afghanistan or Guantánamo leaves the United 




When the Abu Ghraib photographs were released, U.S. officials were, appropriately, horrified. They 
quickly promised a full investigation which would result in bringing the perpetrators to justice. 
President George W. Bush told an Arabic-language television station that “people will be held to 
account. That’s what the process does. That’s what we do in America. We fully investigate; we let 
everybody see the results of  the investigation; and then people will be held to account.”
Secretary of  State Colin Powell described telling foreign audiences:
Watch America. Watch how we deal with this. Watch how America will do the 
right thing. Watch what a nation of  values and character, a nation that believes in 
justice, does to right this kind of  wrong. Watch how a nation such as ours will not 
tolerate such actions.… [T]hey will see a free press and an independent Congress 
at work. They will see a Defense Department led by Secretary Rumsfeld that will 
launch multiple investigations to get to the facts. Above all, they will see a President 
— our President, President Bush — determined to find out where responsibility and 
accountability lie. And justice will be done.
Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld also said the soldiers’ actions were completely unauthorized, and 
promised a full investigation. He testified to Congress that troops’ “instructions are to, in the case of  
Iraq, adhere to the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Conventions apply to all of  the individuals there in 
one way or another.” 
There were multiple investigations into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and many of  the soldiers involved 
were prosecuted. Seven military police (MPs), two dog handlers, and two interrogators were convicted of  
abusing prisoners. Corporal Charles Graner received the longest sentence: 10 years in prison, of  which he 
served over six. Sergeant Ivan “Chip” Frederick was sentenced to eight years, and served three. But not 
every photograph resulted in a conviction, or even a prosecution. Army investigators determined that many 
photographs were too closely tied to military intelligence techniques that were, if  not strictly authorized, 
“standard operating procedures.” 
Abuses in Iraq were not restricted to Abu Ghraib. But attempts to prosecute abuses in other Iraqi prisons 
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were even less successful, due to a lack of  resources for investigators and widespread confusion about 
the rules for prisoner treatment. This was particularly true in cases of  “ghost” detainees held by the 
CIA or by a secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) task force, known over time as Task 
Force 20, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26, and Task Force 143. The JSOC task force was part of  
a highly classified Special Access Program, which reported to a different chain of  command from other 
U.S. forces in Iraq and was subject to different rules. Contrary to Rumsfeld’s congressional testimony, the 
task force did not consider detainees in its custody entitled to the protections of  the Geneva Conventions. 
Neither the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) nor most criminal investigators had 
access to its detention facilities. Two witnesses, retired Air Force Colonel Steven Kleinman and retired 
Army interrogator Colonel Stuart Herrington, described their attempts to report and stop abuses by 
JSOC troops at a detention facility at Baghdad International Airport in interviews with Task Force 
staff. They were both unsuccessful — and in Kleinman’s case, he was threatened as a result. 
87
Chapter 3 - Iraq
The Constitution Project
Special Forces and the CIA
The Battlefield Interrogation Facility
According to a comprehensive report by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the first reports 
of  abuses by the JSOC task force in Iraq came from the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), formed in 
June 2003 to look for evidence of  weapons of  mass destruction in Iraq. As part of  that effort, 
the ISG interrogated high-value prisoners at a facility near Baghdad International Airport. 
Many had been captured by the JSOC task force or the CIA. 
A civilian employee of  the Department of  Defense (DOD) who ran the high-value detainee 
interrogation center, identified in one DOD inspector general’s report as “Mr. Q,” 1 said 
he first heard about abuses by JSOC forces in the first week of  June 2003, when a military 
interrogator told him that a detainee she was interrogating had alleged physical abuse by task 
force personnel.2 By the middle of  June, Q told investigators, the abuse reports had become 
“a pattern.” He relayed a report from a British interrogator in the last week of  June about a 
detainee whose “back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black 
eyes, plus multiple contusions on his face.” 3 
Q reported these allegations to Major General Keith Dayton, the commander of  the Iraq 
Survey Group. Dayton said the interrogation center chief  had described the abuses as “a 
disaster waiting to happen,” and told him that the ISG had to “slam some rules on this place 
to basically keep ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated 
properly.” 4 But another official involved with the JSOC task force, whose name and position 
are redacted in the Senate Armed Services Committee Report, told Dayton that he would hear 
“rumors” of  abuse but “it’s all untrue.” 5
Dayton described a “notorious case” of  alleged detainee abuse, in which “special forces guys” 
brought a badly burned detainee to the Iraq Survey Group facility, claiming he had burned 
himself  on the floor of  a Humvee.6 An FBI report identifies that detainee as Ibrahim Khalid 
Samir al-Ani, the Baathist intelligence officer who was erroneously reported to have met with 
Mohammed Atta in Prague before the September 11 attacks.7 
Al-Ani was captured on July 2, 2003. He alleged to criminal investigators that when he was 
captured, he was put on the floor of  a car with his hands cuffed behind his back. His captor
put his foot on my back and started screaming and cursing me in English, 
which I do understand. And after 15 minutes, I felt that one side of  my belly 
and thigh started to burn due to the heated air that was coming out of  the car. 
And the back of  my feet started to burn. I asked the responsible [person] to be 
careful but he did not care.8 
Al-Ani said he remained on the floor of  the vehicle for an hour. When he arrived at Camp 
Cropper, he fainted, and woke up in a hospital over a month later after being anesthetized. He 
remained hospitalized until mid-October. Al-Ani alleged that his injuries included the partial 
amputation of  his right thumb; the complete loss of  use of  his right forefinger; severe burns 
on both the palm and back of  his left hand, resulting in the partial loss of  use of  his hand; and 
burns on both of  his legs, feet and abdomen, requiring multiple surgeries.9 His medical records 
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and photographs corroborated these allegations, as did statements from U.S. troops stationed 
at Camp Cropper.10 Investigators from the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) 
confirmed that troops from a JSOC task force captured al-Ani, but they could not identify or 
locate the individuals involved, in part because al-Ani’s captors had used pseudonyms on the 
capture documents.11  
According to retired Army colonel and veteran interrogator Stuart Herrington, Q’s reports of  
abuses by the JSOC task force failed to stop them. Herrington told Army investigators that Q
finally was sufficiently upset about the problem by early July that he basically 
didn’t want to associate himself  with it anymore. … [H]is words to me were 
he gave up and asked to leave. Asked to depart theater. He didn’t want to have 
anything do with it.12
Some of  JSOC task force’s harsh treatment was explicitly authorized. According to the DOD 
inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the JSOC task force’s written 
standard operating procedures (SOP), dated July 15, 2003, authorized sleep deprivation, loud 
music, stress positions, light control, and the use of  military dogs.13 Although not in the written 
SOP, nudity was also commonly used, reportedly with the knowledge of  the JSOC task force’s 
commander and legal advisor.14 
The July 15, 2003, interrogation policy was unsigned, although the task force commander’s 
name was on the signature block. The commander, Brigadier General Lyle Koenig,15 told 
Senate committee staff  that he did not recall approving or even seeing an interrogation policy, 
though he did acknowledge that he knew about some of  the harsh techniques in use.16 But two 
task force legal advisors — one who served in July and August 2003, and another who arrived in 
late August — said that they had repeatedly showed the policy to the commander and tried to 
get his signature on it. 17 The Senate committee reported that according to the second task force 
legal advisor,
it got to the point where he would print out a fresh copy of  the policy every 
night and give it to [redacted] aide. The Legal Advisor said that he knew the 
Commander had received copies of  the policy from his aide, but that he had 
a habit of  repeatedly “losing” the draft policy. He said the exercise became 
“laughable.” 18 
In addition to the specific authorization of  abusive techniques, the JSOC task force took the 
position that, contrary to later official statements in the wake of  Abu Ghraib, detainees in its 
custody were not protected by the Geneva Conventions because they were “unlawful combatants.”
In the summer of  2003, General Koenig, then the head of  the JSOC task force, asked Colonel 
Randy Moulton, the commander of  the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), for help with 
interrogation. Moulton later testified to Congress that “before I sent the team over, I talked to 
the task force commander and asked him what the legal status was. I was told they were DUCs 
[Detained Unlawful Combatants] and not covered under the Geneva Conventions.” 19
JPRA sent a team of  three people: Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kleinman, its senior intelligence 
officer; Terrence Russell, a civilian employee who had previously trained interrogators in 
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SERE (survival, evasion, resistance, escape) techniques at Guantánamo; and Lenny Miller, a 
contractor.20 In an interview with Task Force staff, Kleinman said the team arrived in Iraq at the 
end of  August and departed in early October.21 
On September 6, Kleinman “walked into an interrogation room all painted black.” 22 A 
detainee was kneeling on the floor, and a Special Forces interrogator was asking him questions, 
and slapping his face with every response.23 Miller and Russell, who were already in the room 
observing, told Kleinman this had been going on for a half  hour. Russell’s report of  the trip to 
Iraq said that he and Miller told Kleinman that “we saw nothing wrong with what was going 
on,” but over their objections, Kleinman stopped the interrogation and told the interrogator 
it was a violation of  the Geneva Conventions.24 Kleinman later stopped interrogators from 
implementing a plan that called for sleep deprivation and holding a detainee in stress positions 
for hours at a time.25 Kleinman called Moulton and told him what he had done, but Moulton, 
after consulting with the JSOC task force commander, told Kleinman that the JPRA team was 
authorized to use the full range of  SERE techniques on prisoners, including “walling, sleep 
deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach 
slaps, and finger pokes to the chest, space/time disorientation, [and] white noise).” 26 
Kleinman testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that after his conversation with 
Moulton, he intervened in a third interrogation, in which his two JPRA colleagues
ripped [a detainee’s] Abaya off  — not cut — they ripped it off. ... [R]ipped off  
his underwear, took his shoes, they’d hooded him already, then they — they had 
shackled him by the wrist and ankles. … And then the orders were given that 
he was to stand in that position for 12 hours no matter how much he asked for 
help, no matter how much he pleaded, unless he passed out, the guards were 
not to respond to any requests for help.27
Kleinman said he told his colleagues that this was “unlawful,” and stopped it.28 Kleinman’s 
colleagues at the JPRA gave different accounts of  this interrogation. Terrence Russell testified that 
both he and Miller had removed the detainee’s clothing, while Miller said that only Russell had.29 
Russell denied that Kleinman had objected to the interrogation, and said the detainee was naked 
only for “however long it took to have his clothes taken off  and put the new [clothing] on.” 30
Kleinman attempted to address his concerns with the JSOC task force’s commanding general 
and its legal advisor. Both seemed to agree with him, he said, when he raised the issue, but the 
commander “never once issued an order.” 31 
Others soldiers at the Battlefield Interrogation Facility were “very hostile” to Kleinman’s 
objections, and in some cases “literally threatening.” 32 Several accosted him and tried to take 
his camera away, until Kleinman told them it would be an enormous mistake to assault a senior 
officer. One Army Ranger — who was not an interrogator, but went out on raids based on 
information obtained from detainees and had heard that Kleinman was “coddling terrorists” 
— made his point by sharpening a knife near Kleinman, and warned him not to sleep too 
soundly.33 Kleinman reported this to the JSOC task force’s legal advisor, who responded that 
he should be careful.34 The legal advisor had expressed concern about his own safety to officers 
visiting from Guantánamo shortly before Kleinman traveled to Iraq. According to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee’s Report:
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According to LTC Beaver the SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns 
with her about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during 
interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. He told her 
he was “risking his life” by talking to her about these issues. … [T]he SMU TF 
Legal Advisor said he had also raised these issues with the Commander of  the 
SMU TF, but that [redacted] was not receptive to his concerns.35
After Kleinman returned from Iraq, Moulton asked him to write a memo on how JPRA could 
assist the interrogation effort. Kleinman said he refused, because he believed making the 
recommendations Moulton wanted would be unlawful, and suggested that Terrence Russell 
could write a report instead. After that, “I was a pariah. … My access to anything was cut off  
when we got back from Iraq.” 36 
Russell’s report, released in response to a Freedom of  Information Act request, describes a 
JSOC task force officer as “very angry and frustrated” with Kleinman. The officer “told us he 
was going to recommend … the earliest possible departure” for Kleinman because “his presence 
was counter-productive and was a direct impediment for his people to conduct interrogation 
operations.” Russell suggested that “under different circumstances and under a different team 
chief  JPRA could re-engage with TF-20.” 37
The next report about abuses by the JSOC task force came from retired Army Colonel Stuart 
Herrington, who had extensive interrogation experience in the Vietnam War, Operation Just 
Cause in Panama, and the first Gulf  War. Colonel Herrington traveled to Iraq in December of  
2003, at the request of  Major General Barbara Fast, to assess U.S. intelligence operations there. 
Shortly before Herrington went to Iraq, Mr. Q, the former head of  the high-value detainee 
interrogation center at Camp Cropper who first reported abuses by the JSOC task force, told 
Herrington what he had witnessed, and Herrington did his best to investigate further in Iraq. 
Herrington provided Task Force staff  with a copy of  his report, which states that his team 
learned from an officer serving at the ISG detention and interrogation facility at Camp Cropper 
(separate from Herrington’s original source) that
prisoners arriving at his facility who had been captured by Task Force 121 
showed signs of  having been mistreated (beaten) by their captors. Medical 
personnel supporting the [interrogation center] examine each detainee upon 
his arrival to document pre-existing conditions. Detainees captured by TF 
121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note that 
“detainee shows signs of  having been beaten.” … I asked the officer if  he had 
reported this problem. He replied that “Everyone knows about it.” 38 
Herrington’s report also describes discussions with “an interagency representative,” most likely 
from the CIA, who told him that the CIA had been directed not to have contact with JSOC 
task force’s interrogation facility “because practices there were in contravention to his Agency’s 
guidance on what was and what was not permissible in interrogating detainees.” 39 This is 
consistent with a later New York Times report that the CIA had barred its personnel from working 
at the interrogation facility at Camp Nama in August 2003.40 Herrington concluded, “[I]t seems 
clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of  detainees.” 41
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In March or April of  2004, the Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) legal advisor’s office 
wrote to Herrington that they had investigated his sources’ allegations and found no evidence of  
mistreatment. Herrington said he expressed “blunt dismay” and incredulity at this conclusion, 
and said his source “could be excused for thinking this is a cover-up.” 42 
An interrogator based at the Battlefield Interrogation Facility in Camp Nama in the first half  of  
2004 later spoke to Human Rights Watch about ongoing abuses there, including one incident 
in which a detainee “was stripped naked, put in the mud and sprayed with the hose, with very 
cold hoses, in February. At night it was very cold … this happened all night.” 43 He and several 
colleagues had gone to the colonel in charge of  the facility, and told him they were “uneasy” 
with the detainees’ treatment
And within a couple hours a team of  two JAG officers, JAG lawyers, came and 
gave us a couple hours slide show on why this is necessary, why this is legal, 
they’re enemy combatants, they’re not POWs, and so we can do all this stuff  to 
them and so forth. … And then they went on to the actual treatment itself  … 
that’s not inhumane because they’re able to rebound from it. And they claim no 
lasting mental effects or physical marks or anything, or permanent damage of  
any kind, so it’s not inhumane.44
Because of  the high level of  secrecy surrounding the camp, and its unusual chain of  command, 
the interrogator had little other recourse:
I didn’t have any contact with my normal uniformed battalion. [Task Force 
121/6-26] was my new chain of  command for several months. …
We called the colonel by his first name, called the sergeant major by his first 
name. …I couldn’t tell you the sergeant major’s last name if  I tried. Same with 
the colonel. A lot of  my fellow interrogators, I didn’t know their last names 
either. … [W]hen you asked someone their name they don’t offer up the last 
name. … [M]ore often than not, when they gave you their name it probably 
wasn’t their real name anyway.45
In addition to Special Forces personnel, the interrogator said, he worked with the CIA, who 
were stationed at another building nearby. Because of  the level of  secrecy, “[w]e knew that we 
were only a couple steps removed from the Pentagon, but it was a little unclear, especially to the 
interrogators who weren’t really part of  that task force.” 46 
The interrogator said that neither the Red Cross nor the Army’s Criminal Investigative Division 
had access to Camp Nama. Theoretically, he could have gone to his normal unit’s chain of  
command and reported to CID, but he had been told on his first day at the camp that he was not 
allowed to disclose anything that happened at the Special Forces facility to his normal command.47
According to Army CID investigator Angela Birt, if  he had reported to Army CID there was 
little they could have done:
[A]ny investigations that came out of  [JSOC facilities] were referred to a 
couple of  agents embedded with the folks at Fort Bragg. And they operate and 
work directly for them. And as soon as we saw something visible to us that 
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belonged to them we had to hand it over. You don’t see it again. We’d hear 
about it from other detainees but as soon as we referred something it went into 
a black hole and we never saw it again.48
But the reports of  abuse kept coming. On June 25, 2004, an FBI agent emailed his superiors 
and alleged that a detainee captured by the JSOC task force had suspicious burn marks on his 
body, which he said came from torture by his captors.49 The same day, Vice Admiral Lowell 
Jacoby wrote to Undersecretary of  Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, asserting that 
two Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel had observed 
[p]risoners arriving at the Temporary Detention Facility in Baghdad with burn 
marks on their backs. Some have bruises, and some have complained of  kidney 
pain.
One of  the two DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers witnessed TF 6-26 officers 
punch a prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical 
attention. …
One DIA/DH interrogator/debriefer took pictures of  [a detainee’s] injuries 
and showed them to his TF 6-26 supervisor, who immediately confiscated them.
TF 6-26 personnel have taken the following actions with regards to the DIA/
DH interrogators/debriefers:
 • Confiscated vehicle keys
 • Instructed them not to leave the compound without specific permission,even to 
get a haircut at the PX
 • Threatened them
 • Informed them that their e-mails were being screened
 • Ordered them not to talk to anyone in the U.S.50
The next day, Cambone wrote a handwritten note on Jacoby’s report to his deputy, Lieutenant 
General William G. Boykin, ordering him to “[g]et to the bottom of  this immediately. This is 
not acceptable.” 51 Boykin’s review has never been made public, but a spokesman told The New 
York Times that he found no pattern of  abuse.52 
A 2006 DOD inspector general’s report states that “the disagreements between the DIA and 
special mission units were not reconciled to the benefit of  all those conducting interrogation 
operations in Iraq.” Instead, the Department of  Defense seems to have concluded that the 
problem was “disaffected interrogators from DIA who were not prepared for the demanding 
and exacting pace of  operations.” 53
 Shortly after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, and a month before Cambone’s note to Boykin, 
investigative journalist Seymour Hersh had reported that the abuses were linked to a highly 
classified Special Access Program (SAP) run by Cambone and Rumsfeld, code named Copper 
Green. Hersh reported that his source described the program, which predated the Iraq war, as 
operating at the highest level of  secrecy:
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Do the people working the problem have to use aliases? Yes. Do we need dead 
drops for the mail? Yes. No traceability and no budget. And some special-access 
programs are never fully briefed to Congress.54
Hersh wrote that it was Rumsfeld’s and Cambone’s decision to expand the program to Iraq, and 
Cambone’s decision to bring 
some of  the Army military-intelligence officers working inside the Iraqi 
prisons under the SAP’s auspices. “So here are fundamentally good soldiers — 
military-intelligence guys — being told that no rules apply,” the former official, 
who has extensive knowledge of  the special-access programs, added. “And, as 
far as they’re concerned, this is a covert operation, and it’s to be kept within 
Defense Department channels.” 55
Cambone and Rumsfeld declined interview requests from Task Force staff. At the time, Larry 
DiRita, a spokesman for Donald Rumsfeld, called Hersh’s story “the most hysterical piece of  
journalist malpractice I have ever observed,” and CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said the story 
was “fundamentally wrong. There was no DOD/CIA program to abuse and humiliate Iraqi 
prisoners.” 56 
Many details of  Hersh’s report are unconfirmed, and some may not be accurate, but the 
existence of  “Copper Green” has been reported by others. A 2010 memoir by U.S. Army 
intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer about his service in Afghanistan in 
2003 refers to an “enhanced” interrogation program run by the CIA and JSOC task force 
and authorized by the Pentagon’s leadership, called “Copper Green.” 57 A more recent book 
by Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady states that “Copper Green” was another name for a 
classified operation called “MATCHBOX” that “included direct authorization to use certain 
interrogation techniques in the field.” 58
Moreover, government documents show that the JSOC task force’s abuse of  prisoners were part 
of  a Special Access Program. In April 2005, a regular Army CID investigation team wrote to 
the commander of  Criminal Investigation Command that it had been unable to thoroughly 
investigate over 20 cases of  alleged detainee abuse,
due to the suspects and witnesses involvement in Special Access Program’s 
(SAP) and/or the security classification of  the unit they were assigned to during 
the offense. Attempts by Special Agents … to be “read on” to these programs 
ha[ve] been unsuccessful.59
Some of  those cases involve uncorroborated allegations of  abuse, which investigators did not 
find credible. Others were far more serious.
Another memo, written on February 11, 2005, describes in more detail the obstacles that CID 
agents faced in trying to investigate the JSOC task force:
A review of  this case file and investigative reports revealed this detainee was 
captured and detained by Task Force 6-26. … An Information Report was 
provided to this office which stated fake names were used by the 6-26 members. 
The only names identified by this investigation were determined to be fake 
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names used by the capturing soldiers; however, the abuse allegedly occurred 
during the interrogation of  the detainee. The 6-26 CID agent related that the 
capturing soldiers would not know who the interrogators were. 6-26 also had a 
major computer malfunction which resulted in them losing 70 percent of  their 
files; therefore, they can’t find the cases we need to review. 
This investigation meets the necessary requirements and does not need to be 
reopened. Hell, even if  we reopened it we wouldn’t get anymore information 
[than] we already have.60
Five Suspicious Deaths
There are at least five suspicious detainee deaths in Iraq that appear to be linked to the CIA’s 
operations or the JSOC task forces. Four were classified as homicides by medical examiners, 
but only one, the death of  Abed Hamed Mowhoush, resulted in a successful court-martial 
conviction. The interrogator convicted in that case, Chief  Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer (a 
regular Army interrogator, not a CIA officer or Special Forces soldier), received a sentence of  
two months confinement to barracks and a fine of  $6,000.
Dilar Dababa
On June 13, 2003, a detainee named Dilar Dababa died in the custody of  the JSOC task 
force, at an annex to the Battlefield Interrogation Facility in Camp Nama. Documents from 
the investigation of  Dababa’s death show that after he died, medics from the Battlefield 
Interrogation Facility drove Dababa to a field clinic, and falsely told the clinic staff  that the 
patient “had walked up to a guard post and collapsed.” 61 Early entries in the investigative file 
also state that Dababa died of  “an apparent heart attack,” 62 but his autopsy contradicted this, 
finding instead that his death was a homicide caused by traumatic brain injury and hemorrhage. 
The autopsy also describes dozens of  abrasions and bruises, concentrated but not limited to the 
head and neck, and injuries from handcuffs around the wrists and ankles. Many of  these injuries 
were not present at the time of  his capture.63
Investigators encountered a number of  obstacles. No physical evidence was collected, because 
Dababa’s cell was cleaned and another high-value detainee placed there before investigators could 
analyze the crime scene. According to a memorandum in the file from August 7, 2003, “[a]ll of  
the guards on duty at the time of  the detainees’ death were not interviewed nor were they retained 
in Baghdad until interviewed by CID.” 64 Interpreters and other detainees at the facility were 
never interviewed. The death certificate and autopsy report were not finalized until May 2004.65 
The JSOC task force guards and interrogators who were interviewed said that they had been 
“smoking the prisoner” and “putting the detainee under stress,” subjecting him to nudity, sleep 
deprivation, forced exercise, and using “pressure points and bone manipulation” 66 if  he did 
not comply with orders. One guard also admitted making a “stink bomb” in Dababa’s cell 
using Tabasco sauce and the heater from an MRE packet.67 They said, though, that they had 
only struck Dababa in self-defense after he tried to grab their weapons in an escape attempt.68 
Guards described Dababa being blindfolded and flex-cuffed at the hands and feet before his 
escape attempt; it was unclear how he had gotten out of  his restraints, and how he received 
most of  his injuries.  
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An agent who reviewed the file in August 2004 wrote that while there were inconsistencies in the 
soldiers’ statements, and between the statements and the autopsy, “[t]he only way we solve this now is 
with a confession.” 69 No confession ever occurred. The case was eventually ruled a justifiable homi-
cide in September 2006, though at least one investigator “non-concur[red]” with that conclusion.70 
Manadel al-Jamadi
Manadel al-Jamadi is sometimes called the “Ice Man,” because there are notorious photographs 
of  Abu Ghraib guards Sabrina Harman and Charles Graner posing with his ice-packed corpse. 
On November 4, 2003, he was arrested by a team of  Navy SEALs and CIA agents. Al-Jamadi 
struggled violently; even after he was subdued he was reportedly struck and “body slammed into 
the back of  a Humvee”. He was interrogated in a CIA facility, and then driven to Abu Ghraib.71 
Several of  the military police present when al-Jamadi arrived have spoken to government 
investigators and journalists about what happened next. One MP, Jason Kenner, told military 
investigators that al-Jamadi was naked from the waist down when he arrived at the prison, with 
a bag over his head. Two CIA personnel (whom guards referred to as “OGA,” an abbreviation 
for “Other Government Agency”), an interrogator and a translator, asked Kenner and another 
MP to take him to tier one. Kenner said they placed al-Jamadi in an orange jumpsuit and steel 
handcuffs, which was “common procedure” for CIA prisoners, and
walked the prisoner to the shower room on Tier 1B. … The OGA personnel 
followed behind us. The interrogator told us that he did not want the prisoner 
to sit down and wanted him shackled to the wall. I got some leg irons and 
shackled the prisoner to the wall by attaching one end of  the leg irons to the 
bars on the window and the other end to the prisoner’s handcuffs.72
The window was five feet off  the ground. According to Kenner and another MP, Dennis 
Stevanus, there was enough slack that al-Jamadi could stand with his legs supporting his weight, 
but not if  he slumped forward or kneeled. The MPs exited the shower room, leaving al-Jamadi 
with CIA interrogator Mark Swanner and a contract interrogator.73 
According to a National Public Radio (NPR) report, the CIA personnel involved told investiga-
tors that al-Jamadi had been talking “about the city of  Mosul and hating Americans, when all of  a 
sudden he dropped, falling to at least one knee. … [T]hey immediately called for a medic.” 74 
The MPs contradicted this. Walter Diaz stated that Swanner had called the MPs in, and asked them 
to re-shackle al-Jamadi’s hands higher on the window frame, even though his arms were already
almost literally coming out of  his sockets. I mean, that’s how bad he was 
hanging. The OGA guy, he was kind of  calm. He was sitting down the whole 
time. He was, like, ‘Yeah, you know, he just don’t want to cooperate. I think you 
should lift him a little higher.’75  
Diaz asked for help from two other MPs, Jeffrey Frost and Dennis Stevanus, to lift al-Jamadi up 
and re-fasten the handcuffs. Frost said that Swanner assured them the detainee was just “playing 
possum,” 76 but when they released him,
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[h]e didn’t stand up. His arms just kept on bending at this awkward — not 
awkward position, but it was — you know, I was almost waiting for a bone to 
break or something and just thinking, you know, this guy — he’s really good at 
playing ’possum.77
The MPs removed al-Jamadi’s hood, and realized that he was dead. When they lowered him 
to the floor, according to Frost, “blood came gushing out of  his nose and mouth, as if  a faucet 
had been turned on.” 78 The military autopsy classified the death as a homicide, caused by 
“compromised respiration” and “blunt force injuries” to the head and torso, including several 
broken ribs. Other pathologists who reviewed the autopsy report believed that what was fatal 
was the combination of  the broken ribs and al-Jamadi’s position. Dr. Michael Baden, the chief  
forensic examiner for the New York State Police, told Jane Mayer, “You don’t die from broken 
ribs. But if  he had been hung up in this way and had broken ribs, that’s different. … [A]sphyxia 
is what he died from — as in a crucifixion.” 79 
Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, a Navy SEAL from the unit that captured al-Jamadi, was 
court-martialed, but acquitted based on evidence that he did not cause al-Jamadi’s death. No 
CIA officer was ever charged. According to the Associated Press, a grand jury was convened, 
and focused not on Swanner but on the role of  a former CIA officer named Steve Stormoen, 
who ran the agency’s “detainee exploitation cell” at Abu Ghraib. The AP reported that 
Stormoen had processed al-Jamadi into Abu Ghraib, but was not present in the room where 
he died, and that he had been reprimanded after an internal CIA probe for permitting agents 
to “ghost” prisoners, i.e., detain them without registering them or acknowledging their identity, 
without headquarters authorization. The grand jury also reportedly heard testimony about 
a CIA employee nicknamed “Chili” who was at Abu Ghraib the day al-Jamadi died and still 
works for the agency.80 
But the grand jury did not lead to any indictments, and it is unclear whether the Department 
of  Justice (DOJ) ever proposed any indictments. On August 30, 2012, Attorney General Eric 
Holder released a statement that no charges would be brought because “the admissible evidence 
would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 81 DOJ 
declined to elaborate further, or respond to questions about the investigation.
Charles Graner, the soldier who received the longest prison sentence for abusing prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib, spoke to Army investigators about Chili in April 2005. Graner said that Chili had 
said he was an FBI contract worker, but “lo and behold he ends up being the interrogator over 
the analyst that the fellow in the shower dies with.” 82 He also described another incident where 
Chili and his colleagues were interviewing a detainee in the back stairwell, and “drug him back 
unconscious to his cell.” 83 
The MPs’ handwritten log books corroborate Graner’s allegations about CIA involvement in 
interrogation, though they use euphemisms. The entry that, according to Graner, corresponded 
to the detainee being carried unconscious from the stairwell reads simply: “OGA in cell 13 was 
taken away will be taken off  of  the count at this time.” 84 The only record of  al-Jamadi’s death 
is an entry stating: “Shift change Normal relief  1 OGA in IB shower not to be used until OGA 
is moved out.” 85
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One entry from November 11, 2003, is more explicit, stating:
The 4 new OGA’s are in 2, 4, 6, and 8 they are to have no contact with each 
other or anyone else — they are not to sleep or sit down until authorized by OGA 
personnel also we were informed that all four are neither hungry nor thirsty.86
Walter Diaz also reported that the CIA routinely interrogated “ghost prisoners” at Abu Ghraib. 
According to Diaz, the agency “would bring in people all the time to interview them. We had 
one wing, Tier One Alpha, reserved for the O.G.A. They’d have maybe twenty people there at 
a time.” Diaz said, “We, as soldiers, didn’t get involved. We’d lock the door for them and leave. 
We didn’t know what they were doing,” but “we heard a lot of  screaming.” 87 
Major General Antonio Taguba and Major General George Fay confirmed that MPs held 
“ghost detainees” for the CIA. Taguba reported that one MP unit had helped hide detainees 
from a visiting Red Cross survey team.88 Fay found that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan 
“became fascinated with the “Other Government Agencies,” a term used mostly to mean CIA, 
and “allowed OGA to do interrogations without the presence of  Army personnel.” 89
In addition to the criminal investigation, the CIA’s Office of  the Inspector General (OIG) 
investigated al-Jamadi’s killing before the case was referred to DOJ. But the OIG report itself  
remains classified, and courts have ruled that the CIA is not required to disclose it under the 
Freedom of  Information Act. 
The Army CID file on al-Jamadi’s death does provide some clues as to the CIA OIG’s 
conclusions. According to the CID file, OIG personnel “advised their investigation had revealed 
that the CIA personnel involved in the interrogation of  [al-Jamadi] had not been entirely 
truthful in their accounts of  the incident, but declined to provide specifics.” 90 One individual 
whom the CIA OIG interviewed “had admitted removing the sand bag that was used to hood 
[al-Jamadi],” and his explanation for its removal was “not believable.” 91 The individual in 
question claimed that he had taken the bag to keep it secure in the event of  an investigation, 
and had given it to a security officer, but “further information had not corroborated this 
statement.” 92 The hood was never recovered.
Abed Hamed Mowhoush
On November 10, less than one week after Manadel al-Jamadi’s death, former General 
Abed Hamed Mowhoush turned himself  in to U.S. troops at Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
Tiger near the border with Syria. On November 21, he was moved to a temporary detention 
facility in an old train station, known as the “Blacksmith Hotel.” Chief  Warrant Officer Lewis 
Welshofer, a former SERE trainer, took charge of  Mowhoush’s interrogation. 
On November 24, according to classified documents obtained by The Washington Post, 
Mowhoush was interrogated by a CIA operative referred to as “OGA Brian” and a team of  
Iraqi paramilitaries working for the CIA, known as “the Scorpions.” The Iraqis “were hitting 
the detainee with fists, a club, and a length of  rubber hose.” 93 The documents state that this 
was not uncommon treatment for uncooperative detainees at the Blacksmith Hotel.94 
At Welshofer’s court-martial, the CIA’s role in Mowhoush’s interrogation was discussed only 
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obliquely. One witness who testified at the court-martial did so anonymously and behind a tarp, 
to conceal his identity from the public and press.95 At one point a defense attorney asked the 
witness if  he had reported something “to the CIA,” but then stopped himself  and apologized to 
the judge for the reference to the agency.96
Several witnesses did testify about the November 24 interrogation. Specialist Jerry Loper, testifying 
under a grant of  immunity, said that he had escorted Mowhoush to the interrogation room and 
waited outside. While waiting, “I heard loud thuds and screams. It sounded like he was being 
beaten.” When Mowhoush was brought out half  an hour to an hour afterwards, “[h]is hands were 
severely swollen, and he couldn’t walk. His breathing was labored. … It took five of  us to get him 
back.” 97 Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams gave a very similar account to Loper’s.98
Todd Sonnek, a chief  warrant officer with the Army Special Forces unit Operational 
Detachment Alpha, testified that Welshofer had brought in Special Forces troops, civilians, 
and Iraqis to interview Mowhoush with a “fear-up” technique, and supplied the Iraqis with 
the questions to ask. Sonnek testified that “from start to finish, this was Chief  Welshofer’s 
interrogation,” though he acknowledged that Welshofer was not actually the one asking the 
questions and did not have “supervisory or operational control over the Iraqis.” Sonnek claimed 
that Mowhoush had tried to “strike out” and needed to be subdued, and denied that Mowhoush 
was unable to walk unassisted afterwards.99 
Testifying in his own defense, Welshofer acknowledged that he was present for the November 24 
incident but denied he was in control of  it:
5 minutes into his interrogation, when he continued to deny, deny, deny, I 
noticed other people in the hallway. … I passed control of  the interrogation 
over to these individuals in the hallway. It is not correct that I was in control 
of  the interrogation and that the others were just assisting me. I did not feel 
I had any command control over those people. … When the general left the 
room, it was under his own power. I saw what looked like a straight piece of  
radiator hose, a little bit softer material but of  the same diameter, as well as 
a piece of  something like insulation that might go around a door, only it was 
thicker and hollow on the inside with a camouflage net pole down in one 
end of  it. These devices were used to beat the general. There were also some 
kicks, some slaps.100 
CIA Director George Tenet refers in his memoirs to “the Agency-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary 
group known as ‘the Scorpions,’ ” 101 but details of  their involvement with Mowhoush’s death 
have not been declassified. The CIA OIG prepared a report on Mowhoush’s death, but that 
also remains classified. 
OGA and the Scorpions do not appear to have directly caused Mowhoush’s death. According to 
court-martial testimony, on November 26, Mowhoush was having obvious breathing difficulties 
at the beginning of  an interrogation, but Welshofer nonetheless put him into a sleeping bag, 
and wrapped it in a cord to hold it in place. (Welshofer said that Mowhoush did not appear to 
require medical assistance, and he concluded he was using a “resistance technique” of  “acting 
excessively fatigued.”) Welshofer asked Mowhoush questions while sitting on his chest, and 
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sometimes obstructing his nose or mouth.102 Mowhoush died soon after of  “asphyxia due to 
smothering and chest compression,” according to the autopsy report.103 
Welshofer was convicted of  negligent homicide, but was sentenced to only two months of  
confinement to barracks. This was in part because of  evidence that his commanding officers 
knew of  the sleeping bag technique and allowed him to use it on a number of  detainees. They 
also condoned a similar technique that involved placing detainees in wall lockers.104 
Welshofer and his unit continued to use “close confinement” after Mowhoush’s death. Major 
Christopher Layton testified that while investigating the homicide in mid-January 2004, he had 
traveled to FOB Rifles near Al Asad, where Welshofer’s unit was based. He saw a sleeping bag 
and wall lockers in an interrogation room there.105 Another witness, Gerald Pratt, said that after 
Mowhoush’s death, CID took the original sleeping bag, but “Chief  Welshofer procured another 
one. A detainee came in with a sleeping bag, and Chief  got it.” 106 
Welshofer has denied that his actions caused Mowhoush’s death. In a 2009 interview with 
CBS, he said he only did what was necessary: “I helped save soldiers lives. I’m 100 percent 
convinced of  that.” 107
Abdul Jameel
Welshofer’s unit, the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, operated out of  FOB Rifles in Al 
Asad. Another detainee, 47-year-old Abdul Jameel, died there on January 9, 2004. According to 
Jameel’s autopsy, his death was a homicide, caused by 
blunt force injuries and asphyxia. … According to the investigative report 
provided by U.S. Army CID, the decedent was shackled to the top of  a 
doorframe with a gag in his mouth at the time he lost consciousness and 
became pulseless.
The severe blunt force injuries, the hanging position, and the obstruction of  the 
oral cavity with a gag contributed to this individual’s death.108 
Another document summarizing the autopsy report describes the circumstances of  death as: 
“Q by OGA, gagged in standing restraint.” 109 In addition to being gagged and shackled, the 
detainee had suffered “the fracturing of  most of  his ribs and multiple fractures of  some of  his 
ribs,” and a fractured hyoid bone.110
CID investigators concluded that a series of  incidents had contributed to Jameel’s death. Jameel 
was captured by Operational Detachment Alpha 525 of  the 5th Special Forces Group on 
January 4, 2004. CID found that one soldier had kicked Jameel in the chest several times after 
he was already restrained in zip-ties. 
On January 6, 2004, guards and other detainees saw masked interrogators take Jameel out for 
interrogation. He returned with severe bruises on his abdomen, and told other detainees and 
guards that he had been beaten.111 One detainee said Jameel had difficulty breathing. Three 
soldiers in ODA 525 and one interpreter claimed that Jameel had attacked them, attempted 
to grab one of  their weapons during interrogation, and they had been forced to strike 
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him repeatedly for one to two minutes in order to subdue him because “[h]e was strong 
and fought back,” demonstrating “extreme resistance.” 112 CID investigators noted this 
conflicted with other descriptions of  Jameel as appearing to be frail and in poor health.113 
The summary of  Jameel’s interrogation on January 6 did not mention any struggle, and 
CID concluded that the interrogators’ account of  the incident could not credibly account 
for the extent of  Jameel’s injuries.114 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 9, Jameel allegedly tried to escape from the isolation/
sleep deprivation area. After he was re-captured, a soldier in the 3rd ACR (Armored Calvary 
Regiment) used a military police baton to force Jameel to a standing position, by placing the 
baton under Jameel’s chin and lifting. CID investigators concluded that this had broken Jameel’s 
hyoid bone, an injury that directly contributed to his death. CID also found that several soldiers 
had conspired to give a false account of  the details of  Jameel’s attempted escape.115 
Finally, shortly after 7:00 a.m. on January 9, Jameel was “repeatedly ordered … to stand as part 
of  a mass punishment” of  detainees for talking.116 Jameel did not obey. According to military 
doctors, based on the number and manner of  Jameel’s broken ribs and other injuries, he “would 
have been in great pain and would have had great difficulty breathing and would not have been 
able to walk.” 117 Soldiers handcuffed him to the door frame of  his cell in a standing position, 
and forced a gag into his mouth after he “refused to stop making noises.” 118 Five minutes later, 
he was dead.119 
No one was ever prosecuted for Jameel’s death, despite criminal investigators’ recommendation 
of  charges against 11 soldiers. According to an Army document:
The command, with the assistance of  advice of  command legal counsel, 
determined that the detainee died as a result of  lawful applications of  force in 
response to repeated aggression and misconduct by the detainee.120 
Anonymous Detainee
There may have been an additional homicide at Al Asad shortly before Jameel’s death. On 
January 4, 2004, a detainee died of  anoxic brain injury at a military hospital in Balad, after 
being medically evacuated from Al Asad Air Base.121 According to witnesses, he was brought to 
a medical unit in Al Asad by a civilian SUV.122 The patient was unconscious and had a bruise on 
his forehead, approximately 4 centimeters in diameter.123 The person who brought him in said 
the individual had collapsed during interrogation, and might be diabetic.124 A medic described 
the person who brought the patient as
over 6’0” tall, sandy blonde hair, wearing a baseball hat, thin, fair complexion, 
no glasses, wearing civilian clothes. I thought I had seen him in the hospital 
in the past. There were some people in civilian clothes that would frequent 
the hospital from time to time like this person and would carry 9 mm pistols. 
I never saw any identification and I don’t think I ever questioned them about 
who they were. … I think that I was told by someone that they were maybe 
Special Forces or other government agent (OGA). This particular night I did 
not question the individual who brought the patient in.125
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A CT scan was performed on the unidentified detainee at Balad, which revealed brain 
hemorrhages caused by blunt force trauma.126 The death was reported to CID shortly after it 
occurred, but the doctors who treated the detainee were never interviewed, nor was an autopsy 
performed.127 An investigation was opened after a colonel re-reported the incident in the 
wake of  Abu Ghraib, but the deceased detainee could not be conclusively identified and the 
perpetrators could not be identified at all.
The CIA’s and JSOC’s Response to Allegations of Abuse
In an interview with Task Force staff, former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo said that 
headquarters had sent “detailed cables” that gave CIA personnel in Iraq clear limits on their 
role in interrogations:
Don’t hold prisoners yourself. Defer to the military on questioning. Only 
participate when invited to do so. Don’t try to force yourself  into these 
interrogations. Obviously no enhanced interrogation techniques. The bottom 
line of  the guidelines was defer to the military; these were prisoners under their 
control, their auspices. Help, support them, when you’re asked to participate in 
interrogations, do it, but just stay a step back.128
But, Rizzo said, “either some people … didn’t understand it, or chose in the heat of  battle to 
go beyond it.” He said a CIA station chief  and two other officers “were fired because they went 
beyond the guidelines. They started participating in these interrogations. They actually were 
capturing, helping the military capture Iraqi prisoners, and then lied about it.” 129
The Associated Press has reported that CIA officers in Iraq were disciplined, but depicts those 
decisions somewhat differently. According to the AP, CIA officer Steve Stormoen, who ran 
the detainee unit at Abu Ghraib, received a letter of  reprimand for running an unauthorized 
“ghosting” program in Iraq and failing to have a doctor examine Manadel al-Jamadi when 
he arrived at the prison. Stormoen retired, but later returned to the intelligence work as a 
contractor for SpecTal. The CIA also disciplined the Baghdad station chief, Gerry Meyer, and 
his deputy. Meyer resigned rather than be demoted. His deputy was temporarily barred from 
overseas work but later was promoted to run the Pakistan-Afghanistan department within 
the Counterterrorism Center. Another officer involved in al-Jamadi’s death, Chili, remains 
employed by the CIA as of  the date of  the report.130
General Stanley McChrystal has written that in September 2003, the first day he assumed 
control of  the JSOC task forces,
Lyle Koenig, the air force brigadier general then commanding our task force 
in Iraq, called me from Baghdad to welcome me to the command. After 
pleasantries, he stated flatly, “Sir, we need to close the screening facility we’re 
operating at our base at [Baghdad International Airport]. We don’t have the 
expertise or experience to do this correctly.” 131
McChrystal visited the facility about a week later, and “was unimpressed with both the facility 
and our ability to staff  it.” 132 He wrote that he told JSOC staff  regarding detainee treatment 
that “[t]his is our Achilles’ heel. … If  we don’t do this right we’ll be taken off  the battlefield.” 133 
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His memoirs do not specify what he saw, but reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin have 
reported that during McChrystal’s visit, several detainees were being kept naked and their cells 
were guarded by dogs.134 
In January 2004, the Army Times reported that Koenig was retiring “under a cloud of  secrecy.” 
After several weeks of  inquiries about rumors that Koenig had been relieved of  command, an 
Air Force spokesman told the newspaper that he was on terminal leave pending retirement. 
The spokesman said there were no “ongoing investigations at this time” regarding Koenig, and 
refused to elaborate further.135 
In summer 2004, the JSOC task force moved its headquarters to Balad and built a new 
screening facility. McChrystal wrote that the new facility was “as internally transparent as 
possible,” open to visits by representatives from the FBI, the regular military, and other agencies 
as well as U.S. allies.136 McChrystal does not state whether the ICRC had access to the facility in 
Balad, however, and British journalist Mark Urban has written that the Red Cross did not.137
McChrystal’s memoir does discuss a visit by Sen. Carl Levin, who toured the facility 
in its first weeks of  use, when the cells had been built smaller than some others 
in Iraq and were painted black. They weren’t dirty, and the paint choice had 
been made with no particular intent. But it sent a negative message. Senator 
Levin said nothing during the visit, and I judged him satisfied with what he 
saw. But soon afterward I received a letter he’d sent to the secretary of  defense, 
expressing concern with the black cells. … [W]e immediately painted the cells a 
brighter color.138 
McChrystal wrote that the screening facility was expanded with new cells “that matched exactly 
with the standards that had begun to be carried out across all of ” Iraq, but did not specify 
whether the small cells remained in use.139 
According to Urban, one British official who visited the Balad detention facility said that “the 
cells there were like dog kennels — tiny.” 140 Britain eventually told JSOC that its Special 
Forces could not transfer prisoners to the Americans unless the U.S. agreed not to send them to 
Balad.141 Urban states that one visit by British intelligence occurred shortly before a November 
2004 operation in Falluja142 — which implies that the cramped cells remained in use despite 
Levin’s objections.
McChrystal acknowledged that 
[a]s late as the spring of  2004, six months into my command, I believed our 
force needed the option of  employing select, carefully controlled “enhanced” 
interrogation techniques, including sleep management. I was wrong. Although 
these techniques were rarely requested or used, by the summer of  that year we 
got rid of  them completely, and all handling inside our centers followed the 
field manual used by the Army.143
Other reports seem to confirm the ongoing use of  “enhanced techniques” that included “close 
confinement” as well as sleep deprivation into the spring of  2004. An investigation into Special 
Forces task forces’ treatment of  detainees by Brigadier General Richard Formica documented 
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one incident in April or May 2004, in which detainees were held for periods between two and 
seven days in “small cells measuring 20 inches (wide) x 4 feet (high) x 4 feet (deep),” which 
did not provide enough room “to lie down or stand up. They were removed from the cells 
periodically for latrine breaks, to be washed, and for interrogations,” and were “not kept in the 
cells for 72 continuous hours.” The same detainees were sometimes kept naked, “blindfolded, 
sometimes with duct tape,” and loud music was played to prevent them from communicating 
with each other and for “sleep management.” 144 
Formica recommended against disciplining soldiers for these incidents. He acknowledged that the 
tiny cells were “inappropriate for long-term detention,” but said they were not used for this purpose:
Rather, special forces secured combative, resistant detainees in these cells for 
short periods of  time in order to elicit tactical intelligence. … It is reasonable to 
conclude that this would be acceptable for short periods of  time. … [T]wo days 
would be reasonable; five to seven days would not.145
Formica also accepted the explanation that detainees were blindfolded with duct tape “for 
purposes of  force protection and to prevent escape,” and found that this was not inhumane. In 
part, this was because an interrogation policy for Special Forces troops disseminated in February 
2004 permitted interrogation techniques that had been rescinded for ordinary troops, including 
sleep deprivation, stress positions and environmental manipulation.146 
Formica stated, consistent with McChrystal’s memoirs, that this had been corrected in May 
2004. However, in interviews conducted by attorneys in July 2007, two former detainees gave 
detailed descriptions of  being imprisoned in tiny cells that detainees called “black coffins” in 
January 2006.147 They were arrested together and interrogated about the kidnapping of  the 
Christian Science Monitor reporter Jill Carroll, and then taken to a prison near Baghdad airport.148 
There, they alleged, they were held in small wooden cells, painted black, at most one meter wide 
and one meter high. One detainee stated that he was held there for over a week, and the other 
for 16 days.149 Both said that they were continuously handcuffed and hooded, and allowed out 
of  the cells only to use the toilet. One of  the detainees said that he fainted twice inside his box, 
was taken out and given an IV nearby, but afterwards he was returned to the cell: “Everything 
was just the same.” 150 These accounts, while detailed and consistent with each other, could not 
be independently corroborated. 
McChrystal wrote in his memoirs that even after special operations troops were restricted to 
interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual, “[t]here were lapses of  discipline, but they 
were never tolerated. Never a wink and a nod.” 151 As an example of  this, McChrystal describes 
an incident where task force troops interrogating a detainee about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
location “mistreated the detainee by electrically shooting him several times with a Taser.” 152
 McChrystal wrote:
[A]t the conclusion of  the investigation, we acted swiftly. Included in the 
punishment of  those responsible was expulsion from the unit, a uniquely 
difficult blow for soldiers whose very identity relied upon being part of  the 
finest unit of  its kind in the world. They weren’t the first to fall short of  our 
standards and values, nor were they the last. But each time we acted.153
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Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita told a press conference in December 8, 2004, in an 
apparent reference to the same incident, that four individuals associated with the JSOC task 
force “received administration punishments for excessive use of  force. In particular I’m advised 
that it was the unauthorized use of  Taser.” 154 Two of  the four were removed from the unit.155
Di Rita described other investigations involving the JSOC task forces, but most resulted in 
letters of  reprimand or other administrative punishments:
The unit has issued overall 10 letters of  reprimand relating to all allegations 
of  detainee abuse, other allegations that have arisen as well over time. The 
Navy Special Warfare Command has two special courts-martial pending. Two 
personnel have already received non-judicial punishment. There are four other 
non-judicial punishments pending. And there are two investigations of  a — 
what we call Article 32 nature ongoing. 156
According to journalist Marc Ambinder, at some point McChrystal
ordered deputy commanding general Eric Fiel to quietly review the practices 
at Camp Nama. The review, which remains classified and locked in a vault 
at Pope Army Airfield, resulted in disciplinary action against more than forty 
JSOC personnel. Several promising careers — including that of  the colonel 
responsible for Nama at the time of  the abuses — were ended. 157 
Ambinder does not specify whether the “disciplinary action” included criminal proceedings, 
perhaps due to ongoing classification. 
The Regular Military
Rules of Engagement for Conventional Forces in Iraq
At congressional hearings after the Abu Ghraib scandal, a series of  Defense Department 
and military officials testified that unlike Taliban and Al Qaeda suspects in Guantánamo and 
Afghanistan, detainees in Iraq were protected by the Geneva Conventions. Secretary of  Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld testified to Congress that troops’ “instructions are to, in the case of  Iraq, 
adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions apply to all of  the individuals 
there in one way or another.” 158 General Ricardo Sanchez has written that in mid-June 2003, 
he “put out an order to all my units stating that the Geneva Conventions applied to all detainees 
for all interrogations and handling.” 159 
During the summer of  2003, 10 or 12 members of  the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 
the same unit linked to two detainee deaths in Afghanistan, traveled to Abu Ghraib to set up 
interrogation operations there. Captain Carolyn Wood became the officer in charge. On July 
26, 2003, Wood sent a proposed interrogation policy that included sleep management, “comfort 
positions,” the presence of  military dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation and light control.160 
Wood said she understood Sanchez’s order to apply Geneva in Iraq created a different legal 
situation, which was why she sought command approval for the techniques. But she “perceived 
the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan,” and 
thought the same techniques would be useful.161 
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Wood did not hear back from her command about the proposal, and resubmitted it on August 27, 
2003. This time, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib, and told her that “they did not see 
anything wrong with it,” and would approve it and forward it to higher-ranking officers for review.162 
In early September, Major General Geoffrey Miller visited Iraq to advise personnel there about 
improving interrogations. Several soldiers who met with him recalled him saying that they 
were treating detainees too leniently. For example, Major General Keith Dayton, also of  the 
Iraq Survey Group, remembered Miller telling him that ISG is “not getting much out of  these 
people” because “you haven’t broken [the detainees] psychologically.” 163 
On September 14, CJTF-7 issued its first theater-wide interrogation policy, signed by General 
Sanchez. The policy stated that the Geneva Conventions applied, but nonetheless authorized 
sleep “adjustment,” stress positions, the presence of  military dogs, yelling, loud music, light 
control, environmental manipulation, and isolation. The policy went into effect immediately. 
According to Sanchez’s autobiography, his legal advisor, Colonel Marc Warren, told him there 
was “unanimous agreement” among legal experts in Iraq that “every one of  these is authorized 
by the Geneva Conventions.” 164 
At a hearing on May 19, 2004, Sen. Jack Reed asked Warren how he could have concluded that 
those techniques complied with Article 31 of  the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that 
“physical or moral coercion shall not be exercised against protected persons, in particular to 
obtain information from them or from third parties.” Warren stated that they were permitted 
“when applied to security internees, in this case who are unlawful combatants,” and who 
“would have been permissibly under active interrogation.” 165
A December 24, 2003, letter from the military to the Red Cross explains this interpretation in 
more detail. Warren apparently relied on Article 5 of  the Fourth Geneva Convention, which 
states that if  a party to a conflict
is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of  or 
engaged in activities hostile to the security of  the State, such individual person 
shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present 
Convention as would, if  exercised in the favour of  such individual person, be 
prejudicial to the security of  such State. … [S]uch persons shall nevertheless be 
treated with humanity.
The letter cites this provision to argue that security detainees are not eligible for full protection 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and “in the context of  ongoing strategic interrogation … 
we consider their detention to be humane.’’166 
At Central Command, Major Carrie Ricci disagreed with Warren’s interpretation. She stated 
that many of  the techniques in the September 14 policy violated the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions, and should not be authorized.167 On October 12, 2003, Sanchez released a new 
directive, which listed only techniques included in the Army Field Manual, and stated that 
requests for unlisted techniques had to be submitted to him in writing.168
Abu Ghraib
Many have argued that Sanchez’s second memo demonstrates that any subsequent abuses in 
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Iraq were a function of  undisciplined, sadistic soldiers, not policy. This is particularly true of  
the notorious Abu Ghraib photographs. Many of  those pictures depict cruelty and humiliation 
for no discernible purpose, and it was these incidents on which the court-martial convictions 
of  Charles Graner, Ivan Frederick, Lynndie England, and the other night-shift MPs rested. 
Christopher Graveline, the lead Army prosecutor on the cases, later stated that his team had 
avoided “charging MPs if  there was even a hint of  MI [military intelligence] involvement 
that may have led to confusion about how detainees should be treated.” 169 Instead, Graveline 
focused on a few incidents where the detainees involved were never interrogated by MI — a fact 
that he believed put “a stake in the heart” of  the defendants’ claim that they were just following 
orders from interrogators.170 
On October 24, three prisoners who were accused of  raping a juvenile were brought to Tier 
1 of  Abu Ghraib. The MPs stripped them naked, and handcuffed them together in sexual 
positions. The same night, Graner dragged a naked prisoner nicknamed “Gus” out of  his cell 
with a leash around his neck. He handed the leash to Lynndie England, and took a picture of  
the incident. Two weeks later, on November 7, the guards subjected seven detainees accused of  
starting a riot in another part of  the prison to a litany of  abuses: they were hooded, punched and 
kicked (in at least one case, to the point of  unconsciousness), stripped, stacked into a pyramid and 
photographed, and forced to masturbate. As Graveline anticipated, courts-martial rejected the 
soldiers’ attempt to argue that interrogators were ultimately responsible for those incidents. 
But other photographs depict abuses that began before Graner’s unit arrived at the prison, and were 
widely condoned if  not actually authorized. The “Fay Report,” an investigation by Major General 
George Fay into military intelligence personnel’s role in the Abu Ghraib abuses, found that
The MPs being prosecuted claim their actions came at the direction of  MI. 
Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The environment 
created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of  such abuse and that 
it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of  time. What 
started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), 
carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of  morally 
corrupt and unsupervised soldiers and civilians.171
Major General Antonio Taguba (in the “Taguba Report” investigating MP abuses) also found a 
link between MI and the MP guards’ abuses:
Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency’s 
(OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental 
conditions for favorable interrogation of  witnesses. … I find that personnel 
assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to 
change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for MI interrogations.172
In an interview with Task Force staff, General Taguba said he had originally been assigned only 
to interview MP personnel at Abu Ghraib, but he had interpreted his authority broadly in order 
to speak to some of  the key figures in military intelligence. Taguba said he thought the MPs had 
been “exploited,” and that there had been a failure both within the military and in Congress to 
hold those at the top responsible. “It has to be the generals,” Taguba said. In the Navy “if  that 
ship runs aground, who gets relieved? The captain.” 173 Instead, Taguba said, there were several 
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officers complicit or involved in abuse who “got away, or got their fourth star.” He 
did not want to name specific individuals, however.174 
Brent Pack, the CID agent who examined the Abu Ghraib photographs, later told 
journalists that he asked of  each photo, “does this one actually constitute a crime 
or is it standard operating procedure?” Pack regarded nudity and stress positions as 
“standard operating procedures.” 175 
Damien Corsetti, an MP from the 519th Military Intelligence Brigade, has stated, 
regarding stress positions, nudity, and sleep deprivation, that his unit “set the same 
policies in Abu as we set at Bagram. The same exact rules.” 176 A September 16, 
2003, entry from the logbooks kept by the 72nd MP Company corroborates this, 
stating that a detainee “was stripped down per MI and he is [naked] and standing 
tall in his cell.” 177
The Fay Report found that at Abu Ghraib, nudity was “employed routinely and with the belief  
it was not abuse. … CPT Reese, 372 MP CO, stated upon his initial arrival at Abu Ghraib, 
‘There’s a lot of  nude people here.’ ” 178 Fay also said “interrogators believed they had the 
authority to use … stress positions, and were not attempting to hide their use.” 179
The Red Cross came to a similar conclusion based on visits to Abu Ghraib in mid-October 2003, 
where they “witnessed the practice of  keeping persons deprived of  their liberty completely naked 
in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness, allegedly for several consecutive days.” 180 
When they demanded an explanation, “[t]he military intelligence officer in charge of  the 
interrogation explained that this practice was ‘part of  the process.’ ” 181 The ICRC also witnessed 
sleep deprivation, threats, and detainees being “handcuffed either dressed or naked to the bed 
bars or the cell door.” 182 Its medical officer observed both physical and psychological symptoms 
resulting from this treatment, including bruising and cuts around the wrist, “incoherent speech, 
acute anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior, and suicidal tendencies.” 183
Sabrina Harman arrived at Tier 1A of  the prison on October 18 or 19. She was one of  the 
MPs assigned to handle the night shift. On October 20, she wrote to her partner, Kelly, that 
she had seen a detainee, nicknamed “the taxi cab driver,” being handcuffed to his window 
and his bed frame for hours, naked and with underwear over his face, until he was “yelling 
for Allah.” 184 “Taxi Driver’s” real name was Amjad Ismail Waleed,185 and there are multiple 
photographs of  him in the position Harman described. According to Harman, his interrogator 
was Steve Stefanowicz, a contractor who worked for CACI International, Inc.186 Stefanowicz 
was not present that night, but Charles Graner told CID investigators that “Big Steve” had 
instructed him to place Waleed in that position:
With Taxi Driver he was supposed to just be stood up in his cell with—strip 
him out and have his underwear on his head and yelling at him, harass him. 
You know, what if  he doesn’t want to stand there? Well, cuff  him to his bed for 
x amount of  time.187
Graner said this was part of  an interrogator’s “sleep plan,” in which MPs allowed detainees 
to sleep for only four hours out of  every 24. During those four hours, though, detainees were 
interrogated, so “for those guys, initially, they didn’t get much sleep starting out.” 188 
“...some detainees 
arrive at [Abu 
Ghraib] who were 
detained because 
the correct target 
of a raid was not 
home, so a family 
member was taken 
in his place...” 
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Waleed gave a statement to CID investigators on January 21, 2004, in which he described these 
and other incidents of  being beaten and handcuffed in painful positions until unconsciousness. 
He also described being sodomized with a police baton.189 Both Taguba and Fay found that his 
testimony was credible and corroborated by other detainees’ and soldiers’ reports.190 Waleed 
testified at greater length for Sabrina Harman’s court-martial defense, both in a February 2005 
deposition and during Harman’s trial. At the February 2005 deposition, for example, he directly 
attributed the abuse to instructions from “Interrogator Steve,” who “used to come and watch 
the torture and laugh, sometimes he spits, and hit me once or twice.” 191 No soldiers were ever 
charged for Waleed’s abuse. 
In his post-conviction interview with CID, Charles Graner said that in addition to Stefanowicz, 
a sergeant from a Guantánamo Bay interrogation training team had instructed him to use stress 
positions. Graner stated that the previous MP company stationed at Abu Ghraib would sometimes 
handcuff  detainees to the cell bars as punishment for talking, but it was the Guantánamo sergeant 
who “got into the exotic positions,” like handcuffing them “from behind the back, up on the toes 
or up high enough just not to be standing and low enough just not to be kneeling.” 192
Ivan Frederick, another Abu Ghraib MP convicted of  abusing prisoners, corroborated Graner’s 
claims.193 At the court-martial of  Army dog handler Michael Smith, Frederick described 
Stefanowicz telling guards to menace one detainee with military dogs.194 Both the prosecution 
and defense stipulated that Stefanowicz had written in his interrogation notes that working dogs 
were being used during interrogations with command approval.195 Frederick also testified to 
CID that a Guantánamo interrogator had taught Graner about stress positions shortly after the 
unit’s arrival at the prison.196 
Stefanowicz has denied these allegations through counsel. His attorney at the time of  the Smith 
court-martial, Henry E. Hockheimer Jr., told reporters that “we deny that Mr. Stefanowicz 
conspired with anyone to commit any kind of  unlawful act.” 197 Hockheimer has also noted 
that the MPs convicted of  the worst Abu Ghraib abuses have inherent credibility problems.198 
Stefanowicz’s former employer, CACI International, has asserted that its internal investigation 
“could not confirm the suspicion of  the Taguba Report about Stefanowicz or find any credible 
evidence of  abuse by CACI interrogators.” 199 Although Taguba and Fay both found that 
Stefanowicz had instructed MPs to abuse detainees, and made false statements to investigators, 
200 the United States has never charged him with any offense. 
The Fay Report draws a sharp distinction between the use of  nudity and stress positions and 
“violent and sexual abuses.” 201 But Abu Ghraib detainees who spoke to Army investigators 
described the use of  stress positions as one of  the most common and painful forms of  abuse. 
Detainee number 150542 told investigators that “Graner used to hang prisoners by the doors 
and windows in a way that was very painful for several hours and we heard them screaming.” 202 
Detainee number 151362 said
they handcuffed me and hung me to the bed. They ordered me to curse Islam 
and because they started to hit my broken leg, I cursed my religion. They or-
dered me to thank Jesus that I’m alive. And I did what they ordered me. This is 
against my belief. They left me hang from the bed and after a little while I lost 
consciousness. When I woke up, I found myself  still hang[ing] between the bed 
and the floor.203
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Detainee number 150247 described being “cuffed … to the window of  the room 
about 5 hours.” 204 Detainee number 7787 said a night guard “took the clothes and 
left us naked and handcuffed to the bed” for the guard’s entire shift.205 Detainee 
number 152529 said that a soldier with glasses had “grabbed my head and hit 
it against the wall and then tied my hand to the bed until noon the next day.” 206 
Detainee number 151108 said Graner had
cuffed my hands with irons behind my back to the metal of  the window, to 
the point my feet were off  the ground and I was hanging there for about 5 
hours just because I asked about the time, because I wanted to pray. And 
then they took all my clothes and he took the female underwear and he put it 
over my head. After he released me from the window, he tied me to my bed until 
before dawn.207
Colonel Stuart Herrington visited Abu Ghraib in mid-December 2003, after the worst of  the 
abuses had ended. Even then, he found it to be “a sewer,” and “as wrong as wrong could be.” 208 
The prison was dangerously overcrowded, in part because some units were detaining people on 
vague suspicions. In some cases,
we were told, some detainees arrive at [Abu Ghraib] who were detained 
because the correct target of  a raid was not home, so a family member was 
taken in his place (either “voluntarily” or against his will), who would then be 
released when the target turns himself  in. This practice, if  it is being done, has 
a “hostage” feel to it.209
Once detained, it was almost impossible for detainees to get released even if  they were 
innocent. The prison was subjected to regular mortar attacks, resulting in casualties. MPs were 
still keeping detainees off  the books for the CIA. Herrington did not see any detainees being 
mistreated on his visit, but he did see cells with sheets covering the bars. He was told they were 
there to give female detainees some privacy. After the photographs were released, he suspected 
that this was untrue, and the cells had actually held naked male prisoners.210
Abuses by Conventional Forces Outside Abu Ghraib
Abuses in Iraq were not limited to Abu Ghraib. John Sifton of  Human Rights Watch told a 
reporter that detainee abuse in Iraq was
widespread, but that doesn’t mean it’s all the same. There’s been spontaneous 
abuse at the troops’ level; there’s been more authorized abuse; there’s been 
overlap — a sort of  combination of  authorized and unauthorized. And you have 
abuse that passed around like a virus; abuse that started because one unit was 
approved to use it, and then another unit which wasn’t started copying them.211
The abuses by both OGA and the 3rd Armored Cavalry at the Blacksmith Hotel and Al Asad 
Air Base are one example of  abuse being “passed around like a virus.” Two nearby detention 
facilities in Mosul were another. One was a detention site for Navy SEAL Team 7, one of  the 
units affiliated with the JSOC task forces. The other was a “Brigade Holding Area” (BHA) for 
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, a unit of  the 101st Airborne Division. 
“Once detained, 
it was almost 
impossible for 
detainees to get 
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Specialist Tony Lagouranis, an interrogator with the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion who 
was stationed in Mosul, described prisoners’ accounts of  being abused by the SEALs at the base. 
One detainee dropped off  by the SEALs in March 2004, whom Lagouranis called “Fadel,” had 
swollen and black feet, and burns on his legs. Fadel, crying “the entire time,” told Lagouranis he 
had been blindfolded, stripped naked, and placed on a plywood floor. He felt cold water and ice 
poured over him, and started to shiver. A thin tube was inserted into his rectum. Interrogators 
played loud noises, and when he removed his blindfold there was a flashing light. Then he was 
moved to a chair, where someone beat his feet and burned his legs.212 
Lagouranis wrote,
It was not the last I heard about these techniques. At least a half  dozen 
prisoners told me about ice water, beatings, or the strobe and music treatment. 
These prisoners were separated by space and time, so I believe these were not 
coordinated stories.213
Lagouranis said that a guard who sometimes worked with the SEALs described similar 
techniques, including the use of  a rectal thermometer to ensure that the detainee’s body 
temperature did not drop too low.214 Staff  Sergeant Shawn Campbell, the leader of  
Lagouranis’s interrogation team, corroborated his account to journalist Joshua Phillips. 
Campbell said he remembered one detainee “shivering … He looked like he [became] 
hypothermic.” 215
A detainee named Fashad Mohammed died at the SEAL compound in Mosul on April 
5, 2004. He was lying on a sheet of  plywood at the time of  his death.216 According to his 
autopsy, “[d]uring his confinement, he was hooded, sleep deprived, and subjected to hot and 
cold environmental conditions, including the use of  cold water on his body and hood.” 217 
Mohammed also had “multiple minor injuries” on his body, including two black eyes, but none 
significant enough to cause his death. The autopsy found that Mohammed “was subjected to 
cold and wet conditions, and hypothermia may have contributed to his death,” but “the cause 
of  death is best classified as undetermined, and the manner of  death is undetermined.” 218 
Mohammed’s death was the subject of  a preliminary inquiry by the Navy Special Warfare 
Group, which in contrast to the final autopsy rapidly “ruled out the possibility that the 
detainee was even mildly hypothermic” because his temperature was measured at 97.5 
degrees Fahrenheit approximately half  an hour prior to death.219 The Washington Post reported 
in September 2004 that several Navy SEALs were charged with assaulting and maltreating 
Mohammed,220 but in June 2006 a Navy Special Warfare Command public affairs officer said 
his office had no information about anyone being disciplined in the case.221
Lagouranis and Campbell said that with the encouragement of  the warrant officer who ran 
interrogations at Mosul, the regular Army interrogators began adopting many of  the same 
tactics as the SEALs, including sleep deprivation, stress positions, threatening detainees with 
dogs, subjecting them to hot and cold temperatures.222 
These allegations are consistent with several detainees’ accounts of  the detention facilities 
in Mosul. Detainees referred to both the Navy SEAL and Army facilities as the “Disco,” 
or “Disco Mosul,” because of  the loud sounds and flashing lights. Some of  their reports 
predated Lagouranis’s deployment to Mosul. Similarly, in December 2003, a teenaged detainee 
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alleged that a soldier broke his jaw while he was doing stress exercises. An Army 
investigation into that incident found that detainees in Mosul 
were being systematically and intentionally mistreated (heavy metal music, 
bullhorn, hit with water bottles, forced to perform repetitive physical 
exercises until they could not stand, having cold water thrown on them, 
deprived of  sleep, and roughly grabbed off  the floor when they could no 
longer stand). … The 3rd & 4th Geneva Conventions were violated in 
regard to the treatment afforded to these detainees.223
Ben Allbright, an MP guard with the 82nd Airborne told Human Rights Watch 
that he saw similar techniques used at FOB Tiger in Al Qaim. Allbright said that 
“standard procedure” was to deprive detainees of  sleep for the first 24 hours of  
their detention by blindfolding them, handcuffing them in zip-ties behind their 
backs, and forcing them to stand inside a metal shipping container where the tem-
peratures could reach 135 or 145 degrees.224 After this, detainees were taken to be 
interrogated for the first time. The interrogators were
[s]ometimes, military interrogators. Sometimes, civilian personnel. We had a 
lot of  various different — we could have CIA rolling through — it was chaos. 
We had special forces, CIA, everybody — various people at different times. The 
civilian people, I couldn’t really tell you who they were, you know, they weren’t 
wearing tags or tapes or anything. You couldn’t really know, unless you went up 
and asked them.225
Allbright said that he repeatedly witnessed interrogators beat or threaten detainees; he 
estimated that “about half  the guys to 60 percent of  the guys got at least one gut shot — either 
punched or the butt of  the rifle in the stomach.” 226 He said in general, civilian interrogators 
seemed more likely to be violent.227 
Before Allbright, three other soldiers in the 82nd airborne spoke to Human Rights Watch about 
abuses they witnessed. Two of  them corroborated his allegations of  mistreatment at FOB Tiger. 
But all three said the worst abuses they knew of  were at FOB Mercury, near Falluja, in late 2003 
and early 2004. One sergeant, who did not give his name, alleged that he had participated and 
witnessed daily beatings of  detainees, and “smoked” detainees by putting them “in stress posi-
tions until they get muscle fatigue and pass out. That happened every day.” The same sergeant 
alleged that he had witnessed a soldier break a detainee’s leg with a baseball bat, and an other 
incident where soldiers broke open chemical light sticks and beat detainees with them.228 
The unit did not have much interaction with OGA or Special Forces in Falluja. According to 
the sergeant and Captain Ian Fishback, they did witness OGA “stress” prisoners in Afghanistan, 
and had some interactions with them at FOB Tiger. They also had instructions from military 
intelligence to keep prisoners awake. But much of  the abuse was spontaneous, a function of  
soldiers without training in detention or interrogation guarding the same prisoners who had 
shot at their unit. The sergeants who spoke to Human Rights Watch were not military police. 
The first sergeant, who made the most serious allegations of  abuse, said 
I was an Infantry Fire Team Leader. The majority of  the time I was out on 
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mission. When not on mission I was riding the PUCs [Person Under Control]. 
We should have had MPs. We should have taken them to Abu Ghraib [which] 
was only 15 fucking minutes drive. … We should never have been allowed to 
watch guys we had fought.229
Captain Fishback, who repeatedly heard about abuses from noncommissioned officers but 
witnessed fewer directly, agreed:
It’s army doctrine that when you take a prisoner, one of  the things you do is secure 
that prisoner and then you speed him to the rear. You get him out of  the hands of  
the unit that took him. Well, we didn’t do that. We’d keep them at our holding facil-
ity for I think it was up to seventy-two hours. Then we would place him under the 
guard of  soldiers he had just been trying to kill. The incident with the detainee hit 
with a baseball bat; he was suspected of  having killed one of  our officers.230
Fishback did directly witness some abuses, such as the use of  stress positions and forced 
exercise to exhaust detainees, “that I knew were violations of  the Geneva Conventions when 
they happened but I was under the impression that that was U.S. policy at the time.” 231 After 
Abu Ghraib, when Rumsfeld testified that U.S. troops in Iraq were to follow the Geneva 
Conventions, Fishback sought guidance from his chain of  command, without success. On 
September 16, 2005, he wrote to Sen. John McCain about his attempts:
For 17 months, I tried to determine what specific standards governed the 
treatment of  detainees by consulting my chain of  command through battalion 
commander, multiple JAG lawyers, multiple Democrat and Republican 
Congressmen and their aides, the Ft. Bragg Inspector General’s office, multiple 
government reports, the Secretary of  the Army and multiple general officers. … 
Despite my efforts, I have been unable to get clear, consistent answers from my 
leadership about what constitutes lawful and humane treatment of  detainees.232
Fishback described to Human Rights Watch a particularly frustrating conversation with a 
JAG officer:
So I went to JAG and … he says, “Well the Geneva Conventions are a 
gray area.” So I mentioned some things that I had heard about and said, 
“Is it a violation to chain prisoners to the ground naked for the purpose of  
interrogations?” and he said, “That’s within the Geneva Conventions.” So 
I said, “Okay. That is within the Geneva Conventions.” And then there is 
the prisoner on the box with the wires attached to him, and to me, as long 
as electricity didn’t go through the wires, that was in accordance with what I 
would have expected US policy to be and that he wasn’t under the threat of  
death. And he said, “Well, that is a clear violation of  the Geneva Conventions.” 
And I said, “Okay, but I’m looking for some kind of  standard here to be able to 
tell what I should stop and what I should allow to happen.” And he says, “Well, 
we’ve had questions about that at times.” … If  I go to JAG and JAG cannot 
give me clear guidance about what I should stop and what I should allow to 
happen, how is an NCO or a private expected to act appropriately?233
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Six soldiers in the 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment — a tank battalion with no experience 
in detainee operations — told reporter Joshua Phillips that they had regularly tortured detainees 
at a makeshift jail near FOB Lion, in Balad.234 Techniques included sleep deprivation, beatings, 
using zip ties to force detainees into painful positions, and choking detainees with water. The sleep 
deprivation was requested by military intelligence, but many other techniques were improvised — 
though several soldiers said their command discouraged them from reporting abuse.235 
The unit had no experience or training in interrogation or detainee handling, but “[w]e 
were getting shot at all the time so we needed to know what they knew,” according to Adam 
Stevenson.236 A medic, Jonathan Millantz, told Phillips that it was reckless
to give that much power and responsibility to a bunch of  guys who were full of  
hate and resentment — getting shot at and watching their friends get killed … 
seeing people decapitated [in videos] — and then putting those guys in direct 
control of  the people who did these things.237
Millantz committed suicide in 2009. Based on Phillips’ interviews with Millantz, his friends and 
family members, it seems clear that his death was linked to remorse over his role in torturing 
prisoners. Another soldier from Battalion 1-68, Sergeant Adam Grey, died in August 2004 in 
another likely suicide, though the military officially ruled his death “accidental.” 
The confusion about standards of  detainee treatment was not universal in Iraq. Most units 
— too many to thoroughly record or document here — followed the Geneva Conventions’ 
and Army Regulations’ requirements regarding the treatment of  prisoners, though there were 
individual violations. To give one example, Colonel Herrington and Major Douglas Pryer 
have cited the First Armored Division, commanded by Major General Martin Dempsey, for its 
professional and ethical treatment of  captives.238 Reports of  abuses by U.S. forces also declined 
dramatically after Abu Ghraib, as a result of  clearer rules and greater oversight.
A report on U.S. detention operations by Admiral Albert Church found that abuses of  captives 
in Iraq represented “a tiny proportion of  detainee operations,” given that over 50,000 detainees 
had been in coalition custody. Church wrote, “As of  September 30, 2004, 274 investigations of  
alleged detainee abuses in Iraq had been initiated … 160 investigations have been closed, of  
which 60 substantiated abuse.” 239 
That number, though, should not be taken as an estimate of  the number of  detainees who 
were abused, even for the time period in question. First, many substantiated cases of  abuse 
involved more than one detainee, a factor that was particularly relevant where abuses were 
“standard operating procedure” at a facility. Second, many abuses likely went unreported, 
or were reported without leading to a formal investigation. Church wrote that while soldiers, 
civilians and contractors understood their obligation to report abuse, they had “widely varied” 
descriptions of  what constituted abuse, and to whom they should report it.240 Third, military 
criminal investigators faced enormous obstacles in investigating cases. 
Five members of  the Detainee Abuse Task Force, a CID unit charged with investigating cases 
in the vicinity of  Camp Victory in Baghdad — the largest concentration of  detainees in Iraq 
— explained to journalist Joshua Phillips the difficulties they faced. Six full-time agents were 
responsible for investigating hundreds of  cases. Given the agents’ caseload, tracking down 
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corroborating witnesses was extremely difficult, particularly Iraqi victims who had been released 
from prison. The investigators themselves did not have a clear working definition of  what 
constituted unlawful abuse. Jon Renaud, who headed the task force, said
I was an interrogator for a year in 2003. I ran the Detainee Abuse Task Force, 
and I can’t give you an absolute definition of  what detainee abuse is — and none 
of  my bosses can. … Everyone thinks that every interrogator in theater had read 
a list of  enhanced interrogation techniques. Nobody knew what those were.241
Renaud assumed that some complaints never reached CID because military intelligence 
commanders believed the techniques were authorized: “If  you believe your folks didn’t do 
anything wrong … why would you report it?” 242 Another member of  the task force, former 
Sergeant Cooper Tieaskie, said that sometimes the task force would receive reports of  abuse 
from military intelligence units that were heavily redacted for “operational security reasons”: 
“Sometimes, it was just like, ‘Here’s what we’re going to give you — one sentence.’” 243 This 
problem was especially acute for Special Forces units, but not limited to them. None of  the 
members of  the task force could recall a single one of  their cases proceeding to a court-martial 
— even in cases where there was clear physical evidence that a detainee had been beaten. 
Renaud said he viewed the task force’s work as “a whitewash.” 244  
A 2006 study by a group of  human rights organizations reviewing various public sources found 
“at least 330 cases” where U.S. personnel were credibly alleged to have abused detainees, involving 
at least 600 alleged perpetrators, 460 detainees, and “more than 1,000 individual criminal acts 
of  abuse.” 245 Two-thirds of  those cases occurred in Iraq. In all theaters, the report found that 10 
individuals had received sentences of  one year or more in prison. None of  them were officers.246 
The Department of  Defense said these numbers were inaccurate at the time, and even if  
completely accurate they are obviously dated. DOD does not, however, compile its own statistics 
on disciplinary proceedings for abuse, and did not respond to Task Force staff ’s requests for 
statistical information on detentions and disciplinary proceedings. 
Changes After Abu Ghraib 
After Abu Ghraib, abuses by U.S. forces declined dramatically, but other problems arose as the 
prison population continued to grow. Major General William Brandenburg, who became head 
of  detention operations in Iraq in November 2004, said that by the time he arrived, as a result 
of  the Abu Ghraib scandal, “[w]e had very defined rules in place for interrogation. … There 
was no grey areas.” 247 
Brandenburg stated that when he took over command of  Iraq’s prisons, his predecessor, 
General Geoffrey Miller, told him that they planned to reduce the population from 
approximately 7,000 to 4,000. But “the enemy always gets a vote, and circumstances on the 
ground,” and the desire for improved security before the first Iraqi election, “translated to more 
detainees.” 248 Brandenburg said that by November 2005, shortly before he was replaced by 
Lieutenant General Jack Gardner as the head of  detention operations, the population stood at 
“13,000 plus.” 249 The population rose further with the “surge”; by August 2007, The New York 
Times reported that it had reached 24,500.250 
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Some of  them were doubtless civilians, unaffiliated with the insurgency. In an interview with Task 
Force staff, Gardner discussed the difficulties this raised: 
If  you hold somebody that’s not really linked to it, you know, you’re either going 
to alienate him or his family or both, or his community and that doesn’t help 
counter-insurgency, it doesn’t help anything. And then, he’s susceptible to being 
recruited potentially inside.251 
Gardner described conducting “a counterinsurgency” inside the tent compounds at Abu Ghraib 
in March or April 2006 to try to identify people who were “either recruiting or didn’t fit in that 
compound.” 252 Brandenburg also described recruitment as a problem:
A guy who was paid $100 to dig the hole for the IED [improvised explosive 
device] is doing that to feed his family. He’s … at worst, neutral. He goes into 
the theater internment facility. He rubs up against Al Qaeda and Iraq guys. You 
release him, and the next thing you know, you find him dead, as he’s participated 
in some major heinous act somewhere.” 253
Major General Douglas Stone, who followed Gardner as commander of  detention operations in 
Iraq, said that some detainees were planning attacks from inside the prisons.254 There was also 
escalating sectarian violence within U.S. detention facilities after the February 2006 bombing of  
the Askariya Shrine in Samarra. Stone said that “the detainees were burning, they were killing 
each other, they were maiming each other.” 255 This was not an exaggeration; autopsy reports 
released to the ACLU under the Freedom of  Information Act show a number of  cases where 
detainees appear to have been beaten to death, stabbed, or strangled by other inmates.256 Military 
officials told the Associated Press in July 2008 that some of  these killings were carried out by 
self-styled “sharia courts” organized by extremists in the prisons.257 Stone confirmed this in an 
interview with Task Force staff.258 
Brigadier General Rodney L. Johnson told a newspaper that the total number of  detainees tried 
by the “sharia courts” was in the double digits.259 One of  them was 31-year old Mohammed 
Ajimi al-Isawi, who was strangled and beaten to death in Camp Bucca in 2007. According to his 
autopsy report, he was “murdered by members of  the [redacted] and buried in a grave inside 
the detention facility compound. … He was allegedly sentenced to death by the [redacted] for 
speaking against the compound’s [detainee] leadership.” 260
Stone said that one of  the primary problems with the detention system was that “the system is 
designed for you to go in, but never for you to come out. … Even if  you shouldn’t have been in 
there.” 261 In March of  2008, Stone estimated that of  the 24,000 detainees in Iraq, “one-third are 
genuinely continuing and imperative security risks. … But that means two-thirds are not, or at 
least remain a question mark.”
Stone said he viewed this as a strategic problem:
[O]ne out of  every ten Iraqis had a personal experience with detention. So, 
what is the biggest strategic disadvantage to the Surge, in my judgment? And the 
answer, to me, was, the biggest strategic disadvantage is if  anything goes wrong in 
that detention camp — and it was already going wrong.262
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Stone instituted a number of  changes. He created administrative boards to determine whether 
individuals in detention remained an “imperative security risk.” 263 The boards did not offer 
detainees much in the way of  formal procedural protections — detainees did not have lawyers, 
or access to all of  the evidence the board did — but at least gave them a genuine opportunity to 
be heard, and roughly 45 to 50 percent of  hearings resulted in a recommendation for release.264 
The boards also helped identify extremists within the prison, so they could be sequestered 
from more moderate detainees.265 There was a concerted effort to improve conditions for most 
detainees, with measures including literacy and job training courses and other educational 
programs, greater opportunity for family visits, and teleconferences for families who could not 
safely travel to visit their detained relatives.266 
Stone said that contrary to what might have been feared, these measures decreased rather than 
increased the recidivism rate, from approximately 5–10 percent to 1 percent. Riots and other 
violent incidents within the prisons also declined dramatically.267 
Accounts from Former Iraqi Detainees
In August of  2012, Task Force staff  traveled to Iraq and interviewed dozens of  people in U.S. 
detention about their experiences, to preserve their stories and to help assess the detention 
and interrogation programs. There is no way empirically to evaluate these accounts; they can 
neither be reliably corroborated nor dismissed. There are, however, factors that make the 
accounts, at least significant parts of  them, generally plausible and credible. The most important 
is that they comport with what could be expected in a war waged by a military hurriedly trying 
to learn a foreign culture and society; add to that the confusion inherent in an urban military 
engagement where the enemy is in civilian clothes and scattered among the population. The 
initially poor understanding by U.S. occupation forces of  the sectarian and tribal enmities that 
existed, combined with an uncertain and hostile environment, meant that there was a reduced 
awareness that some people would see the confusion as an opportunity to lodge false accusations 
to gain advantages over their rivals. 
One of  the most common complaints from detainees was that they were locked up for years, 
with no opportunity to see or rebut any evidence against them.268 Former detainee Nuri Nejem 
Abdullah said he was detained in September 2003, and held in Abu Ghraib for three months 
and Camp Bucca for 2½  years. “Till now, I don’t know why they arrested me,” he said. His 
interrogators “didn’t know anything about me,” Abdullah said. “They kept asking me two 
questions. They asked about Al Qaeda and about Saddam.” 269 When he was released he 
was told he had been kept in detention because of  a rifle found in house, a weapon that he 
said most Iraqi households have for protection. Abdullah said, “We were so happy [when the 
Americans came]; we believed they would save us from Saddam. We used to curse him but now 
we send blessing to Saddam’s soul.” 270 Abdullah said he suffered a tragedy during the American 
occupation and the chaotic violence that followed: his son, Akhil, born in 1986, disappeared one 
day in 2006 and to this day Abdullah does not know what happened to him.271
Most of  the former detainees alleged being physically abused by U.S. forces, with excessive force 
at the point of  capture being the most common allegation.272 Some said they still suffered from 
the injuries they sustained: Saddam Rahm said that he had been kicked in the groin repeatedly, 
and is unable to have children or perform sexually as a result.273 Tay Rahm Addularida, who 
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was held at Camp Bucca for two years and one month, said that the troops who arrested him 
broke his ribs with their boot, and smashed his teeth. He said he still suffers pain as a result.274 
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
Each former detainee interviewed by Task Force staff  said that before his release, he signed a 
paper attesting that he had not been mistreated. Translated from Arabic, the form reads:
I know that one of  my rights is to give notice of  any mistreatment and I know 
that one of  my rights is to complain about any mistreatment I got during the 
period of  my arrest.
And I understand that no one will punish me because of  this notification. And 
I know also that any notification with regard to this issue will not have an effect 
on the order to release me.
Choice 1: I did not suffer from any mistreatment. [check box]
Choice 2: I suffered from mistreatment during my period of  arrest. [check box]
All those interviewed said they believed the assurances on the release form that they could report 
abuse without suffering any consequences were meaningless. They said that they had no choice 
but to say they had not been mistreated. To do otherwise, they believed, would have been foolish. 
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“The Generals’ War”1 was the title of  an excellent history of  the first Gulf  War, an allusion to the 
fact that the conflict was a set-piece of  modern military strategy conducted by the nation’s top soldiers. 
In some significant ways, the prolonged conflicts that occurred after September 11 could be thought of  as 
“The Lawyers’ War.” 
From the beginning, the detention and interrogation of  prisoners was less dependent on the decisions of  
generals, and more influenced by government attorneys. Both those in uniform and those in the CIA looked 
to government lawyers to guide them and set limits. Never before in the history of  the nation had attorneys, 
and the advice they provided, played such a significant role in determining the treatment of  detainees. 
The horror of  September 11 quickly threw up questions about the obligations of  the United States 
and its agents under domestic and international law. Before then, U.S. detainee policy had arisen, 
almost exclusively, in connection with armed conflicts, fought on foreign soil, between nation states. 
Some government attorneys came to argue that the “unique nature” of  the post–September 11 conflicts, 
allowed — if  not required — some significant reinterpretations of  U.S. legal obligations. 
Events after September 11 did not occur in a legal vacuum. The U.S. Constitution at least implicated 
detainee treatment within our borders. The Geneva Conventions, which the United States had been 
instrumental in shaping decades earlier, contained international humanitarian laws of  war that were 
adopted as U.S. law. The War Crimes Act in 1996 made it a crime under U.S. law to violate the 
Geneva Conventions and other international laws of  war ratified by the United States. The U.S. had 
also been an early and enthusiastic supporter of  the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment during the Reagan administration, and 
in 1994, the United States eventually passed the Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, in 
order to comply with the treaty’s requirement to enact enabling legislation.
Yet, despite the laws in place, some attorneys for the federal government advised the nation’s political 
leaders that a variety of  techniques used by agents of  the United States were permissible. Several of  
those techniques were later deemed by many, including this Task Force, to amount to torture. Almost all 
the significant legal advice formally issued by the federal government pertaining to detainee treatment after 
September 11 came from the Office of  Legal Counsel of  the Department of  Justice. The Office of  Legal 
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Counsel pronounced on the legality and constitutionality of  behavior for the White House, giving it a 
special role, a kind of  internal Supreme Court. Despite playing an important part in the implementation 
of  detainee policy, and despite significant institutional experience in the subjects of  law enforcement, 
interrogation, national security and counterterrorism, subject-matter experts at the Department of  
Defense, the FBI, the Department of  State, and other federal agencies, for the most part, had only a 
minor role — or none at all — in establishing the legal parameters for U.S. policy during this period. 
Individuals at agencies outside the Department of  Justice would press to have their say, but it was the 
advice of  the Office of  Legal Counsel, and a few select individuals, that provided the legal foundation in 
the post–September 11 era.
John Yoo, a deputy attorney general in the Office of  Legal Counsel from 2001 to 2003, was 
instrumental in shaping the office’s early response after September 11 on matters of  national security. 
Though Jay Bybee was the assistant attorney general in charge of  the office at the time, and Yoo his 
deputy, Yoo was the national-security specialist. Yoo met occasionally with a group of  influential 
lawyers: David Addington, legal counsel to the vice president; Alberto Gonzales, White House counsel; 
Timothy Flanigan, deputy White House counsel; and William “Jim” Haynes II, general counsel, for 
the Defense Department to discuss legal issues affecting national security. The informal group became 
known as the “War Council,” despite the fact that the five attorneys themselves had little experience in 
law enforcement, military service or counterterrorism. The precise effect these individuals had on the 
advice provided by Office of  Legal Counsel from 2001 to 2003 remains imprecise, but that they had an 
effect is amply demonstrated in documents, books, emails and interviews.
Even before the issuance of  the 2002 memos that became notorious for appearing to authorize acts 
constituting torture, Office of  Legal Counsel issued a number of  significant legal opinions in the “War 
on Terror” that reinterpreted the power of  the president in wartime in a greatly expanded fashion. The 
president, OLC determined, had authority to: unilaterally suspend the Geneva Conventions; dispense 
with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-clause requirements in the execution of  domestic 
military operations; detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants; ignore specific laws that prohibited the 
surreptitious surveillance of  Americans’ communications; and deploy military force preemptively against 
terrorist organizations and the states that harbor them, whether or not those organizations and states 
were linked to September 11.
The Torture Memos, as they’ve become known, were drafted in the spring and summer of  2002. The 
memoranda examined behavior under the law to determine what actions constituted torture. The authors 
determined the proposed acts could cause pain, and could be degrading, but could still be administered 
without producing pain and suffering intense enough to constitute torture. Ten controversial interrogation 
techniques, including the use of  the infamous “waterboard,” were approved in August 2002.
As the personnel in the Office of  Legal Counsel changed, so too did the office’s legal advice; however, the 
office never determined that the tactics approved by Yoo and Bybee had violated the law. Jack Goldsmith 
III became the assistant attorney general in charge of  Office of  Legal Counsel after Jay Bybee left 
in 2003. When Goldsmith issued legal advice that constrained the president’s policy options, he was 
criticized by remaining members of  the War Council. When news of  the controversial earlier legal 
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advice became public, Goldsmith withdrew Yoo and Bybee’s work but he did not remain in his post long 
enough to issue new guidance to replace it. His successor, Daniel Levin, issued new legal guidance. 
Levin concluded, however, in a footnote, that none of  the interrogation techniques used in the past was 
illegal under his new legal guidance. Similarly, Levin’s successor, Steven Bradbury, determined that 
dietary manipulation, nudity, attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, abdominal slap, cramped 
confinement, wall standing, stress positions, water dousing, sleep deprivation, and even waterboarding 
did not violate the law. Though Yoo’s successors at Office of  Legal Counsel offered different legal advice 
and differing rationales, they still agreed that the methods themselves were legal. 
Yoo has remained an aggressive, vocal defender of  the advice he and others provided the administration, 
while most of  his colleagues from the time have remained silent. Their silence, however, cannot and 
should not be confused with repudiation. Though relatively few attorneys now vocally support Yoo’s 
work, the debate on the appropriateness of  the legal advice he and others gave continues. As long as 
the debate continues, so too does the possibility that the United States could again engage in torture. In 
the last days of  the Bush administration, Steven Bradbury offered an explanation as to why it was 
understandable that Yoo, Bybee and others issued legal advice that later came to be criticized so strongly. 
“It is important to understand the context of  the [memo]. It was the product of  an extraordinary — 
indeed, we hope, a unique — period in the history of  the Nation; the immediate aftermath of  the attacks 
of  9/11.” On January 15, 2009, Bradbury subsequently retracted and cautioned against relying on 
nine different memoranda issued by the Office of  Legal Counsel. 
As this chapter illustrates, more than a decade after September 11, much still remains classified by the 
United States that could shed light on how the legal processes of  the United States contributed to a 
situation in which torture was allowed to occur. 
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Overview of the Legal Framework                              
in the United States on September 11
U.S. law on detainee treatment prior to September 11 was contained primarily in treaties 
ratified by the United States and laws enacted by Congress, based on long-standing principles 
of  international law.
The U.S. Constitution 
Three constitutional amendments implicate detainee treatment domestically. The Fifth 
Amendment establishes the right against compelled self-incrimination and the right to due 
process prior to any deprivation of  liberty by the federal government.2 The 14th Amendment 
requires that a person deprived of  liberty be afforded due process by the states, and establishes 
the right to equal protection under the law.3 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment.4 The rights contained in these three amendments prohibit treatment that 
“shocks the conscience.” 5 As will be discussed further, U.S. statutory law on detainee treatment 
applies Eighth Amendment standards.
The Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Conventions are a collection of  four conventions6 containing international 
humanitarian laws of  war.7 The four conventions have been ratified by every nation in the 
world,8 and therefore constitute both international and U.S. law.9 The humane treatment of  
all war victims, including detainees, has been described as the “fundamental theme running 
throughout the Conventions.” 10 Official commentary on the Conventions notes that “[e]very 
person in enemy hands must have some status under international law” as “[n]obody in enemy 
hands can be outside the law.” 11 
Upon ratification of  the four current versions in 1955,12 the United States reconfirmed its 
commitment to the humanitarian laws of  war, stating that our nation “fully supports the 
objectives of  this Convention.” 13 The United States was instrumental in shaping the four 
Conventions, actively participating in the various conferences that led to their emergence.14 
U.S. commitment to the Conventions continues.15 The U.S. military has incorporated the 
Conventions into its internal regulations,16 and designated its implementation as a key 
objective of  wartime detentions.17 The United States has enacted laws prohibiting breaches 
of  the Conventions.18
The Geneva Conventions create obligations that protect detainees and other persons not 
actively involved in combat. The most fundamental of  those obligations are set forth in what is 
often referred to as “Common Article 3,” a provision that is repeated in all four Conventions.19 
Common Article 3 enumerates the minimum level of  protections for detainees.20 Acts banned 
by Common Article 3 are “prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever” for individuals 
no longer actively involved in hostilities, specifically including detainees.21 The prohibited acts 
include torture, outrages upon personal dignity, and cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, 
among others.22 Common Article 3 also creates an affirmative obligation that detainees “shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely.” 23 
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Two of  the Geneva Conventions create additional protections for certain classifications of  
people subject to detention. The Third Geneva Convention protects persons who meet the 
Convention’s definition of  “prisoners of  war” (POWs).24 The Fourth Geneva Convention  
protects civilians.25 Both Conventions establish protections above and beyond those afforded by 
Common Article 3.
Two related principles are critical to understanding the Conventions’ protections for detainees. 
The first is the distinction between “international armed conflict” and “noninternational armed 
conflict.” 26 An international armed conflict is an armed conflict between two nations; all 
other conflicts, including internal civil wars, are noninternational.27 This distinction is significant 
because POW status, which carries the array of  protections outlined in the Third Geneva 
Convention, applies only in international armed conflicts.28 The laws of  war do not contemplate 
POW status in noninternational armed conflicts.29 Also, the full protections of  the Fourth 
Convention only apply in international armed conflicts.30
The second principle involves the extensive reach of  Common Article 3. According to its 
language, Common Article 3 applies to “armed conflict not of  an international character.” 31 
However, it is generally recognized that Common Article 3 is customary international law32 that 
applies in all conflicts, whether international or not.33 
Common Article 3 states:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of  armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed [outside of  combat] 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely …
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever …
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of  all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture … 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment …
(d) the passing of  sentences and the carrying out of  executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.34
Despite its explicit association with noninternational armed conflict, it is broadly accepted 
that Common Article 3 establishes the minimum standards applicable to all detainees in all 
conflicts.35 The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 2006 decision, would find Common Article 3 applied 
to the conflict with Al Qaeda.36
Several key principles in Common Article 3 appear in other international and U.S. laws. Those 
principles include:
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 • The ban on torture37 
 • The ban on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment38 
 • The requirement that detainees be treated humanely39 
 • Universal application of  these obligations without exception for place 
or circumstance40 
According to Common Article 3(1)(d), no sentences should be passed, nor 
executions carried out, without a prior judgment issued “by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.” 41 
The phrase “regularly constituted court” is not specifically defined in Common 
Article 3 or its accompanying commentary. The International Committee of  the 
Red Cross (ICRC) has defined “regularly constituted court” for the purposes of  
Common Article 3 as a court “established and organized in accordance with the 
laws and procedures already in force in a country.” 42 The ICRC definition would 
later be adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.43
The Third Geneva Convention (GCIII) governs the treatment of  POWs. Much debate in 
the White House after September 11 focused solely on GCIII, which can be divided into four 
major parts. First, GCIII restates and reapplies Common Article 3 as a minimum standard for 
treatment.44 Second, it defines POWs who are entitled to the additional protections created by 
GCIII.45 Third, it requires that a detaining state determine whether detainees are POWs and, 
where any doubt exists, to assume POW status.46 Fourth, GCIII sets forth a series of  protections 
for POWs in addition to those required by Common Article 3.47 
Article 4 of  GCIII defines six categories of  individuals who qualify as POWs.48 They include 
members of  the armed forces as well as militias or volunteers.49 They also include other belligerent 
forces who meet certain criteria, such as command for subordinates, wearing a distinctive insignia, 
carrying arms openly, and acting in accordance with the laws and customs of  war.50 
Article 5 of  GCIII requires that (1) POW status apply from capture until release,51 and (2) where 
any doubt as to status exists, POW treatment is assumed “until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.” 52 
GCIII requires that POWs be humanely treated at all times,53 and protected from torture or 
coercion.54 In addition to these protections, which resemble those provided under Common 
Article 3, GCIII sets forth a series of  obligations toward POWs regarding living conditions, 
medical treatment, religious practices, transfer, and due process guarantees for those charged 
with crimes.55 
The Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) governs the treatment of  detained civilians, with 
civilians defined as persons who are neither members of  the armed forces nor individuals 
actively involved in hostilities.56 GCIV contemplates that detention of  civilians, either by a 
party to armed conflict or an occupying power, will be atypical and provides for protective 
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civilians can be detained without the full array of  protections provided under GCIV. First, in 
occupation settings, protected civilians forfeit their “rights of  communication” contained within 
GCIV if  caught acting as a spy or saboteur “in those cases where absolute military security so 
requires.” 58 Second, where civilians are located “in the territory of  a Party to the conflict,” and 
a civilian is “definitely suspected of  or engaged in activities hostile to the security of  the State,” 
they are not entitled to claim “such rights and privileges as would be prejudicial to the security 
of  such State.” 59 In both instances such detainees are to be “treated with humanity,” “be 
granted the full rights and privileges of  a protected person under the present Convention at the 
earliest date consistent with the security of  the State or Occupying Power,” and, in case of  trial, 
afforded the “rights of  fair and regular trial.” 60 
The decision to detain a civilian must be made on a case-by-case basis,61 and the reasons for 
detention must be reviewed at least once every six months.62 Civilian detention determinations 
shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the “occupying power” in 
accordance with the provisions of  GCIV.63 “Unlawful confinement,” which presumably includes 
confinement not adhering to the above standards, constitutes a “grave breach” under the 
Geneva Conventions.64 Civilians detained as security threats must be released “as soon as the 
individual ceases to pose a real threat to state security.” 65 
GCIV affords civilians similar protections as those afforded to POWs as to family rights, 
religious convictions and practices, humane treatment, and protection against all acts of  
violence, threats, insults and public curiosity.66
Under GCIV, detained civilians are entitled to have the reasons for their detention reconsidered 
as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board. If  internment is continued, 
the court or board shall periodically review the case at least twice annually with a view to 
favorable amendment of  the initial decision to detain.67
The Convention Against Torture
The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), ratified by the Senate in 1994, forms part of  international and U.S. law.68 
Prior to drafting CAT, the prohibition on torture was recognized as a nonderogable norm 
of  customary international law, and included in the Geneva Conventions.69 However, CAT 
provided a legal definition of  torture, added a series of  affirmative substantive requirements 
and prohibitions, and prohibited cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as further described 
below.70 A U.N.-administered Committee Against Torture was created to implement CAT. This 
committee is the enforcement body for CAT, and states party to CAT are obliged to submit 
periodic reports to the committee on their compliance with CAT.71 
CAT reflects that the ban of  torture is one of  the bedrock principles of  international law. 
The prohibition of  torture is absolute, without exception for war or national emergency.72 
Detainees may not be transferred to countries where they would face a serious risk of  torture, 
and information acquired through torture can never be used in court except as evidence 
against those accused of  torture.73 States are required to criminalize all acts of  torture or 
complicity in torture, and to ensure that they have jurisdiction over torture committed on 
their territory or by their citizens. A state must “ensure that its competent authorities proceed 
to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that 
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an act of  torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction,” 
and ensure the prosecution or extradition of  the perpetrators. CAT also requires 
training of  detention personnel and interrogators to ensure they understand 
the prohibition on torture and cruelty, and requires that torture victims have 
a legally “enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation” in the courts. 
CAT similarly bans any “acts of  cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” against detainees even if  they fall short of  torture.74 
The United States was an early and enthusiastic supporter of  CAT, and was actively 
involved in the negotiations that led to CAT’s adoption by the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1984.75 The State Department described U.S. participation in the negotiation of  
the treaty as evidence that “[t]he United States has long been a vigorous supporter of  
the international fight against torture.” 76 President Ronald Reagan similarly noted that the United 
States participated “actively and effectively” in the drafting of  CAT. Although he said that “it was 
not possible to negotiate a treaty that was acceptable to the [U.S.] in all respects,” 77 Reagan urged 
ratification of  CAT based on its central principle — the categorical ban of  torture. After signing 
the treaty, he confirmed the United States’ support for such a ban:
By giving its advice and consent to ratification of  this Convention, the Senate 
of  the United States will demonstrate unequivocally our desire to bring an end 
to the abhorrent practice of  torture.78 
The following section describes the key provisions of  CAT applicable to detainee treatment and 
the relevant U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations.79
Under Article 1 of  CAT, torture is (1) an intentional infliction of  severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental; (2) to obtain information or a confession, to punish for an act or 
suspected act, to intimidate or coerce, or for discrimination of  any kind; (3) when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.80 
Upon ratification, the United States stated that its understanding81 of  the definition of  torture 
included a “specific intent” requirement: “… in order to constitute torture, an act must be 
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” 82 The requirement 
of  specific intent means that infliction of  severe physical and mental pain would not be torture 
unless the violator specifically intended to cause such pain.83 
Severe physical pain is defined as injury that involves (1) substantial risk of  death, (2) extreme 
physical pain, (3) serious burn or disfigurement, or (4) significant loss or impairment of  a body 
part, organ or mental faculty.84
 “Severe mental pain or suffering” is defined as “prolonged mental harm” caused by or resulting 
from one of  the following:
 • Intentional infliction or threatened infliction of  severe physical pain
 • The administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of  mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to 
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality 
“CAT provides 
that evidence 
acquired by torture 
is inadmissible 
except as evidence 
against an alleged 
torturer.” 
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 • The threat of  imminent death
 • The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, 
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application 
of  mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or personality85
In addition to prohibiting torture, CAT also bans “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment  [CID] which do[es] not amount to torture …” 86 This provision was the subject 
of  a significant U.S. reservation, with the United States stating that CID is limited to the cruel, 
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or 14th 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.87 
The United States explained its reservation by stating that “it was necessary to limit U.S. 
undertakings under this article primarily because the meaning of  the term ‘degrading 
treatment’ is at best vague and ambiguous.” 88 
The language of  CAT, particularly Article 16, may appear to create more recourse and 
penalties for torture than it does for CID.89 However, the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s 
position is that CAT applies equally to torture and CID, stating that “the conditions that give 
rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to prevent 
torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment.” 90 
Article 2 of  CAT imposes broad-ranging affirmative obligations to prevent torture, requiring 
states to “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of  
torture in any territory under [their] jurisdiction.” 91 In particular, states must criminalize all 
acts of  torture, including attempted torture, complicity in acts of  torture, and participation in 
acts of  torture.92 
CAT requires nations to ban torture comprehensively, categorically and without exception:
No exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of  war or a threat of  
war, political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of  torture. …
An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a 
justification of  torture.93
The United States issued two relevant understandings with respect to the absolute ban against 
torture. First, the prohibited acts must have occurred against individuals within the “offender’s 
custody or physical control.” 94 Second, “acquiescence” by a public official to torture requires 
both awareness of  the torture prior to its execution and failure to intervene. 
The CAT requires a series of  protections to prevent and to ensure full investigations of  acts of  
torture/CID. Article 10 requires that all officials involved in arrests or detentions (including law 
enforcement and military personnel) be trained and educated about the prohibitions against torture/
CID.95 Article 11 requires states to systematically review rules, instructions, methods and practices 
pertaining to detainee/arrestee treatment “with a view to preventing any cases of  torture.” 96 
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Article 12 requires a state to conduct a “prompt and impartial investigation” by “competent 
authorities” whenever there is “reasonable ground to believe that an act of  torture has been 
committed in any territories within its jurisdiction.” 97 Article 13 requires that persons who 
allege that they were subject to torture/CID have the right to complain and have complaints 
promptly and impartially examined by competent authorities. Article 14 requires that victims 
of  torture have a legally enforceable right to redress and compensation. The duties to train, to 
review rules and to investigate apply to CID as well as to torture.98 
The CAT provides that evidence acquired by torture is inadmissible except as evidence against 
an alleged torturer: 
Each state shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made 
as a result of  torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except 
against a person accused of  torture as evidence the statement was made.99
The exclusion of  torture-acquired evidence applies to all proceedings without exception.100  
The Torture Statute
The Torture Statute is the U.S. federal statute prohibiting acts of  torture.101 The statute was 
enacted in 1994 by Congress in order to comply with CAT’s requirement to enact enabling 
legislation. The statute defines torture as an act committed 
 • by a person acting under the color of  law;
 • specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon another person;
 • within his custody or physical control.102
Conspiracy to commit torture also violates the statute.103 The coverage of  nongovernmental 
officials is left ambiguous by the language of  the Act, which requires that torture be done 
“under color of  state law.” What is clear is that purely private abusive conduct is not covered. 
The Torture Statute covers acts committed outside the United States; acts committed within 
the United States are prohibited by other federal and state laws.104 U.S. courts have jurisdiction 
over all U.S. nationals and any foreign nationals who are present in the United States.105 The 
jurisdiction over foreign nationals, often referred to as “universal jurisdiction,” complies with 
CAT’s requirement that states prosecute or extradite perpetrators of  torture found in their 
territory regardless of  nationality.106 
The Torture Statute imposes fines and/or imprisonment of  “not more than 20 years” 
for torture or conspiracy to torture. If  torture or conspiracy to torture results in death, 
however, the penalty may include death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of  “any term 
of  years.” 107 
The War Crimes Act
The War Crimes Act (WCA), was passed by Congress in 1996 and criminalizes certain 
violations of  the law of  armed conflict.108 The act makes it a crime under U.S. law to violate the 
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Geneva Conventions and other international laws of  war ratified by the United States.109 The 
WCA applies to all U.S. nationals and members of  the U.S. Armed Forces.110
The WCA, as originally enacted, created two categories of  crimes: (1) “grave breaches” of  
the Geneva Convention in international armed conflicts;111 and (2) any violations of  Common 
Article 3 in other conflicts.112
Other Statements of U.S. Legal Intent
Two additional international law instruments reflect U.S. commitment to the bans on torture 
and CID: the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Though the UDHR is not legally binding, it is 
significant as it contains the basic principles upon which many subsequent human rights treaties 
are based. The United States was a leader in drafting and implementing the UDHR.
The UDHR of  December 1948 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 113 Additionally, the Declaration has a series 
of  articles that collectively bar wrongful detention.114 
The ICCPR, which prohibits torture, CID and arbitrary detention, was drafted to clarify 
and enforce the UDHR.115 Though the ICCPR was ratified by the Senate with numerous 
reservations and understandings, it has nearly unanimous support around the world and, as 
such, constitutes binding international law.116 The Senate observed that the ICCPR protects 
“basic democratic values and freedoms.” 117 Many of  the rights contained within the ICCPR 
are already recognized and enforced by the federal and state constitutions.118 
The Initial Legal Response of the                     
Federal Government after September 11
Three days after September 11, President George W. Bush declared a national emergency 
pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.).119 On September 18, 
2001, the one-week anniversary of  the attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use 
of  Military Force (AUMF).120 The stature empowered the president to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” involved in the terrorist 
attacks of  September 11, 2001.121 
President Bush signed a still-classified presidential finding the day prior, on September 17, 
authorizing the CIA to kill or capture suspected terrorists.122 The CIA’s chief  legal officer at 
the time, John Rizzo, who helped draft the September 17 presidential authorization, said of  it: 
“I had never in my experience been part of  or ever seen a presidential authorization as far-
reaching and as aggressive in scope. It was simply extraordinary.” 123 
The September 17 authorization had moved much faster than a typical covert-action finding.124 
Generally, after the CIA’s lawyers drafted a proposed finding, it was reviewed by “the Lawyers’ 
Group,” which was chaired by the National Security Council’s legal counsel and included 
lawyers from DOS, DOD, DOJ, and the CIA.125 After the legal review, the proposed findings 
were reviewed further by cabinet-level national-security policymakers, where, among others, 
the vice president would weigh in and then it would move to the president’s desk. But in this 
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instance, the CIA had gained incredible new powers with very little debate — none of  it 
public. Two weeks after the attacks, DOJ’s Office of  Legal Counsel issued the first of  its known 
opinions in the post–September 11 legal landscape.
The Early Expansion of Executive Authority
The Office of Legal Counsel 
The Office of  Legal Counsel (OLC) is responsible for issuing opinions that instruct government 
officials by providing interpretations of  existing law.126 The opinions by OLC do not constitute 
binding U.S. law. However, OLC considers its opinions binding on the executive branch, 
subject to the supervision provided by the attorney general, under the ultimate authority of  the 
president.127 The office is led by an assistant attorney general.128 A number of  deputy assistant 
attorneys general and attorney advisors, numbering approximately two dozen at any one time, 
serve under the assistant attorney general.129 
On September 11, 2001, Jay S. Bybee was awaiting confirmation as the next assistant attorney 
general in charge of  OLC to replace Randolph D. Moss, who had been appointed by President 
Bill Clinton to the position.130 The confirmation of  Bybee by the Senate came on October 23, 
2001.131 At that time, a deputy assistant attorney general was already working in the office. That 
lawyer, John Yoo, had been hired specifically to supervise OLC’s work on foreign affairs and 
national security.132
Prior to arriving at OLC, Yoo was a law professor at the University of  California at Berkeley and had 
authored a number of  scholarly articles on the Constitution’s separation of  powers.133 In his scholarly 
work, Yoo repeatedly maintained that the president possessed a great deal of  unilateral constitutional 
authority in the execution of  war. Yoo, even in these early articles, in his own words, expressed “a 
more pro-Executive” view of  presidential power than many of  his peers in academia.134 
The “War Council”
An impromptu group of  influential lawyers within the Bush administration met periodically to 
consider legal issues that arose in the immediate wake of  September 11. The group included 
David Addington, legal counsel to Vice President Dick Cheney; Alberto Gonzales, White House 
counsel; Timothy Flanigan, deputy White House counsel; William “Jim” Haynes II, DOD general 
counsel; and Yoo. These five self-selected lawyers called themselves the “War Council.” 135 None 
of  them had significant experience in law enforcement, military service or counterterrorism.
OLC memoranda bind the executive branch, but individuals outside OLC, individuals in the 
War Council in particular, were influential in crafting OLC’s advice. As Yoo set to work crafting 
controversial memoranda on the interrogation of  detainees during the spring and summer of  
2002, he was “under pretty significant pressure to come up with an answer that would justify [the 
program],” John Bellinger III, legal adviser to the National Security Council (NSC) later observed.136 
In an interview with The Washington Times on December 18, 2008, Vice President Cheney 
commented on the dialogue back and forth between OLC and senior White House officials:
Was it torture? I don’t believe it was torture. … We spent a great deal of  time 
and effort getting legal advice, legal opinion out of  the [Justice Department’s] 
office of  legal counsel.137
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And, in a February 14, 2010, interview with ABC News, Cheney said:
The reason I’ve been outspoken is because there were some things being said, 
especially after we left office, about prosecuting CIA personnel that had carried out 
our counterterrorism policy or disbarring lawyers in the Justice Department who 
had — had helped us put those policies together, and I was deeply offended by that, 
and I thought it was important that some senior person in the administration stand 
up and defend those people who’d done what we asked them to do.138
At the time OLC was crafting controversial detainee interrogation memoranda, Yoo stated in 
a July 2002 email to an OLC colleague that comments from Gonzales and others would be 
incorporated into OLC’s work product.139 Gonzales speculated that Addington had a significant 
hand in an OLC memo that was addressed to him on August 1, 2002, as it contained significant 
discussion of  the plenary authority of  the commander in chief   — about which Addington held 
strong views.140 The precise role the War Council or others outside OLC had on OLC and its 
work product remains unclear. Addington denied a role in the authorship of  OLC memoranda 
but, in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in 2008, said:
Now, there is one thing worth pointing out in there in defense of  Mr. Yoo, who, 
as any good attorney would, has, I presume, not felt free to explain and defend 
himself  on the point. I can do this in my capacity essentially as the client on this 
opinion [addressed to Alberto Gonzales, dated August 1, 2002]. …
In defense of  Mr. Yoo, I would simply like to point out that is what his client 
asked him to do. So it is the professional obligation of  the attorney to render 
the advice on the subjects that the client wants advice on.141
The OLC’s Examination of Executive Authority to Take Action Post–September 11
In a memo to Associate Attorney General David Kris, dated September 25, 2001 — two weeks 
after September 11 — Yoo wrote that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the U.S. 
law outlining the procedures and requirements for intelligence collection by the government, 
could be amended unilaterally by the executive without violating the Constitution,142 even though 
under the Constitution, only Congress could lawfully amend a statute. The memo asserted that 
constitutional standards had “shifted” in the aftermath of  September 11. While analyzing the 
constitutionality of  the proposed FISA change, Yoo wrote: 
It is not unconstitutional to establish a standard for FISA applications that may 
be less demanding than the current standard, because it seems clear that the 
balance of  Fourth Amendment considerations has shifted in the wake of  the 
September 11 attacks.143
A month later, OLC issued a memo that further demonstrated its view that September 11 
had changed the application of  constitutional considerations in matters of  national security 
and foreign affairs.144 This later memo, co-authored by Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. 
Delahunty, advised:
 • The president had ample authority to deploy military force against terrorist 
133
Chapter 4 - The Legal Process of the Federal Government After September 11
The Constitution Project
threats within the United States. The AUMF had recognized that the 
president may deploy military force domestically to prevent and deter similar 
terrorist attacks.145
 • The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, which prohibits the use of  the 
Armed Forces for domestic law-enforcement purposes, does not limit the 
ability of  the president to utilize the military domestically against international 
and foreign terrorists operating within the United States.146
 • The Fourth Amendment does not apply to domestic military operations 
against terrorists. “In our view, however well suited the warrant and probable 
cause requirements may be as applied to criminal investigations or to other law 
enforcement activities, they are unsuited to the demands of  wartime and the 
military necessity to successfully prosecute a war against an enemy.” 147
 • The First Amendment protections of  freedom of  the press and freedom 
of  speech may also be subordinated to the overriding need to wage war 
successfully.148
In a memo to the deputy counsel of  the president dated September 25, 2001, Yoo laid out an 
expansive view of  presidential authority to conduct military operations.149 The memo argued that:
 • The AUMF passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, and the War 
Powers Resolution (WPR) of  1973 (50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48) did not grant 
power to the president but were acknowledgments of  the president’s 
inherent executive power.150
 • “The President may deploy military force preemptively against terrorist 
organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can 
be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of  September 11.” 151
 • “[The Constitution’s] enumeration of  the Treaty and Appointments Clauses 
only dilutes the unitary nature of  the executive branch in regard to the 
exercise of  those powers.” 152
 • “The Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist 
groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the 
September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to 
the security of  the United States and the lives of  its people whether at 
home or overseas.” 153
 • “Neither [the WPR nor the AUMF] can place any limits on the President’s 
determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of  military force to be 
used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of  the response.” 154 
A November 5, 2001 memo, again co-authored by Yoo and Delahunty, advised the senior 
associate counsel to the president and NSC legal adviser that the client, the president of  the 
United States, had the authority to unilaterally suspend articles of  the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, to which the United States is a party.155 The memo’s authors concluded that “amending” 
the treaty would require Senate advice and consent, whereas wholesale suspension of  articles 
included in the treaty did not.156
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The First Detainee Legal Considerations
Several weeks passed after September 11 before OLC first considered the issue of  detainees. The 
invasion of  Afghanistan by the U.S. military began on October 7, 2001. Ten days later, General 
Tommy Franks, the commander of  U.S. forces in Afghanistan, ordered his troops to apply the 
requirements of  the Geneva Conventions to all detainees in the theater of  operations.157
Establishing Military Commissions
The first known OLC opinion pertaining to detainees is dated November 6, 2001.158 The memo 
advised that individuals captured in connection with the September 11 attacks could be subject 
to a trial before a military court.159 The memo found the authority for doing so in 10 U.S.C. § 821 
(2000) and, moreover, within the president’s inherent commander in chief  powers, provided that 
the laws of  war were in effect.160 And, the memo asserted, there existed ample evidence and ample 
bases to find that the laws of  war were in effect.161 Furthermore, it stated, even if  Congress had not 
authorized the creation of  military commissions pursuant to § 821, the president nevertheless had 
the authority to convene them by view of  his plenary constitutional authority.162 One week later, 
the president authorized the secretary of  defense to establish military commissions.163 On perhaps 
a related note, Yoo is believed to have issued a still-classified memo to the DOD general counsel 
on possible criminal charges against John Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,’’ on or 
about December 21, 2001.164
Detainee Rights to Habeas Review
Proposals were under consideration in late 2001 to detain alleged Al Qaeda and Taliban 
members at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. OLC was asked to consider whether federal courts 
would entertain a writ of  habeas corpus filed on behalf  of  alien detainees at Guantánamo.165 The 
memo’s authors acknowledged that, were a federal court to take jurisdiction, it could review the 
constitutionality, the detention, and use of  military commissions.166 The late-December 2001 
memo concluded:
[T]he great weight of  legal authority indicates that a federal district court could 
not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at [Guantánamo]. 
Nonetheless, we cannot say with absolute certainty that any such petition would 
be dismissed for lack of  jurisdiction. A detainee could make a non-frivolous 
argument that jurisdiction does exist. … While we believe that the correct answer 
is that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by alien detainees 
held outside the sovereign territory of  the United States, there remains some 
litigation risk that a district court might reach the opposite result.167
On this point the Supreme Court would later explicitly reject OLC’s position.168
Application of the Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda and Taliban
When evaluating the legal analysis that led to OLC’s advice on the application of  the Geneva 
Conventions to Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, it is important to note that the first memo, and 
several subsequent memos produced by OLC on this matter, are believed to still be classified.169 
Currently pending Freedom of  Information Act (FOIA) litigation indicates that an OLC memo 
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may exist, dated November 21, 2001, written by John Yoo to White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales.170 The substance of  the memo is believed to address the War Crimes Act, Hague 
Convention, Geneva Conventions, the federal criminal code and detainee treatment.171
The question of  the application of  the Geneva Conventions to detainees is noteworthy as it 
produced disagreement within the federal government on the topic of  detainee treatment for 
the first time post–September 11.172 The disagreement extended both to the adequacy of  OLC’s 
legal advice and the policy it suggested. The first known OLC opinion on the topic was a draft 
memo dated January 9, 2002, from Yoo and Delahunty to DOD’s Jim Haynes.173 A subsequent, 
virtually identical, version of  the memo came from Bybee addressed to Haynes and Gonzales 
on January 22, 2002.174 The memo concluded that the treaties to which the United States was a 
party did not protect members of  Al Qaeda or the Taliban. The legal rationale differed slightly 
for Al Qaeda and Taliban members: Al Qaeda members were not entitled to the protections 
of  the Conventions since Al Qaeda was neither a state actor nor a signatory to any treaty. For 
Taliban members, Afghanistan’s status as a failed state and the Taliban’s failure to establish a 
government provided the legal grounds to find that members of  the Taliban militia were also 
not entitled to the POW status described in the Conventions. The Taliban “was more akin to 
a non-governmental organization that used military force” and thus “its members would be on 
the same legal footing as Al Qaeda.” 175 
The memo explicitly took no position whether, as a matter of  policy, the U.S. military should 
adhere to the standards of  conduct outlined in the treaties.176 The memo went so far as to state 
even if  the treaty were applicable, OLC found the president had the plenary constitutional 
power to suspend treaty obligations toward Afghanistan until the war’s end.177 The memo went 
on to assert that customary international law had no binding effect on either the president or 
the military, as “[international law] is not federal law, as recognized by the Constitution.” 178
William H. Taft IV, the legal adviser to the State Department, having read OLC’s guidance 
on the application of  the Geneva Conventions, sent Yoo a memo with notes on January 11.179 
Taft’s memo was highly critical of  OLC’s legal analysis.
 • “Both the most important factual assumptions on which your draft is based 
and its legal analysis are seriously flawed.” 180
 • “The draft memorandum badly confuses the distinction between states 
and government in the operation of  the law of  treaties. Its conclusion 
that ‘failed states’ cease to be parties to treaties they have joined is 
without support.” 181
 • “Its argument that Afghanistan became a ‘failed state’ and thus was no 
longer bound by treaties to which it had been a party is contrary to the 
official position of  the United States, the United Nations and all other 
states that have considered the issue.” 182
 • “In previous conflicts, the United States has dealt with tens of  
thousands of  detainees without repudiating its obligations under the 
Conventions. I have no doubt we can do so here, where a relative 
handful of  persons is involved.” 183
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 • “Only the utmost confidence in our legal arguments could, it seems to me, 
justify deviating from the United States unbroken record of  compliance 
with the Geneva Conventions in our conduct of  military operations over 
the past fifty years. Your draft acknowledges that several of  its conclusions 
are close questions. The attached draft comments will, I expect, show you 
that they are actually incorrect as well as incomplete.” 184
Taft’s draft comments proceeded as a wholesale repudiation of  Yoo’s premise: (1) that 
Afghanistan ever ceased to be a party to the Geneva Conventions; (2) that the president had the 
ability to suspend articles of  the Geneva Conventions or the Conventions in their entirety; and 
(3) disputing the position that customary international law had no legally binding effect on the 
United States.185 
After Taft’s complaints, several still-classified memos were then believed to have been exchanged 
between the parties involved in advising on this issue: 
 • On January 11, 2002, Bybee is believed to have authored a memo to 
Gonzales on the authority of  DOJ (including OLC and the attorney 
general) and DOS to interpret treaties and international law.186 
 • The same day, January 11, 2002, Yoo authored a memo to Gonzales 
discussing the Geneva Conventions.187
 • Three days later, Yoo sent a memo to Taft on the prosecution of  Al Qaeda 
members under the War Crimes Act.188
 • Two days after Bybee’s January 22 memo, Yoo is believed to have 
sent Gonzales a memo on the topics of  the Geneva Conventions and 
POWs.189
 • That same day, January 24, 2002, Yoo also sent a memo to the office of  the 
deputy attorney general discussing the application of  international law.190 
On January 18, 2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the president that 
GCIII did not apply to Al Qaeda or the Taliban and the president concurred.191 The next day, 
Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld rescinded the order that the Geneva Conventions were 
to be applied to detainees in the field, which had originally been issued by General Tommy 
Franks on October 17.192 Secretary of  State Colin Powell requested the president reconsider his 
decision and find instead that GCIII did apply or, in the alternative, that a military board, on a 
case-by-case basis, should determine whether Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were prisoners of  
war under GCIII.193 
Gonzales drafted a memo for the president on the matter and sent it to Powell for comment.194 
This draft memo advised that the positives of  concluding GCIII didn’t apply preserved 
“flexibility” and “substantially reduce[d] the threat of  domestic criminal prosecutions under 
the WCA.” 195 The memo provided arguments in support of  the secretary of  state’s contrary 
position but, Gonzales wrote, he found those arguments unpersuasive.196 In support of  Powell’s 
position, the memo states, 
“A determination that [GCIII] does not apply to Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
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could undermine U.S. military culture which emphasizes maintaining the 
highest standards of  conduct in combat, and could introduce an element of  
uncertainty in the status of  adversaries.” 197
In his written comments the following day to Gonzales’s draft memo, Powell expressed concern 
that “the draft does not squarely present to the president the options that are available to 
him.” 198 Powell believed the president should determine GCIII applied because a failure to 
do so would “reverse over a century of  U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva 
Conventions and undermine the protections of  the law of  war for our troops, both in this 
specific conflict and in general.” 199 
Attorney General John Ashcroft weighed in on the matter, sending a letter to President Bush 
dated February 1, 2002.200 By that time, Ashcroft wrote it was his understanding that “the 
[president’s] decision that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of  war remains 
firm. However, reconsideration is being given to whether [GCIII] applies to the conflict in 
Afghanistan.” 201 He advised “a determination that [GCIII] does not apply, will provide the 
United States with the highest level of  legal certainty available under American law.” 202 
Moreover, he added, opting out of  Geneva “would provide the highest assurance that no court 
would subsequently entertain charges that American military officers, intelligence officials, or 
law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field conduct, detention 
or interrogation of  detainees.” 203
As the debate seemed to have shifted during the exchange of  the several memos, Taft, in a doomed 
effort to return the debate to its earlier stage, sent a memo to Gonzales the following day:204
The paper should make clear that the issue for decision by the President 
is whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict in Afghanistan in 
which U.S. armed forces are engaged. … The structure of  the [current] paper 
suggesting a distinction between our conflict with Al Qaeda and our conflict 
with the Taliban does not conform to the structure of  the Conventions. 205
The debate finally concluded when, on February 7, 2002, the president signed a memo in 
which he determined none of  the provisions of  the Geneva Conventions would apply to 
members of  Al Qaeda.206 Additionally, the president determined that Common Article 3 would 
not apply to either Al Qaeda or Taliban detainees.207 Furthermore, the president determined 
Taliban detainees were unlawful combatants and did not qualify as POWs under Article 4 of  
GCIII.208 Finally, the president did determine that the Geneva Conventions would apply to the 
present conflict with the Taliban but he reserved the right to unilaterally suspend the Geneva 
Conventions between the United States and Afghanistan at a later time.209 
On February 7, in response to the president’s decision, OLC issued a memo to Gonzales 
concluding that the president had reasonable factual grounds to determine that no members of  
the Taliban were entitled to prisoner of  war status under GCIII Article 4 and that there existed 
no reason to convene a tribunal under GCIII Article 5 to determine the status of  Taliban 
detainees.210 The categorical determination that all detainees were not POWs, absent an Article 
5 hearing, effectively rendered GCIII moot. Notably, throughout and on all sides of  the debate 
amongst the small group of  individuals involved, no consideration was given to the application 
of  GCIV to Afghan civilians. All captured Afghans were assumed to be either Al Qaeda or 
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Taliban members. From known records, it apparently did not occur to any of  the participants in 
the debate that Afghan civilians, unaffiliated with either organization, could be picked up and 
detained. Absent guidance on lawful detainee treatment under existing U.S. and international 
law, OLC would soon set out on the task of  fashioning new legal parameters. 
Detainee Interrogation Policy is Established        
in the Absence of the Geneva Conventions
Once the federal government determined the Geneva Conventions would not apply to 
detainees, it found it necessary to generate its own detainee policy. A comprehensive policy 
would not be crafted in advance; rather, memorandum by memorandum, issues involving 
detainees were addressed piecemeal as they arose. OLC addressed a wide range of  policy 
questions, even going so far as to wade into the minutiae of  specific interrogation tactics.
Legal Status and Legal Rights Afforded to Detainees
In a February 26, 2002, memo, Bybee advised that the Self-Incrimination Clause of  the Fifth 
Amendment was not applicable in the context of  a trial by military commissions.211 While broadly 
addressing legal constraints applicable to all interrogations, the memo also focused on the case of  
John Walker Lindh, an American citizen captured while serving with the Taliban.212 
Finally, we note that even if  the Government did in fact violate Rule 4.2 by 
having military lawyers interrogate represented persons (including Mr. Walker) 
without consent of  counsel, it would not follow that the evidence obtained in that 
questioning would be inadmissible at trial.213 
A March 5, 2002, still-classified memo from OLC addressed the availability of  habeas 
corpus relief  to detainees.214 Additionally, a March 28, 2002, memo from Yoo to Taft on an 
unknown topic remains classified.215 When Sen. Patrick Leahy proposed a bill, the Swift 
Justice Authorization Act, which would vest in the president the authority to detain certain 
individuals involved in terrorist acts and establish military commissions, OLC saw the bill as an 
unconstitutional interference in the president’s exercise of  his commander in chief  authority.216 
The OLC memo, written April 8, 2002, pushed back against the legislation. Congress “cannot 
constitutionally restrict the President’s authority to detain enemy combatants or to establish 
military commissions.” 217 The memo is consistent with the reasoning found in OLC’s October 
2001 memo, which, by contrast, approvingly viewed the AUMF as appropriate congressional 
action. The AUMF, the October 2001 memo found, had merely acknowledged the president’s 
inherent constitutional authority.218 The April 8 memo, written by Patrick Philbin, a deputy 
assistant attorney general with OLC, adopted similar logic: 
If  [the Swift Justice Authorization Act] merely reaffirmed the President’s exist-
ing authority, it would likely do no harm. As drafted, however, the proposed leg-
islation attempts to impose substantive limits on the President’s authority that 
… are unconstitutional. 219
The case of  John Walker Lindh was not the only instance when OLC considered how the United 
States could legally treat its own citizens involved in terrorist activities. The issue arose again 
139
Chapter 4 - The Legal Process of the Federal Government After September 11
The Constitution Project
when Jose Padilla was captured by federal officials on May 8, 2002.220 In federal court in August 
of  2007, despite his pleas, Padilla, an American citizen, was found guilty of  providing material 
support to terrorists. At the time of  his arrest at Chicago O’Hare International Airport in May of  
2002, a material-witness warrant had been issued for him in connection with an on-going grand 
jury investigation of  the September 11 terrorist attacks.221 On May 22, 2002, Padilla’s lawyer 
moved to vacate the warrant and submitted a motion to that effect on June 7, 2002.222 A court 
conference on the motion was scheduled four days later on June 11. The conference would never 
take place. Instead, on June 9, the government notified the court the president had issued an order 
designating Padilla an enemy combatant and had directed the secretary of  defense to take him 
into custody.223
The day before the president’s order, on June 8, 2002, Bybee, in an OLC opinion addressed 
to Attorney General Ashcroft, determined that Padilla was “properly considered an enemy 
combatant and could be turned over to military authorities for detention as an unlawful enemy 
combatant.” 224 The memo examined past Supreme Court jurisprudence, Ex Parte Quirin,225 where 
the court had found military-commission jurisdiction existed for the defendant, and Ex Parte 
Milligan,226 where the court found military-commission authority did not exist. Bybee concluded 
the instant case of  Jose Padilla was “far closer to the scenario presented in Quirin than Milligan.” 227 
The memo further concluded that the Posse Comitatus Act, which prevents the use of  the military 
for law enforcement purposes in the United States, “present[ed] no statutory bar to the transfer of  
Padilla to the Department of  Defense.” 228
In briefings that followed to the Senate Judiciary Committee and Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, concerns were raised as to whether Padilla’s transfer to the Defense Department had 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 4001.229 That section provides, in part:
(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of  Congress.
(b) (1) The control and management of  Federal penal and correctional 
institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be vested in the Attorney 
General. … 
Yoo’s June 27, 2002, memorandum, which found the detention of  enemy belligerents did not 
violate 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), regardless of  the belligerent’s status as a U.S. citizen, echoed a 
familiar theme.
[T]he President’s authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. 
citizens, is based on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. We 
conclude that section 4001(a) does not, and constitutionally could not, inter-
fere with that authority.” 230
Yoo’s memo found that plenary executive authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants 
“arises out of  the President’s constitutional status as commander in chief.” 231 In support of  this 
finding Yoo noted: 
 • Congress specifically authorized the president to use force against enemy 
combatants pursuant to the AUMF.232
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 • “[M]ilitary detention of  enemy combatants serves a particular goal, 
one that is wholly distinct from that of  detention of  civilians for 
ordinary law enforcement purposes. The purpose of  law enforcement 
detention is punitive. … The purpose of  military detention, by 
contrast, is exclusively preventive.” 233
 • “Nothing in section 4001 indicates that its provisions were meant to 
reach the President’s authority, as Commander in Chief, to detain 
enemy combatants. To the contrary, section 4001 addresses the Attorney 
General’s authority with respect to the federal civilian prison system. … 
As a structural matter, the placement of  section 4001(a) in the United 
States Code signifies it was not intended to govern the detention of  enemy 
combatants by U.S. Armed Forces. Title 18 of  the United States Code 
covers ‘Crime and Criminal Procedure.’ Statutes concerning military 
and national security, by contrast, are generally found in Title 10 (‘Armed 
Forces’) and in Title 50 (‘War and National Defense’).” 234 
 • “The fact that a detainee is an American citizen, thus, does not affect the 
President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief  to detain him, 
once it has been determined he is an enemy combatant.” 235
OLC was “compelled” to conclude that Section 4001 did not interfere with what it found was 
the president’s plenary authority, as “statutes are not to be construed in a manner that presents 
constitutional difficulties so long as a reasonable alternative construction is available.” 236
Rendition
The rendition policy of  the United States over the past two decades is treated in greater detail 
in Chapter 5 of  this report. Here we address only a March 13, 2002, OLC memorandum by 
Bybee that would appear to underpin the so-called “extraordinary rendition” policy of  the 
United States during the early 2000s. The question presented in the memo was whether the 
president had plenary constitutional authority to transfer individuals who were captured and 
held “outside” the United States to another country.237 In this 34-page memo, OLC concluded 
that the commander in chief  had plenary authority under the Constitution to transfer any 
prisoners captured during hostilities. The memo acknowledged that GCIII and CAT both 
regulated the transfer of  enemy prisoners, but it found GCIII did not apply because of  the 
president’s earlier determination in February that Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were not 
legally entitled to POW status within the meaning of  the conventions.238 Moreover, CAT “poses 
no obstacle to transfer” as “the treaty does not apply extraterritorially.” 239
The memo limited its conclusions to those “outside” the United States as individuals within the 
United States “may be subject to a more complicated set of  rules established by both treaty and 
statute.” 240 “We need not address” those in custody in United States territory, as Al Qaeda and 
Taliban prisoners were, the memo’s author found, detained outside of  United States territory 
at Guantánamo Bay or in Afghanistan.241 As with other determinations by OLC, the Supreme 
Court would later rule that Guantánamo Bay was within the jurisdiction of  the U.S. courts. 
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Interrogation Techniques
As controversial as OLC’s legal advice may have been on many topics in the aftermath of  
September 11, none was more controversial than the advice it gave on the use of  certain 
interrogation techniques for detainees. It has been reported that sometime in May 2002, 
attorneys from the CIA’s Office of  General Counsel met with Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen 
Hadley, Legal Adviser to the National Security Council John Bellinger III, and White House 
counsel Alberto Gonzales, and discussed interrogation methods.242 The CIA had not, prior 
to September 11, been authorized to detain or interrogate individuals and, in fact, lacked 
institutional experience and expertise in doing so.243 
In those meetings that discussed detainee interrogations, in the spring of  2002, an operations 
manual is said to have been distributed.244 The operations manual, used to train American 
military members to withstand torture in the military’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape 
(SERE) program, was prepared by the DOD’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).245 
OLC members also attended these meetings. Bellinger and Rice told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in 2008 they either did not see or did not recall seeing the JPRA manual in these 
meetings.246 The operations manual, dated May 7, 2002, was found in OLC’s files, but it could 
not be determined when or how the manual came into OLC’s possession.247 The operations 
manual contained seven of  the 10 interrogation techniques that OLC would approve for use 
on detainees at Guantánamo Bay in an August 1, 2002, memo to the CIA general counsel 
authored by Yoo and signed by Bybee.248 Yoo recalled a conversation with Bellinger in which 
Bellinger told him that access to the interrogation program was extremely limited and that the 
Department of  State should not be informed.249 Unlike OLC’s memo on the application of  the 
Geneva Conventions to members of  Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which had been circulated to 
DOS, this work would not be so circulated. A log sheet from OLC’s records designated “John 
Rizzo Central Intelligence Agency” a client on a pending matter on April 11, 2002.250
Yoo wrote a letter to John Rizzo at the CIA on July 13, 2002.251 The letter was written “in 
response to your inquiry at our meeting today” and discussed the legal elements incident to the 
crime of  torture.252 The letter focused on the definitions of  “severe pain or suffering” within the 
Torture Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)).
Moreover, to establish that an individual has acted with the specific intent to 
inflict severe pain or suffering, an individual must act with specific intent, i.e., with 
the express purpose of  causing prolonged mental harm in order for the use of  
any of  the predicate acts to constitute torture. Specific intent can be negated by 
a showing of  good faith. … If, for example, efforts were made to determine what 
long term impact, if  any, specific conduct would have and it was learned that 
the conduct would not result in prolonged mental harm, any actions undertaken 
relying on that advice would have [been] undertaken in good faith. Due diligence 
to meet this standard might include such actions as surveying professional 
literature, consulting with experts, or evidence gained from past experience.253
The letter concludes, “As you know, our office is in the course of  finalizing a more detailed 
memorandum opinion analyzing section 2340. We look forward to working with you as we 
finish that project.” 254 Yoo recalled providing regular briefings about the pending memo to 
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Attorney General Ashcroft and Ashcroft’s counselor, Adam Ciongoli.255 Yoo also recalled 
mentioning to Ashcroft at the time that the CIA had requested advance assurances that 
CIA officers would not be prosecuted for the use of  “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
(EITs).256 Ashcroft was sympathetic to the CIA’s request and asked Yoo if  such an “advance 
pardon” was possible.257 Yoo informed Ashcroft it was not, and that Michael Chertoff, assistant 
attorney general at the criminal division, had rejected the CIA’s request for such an “advance 
pardon.” 258 Chertoff, later confirmed as the Secretary of  Homeland Security in 2005, suggested 
in his testimony at his Senate confirmation hearing that his only part had been to warn the CIA 
it had “better be careful” as it was dealing in an area where there was potential criminality.259 
As interrogation policy continued to take shape, Yoo sent a still-classified memo to Gonzales on 
July 22, addressing the applicability of  CAT.260 A July 24, 2002, fax was addressed to Yoo from 
an unknown source at the CIA and contained a six-page psychological assessment of  detainee 
Abu Zubaydah.261 It is clear, based on a subsequent OLC memo, that the fax must have come 
from the CIA.262 Abu Zubaydah, as discussed elsewhere in this report, would later be subjected 
to EITs. The faxed psychological assessment posited, “He denies and there is no evidence in his 
reported history of  thought disorder or enduring mood or mental health problems.” 263 Also, the
subject is familiar and probably well versed regarding al-Qa’ida’s detentions and 
resistance training materials. Thus one would expect that subject would draw 
upon this fund of  knowledge as he attempts to cope with his own detention.264
The guidance Yoo had promised arrived on August 1, 2002, when OLC provided a letter and 
a memo to Gonzales at the White House, as well as a memo to Rizzo at the CIA. The White 
House had dictated the pace of  the OLC legal analysis, demanding that one opinion be signed 
no later than the close of  business on August 1, 2002.265 Yoo, with the assistance of  a still-
classified OLC line attorney, had completed the first draft of  the memo to Gonzales on April 
30, 2002, followed by drafts on May 17, June 26, and July 8, 2002.266 Yoo later said he did not 
feel pressure to complete the memoranda quickly.267 Bybee later said “The memos were well 
underway, and we did have some — we did have some pressure at the very end.” 268 The July 
8 draft was the first draft circulated outside of  OLC for comment.269 In emails to the unnamed 
OLC line attorney, Yoo referred to the memo to Gonzales as “the bad things” opinion. On 
Friday morning July 12, 2002, Yoo emailed, “Let’s plan on going over [to the White House] at 
3:30 to see some other folks about the bad things opinion.” 270 Yoo was uncertain who, other 
than either Addington or Flanigan, attended the July 12, 2002, White House meeting.271 Of  the 
attorney general, Bybee later recalled:
We advised the Attorney General. He was generally aware that the memo was 
being prepared. I advised him of  the substance of  our advice; and the Attorney 
General, the one comment that has stuck with me that I remember was the Attor-
ney General said something to the effect that he was sorry that this was necessary.272
The 50-page memo to Gonzales, signed by Bybee, examined, generally, behavior under the 
Torture Statute to address which actions would be torture under the law and which would 
not.273 The memo began by examining the text and meaning of  the Torture Statute. It is from 
this memo that OLC derived its definition of  torture. The memo was concerned with CAT only 
insofar as it was implemented by the Torture Statute. It concluded that:
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 • Acts intended to inflict severe pain or suffering, whether mental or 
physical, must be of  an extreme nature to rise to the level of  torture 
under the law.
 • Certain acts may be cruel, inhuman or degrading, but will not produce 
pain and suffering of  the requisite intensity to fall within the Torture 
Statute’s proscription against torture.
 • Pain, be it physical or mental, must be “severe” to meet the definition 
of  torture.
 • Congress’s use of  the phrase “severe pain” elsewhere in the U.S. Code 
sheds light on its meaning; the phrase “severe pain” appears in statutes 
defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of  providing 
health benefits.
 • Although the health care statutes address a substantially different subject 
from the Torture Statute, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding 
what constitutes severe physical pain. The health care statutes treat severe 
pain as an indicator of  ailments that are likely to result in permanent and 
serious physical damage in the absence of  immediate medical treatment. 
Such damage must rise to the level of  death, organ failure, or the 
permanent impairment of  a significant body function.
 • Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to 
the pain accompanying serious physical injury such as organ failure, 
impairment of  bodily function, or even death.
 • For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under the Torture 
Statute, it must result in significant psychological harm of  significant 
duration lasting for months or even years.
 • CAT only requires general intent, but the specific-intent language found in 
the legislative history of  the United States’ ratification reservation means a 
perpetrator must have specific intent to cause “severe” pain.
 • In determining what actions reach the threshold of  torture in the criminal 
context, courts are likely to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
to determine whether the Torture Statute has been violated.
 • The Torture Statute may be unconstitutional if  applied to interrogations 
of  detainees undertaken pursuant to the president’s constitutional 
commander in chief  power to conduct a military campaign.
 • Under the current circumstances in the War on Terror, even if  an 
interrogation method crossed the line drawn by the Torture Statute, a 
defendant might be able to utilize certain justification defenses, the defense 
of  necessity or self-defense, to eliminate criminal liability.
The July 8 draft and earlier drafts of  the memo had not discussed the president’s constitutional 
power as commander in chief  to conduct a military campaign nor had they addressed possible 
defenses to violations of  the torture statute.274 Those sections were added only after a July 
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16, 2002, meeting Yoo had at the White House.275 The OLC line attorney who assisted Yoo 
in drafting those two additional sections did not believe they had been added in response to 
any request from the White House, NSC or CIA.276 Similarly, Yoo was “pretty sure” those 
sections were added because he, Bybee and Philbin “thought there was a missing element to the 
opinion.” 277 Bybee and Philbin did not know or did not recall why the two sections had been 
added.278 When Philbin inquired about the two sections and was critical of  their inclusion in 
the August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales, Yoo had told him, “They want it in there.” 279 Philbin 
hadn’t inquired further about who Yoo meant when he referred to “they.” 280 In his testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee in June 2008, David Addington recalled that he told 
Yoo, in July 2002, “Good, I’m glad you’re addressing these issues” when he learned Yoo 
planned to include in the memo possible defenses to the Torture Statute and discussion of  the 
plenary authority of  the president.281 
Earlier drafts of  the August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales had been addressed to John Rizzo 
at the CIA but, as Rizzo would later state, the CIA did not want an unclassified memo as it 
would have confirmed the existence of  a classified program.282 The recipient of  the memo was 
changed to Gonzales.
A six-page letter to Gonzales dated August 1, 2002, accompanied the memo and supplemented 
it, addressing the legality of  interrogation methods under international law.283 This six-page 
letter was authored by Yoo and frequently refers to Bybee’s longer, 50-page memo addressed to 
Gonzales. Specifically, the letter provided an opinion on whether methods, found not to have 
violated the Torture Statute, could either (a) violate the United States’ obligations under CAT 
or (b) create the basis for prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).284 Yoo advised 
that interrogation methods that comply with the Torture Statute would not violate international 
obligations under CAT because of  the specific understandings attached by the United States to 
the instrument of  ratification.285 Additionally, actions taken as part of  an interrogation of  an Al 
Qaeda member did not fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.286 Yoo’s letter cautioned 
We cannot guarantee, however, that the ICC would decline to investigate and 
prosecute interrogations of  al Qaeda members. … We cannot predict the 
political actions of  international institutions.287
The August 1 memo and supplemental letter to Gonzales did not address the application of  
specific interrogation methods to a detainee. Those were discussed in a separate OLC memo, 
also dated August 1, 2002, addressed to Rizzo.288 The Rizzo memo, in three parts, directly 
addressed the proposed interrogation of  Abu Zubaydah. On July 24, 2002, Yoo had telephoned 
Rizzo and told him that six enhanced interrogation techniques were approved for use on Abu 
Zubaydah: attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement and wall 
standing.289 As for other techniques, Yoo told Rizzo that DOJ was waiting for more data from 
the CIA.290 At some point thereafter, Rizzo remembered Yoo asking how important a specific, 
still-classified interrogation technique was to the CIA, because it would “take longer” to 
complete the memorandum if  it were included.291 The legal analysis contained in the memo to 
Rizzo is identical to the legal analysis in the Gonzales memo of  the same date. It is extremely 
informative to see the analysis applied in a practical model.
The initial de-classified release of  the memo to Rizzo was heavily redacted. It began “You have 
asked for this Office’s views on whether certain proposed conduct would violate the prohibition 
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against torture. … This letter memorializes our previous oral advice given on July 24, 2002 and 
July 26, 2002.” 292 It continued: “Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have 
provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary 
to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If  these facts were to change, 
this advice would not necessarily apply.” 293
 • The memo stressed that Abu Zubaydah appeared to have vital intelligence, 
that terrorist “chatter” existed at a level equal to that prior to September 
11, and that Abu Zubaydah had become accustomed to traditional inter-
rogation techniques.
 • As part of  an “increased pressure phase” Abu Zubaydah would have con-
tact only with an interrogation specialist and a training psychologist, versed 
in the military’s SERE program. The phase would likely last no more than 
a few days but could last up to 30 days.
 • The interrogation during this phase would utilize 10 techniques including 
(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped 
confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, 
(9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.294
 • In the second part of  the memorandum, OLC reviewed the context in 
which the procedures would be applied, discussing, at length, Abu Zubayd-
ah’s psychological assessment.295 It stressed that these techniques were used 
on military members during their SERE training and no substantiated 
reports of  long-term mental harm have followed. The memo also high-
lighted that interrogators have consulted experts to ensure no long-term 
harm would result from these interrogation methods.
 • The memo to Rizzo determined no specific intent to cause severe pain or 
suffering appeared to be present in the application of  these methods. It re-
iterated that an individual must have the specific intent to cause prolonged 
harm or suffering as required under the statute.296 
In the August 1, 2002, memoranda from Bybee to Rizzo, by stating “if  these facts were to 
change, this advice would not necessarily apply,” OLC had placed itself  as a necessary involved 
party in all future interrogations involving enhanced interrogation techniques. In April 2003, 
in response to a review of  the CIA’s detention and interrogation program by the CIA inspector 
general, OLC attorneys worked with attorneys from the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center to 
draft a list of  “bullet points” summarizing OLC’s guidance to the CIA.297 That document, 
however, was unsigned, undated, and not drafted on OLC stationary. OLC later disavowed the 
bullet points after Yoo no longer worked at OLC.298 Apart from the April 2003 bullet points, 
any continuing legal advice after August 1, 2002, from OLC on the conduct of  interrogations 
remained classified until late 2003 — with one notable exception. 
That notable exception came on March 14, 2003, when Yoo wrote an 81-page memo to 
Haynes.299 It was born out of  the significant disagreement [discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 1] amongst several Pentagon lawyers that arose once the August 2002 OLC advice 
became known. Military attorneys (JAGs) and several federal civilian attorneys believed OLC’s 
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legal guidance was inadequate. A “working group” was established in January 2003 at the 
Pentagon to examine the domestic and international laws that applied to detainee policy. Yoo’s 
March 14 memo addressed precisely that subject.
Yoo’s advice to Haynes on the domestic and international law applicable to the interrogation 
of  detainees by military members mirrored the advice provided in Bybee’s August 1 memo to 
Gonzales. Yoo advised:
 • The Fifth and Eighth Amendments did not extend to enemy combatants 
held abroad, nor did generally applicable criminal laws apply to the 
interrogation of  alien unlawful combatants held abroad. Any law that 
purported to do so would conflict with the president’s plenary authority as 
commander in chief.
 • CAT’s requirement that signatories undertake to prevent “cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment” extends only to conduct that is 
“cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment or otherwise shocks 
the conscience” under the Due Process Clauses of  the Fifth and 14th 
Amendments. 
 • Customary international law supplies no additional standards to the inter-
rogation of  detainees, and in any event, customary international law is not 
federal law and could be overridden by the president.
 • Even if  criminal prohibitions applied, the defenses of  necessity or self-
defense could provide justifications for any criminal liability.300
Despite disagreements between OLC and attorneys at the Pentagon, on April 16, 2003, the 
state of  flux surrounding the federal government’s detainee interrogation policy ended when 
Rumsfeld authorized 24 of  35 previously unapproved interrogation techniques for Guantánamo 
detainees. In July 2003, the CIA’s general counsel, likely relying on the bullet points, briefed 
“senior Administration officials” on the expanded use of  EITs, and, at that time, according to 
the CIA’s inspector general, the attorney general is said to have affirmed that the CIA’s proposed 
conduct remained well within the advice provided in OLC’s August 1, 2002, opinion.301
Evolution of Legal Advice Governing                 
Detainee Treatment
The legal advice pertaining to detainees changed as both OLC’s personnel changed and as 
OLC reacted to events such as Supreme Court rulings.
Jack Goldsmith III Replaces Jay Bybee
In late May 2003, Yoo resigned from OLC and returned to his teaching position at Berkeley.302 
Bybee had already departed OLC on March 28, 2003, after his confirmation as a judge on the 
U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.303 Gonzales had wanted Yoo to take over from 
Bybee.304 Ashcroft reportedly objected to Yoo’s appointment because he believed Yoo was too 
close to the White House and wanted his counselor, Adam Ciongoli, to take the job instead.305 
Gonzales, alternatively, was opposed to Ciongoli’s appointment because he felt Ciongoli was 
147
Chapter 4 - The Legal Process of the Federal Government After September 11
The Constitution Project
too close to Ashcroft.306 Bybee’s replacement, Jack Goldsmith III, was eventually 
suggested as a compromise candidate.307 Goldsmith had been working for Haynes 
at the DOD’s Office of  General Counsel since September 2002, and he began his 
tenure leading OLC on October 6, 2003.308
In late October 2003, a few weeks into his new position, Goldsmith is believed 
to have received a still-classified memo on the Geneva Conventions from an 
unidentified individual within OLC.309 In mid-November 2003, Goldsmith and 
Robert Delahunty are believed to have sent a still-classified memo to the DOD on 
the application of  the Geneva Conventions. Goldsmith asked Patrick Philbin to 
bring him copies of  any OLC opinions that might be problematic, and Philbin gave 
Goldsmith copies of  OLC’s August 1, 2002, memoranda sometime in December 
2003.310 In his book The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith wrote that by December 2003 
he had determined that some of  OLC’s legal opinions would need to be withdrawn 
and replaced.311 Goldsmith called Haynes to inform him that the Defense Department should 
not rely on Yoo’s March 2003 memo.312 When Haynes asked what was wrong with the opinion, 
Goldsmith responded, “There are many potential problems with it.” 313
On March 2, 2004 the CIA’s Office of  General Counsel sent a fax to Goldsmith asking OLC to 
reaffirm the guidance provided in the two August 1 memos, the August 1 letter from Yoo, and 
the still-classified June 2003 memo.314 The fax stated:
We rely on the applicable law and OLC guidance to assess the lawfulness of  
detention and interrogation techniques. …
in addition to the sitting and kneeling stress positions discussed earlier with 
OLC, the Agency has added to its list of  approved interrogation techniques two 
standing stress positions involving the detainee leaning against a wall. We also 
would like to share with you our views on three additional interrogation tech-
niques … and two uses of  water not involving the waterboard. 315 
One of  the uses of  water described in the fax was “pouring, flicking, or tossing (i.e., water PFT),” 
where up to one pint of  potable water would be used to startle, humiliate and cause insult.316 
The other technique was called “water dousing,” where a detainee, dressed or undressed, would 
be restrained by shackles and/or interrogators while potable water was poured on the detainee 
from a container or garden hose.317
March 2004 undoubtedly had to have been a particularly stressful time at OLC. Ashcroft was 
unexpectedly hospitalized and in poor health. In Ashcroft’s absence, Deputy Attorney General 
James Comey had become the acting attorney general. On March 11, 2004, a still-classified 
intelligence program, believed to be a National Security Agency (NSA) program, was set to 
expire.318 Comey and Ashcroft, the week before the March 11 deadline, and prior to Ashcroft’s 
illness, had discussed and agreed that certain aspects of  the secret intelligence program could 
not be certified lawful by DOJ, as required to renew the program.319 Comey had so informed 
the White House. On the evening of  March 10, 2004, Gonzales and White House Chief  of  Staff  
Andrew Card went to visit Ashcroft at his hospital room. When the two men arrived, Comey, 
Goldsmith and Philbin were already in the room.320 Comey dramatically testified to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that he had run up the stairs of  the hospital when he arrived to Ashcroft’s 
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bedside in the intensive care unit, worried that, if  the White House staff  arrived there first, they 
might ask Ashcroft, in his compromised medical state, to overrule him on the classified program.321 
Gonzales did ask Ashcroft to authorize the secret program and was rebuffed by Ashcroft.322
Goldsmith sent a series of  still-classified memos: one on March 11 to Gonzales clarifying 
OLC advice on classified foreign intelligence activities and one to Comey on classified foreign 
intelligence activities dated March 12.323 On Saturday March 13, Goldsmith phoned Comey 
at home and asked to meet with him that same day.324 Philbin and Goldsmith discussed with 
Comey problems that existed in the Yoo memo.325 Goldsmith felt the memo’s discussion 
of  presidential powers was incorrect, that there were problems with the memo’s discussion 
of  possible defenses, and that the memo had arrived at an unduly high threshold for the 
application of  the term “severe pain.” 326 A still-classified memo from Goldsmith to Comey on 
OLC views regarding legal issues concerning classified foreign intelligence activities (followed 
on March 15).327 Comey, in turn, sent to Gonzales a still-classified memo containing legal 
recommendations regarding classified foreign intelligence activities.328
On March 18, 2004, Goldsmith authored a memo on the application of  GCIV to the conflict in 
Iraq.329 Notably, in contrast with OLC’s advice in late 2001, this memo considered and concluded 
that the Convention did apply to the United States’ occupation of  Iraq. Both the United States 
and Iraq had ratified GCIV.330 U.S. nationals, foreign nationals of  a state not bound by GCIV, 
and nationals of  a co-belligerent state were not “protected persons” within the meaning of  GCIV, 
the memo argued. However, it found, Iraqi nationals and permanent residents of  Iraq would 
be protected.331 Thus, Al Qaeda operatives — those who were Iraqi nationals or permanent 
residents — would be protected, the memo reasoned. It is a contrast from earlier OLC memos, 
not only in its finding that an existing international convention affected the options on U.S. action, 
but also because nowhere in the memo was the president’s plenary authority as commander in 
chief  discussed. “They’re going to be really mad,” Philbin told Goldsmith. “They’re not going 
to understand our decision. They’ve never been told ‘no.’ ” 332 Members of  the War Council 
were, indeed, not pleased. “Jack, I don’t see how terrorists who violate the laws of  war can get the 
protections of  the laws of  war,” Gonzales told Goldsmith.333 Of  Addington, Goldsmith observed
If  Gonzales seemed puzzled and slightly worried, David Addington was just plain 
mad. “The President has already decided that terrorists do not receive Geneva 
Convention protections,” he barked. “You cannot question his decision.” 334
The next day Goldsmith followed up with a draft memo on the permissibility of  transferring 
persons to and from Iraq.335 GCIV prohibited “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of  protected persons from occupied territory … regardless of  motive.” 336 The 
memo advised that the United States may “remove ‘protected persons’ who are illegal aliens 
from Iraq pursuant to local immigration law.” 337 Additionally, the temporary relocation of  
“protected persons” who have not been accused of  an offense to another country, for a brief  but 
not indefinite period, to facilitate interrogation, was deemed permissible.338 
Two still-classified documents were later exchanged. Goldsmith sent a memo to the deputy 
assistant attorney general on March 22, 2004, confirming oral advice provided by OLC 
concerning classified foreign intelligence activities.339 Eight days later, the deputy assistant 
attorney general briefed and summarized OLC’s conclusions regarding a terrorist surveillance 
program for the attorney general in a still-classified document.340
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It is worth noting that, in April 2004, the Abu Ghraib scandal became public knowledge and 
Goldsmith reportedly went to work on a replacement draft for the August 1, 2002, Gonzales 
memo assisted by then-Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, who 
would later become OLC’s acting assistant attorney general.341 On May 6, 2004, Goldsmith 
sent a still-classified document to the attorney general consisting of  a legal review of  classified 
foreign intelligence activities.342
In May 2004, the CIA inspector general (IG) released a report critical of  the CIA’s interrogation 
program. The report focused on the period after September 11 up through October 2003.343 
Its conclusions were startling. The IG found the CIA had “failed to provide adequate staffing, 
guidance and support to those involved with the detention and interrogation of  detainees. 
… Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane and undocumented detention and interrogation 
techniques were used.” 344 CIA officials had “neither sought nor been provided a written 
statement of  policy or a formal signed update of  the DOJ legal opinion, including such 
important determinations as the meaning and applicability of  Article 16 of  [CAT].” 345 The 
inspector general discovered CIA officers at different levels were concerned that they would be 
vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad in the future.346 
Although the current detention and interrogation Program has been subject 
to DOJ legal review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply 
from previous Agency policy and practice, rules that govern interrogations 
by U.S. military and law enforcement officers, statements of  U.S. policy by 
the Department of  State, and public statements by very senior U.S. officials, 
including the President, as well as the policies expressed by Members of  
Congress, other Western governments, international organizations, and human 
rights groups.347
Goldsmith sent a letter to the IG in late May and asked to review the description of  OLC’s 
advice contained in the report and provide comment before the report would be sent to 
Congress.348 He sent Scott Muller at the CIA Office of  General Counsel (OGC) a letter two 
days later advising the CIA to suspend the use of  the waterboard technique “until we have 
had a more thorough opportunity to review the Report and the factual assertions in it” and 
ensure, with respect to the other nine enhanced interrogation techniques, that they be used in 
accordance with the OLC’s August 2002 memo.349 Goldsmith talked with Yoo by telephone 
on June 9, 2004, about the bullet points OLC had helped craft in the spring of  2003.350 Yoo 
told Goldsmith that the bullet points did not constitute the official views of  OLC.351 The 
following day, Goldsmith wrote to Muller that OLC would not reaffirm the bullet points, 
which “did not and do not represent an opinion or a statement of  the views of  this Office.” 352 
Four days later, Muller responded to Goldsmith that the bullet points had been jointly 
prepared by OLC and the CIA OGC, that OLC knew they would be provided to the CIA 
IG for the purposes of  the IG’s report, and that the bullet points had been used in a briefing 
slide at a July 2003 meeting attended by the vice president, the national security advisor, the 
attorney general, the director of  the CIA, Patrick Philbin, and others.353 The following day, 
the CIA OGC informed OLC that, because the offices had different views about the legal 
advice OLC had previously provided, the CIA would not be a joint signatory in a letter to 
the CIA IG.354 OLC’s comments and requested changes to the CIA IG report would later be 
submitted separately as an attachment to the report.
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On June 8, 2004, The Washington Post reported that a secret August 2002 DOJ memo had 
authorized torture.355 Five days later, the August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales was posted to the 
Post’s website.356 Shortly after the leak, Goldsmith was asked by the White House to affirm the 
advice contained in the memo, which Goldsmith concluded he could not do.357 He consulted 
with Comey and Philbin, who agreed with his decision and, on June 15, 2004, Goldsmith 
informed the attorney general and David Ayres, John Ashcroft’s chief  of  staff, of  his decision 
to withdraw the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and the following day offered his letter of  
resignation.358 Goldsmith wrote of  this time:
For a week I struggled with what to do. In the end I withdrew the August 2002 
opinion even though I had not yet been able to prepare a replacement. I simply 
could not defend the opinion. …
Ashcroft was, in context, extraordinarily magnanimous and, as always, 
supportive. But I sensed for the first time that he might be questioning my 
judgment, and I wondered when I left his office whether he would agree with 
my decision or exercise his prerogative to overrule me.359
The decision to withdraw the Bybee August 1 memorandum to Gonzales was formally 
announced that same month by Comey, who then directed OLC to prepare a replacement 
memorandum.360 The replacement memo for the Bybee August 1 memo to Gonzales, written 
by Goldsmith’s replacement, Daniel Levin, would be provided at the end of  the year, on 
December 30, 2004.361 
Less than two weeks after Goldsmith submitted his resignation, the Supreme Court ruled that 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay were indeed within the jurisdiction of  the U.S. courts, which 
could review whether a detainee was wrongfully detained.362 On July 16, Goldsmith sent to 
Ashcroft a still-classified memo on the implications of  the recent Supreme Court decision for 
certain foreign-intelligence activities.363 Ashcroft sent a letter dated July 22, 2004, to the acting 
CIA director that the interrogation of  an unidentified detainee, outside territory subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction, would not violate the law if  it utilized nine interrogation techniques (other than the 
waterboard) described in Bybee’s August 1 memorandum.364 After Goldsmith’s disavowal of  the 
bullet points, the CIA appeared to have decided to seek written approval whenever it intended 
to use enhanced interrogation techniques.365 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin
With the departure of  Jack Goldsmith III, two acting assistant attorneys general filled the role 
for the remainder of  the Bush presidency. Daniel Levin first served as acting assistant attorney 
general, from June 2004 until February 2005.366 He had been chief  of  staff  to the director of  
the FBI from 2001 to 2002.367
Shortly after assuming the post, on July 22, 2004, Levin worked on the preparation of  a 
replacement memo. Levin stated that when he first read the August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales 
he remembered “having the same reaction I think everybody who reads it has — ‘this is insane, 
who wrote this?’ ” 368 He wrote to Scott Muller at the CIA requesting assistance in OLC’s 
assessment of  “whether a certain detainee in the war on terrorism may be subjected to the 
‘waterboard interrogation technique’” consistent with the Torture Statute.369 The letter cites the 
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IG’s concerns that the technique in practice did not match the technique upon which OLC’s 
prior opinion had been based.370 Levin’s letter asked:
It would greatly assist us if  you could address the details of  the technique, 
including whether the technique on which we would now opine differs in any 
respect from the one considered in our earlier memorandum. If  there are 
differences but you believe those differences should not alter our conclusion 
that the technique is lawful under the statute, we would appreciate receiving 
an explanation of  your view, including any medical or other factual support on 
which you rely. Finally, we would be grateful if  you could provide information 
about the facts and circumstances of  this detainee, including his medical and 
psychological condition, of  the sort, provided with respect to the detainee 
discussed in our earlier opinion.371
The CIA responded with a still-classified letter dated July 30, 2004.372 A second, nonclassified 
fax, was submitted to Levin on August 5, 2004, with specific details about the water used in a 
waterboard session.373 The next day Levin sent a letter to the CIA confirming OLC’s advice: 
[A]lthough it is a close and difficult question, the use of  the waterboard 
technique in the contemplated interrogation of  [redacted] outside territory 
subject to United States jurisdiction would not violate any United States 
statute, including [the Torture Statute], nor would it violate the United States 
Constitution or any treaty obligation of  the United States.374 
A number of  still-classified letters from the CIA flowed to Levin that described CIA 
interrogation techniques, presumably for OLC’s review.375 Levin took up each interrogation 
request in turn. On August 26, 2004, he wrote that dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing 
and abdominal slaps were lawful with certain conditions.376 On September 6, 2004, Levin 
wrote that attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, 
wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, 
and abdominal slap were lawful with certain conditions.377 The conditions necessary were that 
the techniques conform to all representations previously made to OLC, that no medical or 
psychological contraindications existed to any of  the medical and psychological assessments 
provided to OLC, and that medical officers would be present.378 An almost identical letter to the 
September 6 letter, so similar that it may apply to the same detainee, was written by Levin to the 
CIA on September 20.379
Sometime in September 2004, Levin sent a memo to the attorney general and the deputy 
attorney general on the “Status of  Interrogation Advice.” 380 When discussing the Bybee August 
1, 2002, memo to Gonzales, Levin stated, “It contains discussion of  a variety of  matters that are 
not necessary to resolving any issues raised to date.” 381 Additionally, when discussing the March 
14, 2003, memo to Haynes, Levin wrote “[the memo to Haynes] contains extensive discussion 
of  the torture statute and other matters that is not necessary to resolve any issue.” 382 Levin 
added that the lawfulness of  the tactics themselves “was reaffirmed … in a July 7, 2004 letter from 
Jack Goldsmith to Scott Muller [referring to approval of  both CIA and DOD techniques] and 
also in a July 17, 2004 fax by Jack.” 383
While working on the replacement memo, Levin was reportedly so concerned about the 
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controversial technique of  waterboarding that he went to a military base near Washington and 
underwent the procedure himself.384 
Bybee’s August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Gonzales is Replaced
The first draft of  a replacement memo was produced by OLC in mid-May 2004, and at least 14 
additional drafts followed.385 Two days before the beginning of  2005, in the midst of  the winter 
holiday season, Levin released a memorandum,386 superseding the Bybee August 1 memo to 
Gonzales in its entirety, that  
 • stated that the discussion in the August 1 memo concerning the president’s 
commander in chief  plenary power and the potential defenses to liability 
was — and remains — unnecessary; 387
 • modified the August 1 memo’s analysis of  the legal standards applicable 
under the Torture Statute (e.g., under some circumstances “severe physi-
cal suffering” may constitute torture even if  it does not involve “severe 
physical pain”); 388
 • found that the only relevant definition of  “torture” is the definition con-
tained in CAT; 389
 • acknowledged that “drawing distinctions among gradations of  pain … 
is obviously not an easy task, especially given the lack of  any precise, 
objective scientific criteria for measuring pain” and relied on several 
judicial interpretations of  the Torture Victims Protection Act; 390
 • concluded that “[w]hile we have identified various disagreements 
with the August 2002 Memorandum, we have reviewed this Office’s prior 
opinions addressing issues involving treatment of  detainees and do not believe that 
any of  their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this 
memorandum.” 391
Thus, as with the Bybee memo to Gonzales, this memo did not get into specifics in regard to 
any one detainee’s interrogation. Moreover, in its significant footnote, it stated none of  OLC’s 
conclusions as to the treatment of  detainees would have been any different under the new 
standards now set forth in Levin’s memorandum. Officials at the White House had insisted 
that footnote be included in the memo.392 Of  Levin’s memo, Goldsmith wrote: “[N]o approved 
interrogation technique would be affected by this more careful and nuanced analysis. The 
opinion [the Bybee memo] that had done such enormous harm was completely unnecessary to 
the tasks at hand.” 393
Prior to Levin’s departure, OLC was consulted in still-classified documents about the individual 
interrogation of  detainees.394 On February 4, 2005, as he was leaving, Levin sent a still-classified 
memo to Haynes on the topic of  interrogation policy that, perhaps, is a replacement for the 
March 2003 memo Yoo had authored for Haynes.395 Levin said the CIA never pressured him 
as he examined the issue of  detainee interrogation; however, the White House had “pressed” 
him on this issue.396 “I mean, a part of  their job is to push, you know, and push as far as you 
can. Hopefully not push in a ridiculous way, but they want to make sure you’re not leaving 
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any executive power on the table.” 397 Levin left OLC to take over Bellinger’s 
job as the legal adviser to the NSC. Levin had not initially been interested in the 
job, but Gonzales, White House Counsel Harriet Miers, and the new National 
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley had encouraged him to take the position.398 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Comey later said that senior levels of  the 
Justice Department understood that Levin had been denied appointment as the 
permanent head of  OLC because he had not “delivered” to the White House its 
desired memoranda on interrogation.399
Levin arrived at his new position and found he had “nothing to do.” 400 After 
about a month, Levin asked for permission to leave his new position and returned to private 
practice.401 The behavior toward Levin was not, according to Philbin, an isolated incident. 
Addington approached Philbin in November 2004 and told him he had violated his oath to 
uphold, protect and defend the Constitution by participating in the withdrawal of  Yoo’s NSA 
opinion and the withdrawal of  the August 1 memo to Gonzales.402 Addington told Philbin that 
he would prevent Philbin from receiving any advancement to another job in the government 
and suggested Philbin resign immediately and return to private practice.403 In the summer of  
2005, Solicitor General Paul Clement chose Philbin to be the principal deputy solicitor general; 
Gonzales agreed, and the proposal was sent to the White House for approval. According to 
Philbin, Addington objected strenuously to the appointment and the vice president called 
Gonzales personally to ask Gonzales to reconsider the proposal.404 When told by Gonzales that 
he would not receive the job to preserve good relations with the White House, Philbin told 
Gonzales that he should have defended him, to which Gonzales told Philbin that, if  he felt that 
way, he should resign.405 Philbin resigned and returned to private practice.406
Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury 
Levin had replaced the August 1 memo to Gonzales before his departure, and had been 
working on a “techniques” memo but had been unable to complete it.407 Comey was concerned. 
In an internal DOJ email on April 27, 2005, Comey, who had already submitted his resignation 
by this time and would leave DOJ in August, wrote:
The Attorney General explained that he was under great pressure from the 
Vice President to complete both [replacement] memos, and that the President 
had even raised it last week, apparently at the Vice President’s request and the 
Attorney General had promised they would be ready early this week.408
Comey was worried Bradbury “was getting similar pressure. … Parenthetically, I have previously 
expressed my worry that having Steve as ‘Acting’ — and wanting the job — would make him 
susceptible to just this kind of  pressure.” 409 Later, Comey said no one was ever specific about end results 
from OLC but one would have to “be an idiot not to know what was wanted.” 410 Bradbury stated he 
never felt nor received any pressure from the White House counsel’s office, the vice president’s office, 
the CIA, the NSC, or the attorney general as to the outcome of  his opinions concerning the legality 
of  the CIA’s interrogation program.411 Moreover, Bradbury’s nomination as assistant attorney general 
had already been approved by the president in April 2005, prior to his completion of  the replacement 
memos. However, it was not forwarded to the Senate until June 23, 2005.412
On May 10, 2005, Bradbury authored two memoranda to Rizzo at the CIA. The first, a 46-
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page memo, looked at whether certain specified interrogation techniques designed for use on 
high-value Al Qaeda detainees complied with the Torture Statute.413 This memo
 • utilized the legal analysis in Levin’s December 2004 memo and applied the 
CIA’s request to that analysis; 414
 • assumed that, prior to interrogation, each detainee is evaluated by medical and 
psychological professionals from the CIA’s Office of  Medical Services to ensure 
that he is not likely to endure any severe physical or mental pain or suffering;415 
and that medical and psychological personnel are on-scene; 416
 • discussed in detail the following techniques: dietary manipulation, nudity, 
attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap (insult slap), abdominal slap, 
cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, water dousing, sleep 
deprivation, and waterboarding; 417
 • found that, subject to the understandings, limitations, and safeguards 
discussed, including ongoing medical and psychological monitoring 
and team intervention as necessary, each of  the techniques, considered 
individually, would not violate the Torture Statute,418 but that the issues 
raised by sleep deprivation and the waterboard require great caution in 
their use; 419
 • determined that, in sharp contrast to those practices universally 
condemned as torture over the centuries, the techniques considered here 
were carefully evaluated to avoid causing severe pain or suffering to the 
detainees.420
The second memo to Rizzo from Bradbury, a 20-page memo, addressed the same techniques 
in combination to assess their legality pursuant to the Torture Statute without reference to a 
particular detainee.421 
 • [A]ny physical pain resulting from the use of  these techniques, even in 
combination, cannot reasonably be expected to meet the level of  “severe 
physical pain” contemplated by the statute.422
 • Moreover, although it presents a closer question … we conclude that the 
combined use of  these techniques also cannot reasonably be expected to- 
cause severe physical suffering.423
 • The authorized use of  these techniques in combination “would not 
reasonably be expected to cause prolonged mental harm and could not 
reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe mental pain 
or suffering.”424
 • The waterboard may be used simultaneously with two other techniques: 
sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation. The remaining techniques can-
not be employed during the actual waterboard session,  but “may be used at 
a point in time close to the waterboard, including same day.”425
 • [OLC] stress[es] that these possible questions about the combined use of  
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these techniques … are difficult ones and they serve to reinforce the 
need for close and ongoing monitoring by medical and psychological 
personnel and by all members of  the interrogation team and active 
intervention if  necessary.426 
Later the same month, on May 30, 2005, Bradbury sent a memo to Rizzo on 
whether the CIA’s interrogation techniques were consistent with U.S. obligations 
under Article 16 of  CAT, which forbids cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
that did not amount to torture.427 Article 16, Bradbury’s memo posited, was limited 
to conduct within “territory under [U.S.] jurisdiction.” 428 Territory of  the United 
States “includes, at most, territory over which the United States exercises at least de 
facto authority as the government.” 429 Thus, the memo concludes, 
the CIA interrogation program is not conducted in the United States … 
and does not implicate Article 16. We also conclude that the CIA Interrogation 
program, subject to its careful screening, limits and medical monitoring, would 
not violate the substantive standards applicable to the United States under Article 16 even if  
those standards extended to the CIA interrogation program. Given the paucity of  relevant 
precedent and the subjective nature of  the inquiry, however, we cannot predict 
with confidence whether a court would agree with this conclusion, though … 
the question is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry.430
Philip Zelikow, the counselor of  the Department of  State at the time in 2005, had been 
working at DOS to persuade the rest of  the government to join in developing an option that 
would abandon technical defenses and embrace the definitions of  Common Article 3.431 Of  
Bradbury’s May 30, 2005, opinion, Zelikow testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2009:
The OLC had guarded against the contingency of  a substantive “CID” review 
in its May 30, 2005 opinion. OLC had held that, even if  the standard did 
apply, the full CIA program — including waterboarding — complied with [the 
standard]. This OLC view also meant, in effect, that the McCain amendment 
was a nullity;432 it would not prohibit the very program and procedures Senator 
McCain and his supporters thought they had targeted.433
Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of  the co-sponsors of  the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005 along 
with Sen. McCain, said of  the legal memoranda that approved waterboarding, “the [legal] 
guidance that was provided during this period of  time, I think, will go down in history as some 
of  the most irresponsible and shortsighted legal analysis ever provided to our Nation’s military 
and intelligence communities.” 434 In an interview with Task Force staff, Graham said: “They 
were tortured legal reasoning. … They were trying their best to create legal lanes that, I think, 
were (1) dubious, and (2) long term, damaging.” 435 Of  waterboarding, in 2007 McCain said: 
“All I can say is that it was used in the Spanish Inquisition, it was used in Pol Pot’s genocide in 
Cambodia, and there are reports that it is being used against Buddhist monks today. … It is not 
a complicated procedure. It is torture.” 436
In mid-February 2006, Zelikow wrote a memo challenging OLC’s interpretation of  the 
constitutional law contained in the May 2005 memo.437 Zelikow later heard his memo was 
thought to be “not appropriate” for further discussion and that copies of  his memo were 
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collected and destroyed.438 At least one copy survived, however, and was located in the State 
Department’s files in 2009.439 On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court released its decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, finding that Common Article 3 applied to the government’s treatment of  
detainees.440 According to Bradbury, OLC (along with DOS and DOD) had a central role in 
analyzing the legal issues and legislative options of  the Military Commissions Act of  2006, 
which was a response to the Hamdan decision.441
Notably, after Hamdan, there was an absence of  response by OLC to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in the case. One reason may have been that President Bush was deciding on a course of  
action at the time. Zelikow testified:
Internal debate continued into July [2006], culminating in several decisions by 
President Bush. Accepting positions that Secretary Rice had urged again and 
again, the President set the goal of  closing the Guantánamo facility, decided 
to bring all the high-value detainees out of  the “black sites” and move them 
toward trial, sought legislation from the Congress that would address these 
developments (which became the Military Commissions Act) and defended the 
need for some continuing CIA program that would comply with relevant law. 
President Bush announced these decisions on September 6.442
The next known memorandum on the topic of  detainee treatment from OLC is dated July 20, 
2007. For this opinion, Bradbury solicited input from the attorney general’s office, the deputy 
attorney general’s office, the criminal division, the national security division as well as DOS, 
the NSC and the CIA.443 Bellinger, now legal adviser to Secretary of  State Rice, raised multiple 
objections to the memo in an 11-page letter.444 Bradbury responded to Bellinger in a 16-page letter 
dated February 16, 2007, and reproached Bellinger for taking positions that were inconsistent with 
his previous support of  the CIA program, when he had been the NSC legal adviser.445 Bradbury 
addressed Bellinger’s comments on the memo in detail and rejected almost all of  them.446 
The July 20 memo began “the last eighteen months have witnessed significant changes in the 
legal framework applicable to the armed conflict with al Qaeda.” 447 After this “significant 
change,” the CIA was now “expecting to” detain further high-value detainees, subsequent to the 
president’s announcement of  September 6, 2006.448 The CIA sought approval of  six “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” for these high-value detainees.449 OLC advised that the techniques 
would not violate, and were consistent with, (a) the War Crimes Act, as amended by the Military 
Commissions Act of  2006, (b) the Detainee Treatment Act of  2005, and (c) the requirements of  
Common Article 3.450 In order that its determination would be conclusive under U.S. law, the 
memo continued, the president could exercise his authority to issue an executive order adopting 
OLC’s interpretation of  Common Article 3.451
We understand that the President intends to exercise this authority. We have 
reviewed his proposed executive order: the executive order is wholly consistent with 
the interpretation of  Common Article 3 provided herein, and the six proposed 
interrogation techniques comply with each of  the executive order’s terms.452
The six techniques included in the July 20, 2007, memo were: dietary manipulation, extended 
sleep deprivation, the facial hold, the attention grasp, the abdominal slap, and the insult (or facial) 
slap.453 Later, Bradbury would, three different times — on August 23, November 6, and November 
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7, 2007 — advise the CIA that an additional period of  authorization for its interrogation, the 
precise nature of  which remains classified, would comply with all applicable legal standards.454 
Closing OLC Chapter of the Bush Presidency
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court repudiated OLC’s earlier detainee policies yet again 
when it ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that detainees had a right to challenge their captivity in 
habeas corpus proceedings in federal court.455 
Bradbury authored a memo on October 6, 2008, that “advise[d] caution” before relying “in any 
respect on the Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William 
J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of  Defense, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of  Legal Counsel, Re: 
Authority for Use of  Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States 
(Oct. 23, 2001) as a precedent.” 456 The memo continues:
It is important to understand the context of  the 10/23/01 Memorandum. It 
was the product of  an extraordinary — indeed, we hope, a unique — period 
in the history of  the Nation; the immediate aftermath of  the attacks of  9/11. 
Perhaps reflective of  this context, the 10/23/01 Memorandum did not address 
specific and concrete policy proposals; rather it addressed in general terms the 
broad contours of  hypothetical scenarios involving possible domestic military 
contingencies that senior policy makers feared might become a reality in the 
uncertain wake of  the catastrophic terrorist attacks of  9/11.457
A follow-up memo from Bradbury on January 15, 2009, casts an even broader net of  retraction. 
The January 15 memo, Bradbury’s last at OLC, issued five days before the inauguration 
of  President Barack Obama, confirmed “that certain propositions issued by the Office of  
Legal Counsel in 2001–2003 respecting the allocation of  authorities between the President 
and Congress in matters of  war and national security do not reflect the current views of  
this Office.” 458 Again, “caution should be exercised before relying in other respects on the 
remaining opinions identified below.” 459 Those opinions upon which, Bradbury advised, should 
not be relied included:
 • Bybee’s March 13, 2002, memo to Haynes on the president’s power to transfer 
captured terrorists to the control and custody of  foreign nations ;
 • Philbin’s April 8, 2002, memo to Bryant regarding the Swift Justice 
Authorization Act;
 • Yoo’s June 27, 2002, memo on the applicability of  military detention to a 
U.S. citizen;
 • Bybee’s August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales on the Torture Statute;
 • Yoo’s March 14, 2003, memo to Haynes on the interrogation of  detainees 
by the military;
 • Yoo’s February 8, 2002, memo to Haynes on the interpretation of  the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act;
158
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
 • Yoo and Delahunty’s November 15, 2001, memo to Bellinger on the authority 
of  the president to suspend certain provisions of  the ABM Treaty;
 • Bybee’s January 22, 2002, memo to Gonzales and Haynes on 
the application of  treaties and laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban 
prisoners;
 • Yoo’s September 25, 2001, memo to David S. Kris regarding the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued an executive order that no member of  the 
executive branch rely on any interpretation of  the law governing detainee interrogations issued 
by the Department of  Justice between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009.460 
Why the OLC Opinions Must Be Rejected
On July 29, 2009, DOJ’s Office of  Professional Responsibility (OPR) released a 289-page report 
documenting its 5½-year investigation into OLC relating to the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation 
technique” program.461 Based on the results of  its investigation, OPR concluded that Yoo “had 
committed intentional professional misconduct when he violated his duty to exercise indepen-
dent legal judgment and render thorough, objective, and candid legal advice.” 462 It also con-
cluded Jay Bybee “had committed professional misconduct when he acted in reckless disregard 
of  his duty to exercise independent legal judgment and render thorough, objective, and candid 
legal advice.” 463 Notably, the report 
did not attempt to determine and did not base [its] findings on whether the By-
bee and Yoo Memos arrived at a correct result. Thus the fact that other OLC 
attorneys subsequently concluded that the CIA’s use of  EITs was lawful was not 
relevant to our analysis.464 
Moreover, the report “did not find that the other Department officials involved in this matter 
committed professional misconduct.” 465 On January 5, 2010, Associate Attorney General David 
Margolis wrote a memo to the attorney general in which he did not adopt OPR’s findings of  
misconduct for Bybee and Yoo and did not authorize OPR to refer its findings to the state-bar 
disciplinary authorities in the jurisdictions where the two men were licensed.466 In reaching his 
decision, Margolis stated:
This decision should not be viewed as an endorsement of  the legal work that 
underlies those memoranda. However, OPR’s own analytical framework de-
fines “professional misconduct” such that a finding of  misconduct depends on 
application of  a known, unambiguous obligation or standard to the attorney’s 
conduct. I am unpersuaded that OPR has identified such a standard.467
There are many criticisms of  OLC’s practices and conduct during this period. Alberto Mora 
and Philip Zelikow, who aired their concerns at the time, remain highly critical of  OLC’s advice 
and the attendant policies that followed.468 The noted historian Arthur Schlesinger, on the 
policies authorized by OLC, said, “No position taken has done more damage to the American 
reputation in the world — ever.” 469
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The 1952 seminal decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,470 in which the Supreme 
Court found the president’s authority to act was limited to authority specifically enumerated 
under Article II of  the Constitution or to statutory authority granted by Congress, wasn’t even 
discussed in Bybee’s now infamous August 1, 2002, memo to Gonzales. Nor, critics say, had 
the memo discussed the DOJ’s 1984 prosecution of  a Texas sheriff  and his deputies for “water 
torture.” 471 Nor had the memo discussed war crimes prosecutions of  Japanese soldiers who had 
waterboarded American aviators during World War II. Nor had the memo, in its discussion of  
the invocation of  necessity or self-defense, discussed a Supreme Court decision from just a year 
prior in which the Court indicated a necessity defense was only available when Congress had 
explicitly said such a defense was available. 472 Yoo and Bybee’s conclusion that the president’s 
commander in chief  authority trumped all else during wartime set a dangerous precedent. 
Their reliance upon the health-care statute, in defining severe pain, was extremely poor legal 
scholarship. The OPR report described much of  the criticism of  Bybee and Yoo’s work:473
Harold [Hongju] Koh, then Dean of  Yale Law School, characterized the mem-
orandum as “blatantly wrong” and added: “[i]t’s just erroneous legal analysis.” 
Edward Alden, Dismay at Attempt to Find Legal Justification for Torture, Financial 
Times, June 10, 2004. A past chairman of  the international human rights com-
mittee of  the New York City Bar Association, Scott Horton, stated that “the 
government lawyers involved in preparing the documents could and should face 
professional sanctions.” Id. Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of  
Chicago, said: “It’s egregiously bad. It’s very low level, it’s very weak, embar-
rassingly weak, just short of  reckless.” Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos 
on Torture, New York Times, June 24, 2004 at A14. In the same article, Martin 
Flaherty, an expert in international human rights law at Fordham University, 
commented, “The scholarship is very clever and original but also extreme, one-
sided and poorly supported by the legal authority relied on.” Id. …
Similar criticism was raised by a group of  more than 100 lawyers, law school 
professors and retired judges, who called for a thorough investigation of  how 
the Bybee Memo and other, related OLC memoranda came to be written. Fran 
Davies, Probe Urged Over Torture Memos, Miami Herald, August 5, 2004 at 6A; Scott 
Higham, Law Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture, Washington Post, August 5, 
2004 at A4. A few lawyers defended the Bybee Memo. In a Wall Street Journal 
op-ed piece, two legal scholars argued that the Bybee Memo appropriately con-
ducted a dispassionate, lawyerly analysis of  the law and properly ignored moral 
and policy considerations. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, A “Torture” Memo 
and Its Tortuous Critics, Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2004 at A22.474 
Others have argued that Bybee and Yoo share an unfair portion of  the criticism. Even those 
OLC lawyers who believed that using tough tactics was a serious mistake had agreed that the 
methods themselves were legal.475 OLC attorneys did not retract Bybee and Yoo’s infamous 
August 1, 2002, “Torture Memo” until after it had been leaked to the public in 2004, but then 
did so almost immediately, suggesting the attorneys in the office knew they could not defend 
in public that which had been signed-off  on in secret. Once Yoo and Bybee had said “yes,” 
none of  their successors at OLC were willing to say that they had been wrong in saying yes. 
At most, the criticism from their successors at OLC, and from many others in and outside 
the Justice Department, was that Yoo and Bybee had written more than was needed and/or 
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engaged in dicta — not that they had approved illegal interrogation tactics. Under Daniel 
Levin’s analysis, if  the use of  the waterboard and other “enhanced” techniques didn’t violate 
any U.S. statute or the Constitution, there existed no barrier to using the CIA’s interrogation 
practices on our own domestic criminal suspects. Under Steven Bradbury’s analysis, the CIA’s 
techniques could be used by a foreign enemy against U.S. troops in the future as the uses of  
the techniques were consistent with Common Article 3. In his article The Sacrificial Yoo, David 
Cole wrote:
Yoo and Bybee are in some sense easy targets. Their memos were the first to 
be written, and they employed less polished rhetoric and less nuanced argu-
ment than the memos that followed years later, written by authors who had 
the benefit of  hindsight and were aware of  the public condemnation that the 
initial memo had occasioned.476 … 
And by focusing on Yoo’s methods, rather than his result, the OLC failed 
to confront the real failing. It was not only in Yoo’s work, but also in that of  
those who, following him, authorized the CIA to engage in torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.477
Noted constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman has gone further than many critics and 
suggested that the memoranda of  Bybee, Yoo, and their successors at OLC in the Bush 
administration are symptomatic of  a larger problem in how OLC operates today, one that 
is present irrespective of  whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the White House.478 
Ackerman, a Yale Law School professor, believes OLC as an institution relies too heavily 
on the individual ethics and personalities of  those who occupy its offices to ward off  legal 
abuses. OLC lawyers are expected to push back against a White House even though, 
Ackerman points out, institutional and perhaps personal incentives are in place for OLC to 
provide amenable answers. So long as the status quo remains, Ackerman fears, so too does 
the possibility OLC would, in the future, tell a White House not what it needs to hear from 
its lawyers, but what it wants to hear. He suggests an independent body should be created 
to advise the president as to the legal limits of  his or her executive power, one that would 
operate at arms-length from the White House.479
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
Bybee and Yoo, and those at OLC who came after them, made the same, initial, signature 
mistake from which everything flowed. They promulgated a fundamental and egregious 
misunderstanding of  the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions, duly ratified in 
accordance with the U.S. Constitution, were the latest codification of  laws of  war that dated 
back centuries. They laid out civilized rules of  treatment for all categories of  people caught 
up in armed conflicts — not just “lawful combatants.” The Geneva Conventions openly 
contemplated and addressed what could be done to nonuniformed “unlawful” combatants. 
Such persons could be interrogated.480 They could, after a trial, even be executed.481 But they 
could not be physically or psychologically tortured or subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. They had to be treated “with humanity.” 482 Torture and degrading treatment were 
clearly prohibited not only by the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture, 
two bodies of  international law, but they were illegal under the War Crimes Act and the 
Torture Statute — domestic law — as well.
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The humane treatment of  prisoners is deeply ingrained in the fabric of  the United States’ 
history and its military. During the Revolutionary War, the British Army had viewed 
American soldiers as “unlawful” combatants by reason that all of  them were viewed as 
having committed treason. The British brutalized and killed American prisoners: American 
soldiers were refused the ability to surrender, starving prisoners were mistreated in the hulks 
of  prison ships in New York harbor, and the homes and property of  suspected American 
sympathizers were plundered and destroyed.483 By contrast, American leaders, Benjamin 
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson among them, resolved that the war would be conducted by 
the revolutionaries with a respect for human rights consistent with the values of  their society 
and the principles of  their cause, true to the expanding humanitarian ideals of  the American 
Revolution.484 As leaders in this cause, John Adams gave words to the policy and George 
Washington put the policy into practice.485 In a letter to his wife Abigail, Adams wrote:
I who am always made miserable by the Misery of  every sensible being, am 
obliged to hear continual accounts of  the barbarities, the cruel Murders in 
cold blood, even the most tormenting ways of  starving and freezing commit-
ted by our Enemies. … These accounts harrow me beyond Description. …
I know of  no policy, God is my witness, but this — Piety, Humanity and 
Honesty are the best Policy. Blasphemy, Cruelty and Villainy have prevailed 
and may again. But they won’t prevail against America, in this Contest, 
because I find the more of  them are employed, the less they succeed.486
Washington ordered his troops to treat British captives humanely:
[L]et them have no reason to complain of  us copying the brutal manner of  
the British Army. … While we are contending for our own liberty we should 
be very cautious of  violating the rights of  conscience in others, ever consider-
ing that God alone is the judge of  the hearts of  men, and to Him only in this 
case, are they answerable.487
America’s superior treatment of  its prisoners boosted the morale of  Washington’s troops and 
was seen as hard evidence of  the ideals for which the American revolutionaries were fighting. 
A few Americans managed to escape British captivity and the stories of  their cruel treatment 
at the hands of  the British Army helped rally and fortify the opinions of  many Americans 
against the British. 
During the U.S. Civil War, the United States continued to lead the way when Frances Lieber 
drafted the first, modern, comprehensive code for the laws of  war. The “Lieber Code” 
established the idea that criminals were not the same as soldiers and, therefore, soldiers must 
not be detained in punishing conditions. Starvation, torture, intentional suffering and “other 
barbarity” were all outlawed. Lieber’s code was adopted at two important international 
diplomatic conferences at The Hague in 1899 and in 1907, which would put American 
egalitarianism at the core of  future international humanitarian law.488
Seen in this light, the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture, which the 
United States championed, are not limits on American hegemony; rather, they reflect the 
ideals that have coursed through the country’s history since its founding. Not only are these 
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ideals interwoven into those two international treaties, as well as the Torture Statute and the 
War Crimes Act, they are at the origins of  the nation’s founding document, the Constitution. 
Rather than counseling the president and other senior officials on ways in which the applicable 
law could be avoided, OLC and its attorneys could have, and should have, in a time of  great 
fear and panic, reinforced the country’s commitment to the rule of  law and helped put a stop to 
clearly illegal practices. Had they done so, they would have done their country an immeasurable 
service. The effect of  their failure to do so continues to reverberate and is felt to this day.
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Chapter 5
Between 2001 and 2006, the skies over Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East were crisscrossed by 
hundreds of  flights whose exact purpose was a closely held secret. Sometimes the planes were able to use airports 
near major capitals, while on other occasions the mission required the pilots to land at out-of-the-way airstrips. 
The planes were being used by the CIA to shuttle human cargo across the continents, and the shadowy 
air traffic was the operational side of  the U.S. government’s anti-terrorist program that came to be 
known as “extraordinary rendition.” 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush administration resolved to use every available 
means to protect the United States from further attack. The extraordinary rendition program, used 
previously by President Bill Clinton, quickly became an important tool in that effort. In the years since, 
numerous investigations and inquiries have found evidence of  illegal acts in the form of  arbitrary 
detention and abuse resulting from the program. These, in turn, have led to strained relations between the 
United States and several friendly countries that assisted the CIA with the program. 
The program was conceived and operated on the assumption that it would remain secret. But that proved 
a vain expectation which should have been apparent to the government officials who conceived and ran it. 
It involved hundreds of  operatives and the cooperation of  many foreign governments and their officials, 
a poor formula for something intended to remain out of  public view forever. Moreover, the prisoners 
transported to secret prisons for interrogations known as “black sites” would someday emerge. Many 
were released, and others faced charges, providing them a public platform from which to issue statements 
about the rendition program and their treatment.
The extraordinary rendition program required secrecy for two principal reasons: First, it allowed the CIA 
to operate outside of  legal constrictions; controversial interrogation techniques were approved for use by 
the CIA on a limited number of  “high-value detainees,” and records show that the CIA had flight data 
falsified to limit the ability of  outside actors, including rights groups, to track the movement of  detainees. 
Second, the CIA operated the “black sites” — the secret prisons abroad — typically on the basis of  
agreements between CIA officials and their counterparts, intelligence officials in the host countries. The 
decision to bypass regular diplomatic channels, which would involve the wider political leadership of  
each country, was designed to keep the existence of  the secret prisons entirely out of  domestic politics, 
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bilateral relations, and the media. However, the CIA’s effort to keep hundreds of  flights, prisons in 
numerous countries, and the mistreatment of  detainees secret failed in the end, leaving the participating 
countries to cope with questions about the international legal violations that occurred. Allies such as 
Poland and Lithuania continue to face significant legal and political problems stemming from their 
participation. There have been numerous reports released and lawsuits filed against governments in 
Europe, in some cases prompting official government investigations into complicity with the rendition 
program that clash with the pact of  secrecy relied upon by the CIA and the U.S. government. 
The investigation of  extraordinary rendition by the Task Force uncovered many new details regarding the 
black sites in Poland and Lithuania, countries that were visited by Task Force staff. In Poland, an official 
investigation has been hampered by the U.S. government’s refusal to share information, even as Polish 
prosecutors issued indictments against top Polish officials for their role in facilitating the black site there. 
The secrecy imposed by the CIA also resulted in political attempts to derail the investigation entirely. Polish 
prosecutors have, at various times, been caught in the difficult position of  handling information classified 
by the United States and Poland. The prosecutors also had to judge to what extent they could share such 
information with counsel for detainees who were held in Poland, who have a legal right to access such 
information. The Lithuanian prosecutors faced many of  the same problems, although unlike the Poles, they 
based their investigation on a parliamentary report asserting that black sites did exist in Lithuania. The 
Lithuanian prosecutors suspended their investigation in early 2011 without a public rationale; although they 
acknowledged the existence of  the sites, they initially claimed to Task Force staff  that they had “proven” 
that no detainees had been held there. They later amended their position to say that they simply did not 
have evidence of  detainees being held in the black sites — although human rights groups have insisted that 
such evidence exists. The Lithuanian prosecutors also provided Task Force staff  with new details about 
the suspected black sites, even describing the “cell-like structures.” Other Lithuanian officials gave the 
Task Force full accounts of  how noted intelligence officials came to exceed their authority by concluding 
agreements on their own with the CIA to host the black sites. These officials also described the many 
legislative and political changes that have been made in Lithuania to ensure that such acts are not repeated. 
Former senior CIA officials — including the former head of  covert operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller, 
and the former chief  of  analysis at the counterterrorist center, Paul Pillar — also gave Task Force staff  a 
broader understanding of  the CIA’s internal operations and deliberations. 
Because the United States has declined to hold an official inquiry of  its own, the Task Force’s meetings 
and interviews abroad were essential to gaining a greater understanding of  the founding and operation 
of  the black sites. However, the Task Force staff  found that the investigations abroad and elsewhere 
have been frustrated in part due to the United States’ refusal to respond to information requests regarding 
renditions, and in part because of  the limited or nonparticipation of  government officials with knowledge 
of  the agreements. As a result, allied governments have been caught in the difficult position of  being held 
accountable both by their citizens and by international organizations, while also being discouraged from 
making any public disclosures through direct and indirect warnings from the United States. 
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A Brief History of the Rendition Program
While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the United States first began using rendition as an 
anti-terror technique, the Task Force concludes that it was “well in place” by the late 1980s or 
early 1990s.1 But the nature of  the program changed significantly over time. 
In 1989, William Webster, former CIA and FBI head, stated in an interview that the United 
States had created the term “rendition” to describe the act of  capturing and bringing back 
to the United States a terror suspect.2 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued National 
Security Directive 77 (NSD-77), whose title and contents remain classified, but NSD-77 was 
referenced by President Clinton in President Decision Directive 39 in 1995, which stated that 
[r]eturn of  terrorist suspects from overseas by force may be effected without the 
cooperation of  the host government, consistent with the procedures outlined in 
National Security Directive-77, which shall remain in effect.3
This technique was used to bring Ramzi Yousef, perpetrator of  the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombings, from Pakistan to the United States in 1995, where he stood trial. 
Michael Scheuer, head of  the CIA’s bin Laden Unit from 1996 to 1999, summarized why 
extraordinary rendition was embraced, saying that the United States knew the whereabouts of  
many dangerous militants, but did not want them in the United States. The solution was to send 
them to a third country where they could be held secretly.4 In 1995, the Clinton administration 
approved a new agreement with Cairo to send abducted Islamic militants to Egyptian custody.5 
It was well-known that the mukhabarat — the Egyptian secret police — used torture methods 
on prisoners and committed extrajudicial killings; that was clearly asserted in the Department of  
State (DOS) human rights report on Egypt from 1995.6 Among the individuals rendered by the 
CIA to Egypt during the Clinton administration were Talaat Fouad Qassem, who was arrested 
in Croatia in September 1995, and Shawki Salama Attiya, arrested in Albania in 1998.7 Both 
men (along with four of  Attiya’s cohorts) were transferred by CIA officials to Cairo.8 Qassem 
“disappeared” after his return to Egypt, and is suspected to have been executed.9 Attiya alleged 
that upon return to Egypt, he was tortured by being suspended by various limbs, made to stand 
in knee-deep filthy water, and given electric shocks to his genitals — a technique later also 
alleged by Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed Alzery upon their renditions to Egypt in 2001.10 
Edward Walker, the former ambassador to Egypt who knew about the program, has said that 
the human rights reports were correct, that the “Chinese walls” at the embassy only came 
together at the ambassadorial level and that the DOS diplomats working on human rights 
reports might have been “upset” if  they knew what was going on.11 The negotiations, in 
Egypt’s case, were conducted between top CIA officials and the longtime chief  of  Egyptian 
intelligence, Omar Suleiman.12 Walker described Suleiman as one who understood the negative 
aspects of  torture, but was “not squeamish” about using it for intelligence gathering.13 Suleiman 
remained chief  of  Egyptian intelligence and oversaw post–September 11 renditions to Egypt 
until January 2011, when he briefly held the position of  vice president before Hosni Mubarak’s 
overthrow in February 2011.14 
The rendition program was expanded under Clinton to include Syria, Jordan and Morocco, 
which also used torture in their treatment of  prisoners, and numerous reports state that these 
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four countries have, to date, received the most U.S.-sponsored renditions.15 A former FBI 
official said about the program that from the beginning, the CIA “loved that these guys would 
just disappear off  the books, and never be heard of  again. … [T]hey were proud of  it.” 16 It 
is important to note, however, that Michael Scheuer testified before Congress in 2007 that 
interrogation was specifically not the objective in rendering these individuals under the Clinton 
administration, in part because of  the possibility that torture would be used and the evidence 
would be unreliable. The purpose of  the program at that time, according to Scheuer, was to 
“take these men off  the street” and seize any documents or other information on their persons, 
and the individuals would then be returned to countries in which there was some type of  
outstanding legal process for them.17 This was confirmed to Task Force staff  by former CIA 
deputy director Paul Pillar, who says that renditions before September 11 had “nothing to 
do with interrogation.” 18 Former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan also stated to Task Force staff  
that early renditions were always to the suspects’ countries of  origin, “or [where they were] 
wanted” on criminal charges.19 According to Richard Clarke, former director of  the Central 
Intelligence Agency,  “President Clinton approved every ‘snatch’ that he was asked to review.”20 
In 2004, George Tenet testified before Congress there had been more than 70 renditions 
prior to September 11, 2001.21 Some of  those renditions were to U.S. custody, however. 
Expansion of the Program Post–September 11
After September 11, President George W. Bush authorized a huge range of  covert operations, 
including the creation of  joint operations centers in other states to capture terrorists abroad, 
render and interrogate them.22 These operations included the re-conceptualized rendition 
program. Through the newly expanded network, members of  the “Rendition Group” at 
the CIA’s counterterrorism center were authorized to capture suspects all over the world.23 
According to CIA officers: 
Members of  the Rendition Group follow a simple but standard procedure: Dressed 
head to toe in black, including masks, they blindfold and cut the clothes off  their 
new captives, then administer an enema and sleeping drugs. They outfit detainees in 
a diaper and jumpsuit for what can be a day-long trip. Their destinations: either a 
detention facility operated by cooperative countries in the Middle East and Central 
Asia, including Afghanistan, or one of  the CIA’s own covert prisons — referred to in 
classified documents as “black sites.” 24
CIA flights could transfer suspected terrorists from numerous different countries to either the 
custody of  third countries such as Egypt and Syria, or to secret CIA facilities within third 
countries, to remain within CIA custody throughout. The latter locations became known as 
“black sites” [see below]. The two methods were not necessarily mutually exclusive; there 
are several examples of  suspects who were apparently rendered to black sites as well as third 
country facilities.25 Further, the case-by-case approval given by the president to previous 
rendition operations was replaced after September 11 by a grant of  blanket authority to the 
CIA for the detention and transfer of  suspects.26 Although the president and top administration 
officials continued to receive frequent briefings from the CIA, this broad authority may have 
contributed to renditions and lengthy detention based on patchy intelligence or mistaken 
identities. As former CIA official Tyler Drumheller stated in an interview with Task Force staff: 
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“There was a tendency — [whether] CIA, State Department, Pentagon — 
to run immediately to the White House. Everyone wanted to be the first 
person to reach the President, and once you tell the President something, 
especially President Bush, it’s very hard to go back and say ‘you know, we 
hadn’t quite checked it out enough’ … and they often didn’t.” 27
Due to the secrecy of  the program, it is difficult to accurately estimate how many 
individuals were subject to extraordinary rendition post–September 11. The 
European Parliament issued a report in 2007, culminating an investigation, which 
estimated that the CIA had flown as many as 1,245 extraordinary rendition flights 
between September 2001 and February 2007, including flights to countries where 
suspects are known to be subject to torture.28 The high figure may comport with the 
allegation that suspects were often flown to multiple sites over a short period of  time 
in order to “disorient” them.29 This number of  actual rendition flights is disputed, 
however, by former CIA Director Michael Hayden, who said that many of  those 
flights carried equipment, documents and people not associated with the rendition 
program.30 Hayden also stated in 2007 that “apart from that 100 that we’ve 
detained [at CIA facilities], the number of  renditions is actually even a smaller 
number, mid-range two figures,” placing the actual number of  CIA detainees at 
around 150, including suspects known to have been sent to Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, 
or U.S. custody elsewhere.31 This figure would appear to comport with the statement in the 
May 30, 2005, memorandum from Steven Bradbury, former head of  DOJ’s Office of  Legal 
Counsel (OLC),  to John Rizzo, former counsel for the CIA,  that up to that point, there had 
been 94 detainees in CIA custody.32 There are allegations of  abuse in both Afghanistan and 
Guantánamo Bay in connection with previously rendered detainees, particularly between 2002 
and 2006. The number of  extraordinary renditions to foreign custody in third countries was 
estimated at 53, in a 2008 report by the New America Foundation.33 The report said, “[a]ll 
individuals for whom the rendition destination is known were sent to countries that have been 
criticized by the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
which document ‘torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ ” 34 
In interviews with The Washington Post, unnamed U.S. officials involved with the rendition 
program confirmed that the purpose of  transfers to countries that torture was explicitly to 
utilize those methods: “We don’t kick the [expletive] out of  them. We send them to other 
countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of  them.” 35 The temptation, according to another 
official, is “to have these folks in other hands because they have different standards.” 36 A large 
number of  current and former detainees have alleged torture arising from their renditions to 
foreign custody.37 Drumheller explained to Task Force staff  that in his view, “It’s wrong and 
misguided to send people to places like Egypt, thinking you’re going to get a great truth — 
you don’t. And no military commander would ever go into combat based on this [evidence], 
because they know they can’t verify it.” 38
A striking confirmation of  the extraordinary rendition program was provided in February 2011, 
by Karl Rove, who acknowledged in an interview that detainees had been rendered to Egypt 
and other countries during the Bush administration, saying that “we take steps to make sure that 
they are not treated inhumanely.” 39 The State Department had noted in its 2002 human rights 
report that imprisonment in Egypt frequently involved prisoners being stripped, blindfolded, 
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suspended from the ceiling or door frame; beaten with whips, fists, metal rods; subjected to 
electric shocks; and doused with cold water.40 
Even apart from the numerous allegations by detainees of  torture after rendition, there are 
acknowledgements by U.S. government officials that use of  methods eschewed by the United 
States to obtain information was the primary goal of  the renditions. Omar Suleiman’s personal 
relationship with the United States was cited by DOS as “probably the most successful element 
of  the [U.S.-Egypt] relationship.” 41 On one reported occasion, when the CIA “asked for a 
DNA sample from a relative of  Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Suleiman offered the 
man’s whole arm instead.” 42 When asked in 2007 whether individuals were likely to be tortured 
if  sent to Egypt, former CIA official Bob Baer replied, “Oh, absolutely, no doubt at all. … If  
you never want to hear from them again, send them to Egypt. That is pretty much the rule.” 43 
Former FBI agent Ali Soufan, who interrogated a number of  “high value detainees” (HVDs) 
around the world, noted to Task Force staff  that “[i]t’s an assumption that when you take 
[detainees] to countries like this, you’re taking them to be interrogated by someone else — you 
believe that someone else can get information that you cannot get.” 44 
According to reports, when President Obama and Vice President Biden (who had years of  
foreign-policy experience) were briefed on the CIA’s practice of  sending suspects to “friendly 
intelligence services in places like Egypt and Jordan,” Biden scoffed, “Come on … you turn 
these people over to other countries so they can be tortured.” 45 CIA Director Michael Hayden 
protested this statement, since the CIA retains “moral and legal responsibility” for everyone 
subjected to rendition, and the Bush administration had repeatedly emphasized their position 
that rendition was not for the express purpose of  torture.46 As journalist James Mann put it, 
“Biden was speaking in plain English, Hayden in the CIA’s standard legalistic formulations.” 47
In a report based on 2007 interviews with the 14 HVDs at Guantánamo Bay about their 
time in CIA custody, the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) described the 
transfer process:
Throughout their detention, the fourteen were moved from one place to another 
and were allegedly kept in several different places of  detention, probably in different 
countries. … The transfer procedure was fairly standardized in most cases. The 
detainee would be photographed, both clothed and naked prior to and again after 
transfer. … The detainee would be made to wear a diaper and dressed in a tracksuit. 
Earphones would be placed over his ears, through which music would sometimes be 
played. He would be blindfolded with at least a cloth tied around the head and black 
goggles. In addition, some detainees alleged that cotton wool was also taped over 
their eyes prior to the blindfold and goggles being applied. … The detainee would be 
shackled by hands and feet and transported to the airport by road and loaded onto a 
plane. He would usually be transported in a reclined sitting position with his hands 
shackled in front. … The detainee was not allowed to go to the toilet and if  necessary 
was obliged to urinate or defecate into the diaper. … On some occasions the detainees 
were transported lying flat on the floor of  the plane and/or with their hands cuffed 
behind their backs. When transported in this position the detainees complained of  
severe pain and discomfort. …” 48 Additionally, “the detainees were kept in continuous 
solitary confinement and incommunicado detention.49
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In 2010, it was reported that certain HVDs who had arrived at Guantánamo Bay in 2003 had 
been secretly removed and transferred to black sites abroad specifically to avoid the Supreme 
Court’s ruling granting them access to lawyers and habeas corpus hearings.50 Flight data published 
by the European Parliament seemed to confirm that detainees including Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri, Ramzi bin al Shibh and Mustafa Ahmed al Hawsawi, arrived in Guantánamo 
Bay on September 23, 2003, and were kept at a CIA facility there named “Strawberry Fields.” 51 
However, the Supreme Court had begun to consider whether Guantánamo detainees should 
have access to U.S. courts, and the administration was reportedly afraid that such access would be 
granted by the Court the following summer.52 According to al-Nashiri’s lawyer, Nancy Hollander, 
“[t]here was obviously a fear that everything that had been done to them might come out.” 53 In 
anticipation of  the Court’s ruling of  June 2004, the four detainees were moved from Guantánamo 
Bay on March 27 on a flight that landed in Rabat, Morocco.54
Diplomatic Assurances
The Bush administration’s principal defense to accusations that extraordinary rendition 
included detainee abuse was the system of  requiring “diplomatic assurances,” by which the 
detaining third countries guarantee (despite known practices), that they will not abuse the 
specific individuals being transferred.55 The recently discovered files of  Moussa Koussa, 
Muammar el-Gaddafi’s former intelligence chief  and minister of  foreign affairs, illustrate this 
tactic. One letter from the CIA to Koussa discusses the rendition of  el-Gaddafi opposition figure 
Sami Al Saadi from Hong Kong to Libya, and notes that if  the CIA were to underwrite the cost 
of  a private charter flight for the rendition, “we must have assurances … that [Al Saadi] and his 
family will be treated humanely and that his human rights will be respected.” 56
Former CIA director Porter Goss testified before Congress that while “[w]e have a responsibility 
of  trying to ensure that [detainees] are properly treated, and we try and do the best we can to 
guarantee that … once they’re out of  our control, there’s only so much we can do.” 57 Alberto 
Gonzales, when asked about torture in the rendition program during his confirmation hearings 
for the post of  attorney general in January 2005, “chuckled and noted that the administration 
‘can’t fully control’ what other nations do.” 58 
The implications of  this ambiguity became apparent when the details of  Maher Arar’s 
rendition came to light. Arar, a Canadian citizen of  Syrian descent, was detained in New York 
during a layover at John F. Kennedy Airport while on his way back to Canada from a family 
vacation in Tunisia in September 2002. After several weeks of  detention, Arar was deported to 
Syria via Jordan despite telling U.S. officials he would be tortured in Syria. He was imprisoned 
and tortured for nearly a year in Syria before being released and returned to Canada. Arar 
claimed that while in Syria, he was imprisoned in an unlit “grave” that was three feet wide, 
six feet deep and seven feet high, with a metal door.59 He further described the cell as having 
a small opening in the ceiling with bars and that occasionally cats would urinate through 
the opening into the cell.60 Arar claimed to have been beaten with fists and a two-inch thick 
electric cable, and threatened with being hung upside-down, given electric shocks, and placed 
in a “spine-breaking chair.” 61 To minimize the torture, Arar stated that he falsely confessed 
to having trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, where he has never actually been.62 Arar also 
attested to having been regularly placed in a room where he could hear the screams of  other 
detainees who were being tortured.63 Arar believes that he did not see the sun for six months 
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and lost approximately 40 pounds while detained.64 Arar’s rendition to Syria occurred only 
three months after John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., labeled Syria as part of  the 
“Axis of  Evil” — states “that sponsor terror and pursue weapons of  mass destruction.” 65 
Former congressman William Delahunt (D-MA) discussed the general practice of  obtaining 
such assurances, and explained at a 2008 congressional hearing that
[the assurances provided regarding Arar] were ambiguous as to the source and the 
authority of  the person within Syria providing them. And it appeared that no one 
checked to determine the sufficiency of  these assurances. So to sum it up, there was 
nothing particularly assuring about these assurances. And yet we sent Mr. Arar to 
Syria on the basis of  those assurances. … [T]he Arar case demonstrates the dangerous 
practice of  relying on these diplomatic assurances.66
Clark Kent Ervin, the former inspector general for the Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS), gave a harsher assessment in congressional testimony about the Arar case. According 
to Ervin, “[T]here is no question but that given everything we know, the intention here was to 
render him to Syria, as opposed to Canada, because of  the certainty that he would be tortured 
in Syria and he would not be in Canada.” 67 Ervin said he thought there should be a criminal 
inquiry into whether U.S. officials had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2340(a), which prohibits conspiracy 
to torture. No inquiry has ever occurred.
Drumheller, who was the former head of  CIA covert operations in Europe from 2001 to 2005, 
confirmed that diplomatic assurances regarding a detainee’s treatment were not taken seriously. 
“You can say we asked them not to do it. … [But] [i]f  you know that this is how this country 
has treated people in the past, you have to be honest that that is going to be a part of  it.” 68 He 
later told Task Force staff  that with regard Egypt, Morocco, and other countries where torture is 
routine, “[y]ou can’t really use [diplomatic assurances].” 69 
The current administration tacitly admitted the legal problems with diplomatic assurances in 
2009, when DOS spokesman Ian Kelly stated that the State Department would be responsible 
for implementing a “monitoring mechanism” to augment diplomatic assurances and “make 
sure, after the prisoner is transferred, that he or she is not being abused.” 70 Speaking at a press 
briefing, Kelly said that a process for ensuring that U.S. consular officers could visit detainees 
transferred to third countries was essential, along with the extra safeguard of  speaking with them 
“in confidence” in case of  bugged cells.71 The introduction of  such a monitoring system would 
strengthen the value of  diplomatic assurances, although clearly it would provide no remedies for 
the abuses that occurred under diplomatic assurances for years after September 11, 2001.
Applicable Law
The two major potential legal violations associated with rendition are (1) arbitrary detention, 
and (2) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CID). Arbitrary detention is a 
violation of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United 
States is a party.72 In many cases, rendition also led to the practice of  enforced disappearances. 
The prohibition on enforced disappearance violates international humanitarian law in both 
international and noninternational armed conflicts, according to the Geneva Conventions.73 
The International Convention for the Protection of  All Persons Against Enforced 
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Disappearances, to which the United States is not a party but which codifies binding customary 
international law, states that “[t]he widespread or systematic practice of  enforced disappearance 
constitutes a crime against humanity.” 74 The United States regularly condemns other countries for 
engaging in enforced disappearance in DOS’s annual human rights reports.
Regarding torture and CID, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) specifically provides in Article 
3 that no state “shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of  being subjected to torture.” 
This principle, referred to by international lawyers as the principle of  “nonrefoulement,” is also 
considered to be customary international law, which is binding upon all states.75 The United States 
has said that in determining whether there are “substantial grounds,” it would use the “more 
likely than not” standard, meaning that the decision would hinge on whether it was “more likely 
than not” that an individual would be subjected to torture if  sent to another state.76 This is the 
standard that U.S. immigration courts rely on to make determinations regarding whether it is 
permissible under CAT to expel asylum-seekers to their native countries or to other states. The 
State Department conducts thorough human rights analyses each year, determining whether states 
use torture/CID, and at least some of  the states in which torture/CID is in widespread practice, 
by our own account, are states to which we’ve rendered detainees.77 
The United States has maintained that while as a matter of  policy it does not send anyone to 
areas where they would be mistreated or tortured, it does not have a legal obligations to prevent 
refoulement.78 Former Bush administration officials argued that for the purpose of  rendition, the 
CAT’s prohibition on refoulement does not apply extraterritorially to the transfer of  detainees 
(in U.S. custody) from locations outside the United States to a third country.79 The U.N. special 
rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez, specifically rejects this interpretation of  the prohibition 
on nonrefoulement, stating that it “violates the object and purpose of  the Convention Against 
Torture, making it illegal.” 80 
The CAT also prohibits the actual commission of  torture or CID, which is alleged to have been 
perpetrated by CIA officials in the black sites. Those countries that allegedly hosted such prisons, 
as well as countries that assisted the United States with the extraordinary rendition program, 
have been censured by institutions including the European Parliament, the Council of  Europe, 
and the United Nations.81 A number of  these allies and former allies have conducted internal 
investigations, as mentioned, and several have cases pending against them before the European 
Court of  Human Rights.82
On March 19, 2004, Jack Goldsmith, then head of  the Office of  Legal Counsel at the 
Department of  Justice (DOJ), drafted a confidential memo allowing the CIA to transfer 
detainees out of  Iraq for interrogation.83 Although the memo limited the duration of  the 
transfer to a “brief  but not indefinite period,” the memo also allowed permanent removal of  
detainees determined to be “illegal aliens” under “local immigration law.” 84 Although the 
memo was reportedly never finalized or signed, a substantially similar March 18, 2004, memo 
concluded that “Al Qaeda operatives captured in occupied Iraq lack ‘protected person’ status” 
under the Geneva Conventions.85 It is unclear whether the March 19 memo was ever explicitly 
used to justify detainee transfers out of  Iraq by the CIA [see discussion below on black sites in 
Iraq], although at least one intelligence official has stated that “the memo was a green light” 
for such transfers, and the military transferred at least two detainees from Iraq to Afghanistan: 
Amanatullah Ali, and Yunus Rahmatullah.86 Additionally, a Swiss intelligence cable published 
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by Swiss newspaper SonntagsBlick in 2006 reported that Egyptian officials had proof  that there 
were 23 Iraqi and Afghan detainees being held for interrogation at a CIA facility in Romania 
[see “Romania” section below].87 The transfer of  Iraqi citizens or Al Qaeda detainees captured 
in connection with the armed conflict in Iraq would be prohibited by Article 49 of  the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which provides that “[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of  protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of  the Occupying 
Power or to that of  any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of  their 
motive.” 88 Further, Goldsmith’s March 19 draft memo acknowledges that “violations of  Article 
49 may constitute ‘grave breaches’ of  the Convention, art. 147, and therefore ‘war crimes’ 
under federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. § 2441.” 89 
International Cooperation 
A long roster of  allies was necessary to operate the rendition program.90 In addition to Egypt, 
Syria, Morocco and Jordan, countries including the U.K.,91 Canada,92 Italy,93 Germany,94 and 
Sweden95 have acknowledged collaboration with the rendition program.96 Their assistance 
ranged from capturing suspects and turning them over to U.S. custody, and assisting in 
interrogations and abuse, to allowing stopovers of  known CIA flights carrying detainees. In 
February 2013, the Open Society Justice Initiative released a report detailing the involvement of  
54 countries with the extraordinary rendition program.97
Examples of  the many roles played by allies are evident in well-documented individual stories; 
these include Maher Arar (mentioned above), Binyam Mohammed, Khaled El-Masri, Ibn 
al-Shaykh al-Libi, Abu Omar, Ahmed Agiza, and Muhammed Alzery. Their stories have 
been verified by numerous sources, including other governments, and in part even by the U.S. 
government. The details of  their allegations are below.
 • In 2007, the Canadian government undertook a full inquiry into the CIA’s rendition 
of  Maher Arar from JFK Airport in New York to Syria. The commission of  inquiry 
determined that Canadian government officials had known that Arar was in danger of  
rendition by the United States along with torture, and Arar was formally cleared of  any 
terrorism charges. The commission also found that Canada had provided the United States 
with false information leading to Arar’s rendition, stating that “[t]here is no evidence to 
indicate that Mr. Arar … committed any offence or that his activities were a threat to the 
security of  Canada.” 98 Finally, the commission concluded that 17 of  the techniques used 
against Arar in Syria constituted torture.99 The Canadian government paid Arar $9.8 
million in damages, along with a formal apology.100 
 • Abdel Hakim Belhadj and Sami Al Saadi, both Libyan nationals, were arrested in 
Bangkok and Hong Kong (respectively) and rendered to Libya along with members of  
their families. [For further details and Task Force interviews with Belhadj and Al Saadi, 
see Libya case study in Chapter 8]. Belhadj has filed legal proceedings (currently pending) 
in the United Kingdom against the government, U.K. security forces, an MI6 official, and 
former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw for the administration and approval of  his rendition 
and alleged torture.101 
 • Binyam Mohammed, an Ethiopian national and U.K. resident, was arrested at Karachi 
Airport in Pakistan on suspicion of  being an Al Qaeda operative who had attended 
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weapons training camps.102 While imprisoned in Pakistan, Mohammed was 
interrogated by an American who identified himself  as an FBI agent, and 
asked repeatedly about his links to Al Qaeda.103 Mohammed was held in 
Pakistan for a period of  time, where he claims to have been beaten by Pakistani 
authorities with a “thick wooden stick” while he was chained in his cell, fed 
only every other day, given limited access to toilet facilities, and subjected 
to mock executions.104 Mohammed was also interrogated by at least one 
MI5 officer while in Pakistan, who alluded to his forthcoming rendition.105 
Documents published by the U.K. Foreign Office in 2010 show that “MI5 was 
aware that Mohamed was being continuously deprived of  sleep, threatened 
with rendition and subjected to previous interrogations that were causing him 
‘significant mental stress and suffering.’” 106 In July 2002, Mohammed was 
rendered by the CIA to Morocco, where he was further interrogated by U.S. 
officials.107 Mohammed also claims that Moroccan prison officials beat him, 
subjected him to sleep deprivation, and cut his chest and penis repeatedly 
with a scalpel.108 Mohammed has said that “[a]bout once a week … I would 
be taken for interrogation, where they would tell me what to say. They said if  you say 
this story as we read it, you will just go to court as a witness and all this torture will stop. 
I eventually repeated what was read out to me.” 109 Telegrams from MI5 to the CIA in 
November 2002 confirm MI5’s participation in Mohammed’s interrogation; the telegrams 
provided numerous questions for interrogators to put to Mohammed, along with large files 
of  information and photos to be shown during interrogation.110 When Mohammed was 
eventually transferred to Afghanistan in January 2004, a female military police officer (MP) 
took photos of  his injuries.111 However, Mohammed was held in the “Dark Prison” near 
Kabul, where he was allegedly beaten further, starved and deprived of  sleep before being 
sent to Bagram.112 Mohammed was transferred to Guantánamo Bay in September 2004.113 
The U.S. government charged Mohammed with terrorism-related offenses, which were later 
dropped before he was released in 2009.114
 • Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen, was captured in Macedonia in December 2003 
because his name was identical to a known Al Qaeda member. He was interrogated by 
Macedonian officials (who thought his German passport was a forgery), then transferred to 
U.S. custody in January 2004 and rendered to Afghanistan. El-Masri was sent to the “Salt 
Pit” prison [see “Afghanistan,” below], where he was interrogated and claims to have been 
repeatedly tortured by U.S. officials via beatings, sodomy, and malnourishment. In March 
2004, the CIA discovered that El-Masri’s passport was genuine, but debated about how to 
release him while El-Masri staged a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment. CIA Director 
George Tenet discovered El-Masri’s wrongful imprisonment in April 2004, and El-Masri 
was released on May 28, 2004, after two orders were issued by then–National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice. El-Masri was flown to Albania and abandoned on a rural road 
without funds. He was eventually picked up by Albanian authorities and reunited with his 
family, who had moved to Lebanon in the interim period. El-Masri has filed numerous suits 
against the U.S. government, and several European countries (Germany and Spain among 
them) have launched inquiries and/or warrants for the arrests of  the CIA agents involved 
in the rendition. In an interview with Task Force staff, former CIA official Drumheller 
reiterated that Germany had been concerned since 2001 about the U.S. rendition program: 
“They knew we had this capability, from the 90s, and [the Germans] were worried about 
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the FBI (rather than the CIA) coming into Germany and arresting people on German 
soil,” a concern that was neatly sidestepped by El-Masri’s arrest in Macedonia.115 Actions 
on El-Masri’s behalf  in Macedonia and before the European Court of  Human Rights 
have been pending for years, after a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit was dismissed when the U.S. government invoked the state-secrets privilege. Angela 
Merkel, the German chancellor, has stated publicly that Condoleezza Rice acknowledged 
to the German government that El-Masri’s rendition was a mistake, and that he should not 
have been held or rendered at all.116 While the State Department and the CIA reportedly 
“quibbled” over whether to issue an apology for El-Masri’s rendition and detention, no 
such statement has ever been made by the U.S. government.117 El-Masri’s lawyer, Manfred 
Gnjidic, testified in a court declaration that El-Masri had provided hair samples for 
radioactive isotope analysis to the Munich prosecutor’s office to assist in their inquiry, and 
the results showed that El-Masri had spent time in a South Asian country during the time in 
question and had been “deprived of  food for an extended period.” 118
 • Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan citizen, has been described as a member of  the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group and also as a member of  Al Qaeda, although the evidence currently 
suggests that he was not a member of  either group. Al-Libi was one of  the leaders of  the Al 
Qaeda-linked Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. He was detained in December 2001 
and rendered to Egypt. Once there, al-Libi was tortured, including being put into a small 
box for 17 hours, struck on his chest, and badly beaten.119 He subsequently made a false 
confession stating that Saddam Hussein had provided Al Qaeda operatives with information 
about the use of  biological and chemical weapons.120 This “confession” was then used as 
part of  the justification for the invasion of  Iraq by the United States in March 2003, despite 
the fact that the information had been debunked by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
a full year earlier: “[I]t is … likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. 
Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing 
scenarios to the debriefers he knows will retain their interest. Saddam’s regime is intensely 
secular and is wary of  Islamic revolutionary movements.” 121 In an interview with Task 
Force staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson confirmed that senior Bush administration officials 
had eagerly used al-Libi’s confession, with Colin Powell only later finding out that the 
confession was elicited through torture.122 [See Chapter 7 for more on efficacy of  torture.] 
al-Libi was subsequently forcibly disappeared, possibly rendered to Mauritania, Poland, 
Morocco, Jordan, and back to Afghanistan before finally being returned to Libya (probably) 
sometime in 2006.123 He died in Abu Salim Prison in 2009 under disputed circumstances: 
while the el-Gaddafi government stated that he committed suicide, U.S. officials, as well as 
rights group, were skeptical.124 Two weeks before his death, al-Libi was visited at Abu Salim 
by workers from Human Rights Watch, who claim that al-Libi told them that he had been 
tortured in U.S. custody.125 Following the Libyan revolution, an inquiry was begun by the 
new government into the circumstances of  al-Libi’s death.126 According to Human Rights 
Watch, who visited al-Libi’s family in Tripoli, photographs have emerged of  al-Libi in 
his cell when he was allegedly found dead by guards.127 The photographs show a severely 
bruised al-Libi with his head resting in the loop of  a sheet tied around a wall in his cell, with 
his feet flat on the ground and knees bent.128 al-Libi’s family is reportedly consulting forensic 
specialists to learn if  the photographs depict an individual who has committed suicide.129
 • Abu Omar, an Egyptian cleric abducted from Italy in February 2003 by CIA agents 
(who believed that he was plotting a bomb attack against American school children) and 
175
Chapter 5 - Rendition and the “Black Sites”
The Constitution Project
rendered to Egypt, where he was interrogated and tortured for 14 months (seven months 
in the custody of  the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, and seven months at the State 
Security Investigation Service’s (SSI) national headquarters) before being released without 
charge in February 2007.130 Italian police later identified the CIA agents involved in the 
rendition, and they were tried and convicted in absentia for their roles in the operation in 
2009. The convictions were upheld by Italy’s highest criminal court on September 19, 
2012.131 [See “Legal and Political Consequences of  the Rendition Program,” below.]
 • Muhammed Alzery and Ahmed Agiza, Egyptian nationals, were rendered from Sweden 
to Egypt in December 2001, where they were imprisoned. Both men have said that almost 
immediately upon arrival in Egypt, they were tortured with “excruciatingly painful” electrical 
charges attached to their genitals, and Alzery claimed that he was forced to lie on “an 
electrified bed frame.” 132 Alzery was released in October 2003, and Agiza in August 2011. 
The cases of  Alzery and Agiza were widely publicized after a Swedish television network aired 
a documentary on their deportations in 2004.133 Both the U.N. Committee Against Torture 
and the Human Rights Committee found that Sweden had violated obligations under the 
CAT and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in deporting Agiza and 
Alzery.134 In 2008, Alzery and Agiza were awarded 3 million kroner (roughly $450,000) each 
in settlements from the Swedish Ministry of  Justice for the wrongful treatment they received in 
Sweden and the subsequent torture in Egypt.135 
Public Recognition of the Extraordinary 
Rendition Program
Both Secretary of  State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush confirmed the use of  
rendition in 2005 and 2006 speeches, respectively, with Rice stating that “[r]endition is a vital 
tool in combating transnational terrorism.” 136 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a 
hearing in 2007 on extraordinary rendition, during which much of  the detail about the length 
and breadth of  the rendition program was publicly stated for the first time. Congressman Bill 
Delahunt, chairman of  the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight, said during the hearing, “These renditions not only appear to violate our obligations 
under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other international treaties, but they have 
undermined our very commitment to fundamental American values.” 
Further information came to light in two reports issued by the Council of  Europe in 2006 and 
2007, and one released by the European Parliament in 2007. The 2006 Council of  Europe 
report, presented by Swiss senator Dick Marty, followed a months-long investigation triggered 
by media reports in November 2005 about the existence of  CIA secret prisons in Europe [see 
“Black Sites,” below]. This report stated that it was clear that arbitrary and unlawful arrests 
and renditions had been carried out in Europe.137 Moreover, the renditions “were made possible 
either by seriously negligent monitoring or by the more or less active participation of  one or 
more government departments of  Council of  Europe member states”.138 The 2007 Council 
of  Europe report benefited from greater investigation, and concluded that the existence of  
CIA detention centers in Poland and Romania was considered “factually established.” 139 This 
second report also noted that other European states may have hosted secret detention facilities 
for the HVDs, and criticized national governments’ invocations of  “state secrets” to avoid 
cooperation with judicial or parliamentary proceedings.140
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Also released in 2007, the European Parliament report analyzed a large amount of  flight data 
and commented that data on detainee transfers seemed to match with media reports about 
detainees held in Poland.141 The European Parliament report, like the Council of  Europe 
reports, characterized extraordinary rendition as “an illegal instrument used by the U.S.A. 
in the fight against terrorism” and condemned both the cooperation of  European states 
with the program and the lack of  cooperation from European Parliament members in the 
inquiry.142 Jozef  Pinior, member of  the European Parliament investigative committee and now 
a Polish senator, said in an interview with Task Force staff, “We spent nearly two years on the 
investigation, and invited to Brussels, people who knew something about these sites in the 
different European states.” 143 Although the Polish government did not cooperate at the time, 
Pinior described “secret hearings” during the European Parliament investigation in Warsaw with 
Polish intelligence officials whose identities he could not disclose. “After these hearings, I could say 
that [a black site] was created in Poland, and the site contained prisoners from Afghanistan.” 144 
A 2010 report by the U.N. Human Rights Council on secret detention discussed use of  the 
black sites at length, including publicizing a finding that use of  the black sites “clearly fell within 
[the definition of] arbitrary detention.” 145 The U.N. report also listed known evidence for the 
various rendition sites.146
In 2011, Reprieve, a British human rights organization, discovered a legal dispute over unpaid 
bills between two small aviation companies in upstate New York.147 Court documents revealed 
the details of  numerous CIA rendition flights between 2002 and 2005.148 Lawyers for both 
companies, Richmor Aviation and Sportsflight (which hired planes from Richmor and then 
allegedly breached payment contracts), acknowledged the nature of  the flights. One attorney 
stated,  “Richmor Aviation entered into a contract with Sportsflight to provide rendition flights 
for detainees. … I saw the various invoices from Richmor that were submitted to Sportsflight 
[and] it was amazing to me that no one from the United States government ever said boo to me 
about any of  this.” 149 Indeed, Richmor v. Sportsflight Aviation is the only known rendition-related 
case in which the U.S. government has failed to invoke the “state secrets” privilege, in what was 
an apparent oversight.150 Flight logs and transcripts of  court proceedings were also included 
among the documents in the public record. One such transcript noted Richmor’s president, 
Mahlon Richards, testifying that passengers were “government personnel and their invitees,” 
and confirming that his planes flew “terrorists” and “bad guys.” 151 The Richmor documents 
confirmed many of  the conclusions set forth by the Council of  Europe and the European 
Parliament regarding the movement of  specific detainees and the countries involved in the 
rendition program.
Finally, in February 2012, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee launched 
an effort to follow-up on the 2007 report, with a hearing on March 27 at which members of  
various human rights organizations investigating rendition spoke about new evidence for the 
European black sites.152 The purpose of  the initiative was to penetrate the “law of  silence 
among governments” on the topic, according to committee member Hélène Flautre.153 
Committee members visited Lithuania in April 2012. The report, released in September 2012, 
focused on renditions to Lithuania, Poland and Romania, and found that no EU member state 
has fulfilled its legal obligation to hold an open and effective investigation into collaboration 
with the CIA rendition program.154
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The Black Sites
President Bush publicly acknowledged for the first time, in September 2006, that certain 
suspected terrorists had been held outside the United States, although he refused to divulge the 
locations of  their detention or any details of  the prisoners’ confinement.155 CIA use of  secret 
prisons abroad, however, had actually begun in early 2002, and by the time of  Bush’s speech, 
reports indicate that that the “black sites” had been closed. According to unnamed sources, 
initially the CIA considered keeping detainees on ships in international waters, but “discarded” 
the idea. (The capture of  Ahmed Warsame in 2010 raises the question of  whether the idea was 
entirely discarded, though he was likely detained by Joint Special Operations Command forces 
rather than the CIA).156
After 2001, the United States established detention facilities for CIA captives from Afghanistan 
and elsewhere. Congress approved an expenditure of  “tens of  millions of  dollars” to establish 
CIA secret prisons including the Salt Pit, outside Kabul, but further facilities were deemed 
necessary.157 From the available information, it is apparent that the CIA used a secret 
facility in Thailand for several months beginning in March/April 2002, to interrogate Zayn Al-
Abedin Muhammed Al-Husayn (more commonly known as Abu Zubaydah), Abd al-Rahim 
al-Nashiri, and possibly Ramzi bin al Shibh.158 A similar facility was established in Poland in 
2002, and approximately $100 million for the costs was “tucked inside the classified annex of  the 
first supplemental Afghanistan appropriation.” 159 It is not clear whether this figure was to fund 
operations at all of  the black sites, including the Salt Pit and the Dark Prison in Afghanistan and 
the facilities in Thailand, Poland, Lithuania and Romania, or whether further funds were necessary 
as the facilities were opened and closed in turn. It is generally understood that the Thai facility was 
closed in 2003, soon after the Polish facility was opened. A Romanian facility was used from about 
2003 to 2006, and a facility was also used in Lithuania between 2005 and 2006.160 Credible reports 
also alleged the existence of  secret detention facilities in Kosovo and Eastern Africa, as well as 
additional unsubstantiated reports involving sites in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Macedonia.161 
Former CIA official Drumheller objected to the proposition of  CIA secret prisons. “People say 
that you can’t equate this with the Soviets, [but] of  course you can. …When you have an intelli-
gence service [that] gets caught up in detentions and interrogation, then you’re moving towards 
having a secret police, and that’s really what you don’t want to have. The [FBI] and the military 
have a long tradition of  training — they have career interrogators, that’s what they do. And so 
the idea that you can take a bunch of  CIA guys and you give them some training, and say ok, 
now you’re going to be an interrogator; under any circumstances … it’s a mistake.” 162
Afghanistan
The CIA has used sites in Afghanistan for interrogation and detention of  terror suspects since 
the U.S. invasion in the fall of  2001. The three well-known secret prisons were called “The 
Hangar,” the Dark Prison, and the Salt Pit, although it cannot be definitively established that 
the Dark Prison and the Salt Pit were separate facilities.163 The Hangar is understood to be 
located on Bagram Air Base, where the U.S. military also held detainees from the battlefield. 
The CIA facility was reported as a “prison within a prison,” where the Red Cross had no 
access to CIA detainees.164 Former detainee Mohamed Bashmilah described the Hangar as 
having “makeshift cages” in which prisoners were kept, and being forced to listen to loud 
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music, including American rap and Arab folk songs, 24 hours a day.165 Another former detainee 
recalled that they were held in barbed-wire cages measuring six feet by 10 feet, and furnished 
with a mattress and a bucket for a toilet.166 Although it is difficult to ascertain which detainees 
were held at the CIA facility at Bagram, it is known that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Binyam 
Mohammed, and Omar al-Faruq were among them.167 Omar al-Faruq escaped from the 
Hangar in July 2005 with three other detainees, and was eventually killed by British forces in 
Iraq in 2006.168
In the Dark Prison near Kabul Airport, there were “no lights, heat, or decoration,” with detainees 
being held in constant pitch blackness and cold temperatures.169 Similar in description to the 
Hangar, the cells were roughly five by nine feet, contained a bucket to be used as a toilet, and loud 
rock music was played continuously.170 Detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation for days at a 
time and reported being “chained to walls, deprived of  food and drinking water.” 171
According to former detainee Binyam Mohammed, he was chained up to the point where 
“My legs had swollen. My wrists and hands had gone numb. … There was loud music, 
[Eminem’s] Slim Shady and Dr. Dre for 20 days. … [Then] they changed the sounds to 
horrible ghost laughter and Halloween sounds. [At one point, I was] chained to the rails for a 
fortnight.” 172 Similarly, both Khalid al-Sharif  and Mohammed Shoroeiya described the cells 
and interrogation rooms where they were held as “in total darkness,” with “loud, Western music 
blaring constantly.” 173 Al-Sharif  and Shoroeiya also stated that their cells contained buckets 
to be used as toilets.174 Majid al-Maghrebi, another Libyan national allegedly held at the Dark 
Prison, commented that “[i]t was so dark I couldn’t find the bucket to use as a toilet. I banged 
my head against the wall.” 175 The Libyan detainees detailed how they were chained to their cell 
walls for the first few months of  their detention; sometimes by one or both hands, and several 
long periods with both hands and feet bound to a metal ring in the wall. Al-Sharif  recalled a 
two-week period when he was shackled by all fours to the wall, and released only for 30 minutes 
each day to eat one meal and use the bucket.176 Al-Maghrebi said that when he called for a 
doctor due to severe illness, the “doctor” removed his clothes, “shackled him to the wall naked, 
and took away his blankets” for the night.177 
The claims of  former detainees regarding the Dark Prison have been consistent, both 
regarding their treatment and noting that while the guards were Afghans, the interrogators and 
supervisors were American and did not wear military uniforms.178 Most of  the former detainees 
were able to identify that they were being held in Afghanistan due to various factors including 
the shapes of  the buildings, the soil, and the Dari-speaking guards.179 Aside from frequent 
beatings, shaving of  body hair, lack of  food, and being shackled in stress positions, former 
detainees described three different “torture instruments” at the Dark Prison: the waterboard 
(although neither al-Sharif  nor Shoroeiya knew the term “waterboard” [see Chapter 8]), a 
small box, and a wooden wall.180 The small box was described by Shoroeiya as being roughly 
one square meter; when he was squeezed into it on one occasion, the box was locked and he 
was prodded with “long thin objects” through holes in the box.181 The wooden wall had a foam-
covered ring that would be placed around detainees’ necks, presumably to hold them in place 
as they were subsequently beaten against the wall.182 Detailed death threats were also used on 
detainees, according to al-Sharif.183
Detainees held in the Dark Prison between 2002 and 2004 included Binyam Mohammed, 
Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil el-Banna, Hassan bin Attash, Laid Saidi, Abdul Salam Ali al-Hila, 
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Khalid al-Sharif  (currently commander of  the Libyan National Guard; see “Legal and Political 
Consequences of  Rendition,” below), and Mohammed Shoroeiya.184 
The use of  cold temperatures played a large role in the third known Afghan black site — the 
Salt Pit.185 The Salt Pit was reportedly a former brick factory located northeast of  Kabul 
Airport.186 In November 2002, an Afghan militant named Gul Rahman was brought to the 
prison, where he died in CIA custody a few hours later from hypothermia.187 
Other detainees reported similar treatment: “I was left naked, sleeping on the barren concrete,” 
and hung up naked for “hours on end,” said Ghairat Baheer, who was held at the same time as 
Rahman.188 El-Masri claimed that his cell at the Salt Pit was “cold and dirty,” and that he was 
brutally beaten and told that by an interrogator that “[y]ou are here in a country where no one 
knows about you, in a country where there is no law. If  you die, we will bury you, and no one 
will know.” 189 
It is unclear when each of  the Afghan black sites was closed, but officials insist that they 
have not been used subsequent to President Obama’s 2009 executive order shutting all CIA 
detention facilities.190
Iraq 
In 2004, an investigation by Major General George Fay concluded: “The CIA conducted 
unilateral and joint interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib … [which] contributed to a loss of  
accountability and abuse at Abu Ghraib. No memorandum of  understanding existed on the 
subject interrogation operations between the CIA and CJTF-7 [Combined Joint Task Force 7], 
and local CIA officers convinced military leaders that they should be allowed to operate outside 
the established local rules and procedures.” 191
In 2005, however, it was reported that the CIA had signed a memorandum of  understanding 
(MOU) with military intelligence officials at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, authorizing the CIA 
to “hide certain detainees at the facility without officially registering them.” 192 According to 
Colonel Thomas Pappas, a military intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib, the CIA requested in 
September 2003 that “the military intelligence officials ‘continue to make cells available for their 
detainees and that they not have to go through the normal inprocessing procedures.’ ” 193
The most notable CIA detainee in Iraq was Manadel al-Jamadi, an Iraqi national who died 
during interrogation in 2003.194 Al-Jamadi was brought to Abu Ghraib in military custody, 
after allegedly being beaten and doused with cold water by Navy SEALs and CIA personnel 
at Baghdad Airport, although he was “walking fine” upon arrival.195 He was never “checked 
into” the prison via any booking process; he was “basically a ‘ghost prisoner,’ ” according to 
a government investigator.196 Al-Jamadi was shackled in “strappado” fashion, with hands tied 
behind his back and shackled up to a window behind him while being interrogated by CIA 
officer Mark Swanner.197 Less than an hour later, al-Jamadi was dead, bleeding profusely and 
with severe bruising to his face.198 Several Navy SEALs received administrative punishment for 
al-Jamadi’s abuse (and that of  other prisoners). However, Swanner never faced charges, and 
Walter Diaz, an MP on duty at the time who deduced that al-Jamadi was dead, claims that the 
CIA covered up their own involvement: “They tried to blame the SEALs. The CIA had a big 
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role in this.” 199 After al-Jamadi’s death, the CIA reportedly issued a memo ordering agents to 
stop all interrogations, although the scope of  the order is not known.200 
In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder assigned federal prosecutor John Durham to lead a new 
inquiry into whether the deaths of  al-Jamadi in Iraq and Gul Rahman in Afghanistan may have 
constituted war crimes.201 The inquiry followed a lengthy “preliminary review” by the Justice 
Department into the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program, ordered by Holder to 
determine whether “any unauthorized interrogation techniques were used by CIA interrogators” 
outside “the scope of  the legal guidance given by the Office of  Legal Counsel regarding the 
interrogation of  detainees.” 202 Although Swanner was part of  the investigation, the investigation 
ended in August 2012 without charges being filed.203 DOJ’s inquiry was seemingly the last 
possibility of  any criminal charges being filed in the United States as a result of  CIA abuse.204
The CIA’s role in Iraq is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Thailand
The southern provinces of  Thailand have been plagued by separatist violence from Muslim 
insurgents for more than a hundred years.205 The 1902 annexation of  Pattani, inhabited largely 
by Malay Muslims, and subsequent human rights violations sparked tensions between the 
Muslim minorities in the south and the Buddhist majority in the remainder of  the country.206 
These tensions were exacerbated after 2001 with the implementation of  Thaksin Sinawatra’s 
suppressive policies towards the Muslim South, which triggered violent riots.207 Although 
scholars generally agree that the Muslim insurgency remains a local movement, they note that 
Thai militants “increasingly use the language of  jihadi extremism.” 208 
The Thai struggle with Muslim insurgents, combined with the positive, long-standing 
relationship between the CIA and Thai intelligence counterparts built during the Vietnam War 
and its aftermath, may account for the decision to establish the first black site for high value 
detainees in that country.209 As recounted to the Council of  Europe investigators by one CIA 
official, “In Thailand, it was a case of  ‘you stick with what you know.’ ” 210 This is similar to the 
reasons for the initial rendition collaboration with Egypt. 
It is difficult to identify the precise location of  the CIA site in Thailand, due to conflicting 
details gleaned from former detainees and individuals involved in the renditions. The first 
individual rendered to Thailand was Abu Zubaydah, who was arrested in Pakistan on March 
28, 2002.211 FBI interrogator Ali Soufan, who questioned Abu Zubaydah, stated that he arrived 
at an overseas location to participate in the detention on March 30 (he does not name the 
country) and took an additional flight from the international airport to reach the detention 
facility, which he describes as a “very primitive place” with a snake problem.212 The 2007 
Council of  Europe report noted that the exact location of  the black site was publicly alleged 
to be in Udon Thani in northeast Thailand, “near to the Udon Royal Thai Air Force Base” 213 
and possibly connected to the Voice of  America relay station in that area.214 This could well be 
the facility to which Soufan was referring, and in which Abu Zubaydah was held. Shot three 
times in the thigh, groin and stomach during the arrest raid in Pakistan and critically injured, 
Abu Zubaydah was attended in Thailand by a Johns Hopkins trauma surgeon who was specially 
flown to the Thai hospital where the CIA temporarily moved him from the detention facility 
on or around March 30.215 According to a source with knowledge of  the flight, 19 individuals, 
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including medical personnel, landed at the military side of  Don Mueang International Airport 
on March 31, 2002.216 Media coverage on videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA also 
indicates that Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (alleged mastermind of  the USS Cole bombing who 
was arrested in Dubai in November 2002), was held in Thailand briefly between detention at 
the Salt Pit in Afghanistan and the black site in Poland.217 He was held in the same facility as 
Abu Zubaydah, where their interrogations were recorded on video.218 Incidentally, both CIA 
Director Michael Hayden and CIA officer Jose Rodriguez stated that the videotapes were 
destroyed in November 2005 — the same month that Dana Priest of  The Washington Post wrote a 
comprehensive story about the CIA holding detainees in prisons abroad.219
Evidence exists for another detention site in Thailand for CIA detainees: Libyan national Abdel 
Hakim Belhadj claims that in 2004, he and his wife were arrested at Don Mueang Airport 
and held for several days in a prison “within minutes of ” the airport.220 Additionally, while  
Abu Zubaydah was transferred to Thailand “within three days” of  his arrest, the videotapes 
made by the CIA (in part to document his treatment in case he died in custody221) did not begin 
until April 13.222 It has been reported that Belhadj and Abu Zubaydah could have been held in 
a Thai facility near or on the military side of  the Bangkok airport.223 However, the three-day 
delay before Abu Zubaydah’s CIA tapes begin could also be ascribed to his hospital stay.  
There have also been reports of  a prison nicknamed “Cat’s Eye,” but is unclear whether this 
name refers to a facility near Bangkok or to the alleged facility in Udon Thani.224
In June and August 2003, alleged Al Qaeda operatives Mohammed Farik Amin (“Zubair”), 
Bashir bin Lep (“Lillie”), and Riduan Isamuddin (“Hambali”) were arrested in joint U.S.-
Thai operations. Thai authorities confirmed that after their arrests, the three men were 
“interrogated at a secret location” by “allied countries.” 225 According to their Guantánamo 
files, the three men did not arrive at Guantánamo Bay until September 2006.226 They have 
been classified among the 14 HVDs, several of  whom were rendered to multiple black sites, 
and it is therefore possible that they were briefly held at the Thai black site before being 
rendered elsewhere.227 
In terms of  treatment at the Thai black site(s), the since-destroyed CIA videos show the 
waterboarding “and other forms of  coercion” 228 of  al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, and were 
described by former CIA officer Jose Rodriguez as “ugly visuals.” 229 The videos were also 
reported to show Abu Zubaydah “vomiting and screaming.” 230 After being medically treated 
by the CIA to keep him alive for interrogation, Abu Zubaydah was subjected to several, if  not 
all, of  the techniques authorized by the August 1, 2002, memo from DOJ’s Office of  Legal 
Counsel.231 This included being “slapped, grabbed, made to stand long hours in a cold cell,” 232 
along with water dousing, similar to the treatment of  Gul Rahman in Afghanistan: “spraying 
him with extremely cold water from a hose while he was naked and shackled by chains attached 
to a ceiling in his cell.” 233 Abu Zubaydah was also waterboarded 83 times in August 2002, and 
it is likely that this occurred in Thailand.234 Abu Zubaydah owed this treatment to the fact that 
“Bush administration officials kept insisting that Abu Zubaydah was a member of  Al-Qaeda, 
and they inflated his importance, not only publicly but in classified memos. … None of  this 
was true, nor should it ever have been believed,” according to former FBI interrogator Ali 
Soufan. 235 “He wasn’t even an Al Qaeda member,” Soufan added in an interview with Task 
Force staff.236 Even prior to the OLC memo, the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to techniques 
including loud music blasted in his cell, forced nudity, sleep deprivation — over the objections 
of  Soufan and other FBI interrogators present.237 Rodriguez ordered the destruction of  
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the videos in 2005, saying that he wanted to protect the interrogators on the video.238 That 
revelation triggered a DOJ investigation that resulted in no charges, despite the potential of  the 
tapes as evidence in the forthcoming military commission proceedings.239 
The facility where al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations were taped was reportedly 
closed in 2003, after Thai officials took issue with “published reports reveal[ing] the existence of  
the site in June 2003.” 240 
Poland
In December 2002, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were transferred from Thailand to a new 
facility in Poland, just days after that facility was opened.241 Unlike the uncertainty over the 
location of  the Thai facility, the Polish facility is widely reported to have been located in Stare 
Kiejkuty (in northeastern Poland), on the grounds of  a Polish intelligence training center.242 
According to the Council of  Europe, “[t]he secret detention facilities in Europe were run 
directly and exclusively by the CIA,” while local personnel had “no meaningful contact with the 
prisoners and performed purely logistical duties such as securing the outer perimeter.” 243 
According to a 2007 Council of  Europe report, one incentive for Poland’s participation in the 
rendition program was U.S. support of  Poland’s inclusion in the “lucrative” NATO Integrated 
Air Defense System, which pulled Poland further away from “communist remnants.” 244 
However, there are reasons for believing that Poland’s acquiescence to the establishment of  
the black site went deeper than monetary compensation. A CIA official told the Council of  
Europe that “we have an extraordinary relationship with Poland. My experience is that if  the 
Poles can help us they will. Whether it’s intelligence, or economics, or politics or diplomacy — 
they are our allies.” 245 A source close to the Polish investigation into its collaboration with the 
rendition program told Task Force staff  that Poland’s willingness to cooperate with Washington 
in providing a black site was centered on its great desire to be close allies with the United States, 
following the collapse of  the Soviet Union: “The problem is that Poland always looked to the 
United States as a beacon of  what was right, what was aspirational, what is ethically correct. To 
us, when we heard about the Russians, torturing and kidnapping and killing … we thought, the 
United States is our model.” 246 
In 2002, then-Prime Minister Leszek Miller reportedly authorized Polish intelligence officials 
to assist the CIA in establishing the new detention facility.247 Such assistance included “purely 
logistical duties such as securing the outer perimeter,” and allowing American “special purpose” 
planes to land on Polish territory.248 Pinior, a former member of  the European Parliament 
(MEP), also maintains that during the European Parliament investigation, he found out about 
a document signed by Miller, regarding the treatment of  any corpses within the CIA facility.249 
The document was not signed by U.S. officials, allegedly to hide “traces of  evidence” of  the 
agreement.250 “To my knowledge, it was a document signed by the Prime Minister [Miller] 
with instructions for the construction of  a CIA site on Polish territory, and there is a paragraph 
in the instructions which described the situation for what is to be done in situations involving 
corpses.” 251 If  Pinior’s recollection is accurate, the only plausible explanation is the CIA’s 
anticipation of  detainee deaths in custody. 
According to 2007 Council of  Europe report: “[T]he CIA determined that the bilateral 
arrangements for operation of  its HVD programme had to remain absolutely outside of  the 
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mechanisms of  civilian oversight. For this reason the CIA’s chosen partner intelligence 
agency in Poland was the Military Information Services (Wojskowe S uzby 
Informacyjne), whose officials are part of  the Polish Armed Forces and enjoy 
‘military status’ in defence agreements under the NATO framework.” 252 From 
2002 until possibly 2005, between eight and 12 HVDs were allegedly held in 
Poland, including al-Nashiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, 
Ramzi bin al Shibh, Walid bin Attash, Abu Yasir Al-Jazairi, and Ahmed Khalfan 
Ghailani.253 A 2009 FOIA release of  flight data from the Polish Air Navigation 
Services Agency shows CIA-operated planes arriving at Szymany Airport (near 
Stare Kiejkuty) in 2003 from Afghanistan and Morocco that correspond with the 
movements of  several of  these detainees.254 Notably, the flight data shows that four 
of  these flights arrived at Szymany despite having flight plans for Warsaw, and two 
more were allowed landing at Szymany without any flight plans.255 The data further 
illustrates how Jeppesen International Trip Planning (which planned the rendition 
flights in conjunction with the CIA) requested, and was granted by Poland Civil 
Air, the dummy landing permits for Warsaw, which would later be cited in the flight plans.256 
Each of  the flights was operated by Stevens Express Leasing Inc., described as a CIA “shell 
company” (existing only on paper) by the European Parliament and media outlets.257 
The Polish flight data, in conjunction with previously discovered rendition flight data, illustrates 
aspects of  Polish cooperation with the CIA. Direct involvement by the Department of  State 
(DOS) has never been proven regarding the rendition program, and former DOS legal advisor 
Harold Hongju Koh stated in an interview with Task Force staff  that many renditions during 
the Bush administration “took place without State Department awareness.” 258 However, the 
Richmor documents include DOS authorization letters sent to flight crews prior to each flight, 
from an official named Terry Hogan.259 The letters described the flights as “global support for 
U.S. embassies worldwide.” 260 No current or former DOS official by that name has ever been 
located, and the letters are reported to have been forged.261 
In describing an Eastern European CIA facility that was likely the Polish black site, 
Jane Mayer relies on accounts from former CIA officials: “The newer prison … was 
far more high-tech than the prisons in Afghanistan, and more intensely focused on 
psychological torment. The cells had hydraulic doors and air-conditioning. Multiple 
cameras in each cell provided video surveillance of  the detainees. In some ways, the 
circumstances were better: The detainees were given bottled water.” 262
The bottled water allowed KSM an attempt at identifying one of  his prisons. In his 2007 
interviews with the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) at Guantánamo Bay, 
KSM reported that “on one occasion a water bottle was brought to me without the label 
removed. It had email address ending in ‘.pl.’ ” 263 However, KSM’s other descriptions of  the 
facility differ somewhat from Mayer’s — specifically, he described an “old style” central heating 
system common to former communist countries, along with cells of  roughly three meters by 
four meters with wooden walls.264 If  KSM’s account is correct, the CIA may have had reason to 
plan for the possibility of  corpses. Although KSM was told by interrogators that he would not 
be allowed to die, he “would be brought to the verge of  death and back again.” 265 KSM was 
famously waterboarded 183 times, according to the CIA Inspector General report.266 Based on 
the publicly-reported chronology of  his detention, this most likely occurred in Poland. KSM 
told the Red Cross, 
“Although KSM 
was told by 
interrogators 
that he would 
not be allowed 
to die, he ‘would 
be brought to the 
verge of death and   
back again.’”
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“I would be strapped to a special bed, which could be rotated to a vertical posi-
tion. A cloth would be placed over my face. Cold water from a bottle that had 
been kept in a fridge was then poured onto the cloth by one of  the guards so 
that I could not breathe. … Injuries to my ankles and wrists also occurred during 
the waterboarding as I struggled in the panic of  not being able to breathe.” 267 
KSM also described frequent beatings, stress positions, and being doused with cold water from a 
hose in his cell.268 He closed his ICRC interview by asserting: 
During the harshest part of  my interrogation, I gave a lot of  false information in 
order to satisfy what I thought the interrogators wanted to hear in order to make 
the ill-treatment stop. I later told the interrogators that their methods were stupid 
and counterproductive. I’m sure the false information … wasted a lot of  their 
time and led to several false red-alerts being placed in the U.S. 269 
The CIA IG report identifies several other episodes of  detainee mistreatment, which most 
likely occurred in Poland. Around the end of  December 2002 (after al-Nashiri had been 
transferred to Poland), a CIA debriefer used an unloaded handgun to “frighten Al-Nashiri into 
disclosing information.” 270 On what was probably the same day, the same debriefer “entered 
the detainee’s cell and revved [a power drill] while the detainee stood naked and hooded.” 271 In 
another incident, the debriefer threatened to produce al-Nashiri’s mother and family members, 
reportedly so that al-Nashiri would “infer, for psychological reasons … [that his interrogation 
could include] sexually abusing female relatives” in front of  him.272 CIA officials say that both 
the debriefer and the CIA official in charge of  the prison were disciplined for these incidents.273 
Al-Nashiri also told the ICRC that he was “threatened with sodomy” and the arrest and rape 
of  his family.274 On at least one occasion, al-Nashiri was forced into a “strappado” position, 
being “lifted off  the floor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a 
belt.” 275 According to court papers, Abu Zubaydah and Walid bin Attash also reported further 
mistreatment in Poland.276 A source close to the Polish investigation told Task Force staff  that 
“there is a scenario that I can accept, that [a detainee] was tortured by CIA people only in a 
closed room, and the Poles were outside and they did not know — but what the Poles did know 
is that he was held illegally.” 277 In September 2010, the Open Society Justice Initiative filed an 
application before the European Court of  Human Rights to open a suit against Poland for the 
mistreatment of  al-Nashiri while in Polish territory.278 Legal action for mistreatment has also 
been taken in Poland on behalf  of  Abu Zubaydah.279
The Polish government conducted an internal investigation when news reports surfaced naming 
Poland as a potential CIA black site, and concluded in November 2005 that there was no 
evidence of  secret detention facilities in Poland.280 During Foreign Minister Stefan Meller’s visit 
to Washington in 2005, the Polish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs asked to keep “in close contact” 
to coordinate their public stance on Poland’s involvement in the rendition program.281 Although 
Prime Minister Miller and former President Aleksander Kwasniewski were kept apprised of  the 
CIA facility, Miller continuously denied the existence of  the prison, saying that “democratic 
countries have a whole range of  other instruments which can be used very effectively in 
situations when they are under threat.” 282 
But things changed in March 2008 when the new Prime Minister Donald Tusk issued an 
order to the appellate prosecutor’s office in Warsaw, launching an official inquiry into the 
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role of  the Polish authorities in the rendition program. The investigation was 
unprecedented, given that the United States has resisted all attempts, domestic 
or international, to officially investigate the black sites, either in the form of  
detainee lawsuits or official inquiries.283 
The Polish investigation is aimed at identifying whether public officials abused 
their powers by allowing the establishment of  an extraterritorial zone under the 
control of  a foreign state’s jurisdiction.284 The prosecutor’s investigation, which 
is still pending, proceeded for four years largely in secret except for the granting 
of  “victim status” to al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, upon their application.285 
The granting of  victim status gave credence to al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah’s 
claims of  mistreatment on Polish territory, following the review of  the evidence 
in their applications by Jerzy Mierzewski, the first prosecutor heading the investigation, and 
then Waldemar Tyl, the second prosecutor.286 Receiving victim status also allowed lawyers for 
Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri full access to the public and classified portions of  the Polish 
prosecutor’s investigative files.287 The sudden removal of  Mierzewski as prosecutor in May 2011 
was reported to be connected to the publication of  a memo in which several Polish experts in 
international law provided Mierzewski with opinions on various questions of  law raised by the 
investigation. Sample questions and answers included:
Question: Whether there are any provisions of  public international law that allow 
exclusion of  an existing detention centre for persons suspected of  terrorist activities 
from jurisdiction of  the State in which such a centre has been set up, and if  so, which of  
those provisions are binding on the Republic of  Poland.
Answer: There are no such provisions. Setting up of  such a centre would violate the constitution and it 
would be a crime against the sovereignty of  the Republic of  Poland.
Question: In light of  public international law, what influence does the fact of  being 
detained [i.e. caught] outside a territory that is occupied, taken or that is a place of  
military activities has on the status of  a person suspected of  terrorist activities?
Answer: Such detention may be qualified as unlawful kidnapping.
Question: Whether regulations issued by the U.S. authorities concerning persons found 
to conduct terrorist activities and their practical application conform with the public 
humanitarian international law provisions ratified by Poland?
Answer: No. Those regulations are often in contradiction with international law and human rights.288 
Sources close to the Polish investigation, however, told Task Force staff  that Mierzewski 
was removed after he refused to follow orders on the running of  the investigation from a 
superior at the appellate prosecutor’s office, in what would constitute an illegal intervention.289 
Whatever the reason for Mierzewski’s removal, access to the investigative files for the victims’ 
lawyers was severely restricted by the new prosecutor, Waldemar Tyl, and human rights 
groups active in Poland suspected that former Prime Minster Miller, once again gaining 
power in Poland, used his influence to slow the investigation.290 Although the current 
prosecutors insisted to Task Force staff  that “it is not legal to refuse defense lawyers access 
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to evidence of  the case,” they later qualified that requests for access by the lawyers would be 
“postponed for further review” if  the requests “obstructed secret procedures.” 291 It was not 
explained how this qualification was consistent with the “full access” to which lawyers are 
legally entitled. 
In a broad interview with Task Force staff, Polish prosecutors Waldemar Tyl, Dariusz Korneluk 
and Szymon Liszewski stated that they believed that the investigation would be completed 
sometime in 2012.292 However, they noted that their attempts to request information from the 
United States for the investigation, pursuant to the Polish-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
had caused delays: “The first request was rejected [by DOJ in October 2010], and the reason 
given was the safety of  the state. As far as the second one is concerned we are still waiting for 
a response.” 293 The prosecutors said to Task Force staff  that the refusal of  the United States 
to provide any assistance to their inquiry made their task “difficult,” as dispositive information 
about the passengers on CIA planes would likely only be available from the United States. 294 
Despite this challenge, it was announced on February 11, 2012, that the investigation had 
been transferred from the appellate prosecutor’s office in Warsaw to the appellate prosecutor’s 
office in Krakow.295 An indictment filed against Zbigniew Siemiatkowski (former head of  Polish 
intelligence) became public on March 27, 2012, and although the file had been transferred 
to Krakow soon after the indictment was filed, detainee lawyers were able to meet with the 
new prosecutors shortly afterwards.296 According to Siemiatkowski, the indictment included 
allegations of  violating international law by “unlawfully depriving prisoners of  their liberty” 
and allowing corporal punishment in connection with the site at Stare Kiejkuty.297 Charges 
were reportedly being considered against Siemiatkowski’s deputy, Colonel Andrzej Derlatka, 
and former Prime Minister Leszek Miller, and in May 2012 former President Kwasniewski 
commented that “[o]f  course, everything went on behind my back” despite records of  
conversations showing that he and Miller were well informed about the site.298 In response to a 
question about U.S.-Polish relations following the indictment, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said, 
“Poland is the political victim of  the indiscretion of  some members of  the U.S. administration 
a few years ago. … [We will] no longer be a country where politicians — even if  they are 
working arm-in-arm with the world’s greatest superpower — could make some deal somewhere 
under the table and then it would never see daylight.” In February 2013, however, a major 
Polish newspaper announced that the charges against Siemiatkowski would be dropped by the 
Krakow prosecutors, despite charges reportedly having been drawn up against him. At the time, 
prosecutors declined to comment.299 
Romania
The existence of  a black site in Romania was reported in November 2005 by Human 
Rights Watch, at the same time of  the revelation of  the site in Poland.300 After two years of  
investigation, the 2007 Council of  Europe report announced that there was sufficient “evidence 
to state that secret detention facilities run by the CIA did exist in Europe from 2003 to 2005, in 
particular in Poland and Romania.” 301 Multiple sets of  flight data, including those contained 
in the Richmor documents, show the landing of  CIA-contracted flights in Bucharest.302 
Additionally, documents issued by Poland’s Border Guard Office in July 2010 show at least one 
flight from Szymany airport to Romania on September 22, 2003, carrying five passengers upon 
departure after the plane had arrived at Szymany without passengers.303 
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In response to the release of  the flight data, the Romanian government acknowledged that 
planes leased by the CIA landed in Bucharest, but denied that the planes transferred detainees 
or that Romania hosted a black site.304 A 2006 inquiry by the Romanian senate found that 
the allegations regarding a black site in Bucharest were “unfounded,” although no other 
information regarding the inquiry was made public.305 Indeed, Romanian authorities indicated 
to Swiss senator Marty during the Council of  Europe investigation that “CIA activities [in 
Romania] now fall unambiguously under the secrecy regime instituted under the NATO 
Security Policy.” 306 Marty also noted that “[a]s in several other Eastern European countries 
who adopted more stringent secrecy policies as part of  their NATO accession, Romania’s 
legislation on classified information was expedited through Parliament and criticised by civil 
society for being unbalanced.” 307 Beyond abbreviated statements and provision of  select flight 
data to the Council of  Europe and the media, Romania’s official position on the black site 
has remained a “sweeping, categorical denial of  all the allegations, in the process overlooking 
extensive evidence to the contrary from valuable and credible sources.” 308 This position stands 
in contrast to the official investigations undertaken by prosecutors in Poland and Lithuania, and 
is much more similar to the position taken by the United States on the subject. 
According to the Council of  Europe report, a select group of  Romanian officials (including, 
President Ion Iliescu, Minister of  National Defense Ioan Talpes, and Head of  Military Intelligence 
Sergiu Tudor Medar) were involved in the CIA collaboration, thereby “short-circuit[ing] the classic 
mechanisms of  democratic accountability.” 309 The collaboration was “withheld” from Romania’s 
Supreme Council of  National Defense and civilian intelligence agencies, as well as “senior figures in 
the Army.” 310 The Council of  Europe also noted that according to sources, the majority of  detainees 
brought to Romania were extracted “from the theater of  conflict,” referring to transfers from 
Afghanistan and Iraq.311 This allegation is supported by the 2007 Swiss intelligence cable stating 
Egyptian counterparts had unequivocally confirmed that there were 23 Iraqi and Afghan detainees 
being held for interrogation at a CIA facility in Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base.312 
By the latter account, it is likely that detainees were interrogated at Mihail Kogalniceanu in 
addition to a separate detention facility. In 2009, The New York Times published an account of  
former CIA agent Kyle “Dusty” Foggo’s role in the building of  three black sites, including “a 
renovated building on a busy street in Bucharest, Romania.” 313 The paper quoted sources 
saying that the sites “were designed to appear identical,” and Foggo relied on contractors to 
provide “toilets, plumbing equipment, stereos, video games, bedding, night vision goggles, 
earplugs and wrap-around sunglasses” to equip the sites.314 
In December 2011, a joint investigation by the Associated Press and German media outlet 
ARD Panorama claimed to have located the black site in Bucharest.315 Former intelligence 
officials reportedly “described the location of  the prison and identified pictures of  the 
building,” which was used as the headquarters of  ORNISS — the National Registry 
Office for Classified Information, where secret Romanian, NATO and EU information 
is stored.316 The building itself  is on a residential street in Bucharest, where CIA officials 
shuttled detainees in vans after arrival in Bucharest.317 The report asserted that the prison, 
code-named “Bright Light,” opened in the fall of  2003, after the Polish facility was closed, 
and that “[t]he basement consisted of  six prefabricated cells, each with a clock and arrow 
pointing to Mecca. … The cells were on springs, keeping them slightly off  balance and 
causing disorientation among some detainees.318 Former officials further confirmed that in the 
first month of  detention, detainees “endured sleep deprivation and were doused with water, 
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slapped or forced to stand in painful positions.” 319 The Romanian government dismissed the 
AP report, and all details contained therein, as “pure speculation.” 320
The identities of  detainees held in Romania have not been confirmed, but they are reported 
to have included Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid bin Attash, Ramzi bin al Shibh, Abd 
al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi.321 Disappointingly, the European Parliament Civil 
Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee’s current renewal of  its 2007 investigation has 
not encouraged Romania toward limited information disclosure or more thorough internal 
inquiries. Tasked with debating the text of  the new European Parliament report in July 2012, 
Romanian MEPs proposed numerous amendments to the report, including the proposed 
deletion of  a call for Romania to undertake an independent inquiry.322 The Romanian MEPs 
also criticized the report for a lack of  judicial evidence, despite the fact that they have steadfastly 
refused to undertake any judicial process by which such evidence could be uncovered.323
Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of  Europe’s commissioner for human rights, submitted a 
confidential memorandum to the prosecutor-general of  Romania in March 2012 (made public 
in December 2012) that detailed his findings regarding the Romanian black site.324 In his memo, 
Hammarberg named the September 22, 2003, flight from Poland as the first rendition that opened 
the Romanian black site.325 He also provided details on the practice of  filing “dummy” flight plans 
as “part of  a system of  cover-up frequently used in relation to CIA flights,” saying that the CIA’s 
contractor, Jeppesen International Trip Planning, had deliberately avoided listing Bucharest as 
an express destination. 326 Hammarberg expressed his concern that the HVDs held in Romania 
were likely subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques” that might “have ramifications for 
compliance with the [European Convention on Human Rights], including the use of  blindfolding 
or hooding, forced shaving of  hair, indefinite periods of  incommunicado solitary confinement, 
continuous white noise, continuous illumination using powerful light bulbs, and continuous use of  
leg shackles (in some instances for 24 hours a day).” 327 He concluded that 
sufficient evidence has now been amassed to allow us to consider the existence of  a CIA 
Black Site in Romania as a proven fact, and to affirm that serious human rights abuses 
took place there. … In order to fulfil Romania’s positive obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, I believe it is now imperative that the Romanian 
authorities conduct a prosecutorial investigation capable of  leading to the identification 
and punishment of  those responsible, whoever they might be.328
In August 2012, the Open Society Justice Initiative filed an application on behalf  of  al-Nashiri 
before the European Court of  Human Rights (ECHR), collecting flight data on renditions to 
and from Romania from the Richmor documents and Eurocontrol (the European Organisation 
for the Safety of  Air Navigation).329 If  the application is accepted (a similar application against 
Poland was accepted by the ECHR in June 2012), Romania may be compelled to produce 
further information about Bright Light and the detainees held there.
Lithuania
In 2009, it was reported for the first time by ABC News that Lithuania had provided at least 
one secret prison (disguised as a riding school) for the CIA to detain and interrogate up to 
eight HVDs.330 The report included details regarding flights from Afghanistan to Vilnius, and 
stated that Lithuania was likely the last black site to be opened in Eastern Europe, after the 
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closure of  the Polish site in late 2003 or early 2004.331 The Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) 
immediately undertook an investigation into the allegations, which was closely followed by the 
U.S. government.332 Correspondence from the U.S. embassy in Lithuania, from 2010, commented 
that “many thought” the investigation was “ill-advised.” 333 Additionally, after President Dalia 
Grybauskaite called “for more accountability” on the secret prisons, the U.S. embassy commented 
that “[s]he did not seem to be aware of  how this could affect relations with the U.S.” 334 
Headed by Arvydas Anusauskas, chairman of  the Committee on National Security and Defense 
(CNSD), the CNSD held a number of  hearings at which 55 former and current officials with 
potential knowledge of  the CIA program were interviewed.335 Former director general of  the state 
security department, Me ys Laurinkus and his deputy Dainius Dabašinskas, admitted to knowledge 
of  the program.336 Additionally, Laurinkus discussed the receipt of  the proposal from the United 
States, and recounted his consultation with then-President Rolandas Paksas on the matter.337 All 
other former officials, including Paksas, denied any knowledge of  the CIA program.338
Even without the cooperation of  most government officials, the conclusions of  the CNSD 
were startling. On the question of  whether CIA detainees were subject to transportation and 
confinement in Lithuania, the CNSD found that it was impossible to establish whether detainees 
were brought into Lithuania; however, “conditions for such transportation did exist.” 339 The 
CNSD highlighted several CIA-related flights to Lithuania that had not been reported to the 
Council of  Europe in their inquiry, including three flights for which no customs inspections were 
carried out.340 In fact, the state border guard security was prevented from making inspections 
by the State Security Department (SSD) — it was found “that oral arrangements had been 
made [by the SSD] with representatives of  the airport and aviation security.” 341 ABC News also 
reported that the CIA submitted false flight plans to European aviation authorities, similar to 
the practice in Poland. “Planes flying into and out of  Lithuania, for example, were ordered to 
submit paperwork that said they would be landing in nearby countries, despite actually landing 
in Vilnius. … Finland and Poland were used most frequently as false destinations.” 342 
Jonas Markevicius, President Grybauskaite’s special advisor on national security, confirmed 
to Task Force staff  that after the reports of  the secret facilities surfaced, the president had 
been concerned “about the ability of  special services to manipulate gaps in the law.” 343 These 
concerns were validated, he said, when the CNSD found that “flights had avoided border 
guard inspectors.” 344 At the time, “there was no procedure of  scrutinizing SSD actions,” and 
Markevicius insisted that there would have been “no way to authorize the action, [which] was 
illegal from the beginning.” 345 This lack of  formal review over the SSD decision to cooperate with 
the CIA also concerned Anusauskas, who told Task Force staff: “There were gaps and problems 
in intelligence control … and high level accountability. The previous intelligence laws allowed 
agencies to act independently, and information provided to the political authorities was simply not 
sufficient.” 346 Meanwhile, embassy correspondence showed the United States’ continued alarm at 
Grybauskaite’s forthright public comments on her suspicions that detention facilities existed: 
Rather than help quiet a story that does not reflect favorably on Lithuania, her 
comments instead have suggested that there may be a kernel of  truth to the allega-
tion, and have reignited a parliamentary investigation that in the end likely will re-
sult in another inconclusive finding. … The president’s comments are all the more 
puzzling given her concerns about Russian influence in the Lithuanian media, as 
the story tends to cast doubt on the strength of  the U.S.-Lithuanian relationship. 347 
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Grybauskaite’s comments may have been particularly troubling to U.S. officials, given that CIA 
officials spoke highly of  their Lithuanian counterparts. “We didn’t have to [offer any incentives 
to be allowed to establish a facility.] … They were happy to have our ear.” 348 Lithuania had also 
joined NATO in April 2004, along with Romania.349
The CNSD was similarly candid about the existence of  secret CIA detention sites in Lithuania, 
establishing that “the SSD had received a request from the partners to equip facilities in Lithuania 
suitable for holding detainees, and that “in the course of  the project, facilities suitable for holding 
detainees were equipped, taking account of  the requests and conditions set out by the partners.” 350 
The CIA detention program in Lithuania began with use of  a facility named “Project No. 1” in 
or near Vilnius in 2002.351 The CNSD also outlined the launch of  a second facility in Antaviliai, 
named “Project No. 2,” and situated in a former riding school.352 Although the CNSD could find no 
evidence in their final report that any detainees were actually held in either facility, Project No. 2 has 
received the most scrutiny, and much more is known about its provenance.
According to the former owner of  the riding school, he responded to an ad looking for land, which 
had been posted on the Internet by the U.S. embassy in Vilnius.353 The land was actually bought 
by Elite LLC, an apparent CIA shell company, on March 5, 2004.354 Elite was incorporated on 
July 9, 2003.355 Its initial member was Star Group Finance and Holdings, Inc. (Panama) and its 
initial registered agent was the Federal Research Corporation of  Washington, D.C. Elite LLC had 
vested power of  attorney in a purported Lithuanian national by the name of  Valdas Vitkauskas.356 
However, according to Lithuanian reporter Egle Digryte, journalists attempting to look for 
Vitkauskas found that he had no Social Security number and had paid no taxes as of  2006.357 
Moreover, the address listed for him was a student dormitory where the exasperated guard told 
Digryte that “no one by that name” had ever lived there, and that she “wasn’t the first” to look for 
him there. 
After the purchase of  the riding school by Elite Corp for two million litas (roughly $700,000), 
the former owner said that he continued to “work with the Americans” for about a year on 
changing the electricity to make it U.S.-compatible.358 This comports with the ABC News 
report, which describes the renovated facility as being composed of
“ ‘prefabricated pods’ to house prisoners, each separated from the other by five 
or six feet. Each pod included a shower, a bed and a toilet. Separate cells were 
constructed for interrogations. ... All the electrical outlets in the renovated struc-
ture were 110 volts, meaning they were designed for American appliances.” 359
According to the CNSD, the layout and operation of  the facility “allowed for the performance 
of  actions by officers of  the partners [CIA] without the control of  the SSD and use of  the 
infrastructure at their discretion.” 360 
The final question addressed by the CNSD was whether the Lithuanian state institutions considered the 
activities of  the CIA relating to secret detention on Lithuanian territory.361 The CNSD found that “Me ys 
Laurinkus, [Lithuanian military commander] Arvydas Pocius, [and] Dainius Dabašinskas, had knowledge 
of  Project No. 2 at the time of  launching and running thereof.” 362 However, there was no evidence that 
Paksas or President Valdas Adamkus were informed about the specific operations at Project No. 2.363 
The CNSD concluded their report with the proposal to refer the question of  charges (misuse 
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of  office or abuse of  power) against Laurinkus, Pocius, and Dabašinskas to the prosecutor 
general’s office, along with recommendations to strengthen oversight of  the SSD.364 According 
to Lithuanian officials, those recommendations have been fully implemented. Anusauskas 
provided details of  reforms including “procedures whereby intelligence needs are formulated by 
the political power, rather than the SSD;” the creation of  an “Intelligence Coordination Group” 
under presidential authority; and a new draft law on intelligence to improve parliamentary 
control over the SSD.365 However, Anusauskas admitted that the “classification of  information 
led to the conclusion of  ‘no evidence’ that detainees had been held in Lithuania.” 366 Similar to 
the Polish inquiry, Anusauskas confirmed that the CNSD “had asked the USG for information 
through diplomatic channels, but received an answer of  ‘no comment.’ ” 367 
The release of  the CNSD report caused a political flurry in Lithuania. Laurinkus, who was 
then serving as ambassador to Georgia, was recalled by President Grybauskaite.368 Foreign 
Minister Vygaudas Usackas resigned in January 2010 after Grybauskaite publicly declared her 
mistrust of  him.369 While Grybauskaite stated that the CNSD report supported her suspicions 
that detention facilities had existed in Lithuania, Usackas contradicted this interpretation, 
emphasizing that “conclusions of  the commission show that they haven’t found any facts 
which would prove that Lithuanian territory was used for any kind of  detention contrary to 
international obligations.” 370 Usackas was ambassador to the United States from 2001 to 2006, 
when the alleged negotiations and operations of  the sites in Lithuania took place. However, he 
asserted that “[t]he facts announced by [news reports] came from a time when I was not foreign 
minister. I had no clue about it.” 371
Following the referral from the CNSD, the prosecutor general’s office opened a criminal inquiry 
in January 2010, regarding whether SSD officials had colluded with the CIA in the rendition 
program.372 Irmantas Mikelionis, of  the Organized Crime and Corruption Investigation 
Unit of  the prosecutor general’s office, stated that compared to the CNSD investigation, 
prosecutors had “access to [a] larger amount of  documents and materials, they interviewed 
many individuals with access to classified information, and so they could reach a more objective 
decision.” 373 During the prosecutor general’s investigation, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of  Torture (CPT), a treaty-monitoring body, requested and was granted access to 
the two purported detention sites.374 The CPT report confirms many of  the details provided by 
ABC News and the Seimas Report, including that Project No. 1 “consisted of  a small, single-
storey, detached building located in a residential area in the centre of  Vilnius,” while Project No. 
2 was located 20 kilometers outside of  Vilnius.375 
Despite the CPT’s findings, as well as the 2010 publication of  the U.N. Report on Secret 
Detentions (which also found that Lithuania had participated in the CIA rendition program), the 
prosecutor general’s office concluded its inquiry in January 2011, citing a lack of  information. 
This was explained in 2012 remarks by President Grybauskaite, who said that 
“the legal investigation, no doubt, stalled due to the fact that we did not receive 
additional information from the United States. … What concerns prosecutors 
and other investigators [is that] we had no access to full information due to the 
other country’s refusal to provide it.” 376
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In the hope that the investigation would be reopened, further information was provided to the 
prosecutor general’s office in September 2011, by NGOs Amnesty International and Reprieve. 
The Amnesty International report outlined new flight data for CIA flights landing in Vilnius and 
further evidence linking Abu Zubaydah to the Vilnius detention site. In particular, the organiza-
tions presented flight data showing that Abu Zubaydah was rendered from Morocco to Lithuania 
on a Boeing 737 in February 2005 — evidence that had been previously unavailable.377 The pros-
ecutor general spent several weeks considering the possibility of  reopening the investigation, but 
ultimately declined to do so, initially offering no public explanation for the decision. 
Deputy Prosecutor General Darius Raulušaitis attempted to explain the refusal in an interview 
with Task Force staff, stating that by the date of  Abu Zubaydah’s alleged flight to Lithuania in 
February 2005, “there were no conditions to keep individuals in the facility — they had been 
removed.” 378 This assertion is at odds with statements by CIA officials and flight data showing 
CIA-related flights into Lithuania from 2004 until at least March 2006.379 He added that the 
“conditions” were “not particularly meant for detention — it was not necessarily a jail.” Mikelionis 
agreed, saying that the facility “could just as well have been meant to hold valuables.” 380 
Citing state secrets, neither Raulušaitis nor Mikelionis could provide any further details on 
the investigation, including the number of  individuals interviewed, the number of  documents 
examined, and the completion of  any forensic tests. 
Both Mikelionis and Raulušaitis did, however, insist strongly to Task Force staff  that following 
their “exhaustive” investigation, they came to the “categorical conclusion that no persons have 
been secretly detained in the Republic of  Lithuania.” 381 When asked how such a conclusion 
could be proven, Raulušaitis stated that after “all necessary procedural inquiries … the officers 
made a categorical conclusion that no person who’d been secretly transported had been 
detained in the secret sites indicated in the CNSD report, nor in any other possible sites.” 382 The 
prosecutors refined this statement in a later clarification, saying, “It is more accurate to say: there 
is no evidence that any persons were secretly detained in Lithuania.” However, they once again 
made the “categorical” assertion to representatives of  the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties 
Committee in April 2012, that they had proven that “no detainees have been detained in the 
facilities of  Projects No. 1 or No. 2 in Lithuania.” 383 
The divergent voices within the Lithuanian government — from Grybauskaite to Anusauskas 
and Raulušaitis — on the subject of  alleged CIA sites have kept the debate in the headlines. 
In its 2012 report, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee found that “the 
layout of  [Project No. 2] and installations inside appears to be compatible with the detention 
of  prisoners,” and called for “the Lithuanian authorities to honour their commitment to 
reopen the criminal investigation into Lithuania’s involvement in the CIA programme if  new 
information should come to light, in view of  new evidence provided by the Eurocontrol [flight] 
data.” 384 In addition, the filing of  an application against Lithuania before the European Court 
of  Human Rights by lawyers for Abu Zubaydah may yield the disclosure of  further evidence or 
new detainee names associated with the two detention sites.385 
Morocco
Flight records and reports from CIA officials have indicated that a prison near Rabat, Morocco, 
was used as a proxy detention site for detainees including Ramzi bin al Shibh, Binyam 
Mohammed, and Abou Elkassim Britel.386 Both Mohammed and Britel appear to have been 
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brutally tortured in Moroccan custody. Britel, an Italian citizen of  Moroccan origin, was captured 
in Pakistan in March 2002, and rendered by the CIA to Morocco two months later.387 Britel 
was imprisoned in Morocco until February 2003, when he was briefly released.388 During his 
imprisonment, Britel claims to have been repeatedly beaten as well as subjected to a Moroccan 
interrogation technique known as “bottle torture,” whereby a bottle is forced into the anus of  
a prisoner.389 Britel was released without charge in February 2003, but was re-arrested in May 
2003 while he was traveling back to Italy, on suspicion of  involvement in the recent Casablanca 
bombings.390 Britel claims that he was once again held in inhumane conditions and forced to sign 
a confession that he had not read. After a trial that failed to comport with international fair-
trial standards, Britel was sentenced to 15 years in prison, which was reduced to nine years after 
appeal.391 In 2006, a six-year long Italian criminal investigation into Britel (which was influential 
in the Moroccan charges) was dismissed for a lack of  any evidence of  criminal or terrorist activity 
by Britel.392 Britel was finally released from Morocco in April 2011, and returned to Italy.393 While 
imprisoned, he was a plaintiff  in the lawsuit filed by several detainees against aviation company 
Jeppesen Dataplan, which organized his flight to Morocco in 2002.394
Bin al Shibh and Mohammed were also held in Morocco between 2002 and 2003.395 It has been 
reported that the CIA began building its own prison in Morocco, similar to the black sites, in 
2003, but it is unclear whether the prison was completed or if  detainees were held there.396
Kosovo
In 2005, allegations surfaced in Europe that the United States was using a NATO military base 
in Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel) for secret detentions related to the “War on Terror.” 397 Alvaro 
Gil-Robles, the human rights commissioner for the Council of  Europe, visited Camp Bondsteel 
in September 2002. He described the prisoners’ situation as similar to Guantánamo Bay: “Each 
prisoner hut was surrounded with barbed wire, and guards were patrolling between them. 
Around all of  this was a high wall with watchtowers.” 398 At the time, the camp was under the 
control of  NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops, and Gil-Robles described the prisoners as 
“Kosovo Albanians or Serbs, and there were four or five North Africans. Some of  them wore 
beards and read the Koran.” 399
These details were partially supported by the periodic review of  the Kosovo criminal justice 
system by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) covering March 
2002 through April 2003.400 The report states that the OSCE was concerned with arrests made 
by KFOR in September 2002 and again in March 2003 and noted that some of  the detentions 
breached international human rights standards. The OSCE was “particularly concerned 
about the treatment of  five Algerian nationals, three of  whom were detained for more than 30 
days.” 401 When the OSCE interviewed the five Algerian detainees, they were informed “that 
the line of  interrogation had little to do with security issues in Kosovo and was more related to 
their possible connections to Islamic activists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Algeria, or the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network. If  true, this could be contrary to KFOR’s own Directive 42, which states that 
“the fact that a person may have information of  intelligence value by itself  is not a basis for 
detention.” 402 The fact that the OSCE had some degree of  access to the detainees, however, 
suggests that they were not necessarily being held by the CIA at the time.403 
In 2005 and 2006, the Council of  Europe’s Committee on the Prevention of  Torture submitted 
seven requests for information to NATO on the detentions at Camp Bondsteel, but failed 
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to receive any response.404 Before the 2006 and 2007 Council of  Europe reports on secret 
detention were released, the Council’s secretary-general, Terry Davis, threatened to “go 
public” about the secret detentions at Camp Bondsteel if  NATO failed to cooperate with the 
investigation.405 The 2006 report described Kosovo as a “black hole” for the investigation, and 
stated that “[the lack of  cooperation] is frankly intolerable, considering that the international 
intervention in this region was meant to restore order and lawfulness.” 406 The report also 
cited the 2005 Swiss intelligence cable intercepted from Egyptian intelligence, which appeared 
to confirm that there was a secret interrogation center in Kosovo, in addition to Mauritania, 
Ukraine, Macedonia and Bulgaria.407 There is no further information about the latter three 
sites. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Abdullah Mohammed Omar al-Tawaty and Saleh Hadiyah Abu 
Abdallah Di’iki (also Libyan nationals) were reportedly held in Mauritania, with Di’iki being 
initially arrested in Mauritania and allegedly interrogated by both Mauritanian and American 
officials before being transferred to Morocco and Afghanistan.408
Djibouti
Limited information exists about the use of  Djibouti, on the Horn of  Africa, by the CIA, but 
it has been reported that Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. naval base, was used for interrogations of  
several detainees, including Mohammed al-Asad, Suleiman Abdallah [see “Somalia,” below], 
Gouled Hussein Dourad, Mohammed Ali Issa, and Abdulmalik Mohammed.409 Al-Asad is the 
only known detainee to have identified Djibouti as the site of  one of  his prisons.410 After his 
arrest in Tanzania in 2003, al-Asad claims that he was flown to Djibouti and placed in a small 
cell in a prison with a photograph of  Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh on a wall.411 
Al-Asad stated that a guard also told him that he was being held in Djibouti, and al-Asad’s 
father was given the same information by Tanzanian authorities.412 During their investigation, 
U.N. officials received information “proving that [al-Asad] had been transferred by Tanzanian 
officials by plane to Djibouti on 27 December 2003.” 413
During his detention in Djibouti, al-Asad claims to have been interrogated by a white English-
speaking woman identifying herself  as American.414 Al-Asad said he was held for two weeks 
in the prison, without being given a change of  clothes, before being taken to an airport where 
his clothes were torn off  and he was assaulted by a team of  “black-clad men masked with 
balaclavas” — a description that applies to the CIA “Rendition Group.” 415 
Flight records from the Richmor legal documents show numerous CIA-contracted flights to 
Djibouti from Egypt, Afghanistan and Cyprus in 2003 and 2004.416 In 2005, General John 
Abizaid (then commander of  U.S. Central Command), commented before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that “Djibouti has given extraordinary support for U.S. military basing, 
training, and counter-terrorism operations.” 417 
In January 2013, it was reported that three European men (two from Sweden and one from 
the UK) with Somali backgrounds had been arrested in August 2012 while traveling through 
Djibouti.418 Accused of  supporting extremist group Al Shabab, the men were first interrogated 
by U.S. agents in Djibouti for several months before being secretly indicted by a federal grand 
jury and flown to the United States to stand trial.419 They appeared in a New York courtroom 
for the first time on December 21, 2012.420 This case bears greater resemblance to traditional 
renditions conducted pre–September 11, in which suspects captured overseas (with or without 
cooperation from the host government) were transferred to the United States to stand trial. 
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Although due process concerns remain, there are no reported allegations of  
mistreatment of  the three men aside from extended secret detention.421
Somalia
In July 2011, after an extensive investigation on the ground in Mogadishu, Jeremy 
Scahill of  The Nation published new information about alleged CIA counterterrorism 
operations in Somalia. These operations including a training center for Somali 
intelligence agents and operatives at Mogadishu’s international airport, composed 
of  “more than a dozen buildings behind large protective walls and secured by guard towers … 
[containing] eight large metal hangars” with CIA aircraft.422 The training center is said to have 
been completed in spring 2011.423 According to Somali counterterrorism officials and other 
operatives interviewed by Scahill, the CIA also presently uses a secret prison in the Somali 
National Security Agency headquarters to hold terror suspects and those with ties to Al Shabab.424 
Similar to the closed black sites, the prison is staffed by Somali guards, but CIA officials pay the 
salaries of  the officials and “directly interrogate” detainees, who include individuals rendered from 
Kenya to Mogadishu by the CIA.425 The prison 
consists of  a long corridor lined with filthy small cells infested with bedbugs and 
mosquitoes. One said that when he arrived in February, he saw two white men wearing 
military boots, combat trousers, gray tucked-in shirts and black sunglasses. The former 
prisoners described the cells as windowless and the air thick, moist and disgusting. 
Prisoners, they said, are not allowed outside. Many have developed rashes and scratch 
themselves incessantly. Some have been detained for a year or more. According to 
one former prisoner, inmates who had been there for long periods would pace around 
constantly, while others leaned against walls rocking.426
The existence of  both sites was confirmed by a U.S. official, who stated that “[i]t makes 
complete sense to have a strong counterterrorism partnership” with the Somali government.427 
One of  the alleged inmates of  the prison was Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, a Kenyan citizen 
suspected of  involvement with Al Qaeda in East Africa, who was captured in Nairobi in 2009 
and “disappeared” for nearly two years.428 The Kenyan government denied any knowledge 
of  his whereabouts.429 In 2011, a man who had been released from the Mogadishu prison 
described being imprisoned with Hassan, who told him that he had been tied up and flown 
to Mogadishu (which he recognized by the smell of  the sea), and interrogated by Somalis and 
“white men” constantly after his arrival.430 Hassan’s lawyers in Kenya (hired by his family after 
his disappearance) plan to file a habeas petition in order to compel the production of  information 
about Hassan’s whereabouts and reasons for detention.431 According to Scahill, a U.S. official 
denied that Hassan had been rendered by the CIA, but acknowledged that the U.S. was 
involved in his capture and detention, implying that the Mogadishu prison is being used as a 
proxy detention site rather than a traditional black site. 
In June 2012, a report by investigator Clara Gutteridge detailed how a Tanzanian national, 
Suleiman Abdallah, had been captured in Mogadishu in 2003 by a warlord and transferred 
to American custody, after which he was rendered through Kenya and Djibouti. Abdallah was 
imprisoned for five years at U.S. prisons in Afghanistan, including the Dark Prison and Bagram. 
The reasons for his detention were not clear; one report by a Kenyan minister claimed that 
Abdallah was being extradited to the United States for charges related to the 1998 embassy 
“Somali warlords 
would send 
captured locals to 
the CIA for cash 
payments.”
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bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but he never arrived in the United States. Gutteridge 
described how Abdallah was essentially “disappeared”; his name “appeared in the margins of  
a confession barred by a Kenyan court in 2005 for having been obtained through torture.” 432 
Abdallah was released from Bagram in 2008 without explanation for either his detention or his 
release.433 However, one possible explanation, as Gutteridge explains, was the bounty system 
(similar to that in Afghanistan) that developed in Somalia in 2002, whereby Somali warlords 
would send captured locals to the CIA for cash payments.434 Both Abdallah and Hassan’s stories 
appear to confirm that CIA operations in Somalia include both proxy detention and rendition. 
Legal and Political Consequences of the 
Rendition Program
The extraordinary rendition program has triggered a number of  lawsuits in the United States 
and abroad, along with investigations and official inquiries that continue more than six years 
after the black sites were allegedly closed. 
 • Former detainees Khaled El-Masri and Maher Arar filed lawsuits in U.S. district court against, 
respectively, George Tenet (former director of  the CIA) and John Ashcroft (former attorney 
general), alleging violations of  U.S. and international laws in connection with their renditions 
and torture. Both cases were eventually dismissed by judges after the U.S. government argued 
that adjudicating the cases would compromise state secrets.435 However, Arar received an 
apology by Democratic and Republican members of  the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties for his treatment and the fact that he was 
barred from entering the United States to testify before the committee in person.436
 • Former detainees Binyam Mohammed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Ahmed Agiza, Mohamed 
Bashmilah, and Bisher al-Rawi filed a lawsuit in 2007 in U.S. district court against 
Jeppesen Dataplan, a Boeing subsidiary, alleging knowing participation in the CIA 
detainee transfers to potential torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.437 In 
earlier media reports, a Jeppesen employee recalled that “Bob Overby, the managing 
director of  Jeppesen International Trip Planning, said, “We do all of  the extraordinary 
rendition flights — you know, the torture flights. Let’s face it, some of  these flights end up 
that way.” 438 The lawsuit was eventually dismissed after the U.S. government intervened 
and asserted the state-secrets privilege.439
 • Lawyers for El-Masri also filed an application against the United States in 2009 before the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights alleging violations of  the American Declaration of  
the Rights and Duties of  Man, including kidnapping and torture. The United States never 
responded to the application.440 
 • In 2009, after a three-year trial, an Italian court convicted 23 U.S. citizens (22 alleged 
CIA agents and one U.S. Air Force officer) for their roles in the rendition and subsequent 
torture of  Abu Omar.441 The agents, who were all tried in absentia, included former CIA 
Milan chief  Robert Lady, despite attempts by at least one defendant to halt the prosecution 
via invocation of  diplomatic immunity.442 Lady was sentenced to seven years in prison, 
while the remaining agents were sentenced to five years each.443 All 23 individuals are 
now considered fugitives under Italian law.444 To pay the €1.5 million (approximately $2 
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million) in damages awards to Abu Omar, Lady’s property in Italy was seized. In February 
2013, a Milan appeals court vacated acquittals (previously based on diplomatic immunity) 
for three U.S. citizens in the same case, including the former CIA station chief  in Rome, 
Jeffrey Castelli, and instead convicted them in absentia. Castelli was sentenced to seven years, 
and the other two officials were sentenced to six years each. On February 12, 2013, Italy’s 
former military intelligence chief  Nicolas Pollari and his deputy, Marco Mancini, were both 
sentenced to 10 years and nine years in prison, respectively, for their roles in the Abu Omar 
rendition. Unlike the CIA officials convicted in absentia, Pollari and Mancini will serve their 
sentences in Italy if  they lose the appeals process. 445
 • Four applications have been filed in the European Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) on 
behalf  of  Khaled El-Masri (against Macedonia), Abu Zubaydah (against Lithuania), and 
al-Nashiri (against Poland and Romania), alleging violations of  the European Convention 
on Human Rights, including the prohibition of  torture/CID and the right to liberty and 
security of  person.446 El-Masri’s application was accepted by the ECHR, and arguments 
were heard on May 16, 2012. On December 13, 2012, the ECHR ruled in favor of  
El-Masri, finding that El-Masri was subjected to techniques amounting to torture by 
the CIA following his capture in Skopje, and that Macedonia bore responsibility for El-
Masri’s rendition to Afghanistan and treatment over his entire period of  detention in 
Macedonia and Afghanistan.447 El-Masri was also awarded €60,000 (roughly $80,000) in 
compensation, to be paid by the government of  Macedonia. The ruling was viewed as an 
historic judgment, and U.N. special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Ben 
Emmerson, described it as “a key milestone in the long struggle to secure accountability of  
public officials implicated in human rights violations committed by the Bush administration 
CIA in its policy of  secret detention, rendition and torture.” 448
 • In 2010, the U.K. government came to a settlement worth “millions” of  pounds in a lawsuit 
filed by a dozen former detainees, including Binyam Mohammed, Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil 
el-Banna, Richard Belmar, Omar Deghayes, and Martin Mubanga.449 The suit alleged the 
complicity of  MI-5 and MI-6 in interrogation and torture prior to the claimants’ detention 
at Guantánamo Bay.450 In contrast to the U.S. lawsuits, the U.K. Court of  Appeals ruled 
that the government could not assert state secrets or use secret evidence in its defense, ruling 
that “allegations of  wrongdoing had to be heard in public.” 451 Additionally, the British 
Crown Prosecution Service is currently investigating whether MI-6 and its former head 
were involved in the rendition of  Abdel Hakim Belhadj to Libya, and Belhadj has filed a 
lawsuit on the issue against former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and MI-6.452 
 • On December 13, 2012, it was announced that the U.K. government had paid £2.2 
million (approximately $3.55 million) to Libyan national Sami Al Saadi [see Chapter 8, 
on Consequences] to settle his legal claims over MI-6’s involvement in his rendition to 
Libya and subsequent torture in 2004.453 The U.K. government admitted no liability in 
the settlement, although Al Saadi commented that “I started this process believing that a 
British trial would get to the truth in my case. But today, with the government trying to push 
through secret courts, I feel that to proceed is not best for my family. I went through a secret 
trial once before, in Gaddafi’s Libya. In many ways, it was as bad as the torture. It is not an 
experience I care to repeat.” Also in December 2012, it was reported that Al Saadi had filed 
a lawsuit against the Hong Kong government for its involvement in his rendition. That case 
is currently pending.454 
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 • An All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (APPG), headed by 
Conservative MP Andrew Tyrie, has held hearings since 2006 on the U.K.’s involvement 
in the extraordinary rendition program. The APPG issued a report in 2011 titled “Account 
Rendered,” which summarized their conclusions that “Britain was drawn into” the 
extraordinary rendition program and “mixed up in wrongdoing.” 455 The APPG also 
continues to push for an official government inquiry, following the very brief  existence 
of  the Gibson Inquiry in 2011 whose credibility was questioned by NGOs, and which 
ultimately could not proceed at the same time as the government investigation into 
Belhadj’s allegations.456
 • The 2007 annual report of  the U.K. House of  Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee 
examined the torture and CID allegation in connection with the rendition program, as 
well as purported U.K. involvement in the program. The committee concluded that “the 
Government has a moral and legal obligation to ensure that flights that enter U.K. airspace 
or land at U.K. airports are not part of  the ‘rendition circuit,’ ” and that “given the clear 
differences in definition, the U.K. can no longer rely on U.S. assurances that it does not use 
torture.” 457 
 • In December 2009, lawyers for Mohammed al-Asad filed suit against Djibouti before the 
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, alleging Djibouti’s complicity in 
al-Asad’s rendition and abuse.458 The Commission has taken preliminary steps to accept 
the case, although it remains to be seen whether the case will progress. This suit is the first 
involving an African nation’s role in the CIA rendition program.459
Reports have also shown the United States’ increasing frustration and concern about investigations 
and lawsuits abroad, and a concerted effort by the U.S. government to halt such inquiries through 
political and diplomatic pressure.
 • The most egregious example of  a deliberate effort to impose secrecy is the German 
investigation into the rendition of  Khaled El-Masri. A 2010 report by Der Spiegel details the 
negotiations between the U.S. State Department, the political leadership of  Germany, and 
German prosecutors.460 In one cable, Deputy U.S. Ambassador John Koenig wrote directly 
to Secretary of  State Condoleezza Rice that he had asked Angela Merkel’s office to “weigh 
carefully at every step of  the way the implications for relations with the U.S.,” following 
the issuance by the German prosecutor of  arrest warrants for the 13 CIA agents involved 
in El-Masri’s abduction. 461 According to another cable, Bavarian state officials called the 
U.S. embassy and emphasized that they had “no role” in the prosecutor’s decision to issue 
the warrants.462 U.S. officials were reportedly most concerned that the warrants would be 
enforced outside of  Germany, and were reassured by both the German Ministry of  Justice 
and the Foreign Ministry that the cases “would not be handled as routine,” and would take 
into account any foreign policy consequences.463 On that issue, Koenig helpfully “pointed out 
that [the United States’] intention was not to threaten Germany … but reminded [Merkel’s 
office] of  the repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake of  [the Italian arrest 
warrants issued the previous year].” 464 Ultimately, the pressure yielded results: Justice Minister 
Brigitte Zypries decided that because the United States would not recognize the validity of  the 
arrest warrants, it was not worth the effort to pursue charges or extradition.465
 • In 2005, Spanish police opened an investigation into rendition flight stopovers (including 
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the flight carrying Khaled El-Masri) in Mallorca, with the inquiry eventually being sent to 
Spain’s national court to determine the facts of  the flights and whether CIA operatives used 
false identities without the permission of  the Spanish government.466 In 2010, the Spanish 
National Court’s Office of  the Prosecutor requested arrest warrants for the 13 CIA agents 
involved in El-Masri’s rendition.467 U.S. officials were reportedly alarmed when German and 
Spanish prosecutors began comparing information on the rendition flights, commenting that 
“[t]his co-ordination among independent investigators will complicate our efforts to manage 
this case at a discreet government-to-government level.” 468 Officials in the prosecutor’s office 
did, however, accede to U.S. concerns regarding the Spanish investigation: U.S. embassy 
officials noted, following a meeting with one of  the prosecutors, that “[t]he prosecutors do not 
intend to request information on this case from the embassy or from the U.S. government in 
general.” 469 Additionally, U.S. officials expressed a concern that surfaced in State Department 
communications about many countries’ rendition allegations — that they simply did not 
know the facts. “Our ability to beat down this story is constrained by the fact that we do not 
ourselves know, factually, what might have transpired five or six years ago.” 470
 • In 2008, U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband announced that the British territory 
of  Diego Garcia had been used for rendition flight stopovers by the United States.471 
Miliband’s predecessor, Jack Straw, and former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair had 
previously been informed by the U.S. government that no rendition flights had been 
conducted through U.K. airspace.472 Bellinger explained the discrepancy by stating that 
even though several previous inquiries on the use of  U.K. airspace and territory for 
renditions had been conducted, the new information resulted from the CIA conducting 
a “more comprehensive record search” after “continuing allegations” about the use 
of  Diego Garcia — despite the incidents occurring six years prior.473 Neither Bellinger 
nor Miliband provided any details about the detainees moved through Diego Garcia, 
including their previous and subsequent destinations.474 Bellinger stated that there had 
been no legal obligation to inform the British government of  the flights through Diego 
Garcia, but that there would be no future such flights without U.K. permission.475 Andrew 
Tyrie, Conservative Party MP and head of  the U.K.’s APPG, stated that “[t]his statement 
will leave the British public unwilling to trust other assurances we have received from 
the U.S.” 476 Despite the diplomatic tension, the U.S. State Department’s focus was on 
stifling wide reporting of  the story. DOS officials in London noted with evident relief  that 
“U.K. media covered the story but for the most part didn’t have it on the front pages.” 477 
Unclassified DOS emails summarized the coverage of  the Diego Garcia story, noting the 
benefit of  competing headlines regarding fatal embassy burnings in Serbia.478 
 • In November 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Gladys Kessler in Washington, D.C., 
issued an opinion in the habeas corpus case of  Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed v. Barack Obama, 
which included a thorough assessment of  the validity of  Binyam Mohammed’s claims of  
torture.479 Kessler found that “Binyam Mohamed’s trauma lasted for two long years. During 
that time, he was physically and psychologically tortured. His genitals were mutilated. 
He was deprived of  sleep and food. He was summarily transported from one prison to 
another. Captors held him in stress positions for days at a time. He was forced to listen 
to piercingly loud music and the screams of  other prisoners while locked in a pitch-black 
cell. All the while, he was forced to inculpate himself  and others in various plots to imperil 
Americans.” 480 Kessler concluded that there was “no question that throughout his ordeal 
Binyam Mohamed was being held at the behest of  the [United States],” and that any 
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information he gave during his various interrogations was not “reliable evidence.” 481 In 
2010, Kessler’s opinion was relied upon by the U.K. Court of  Appeal in determining that 
classified information given by the CIA to the Foreign Ministry would be made public as 
part of  Mohammed’s suit to force the British government to disclose knowledge of  his 
treatment.482 Prior to the Court of  Appeals’ decision, the Foreign Ministry received a letter 
from John Bellinger, the DOS legal adviser, stating that “[w]e want to affirm in the clearest 
terms that a decision that the public disclosure of  these documents or of  the information 
contained therein is likely to result in serious damage to U.S. national security and could 
harm existing intelligence information-sharing between our two governments.” 483 The 
Court of  Appeals found that the information amounted to evidence that Mohammed 
was indeed “subjected to torture.” 484 The Court of  Appeals, however, determined that 
there was “overwhelming” public interest in the information with minimal risk to national 
security, and the judgment publicly castigated the Foreign Office and MI-5’s failure to 
respect human rights, lying to Parliament, and “culture of  suppression.” 485 The White 
House heavily criticized the court’s decision, stating that “the court’s judgment will 
complicate the confidentiality of  our intelligence-sharing relationship.” 486 
 • Following the deportation of  Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed Alzery, and subsequent 
torture in Egypt, the Swedish Ministry of  Defense began requiring more details regarding 
U.S. flights and refueling stops in Sweden. 487 The U.S. embassy noted that the ministry’s 
questions “appear[ed] to be directed at finding out whether [the] flight was for renditions 
or prisoner transfers connected with the war on terror — a sensitivity [one Swedish official] 
mentioned … explicitly.” 488 The embassy commented that it was unclear whether “Sweden 
wants to make the clearance process so difficult that we will seek other refueling venues.” 489 
Sweden later awarded Alzery and Agiza 3 million kroner (approximately $425,000) each 
in settlement for their treatment in Sweden and Egypt. Additionally, Agiza was granted 
residency in Sweden in 2012.490 
 • In 2007, the Irish Human Rights Commission (a government entity) issued a report entitled 
“Extraordinary Rendition: A Review of  Ireland’s Human Rights Obligations,” which 
concluded that flights that were part of  the CIA rendition circuits had landed at Shannon 
Airport without being subject to inspections or searches.491 Following the report, the Irish 
government established a cabinet-level committee to review human rights policies and ensure 
that airport authorities had a mandate to search and inspect all aircraft transiting through 
Ireland.492 A representative from the Irish Department of  Foreign Affairs, however, explained 
to the U.S. embassy that the creation of  the committee was merely to “assuage” the Green 
Party members of  the governing coalition, and that the question of  inspecting all aircraft was 
a “nonstarter.” 493 This view was confirmed in 2010 by reports that the committee had met 
only three times over two years, without any progress.494 However, the Irish government did 
privately begin requesting further information from the United States about military flights 
through Shannon Airport, similar to the Swedish government, out of  fear that renditions were 
being transited through Ireland.495 The U.S. embassy noted the new “cumbersome notification 
requirements,” and commented on the possibility of  pulling out of  Shannon as a transit hub.496
 • In 2007, the Swiss Federal Council authorized a criminal investigation into the alleged 
unlawful use of  Swiss airspace by 13 CIA agents for the rendition of  Abu Omar.497 At the 
time, the U.S. embassy noted that Dick Marty (who spearheaded the Council of  Europe 
reports) provided the impetus for the Swiss investigation, and that it was “difficult to say 
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what type of  evidence the Swiss possess.” 498 The investigation was suspended in November 
2007, although the suspension was not announced by the Swiss federal prosecutor’s office 
until January 2008.499 No reason was given for the suspension, and a spokesperson for the 
prosecutor’s office stated that the office would “not provide any further information on this 
case until the circumstances allow.” 500
 • In 2011, Finland’s Ministry of  Foreign Affairs asked the United States for clarification 
regarding an alleged rendition flight that landed in Helsinki, which was reportedly one 
of  many between 2004 and 2006.501 Media reports of  rendition flights through Finland 
resulted in Finland delaying ratification of  the U.S.-E.U. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
for two years, from 2005 until 2007, with Finnish ministers expressing concern that United 
States rendition violated Finnish constitutional law.502 There has been no reported response 
from the U.S. to Finland’s request for information regarding the flight.
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
In 2009, President Obama’s Interrogation and Transfer Policy Task Force announced that 
transfers “in which the United States moves or facilitates the movement of  a person from one 
country to another or from U.S. custody to the custody of  another country” would continue, 
but with stricter oversight of  diplomatic assurances.503 The decision was immediately criticized 
by rights groups, and Amrit Singh of  the Open Society Justice Initiative pointed out those 
diplomatic assurances, even with American or consular visits, had been “completely ineffective 
in preventing torture.” 504 This conclusion was illustrated by the Canadian government’s 
investigation into the Maher Arar rendition; a Canadian consular official visited Arar several 
times, but Arar was forced by Syrian officials to speak in Arabic with a translator, and was often 
cut off  in his responses to the official’s questions.505 The Arar Inquiry found that Arar was not in 
a position to be able to speak freely about his treatment in Syria with the consular official.506 
In accordance with the statement by President Obama’s Task Force, there is evidence that 
a number of  renditions and instances of  proxy detention have taken place since 2009, most 
notably in the 2011 and 2012 reports regarding detentions in and renditions from Mogadishu. 
Harold Hongju Koh, the former DOS legal advisor, seemed to dispute this in an interview with 
Task Force staff, saying that during his time in the administration, the CIA had not conducted 
any unlawful renditions.50
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More than a year after Camp Delta at Guantánamo opened, officials enthusiastically presented to the public a 
simple narrative about the interaction of  medical personnel and the detainees held there. Officials said that the 
medical personnel were providing the detainees with an especially high level of  medical care. The modern clinic 
inside the barbed wire enclosure was proudly exhibited to visiting journalists and members of  Congress. 
The detainees were getting medical treatment far superior to any they had ever received or could hope to receive 
in their home countries like Afghanistan or Yemen. Officials said that many detainees were scrawny when 
they arrived but were now gaining weight — metrics were shown to visitors — and their health was attended 
to with what the superintendent of  the hospital described in 2003 as care equivalent to that which the U.S. 
provides for its own soldiers. “They never had it so good,” said Captain Albert Shimkus, the detention center’s 
chief  medical officer at the time.1
Military doctors performed minor surgery on some prisoners; others were prescribed heart medicines, or statins to 
control cholesterol. The message was that, yes, these people were in prison but there was a silver lining for them 
in their doleful situation: they were getting benefits they never would have received but for their imprisonment at 
Guantánamo — first-rate medical attention and a planned nutrition regimen.
But there was an entirely different universe of  professional medical involvement in the detainees’ lives that was 
hidden from wider view: the use of  psychologists, psychiatrists and other physicians, and other medical and 
mental health personnel, to help assist and guide interrogations that were often brutal.
The involvement of  medical personnel was ostensibly to make the process more efficient (psychologists could 
provide guidance to interrogators as to how best obtain information) and safe (medical personnel could monitor 
the conditions of  subjects and, theoretically, intervene if  necessary to prevent excessive harm or death). But the 
other major advantage in enlisting doctors to the interrogation program was that they appeared to provide a sort 
of  ethical approbation for what would occur. The participation of  doctors — professional healers — would 
certify that the activities were not inhumane. 
The Office of  Legal Counsel relied very heavily on this role of  medical personnel to support its much-criticized 
findings that “enhanced” techniques did not amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
It was perhaps for those very reasons — utilizing medical participation to signify humaneness and approval 
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— that once the participation of  doctors in the interrogation program became known publicly, controversies 
erupted in the professional associations that regard themselves as guardians of  the identities and collective ethics 
of  their members. 
The New York Times reported on November 30, 2004, that psychiatrists and psychologists were important 
and direct participants in the interrogation regime at Guantánamo. The article put into public consciousness 
for the first time the term “biscuits,” a nickname for Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCTs). These 
biscuit teams included behavioral psychologists, who provided guidance for interrogators as to how to best 
obtain information from detainees. The psychologists did not, as a rule, interact directly with the subjects of  
interrogations, but observed what was happening, usually through one-way glass and made recommendations 
to the interrogators. Sometimes, the newspaper reported, the psychologists made their recommendations based on 
information found in detainees’ medical files.
After the article’s publication, the professional associations for psychiatrists and psychologists were faced 
with urgent questions about the proper and ethical role of  their members in such situations. The American 
Psychiatric Association, a medical association consisting of  physicians who are specialists in mental health, 
quickly achieved a consensus. That group decided, with little dissent, that its members could not ethically 
participate in any way in the interrogations. It was a different situation for the community of  psychologists, 
many of  whom considered themselves behavioral scientists and thought it thoroughly appropriate to provide their 
expert guidance to legitimate authorities, like police and the military. Those psychologists argued that they were 
not treating the detainees and thus did not owe any professional duty to them; they said their clients were, in 
fact, the authorities who sought their help. The controversy produced significant battles within the psychologists’ 
group and many questions remain unresolved.
The use of  medical personnel in questionable activities also exposed another vexing issue, that of  dual loyalties 
for medical personnel in the military. Military doctors are obligated to abide by the codes of  their profession 
while also simultaneously required as soldiers to obey their commanders. 
Medical professionals — specifically, psychologists  — had an even more central role in the CIA’s interrogation 
program. Two CIA contract psychologists convinced senior policymakers of  the appropriateness of  using a 
military program previously used to train U.S. soldiers during the Cold War to resist interrogation as a model 
for a regime to break down detainees taken in the new war. The selection of  the Survival, Evasion, Resistance 
and Escape program would come to be recognized as a singularly misguided approach.
Like attorneys, medical personnel were crucial to official authorization for brutal interrogation techniques by the 
CIA. Unlike lawyers, they were sometimes physically present while the techniques were administered, and in a 
few cases may have taken part directly. 
[In examining the role of  health care professionals in detainee treatment, it is important to clarify some 
definitions at the outset. This chapter uses the terms “clinicians,” “doctors,” and “medical personnel” broadly, 
to include not only physicians (including psychiatrists, i.e., medical doctors who specialize in providing mental 
health treatment) but also psychologists (mental health clinicians who have Ph.D.s, not M.D.s, and are not 
licensed as physicians), physicians’ assistants, nurses and all other medical and mental health professionals.]
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Doctors’ and Psychologists’ Role 
in Treatment of Prisoners in CIA Custody
Learned Helplessness
Many of  the techniques used against Al Qaeda suspects in CIA custody originated in the 
military’s “Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape” (SERE) program, a training program 
designed to enable U.S. Armed Services personnel to endure abusive treatment and evade 
revealing truthful information while in enemy hands. The methods applied during SERE 
training, inspired by practices used by communist enemies of  the U.S. during the Cold War, 
include physical slaps, prolonged hooding, stress positions, close confinement in small spaces, 
slamming into walls, forced nudity, extended isolation, sleep deprivation and waterboarding. 
According to former chief  U.S. Navy SERE trainer Malcolm Nance, the SERE techniques 
are “dramatic and highly kinetic coercive interrogation methods” patterned after techniques 
employed by “brutal authoritarian enemies,” such as “the Nazis, the Japanese, North Korea, 
Iraq, the Soviet Union, the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese.” 2 Lieutenant Colonel 
Daniel Baumgartner, former chief  of  staff  for the agency that administers SERE training, has 
testified that “I’m not going to torture students,” but affirmed that “[w]e are simulating an 
enemy that is not complying with the Geneva Conventions.” 3 
SERE training is carefully regulated, both for students’ safety, and to ensure that the training 
increases rather than decreases their confidence in their ability to resist. Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, 
former SERE psychologist for the U.S. Air Force Survival School, explained in congressional 
testimony in 2008 that SERE’s purpose was to “enhance student decision-making, resistance, 
confidence, resiliency, and stress inoculation, and not to break the will of  the students and teach 
them helplessness.” An instruction manual for SERE trainers similarly states that “maximum 
effort will be made to ensure that the students do not develop a sense of  ‘learned helplessness,’ ” 
because “learned helplessness … will render the student less prepared for captivity than prior to 
the training.” 4 
“Learned helplessness” is a phenomenon first described by psychologist Dr. Martin Seligman, 
based on experiments he performed on animals in the 1960s. Seligman found that when dogs 
were given electric shocks while confined in harnesses that they could not escape, most later failed 
to escape shocks when the harnesses were removed.5 Similar behaviors occur in other animals. For 
example, one study found that rats placed in a water tank with no exit would attempt to swim for 
60 hours before succumbing to exhaustion and drowning. If  rats were squeezed in a researcher’s 
hand until they stopped struggling before being placed in the tank, however, they drowned after an 
average of  30 minutes.6 Such experiments could not be ethically repeated on human subjects, but 
Seligman believed that clinical depression was linked to learned helplessness.7 
Two psychologists with the SERE program, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, were heavily 
influenced by Seligman’s findings about “learned helplessness.” Mitchell retired from the Air 
Force SERE school in May 2001, and began working as a consultant.8 In December 2001, the 
CIA asked him to review the “Manchester Manual,” an Al Qaeda manual seized in the United 
Kingdom that advised terrorists on resistance to interrogation.9 Also in December 2001, a small 
group of  psychologists that included Mitchell and a CIA operational psychologist named Kirk 
Hubbard met with Martin Seligman at Seligman’s home in suburban Philadelphia. Hubbard 
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had some role in the CIA’s decision to hire Mitchell and Jessen; in his words, “I didn’t make the 
decision to hire [Mitchell and Jessen]. … I just introduced them as potential assets” to the agency.10
Seligman has told reporters that the meeting at his house with Mitchell and Hubbard “did not touch 
on interrogation or torture or captured prisoners or possible coercive techniques — even remotely,” 
and that he was “grieved and horrified” that his research may have been used to inflict harm. But 
Seligman did remember that Mitchell had complimented his work on “learned helplessness.” 11 
In the months that followed, Mitchell and Jessen drafted a proposal to use SERE techniques 
against captured members of  Al Qaeda.12 The purpose, though, was the opposite of  that of  the 
SERE program: to induce, rather than inoculate against, learned helplessness in order to force 
detainees into a state of  compliance.
In an interview with Task Force staff, Steven Kleinman, a retired Air Force colonel and former 
interrogator who knew Mitchell professionally before September 11, said that Mitchell’s 
paradigm for interrogation was heavily based on “Martin Seligman’s concept of  learned 
helplessness.” 13 Mitchell and Jessen, through their counsel, both declined interview requests 
from Task Force staff. In the past, Mitchell has disputed that learned helplessness research 
was the basis for the CIA “enhanced interrogation program,” 14 but the CIA’s own documents 
suggest otherwise. 
A December 2004 description of  the program the CIA sent to the Office of  Legal Counsel 
(OLC) explained that “[t]he goal of  interrogation is to create a sense of  learned helplessness 
and dependence conducive to the collection of  intelligence in a predictable, reliable, 
and sustainable manner.” In order to create this sense of  helplessness, “it is important to 
demonstrate to the [detainee] that he has no control over basic human needs.” 15
CIA officials have confirmed to the press that the techniques were designed to induce learned 
helplessness. According to former CIA counsel John Rizzo, “the techniques themselves were 
not intended [or] designed to make [detainees] talk while actually being subjected to those 
techniques. … I’m a lawyer, not a psychologist, but as I also understand, there’s a theory called 
learned helplessness.” 16 Similarly, Jose Rodriguez, head of  the CIA’s counterterrorism center 
from 2002 to 2005, has said, “this program was not about hurting anybody. This program 
was about instilling a sense of  hopelessness and despair on the terrorist,” and hopelessness led 
detainees to “compliance.” 17 
But according to the Istanbul Protocol, the United Nations’ guide for doctors and lawyers 
documenting and investigating allegations of  prisoner mistreatment, reducing detainees to a 
state of  helplessness and despair is itself  one of  the central harms of  torture:
One of  the central aims of  torture is to reduce an individual to a position of  
extreme helplessness and distress that can lead to a deterioration of  cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral functions.18
The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 
On March 28, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was captured in a gunfight in Faisalabad, Pakistan. He was 
believed at the time to be the highest level Al Qaeda suspect in U.S. custody. He was transported 
to a secret CIA site, most likely in Thailand. There, FBI interrogators Ali Soufan and Stephen 
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Gaudin began interviewing Abu Zubaydah while doctors worked to stabilize his condition. Soon 
after, according to Soufan, a CIA team including contractor James Mitchell began directing the 
interrogation, and using “enhanced” techniques such as nudity and sleep deprivation. When 
Soufan argued that his questioning had gained valuable intelligence and expressed skepticism 
about the new techniques, Mitchell reportedly replied, “This is science.” 19
Soufan has written that when the “enhanced” techniques failed to yield the desired results, 
Mitchell began using longer periods of  sleep deprivation. At that point, Soufan said, although 
Mitchell was operating with headquarters’ approval, a CIA operational psychologist left the 
interrogation for fear of  losing his license. Reporters have identified that psychologist as R. 
Scott Shumate.20 
Not long after that, Soufan saw a “confinement box” that “looked like a coffin,” in which 
Mitchell was seeking authorization to place Abu Zubaydah.21 Soufan concluded that “the 
interrogation was stepping over the line from borderline torture. Way over the line.” Soufan left 
the interrogation, with the approval of  his FBI superiors, Assistant Director Pat D’Amuro and 
FBI Director Robert Mueller.22
CIA officials, particularly former Counterterrorism Center Director Jose Rodriguez, have 
disputed Soufan’s account. Most of  the disputes concern whether the FBI agents using 
traditional interrogation techniques or CIA interrogators using “enhanced” methods had more 
success in obtaining intelligence from Abu Zubaydah — an issue discussed elsewhere. Rodriguez 
also asserted that Soufan23 overestimated the contract psychologist’s role, and “seemed to blame 
our contractor for everything,” even threatening the contractor with violence at one point. 
Rodriguez wrote that “[a]t the time the contractor was just an advisor. He was not in charge 
of  the interrogation.” Rodriguez, however, does not dispute that the contract psychologist was 
advising FBI agents as well as CIA interrogators from the beginning, and Soufan does not 
dispute that Mitchell had CIA headquarters’ authorization for his actions.24 
According to Rodriguez, after Soufan and the FBI left, he met with the contract psychologist 
and CIA personnel involved in the interrogation and asked the psychologist how long it would 
take for more aggressive techniques to be effective:
“Thirty days” was his estimate. I thought about it overnight and the next 
morning asked the contractor if  he would be willing to take charge of  creating 
and implementing such a program. He said he would be willing to take the 
assignment but could not do it himself. … I agreed that the contractor should 
bring in someone from the outside to help him work with Agency officers in 
crafting a program we hoped would save lives.25
The program had approval from the highest levels of  the U.S. government, as former President 
George W. Bush wrote in his memoirs:
CIA experts drew up a list of  interrogation techniques that differed from 
those Zubaydah had successfully resisted. George [Tenet] assured me all 
interrogations would be performed by experienced intelligence professionals 
who had undergone extensive training. Medical personnel would be on-site to 
guarantee that the detainee was not physically or mentally harmed.
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At my direction, Department of  Justice and CIA lawyers conducted a careful 
legal review. They concluded that the enhanced interrogation program complied 
with the Constitution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture..26
The techniques that President Bush approved and that the OLC deemed legal, in a classified 
opinion signed by OLC head Jay Bybee (hereinafter “classified Bybee memo”), included not 
only waterboarding, but: (1) sleep deprivation for up to 11 consecutive days; (2) “cramped 
confinement” in small, darkened boxes; (3) the placement of  an insect inside a confinement box, 
which the suspect could be told was a stinging insect but was in fact “a harmless insect such 
as a caterpillar”; (4) “wall standing” and other stress positions; (5) physical assaults including 
grabbing a suspect’s collar, grabbing his face, slapping his face or abdomen, and slamming him 
into a specially constructed plywood wall.27
In approving these techniques, OLC relied heavily on the SERE psychologists’ representations. 
It cited SERE psychologists’ assurances that the “enhanced” techniques would not cause 
prolonged mental harm, stating: 
Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for [SERE] 
training, you have learned that these techniques have been used as elements in a 
course of  conduct without any reported incident of  prolonged mental harm. …
You have informed us that your on-site psychologists, who have extensive 
experience with the use of  the waterboard in Navy training, have not 
encountered any significant long-term mental health consequences from its 
use. Your on-site psychologists have also indicated that JPRA [Joint Personnel 
Recovery Agency] has likewise not reported any long-term mental health 
consequences of  the waterboard.28
These “on-site” psychologists were likely James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, who joined Mitchell 
at the Abu Zubaydah interrogation in July or August 2002.29 
OLC also relied on the CIA’s representations that “a medical expert with SERE experience 
will be present throughout this phase, and the procedures will be stopped if  deemed medically 
necessary to prevent severe medical or physical harm” to Abu Zubaydah.30 
Finally, OLC cited a psychological assessment of  Abu Zubaydah that a psychologist sent to John 
Yoo on July 24, 2002.31 The assessment states that it is based in part on “direct interviews” with 
Abu Zubaydah, and is thus widely assumed to have been written by James Mitchell. It states that 
Abu Zubaydah is “[a]lleged to have written al Qa’ida’s manual on resistance techniques,” was 
“[i]nvolved in every major Al Qa’ida terrorist operation,” and was a planner of  the September 
11 attacks.32 It also states that he is personally resilient, skilled at resisting interrogation, and has 
no history or symptoms of  mental illness.33
Ali Soufan has written that the psychological profile’s claims about of  Abu Zubaydah’s role in 
September 11, and other Al Qaeda operations, were known at the time to be false:
To this day, I don’t understand how anyone could write such a profile. Not 
only did we know this to be false before we captured Abu Zubaydah, but it 
was patently false from information obtained after we captured him. … It 
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seems they just put down on paper whatever they could to show that Abu 
Zubaydah was “twelve feet tall.” 34
The government has never charged Abu Zubaydah with war crimes, and has 
stated in Abu Zubaydah’s habeas case that it “has not contended that [he] had 
any personal involvement in planning or executing” the 1998 embassy attacks 
or September 11, nor that he “was a member of  al-Qaida or otherwise formally 
affiliated with al-Qaida.” 35 The unclassified portions of  the psychological profile 
also make no mention of  a head injury that Abu Zubaydah suffered in 1992, which 
led to serious memory loss and possible psychological consequences.36
The psychologists’ assurance about the safety of  SERE techniques has also been 
questioned, including within the CIA. The CIA inspector general (IG) reported in 
May 7, 2004, that according to the head of  the CIA’s Office of  Medical Services 
(OMS), “OMS was neither consulted nor involved in the initial analysis” of  the 
interrogation techniques.37 OMS took issue with the Office of  Technical Services and 
contract psychologists’ conclusions about the techniques, particularly waterboarding:
OMS contends that the expertise of  the SERE psychologist/interrogators 
on the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE 
waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to 
make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a 
priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and 
intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either 
efficacious or medically safe.38
In an interview with Task Force staff, former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo said that other 
agency personnel “swear they consulted with the Office of  Medical Services,” though he lacked 
first-hand knowledge of  the consultations. Rizzo said that medical personnel, in addition to 
psychologists, monitored Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation: 
[I]n terms of  overseeing the program, there were always medical people. I 
know there were psychologists and physicians’ assistants. I believe doctors 
would go through periodically but I can’t say that MD’s were there constantly. 
Rizzo said that because Abu Zubaydah had been wounded during capture and “was the first 
one” subjected to the techniques, “people wanted to be extraordinarily careful” and “I believe 
there were medical doctors from OMS on site.” 39
Dr. Kirk Hubbard wrote in an email to Task Force staff  that
I don’t think OMS was involved in the initial analysis of  the enhanced 
interrogation techniques, but … an OMS medical doctor observed at least 
some of  the interrogations of  [Abu Zubaydah].40 
The report of  the CIA Office of  Inspector General (CIA OIG report) stated that investigators had 
viewed the videotapes of  Abu Zubaydah’s waterboarding. In contrast to the OLC’s statement that 
waterboarding “will not be used with substantial repetition,” 41 “OIG identified 83 waterboard 
applications, most of  which lasted less than 10 seconds.” 42 There were other differences as well:
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OIG’s review of  the videotapes revealed that the waterboard technique 
employed at [redacted] was different from the technique as described in the 
DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner 
in which the detainee’s breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in 
the DoJ opinion, the subject’s airflow is disrupted by the firm application of  a 
damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of  
water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator 
[redacted] continuously applied large volumes of  water to a cloth that covered 
the detainee’s mouth and nose.43
In 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee found that the divergence between SERE 
school and actual CIA practices on detainees were not restricted to waterboarding, or to 
any particular technique. SERE schools use “strict controls” to reduce the threat of  harm to 
students, including
medical and psychological training for students, intervention by trained 
psychologists during training, and code words to ensure that students can stop 
the application of  a technique at any time should the need arise. Those same 
controls are not present in real world interrogations. 44
In 2009, the Department of  Justice’s (DOJ) Office of  Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
criticized the OLC memo for relying “almost exclusively on the fact that ‘the proposed 
interrogation methods have been used and continue to be used in SERE training’ without ‘any 
negative long-term mental health consequences.’ ” They found this reliance unwarranted “[i]n 
light of  the fact that the express goal of  the CIA interrogation program was to induce a state of  
‘learned helplessness.’ ” 45 
In addition to their role in developing the program and advocating for the use of  coercive 
techniques, Mitchell and Jessen may have directly participated in interrogations. The CIA 
OIG report describes the individuals who waterboarded Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim 
al-Nashiri as “SERE psychologist/interrogators” or “psychologist/interrogators.” The 
DOJ OPR report similarly states that “psychologist/interrogators administered all of  the 
interrogation sessions involving EITs [enhanced interrogation techniques]” for Abu Zubaydah, 
and administered the waterboard to al-Nashiri on two occasions.46 The Associated Press, which 
cited anonymous U.S. intelligence officials, has also reported that Mitchell and Jessen personally 
waterboarded Abu Zubaydah and Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri.47 
This is not to say that Mitchell and Jessen were acting without headquarters’ guidance or 
oversight. Both the OIG report and the DOJ OPR report state that CIA headquarters closely 
monitored Abu Zubaydah’s and al-Nashiri’s interrogations, including videotapes of  the 
sessions. Based on the CIA’s response to Freedom of  Information Act requests, Abu Zubaydah’s 
interrogators included “medical update’’ and “behavioral comments” in daily cables to CIA 
headquarters describing the interrogation in August 2002.48
Hubbard wrote in an email to Task Force staff  that 
Drs. Mitchell and Jessen had no authority to establish policy or procedure, 
or make independent decisions regarding the interrogation program. The 
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conditions of  their contract prohibited that. Everything they did was specifically 
approved by the CIA.49 
Hubbard also wrote that, contrary to some accounts he had seen in the press, Mitchell and 
Jessen “were not promoting themselves; the CIA approached them.” 50
The Washington Post has reported that Mitchell and Jessen concluded that Abu Zubaydah was 
fully “compliant,” and there was no need or use for further waterboarding sessions, before CIA 
headquarters did. According to the Post’s source, the CIA counterterrorist center sent back cables 
advocating for waterboarding to continue for another 30 days, and told Mitchell and Jessen that 
“you’ve lost your spine.” Mitchell and Jessen requested that the officials observe a waterboarding 
session at the site, after which they agreed that no further waterboarding was needed.51 It is 
impossible to confirm the details of  this incident without access to classified information, but the 
Post’s reporting is consistent with the public portions of  the CIA OIG report.52 
In a possible reference to the same incident, Abu Zubaydah later told the Red Cross that 
during the period when he was undergoing waterboarding, “I collapsed and lost consciousness 
on several occasions. Eventually the torture was stopped by the intervention of  the doctor.” 
He stated, however, that the intervention came long after he suffered severe physical pain 
and prolonged mental stress. Abu Zubaydah described waterboarding as causing severe pain, 
repeated vomiting and hopelessness: “I struggled against the straps, trying to breathe, but it was 
hopeless. I thought I was going to die. I lost control of  my urine. Since then I still lose control of  
my urine when under stress.” 53
Abu Zubaydah made further allegations about continued physical and mental harm during 
his Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearing, though the details were not clear and 
most of  his statements about treatment at the CIA facility were redacted.54 His medical records, 
statements about his treatment in custody, and information about his current medical condition 
are also largely classified. 
According to a filing by Abu Zubaydah’s counsel in Lithuania, requesting victim status in an 
inquiry into allegations of  CIA prisons, while they cannot reveal “the details of  his physical 
and psychological injuries because all information obtained from Abu Zubaydah is presumed 
classified under a U.S. court order,” publicly available records show that his prior head injuries 
were exacerbated by his ill-treatment and by his extended isolation. As a 
consequence, he has permanent brain damage and physical impairment. 
He suffers blinding headaches, and has an excruciating sensitivity to sound. 
Between 2008 to 2011 alone, he experienced more than 300 seizures. At some 
point during his captivity, the CIA removed his left eye. His physical pain is 
compounded by his awareness that his mind is slipping away. He suffers partial 
amnesia, and has trouble remembering his family.55
Elsewhere, Abu Zubaydah’s counsel has alleged that he had been prescribed Haldol, a powerful 
antipsychotic.56
Photographs confirm that Abu Zubaydah is missing an eye, but all other medical records or 
evaluations that would confirm or refute these allegations remain classified.
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Refinements to the CIA Program by the Office of Medical Services
On January 28 2003, the CIA issued and George Tenet signed written guidelines regarding 
interrogation and conditions of  confinement for detainees in CIA custody.57 This was the first 
agency-wide written guidance on the program. 
The Conditions of  Confinement Guidelines are largely redacted. One of  the few legible 
passages states that “[d]ue provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of  CIA 
detainees, including basic levels of  medical care.” 58 
The Interrogation Guidelines categorized isolation, sleep deprivation of  72 hours or less, 
reduced caloric intake, use of  loud music or white noise, and the use of  diapers “generally not 
to exceed 72 hours [redacted]” as “standard” interrogation techniques. “Enhanced techniques” 
included close confinement, stress positions, wall standing, harmless insects, walling, slapping or 
grabbing a detainee’s face or body, more prolonged periods of  diapering and sleep deprivation, 
waterboarding, and “such other techniques as may be specifically approved” by headquarters.59 
In order to approve a request for “enhanced” techniques, the director of  the counterterrorism 
center had to certify that “appropriate medical and psychological personnel have concluded that 
the use of  the Enhanced Technique(s) is not expected to produce ‘severe physical or mental pain 
or suffering.’ ” 60 The guidelines also required that “[a]ppropriate medical and psychological 
personnel” be available for consultation with or travel to the interrogation site for standard 
techniques, and physically present at the interrogation site for the application of  enhanced 
techniques. Whether on-site or off-site, medical and psychological personnel were instructed 
to suspend the interrogation if  they found that “significant and prolonged physical or mental 
injury, pain, or suffering is likely to result if  the interrogation is not suspended.” If  this occurred, 
the interrogation team would be required to “report the facts to Headquarters for management 
and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may be resumed.”61 
The CIA’s OMS issued its first, draft guidelines on medical treatment of  detainees in March 
2003. That first draft has not been publicly released, but revised versions issued in September 
2003, May 2004, and December 2004 are publicly available in redacted form.62 There are 
subtle differences between the three versions.
The guidelines state that CIA captives
may be subjected to a wide range of  legally sanctioned techniques, all of  which 
are also used on U.S. military personnel in SERE training programs. These 
[techniques] are designed to psychologically “dislocate” the detainee, maximize 
his feeling of  vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or eliminate his will to 
resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence.63
The guidelines describe OMS’s obligation to detainees as “assessing and monitoring the health 
of  all Agency detainees subject to ‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques” and “determining that 
the authorized administration of  these techniques would not be expected to cause “serious 
or permanent harm.” A footnote points out that, according to the Department of  Justice, 
mental harm is not considered serious unless it lasts “months or years,” and “in the absence of  
prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been inflicted.” 64  
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The initial version of  the OMS guidelines appears not to mention medical 
professionals’ common obligation to “do no harm,” rather than ensuring that harm 
inflicted is not “serious or permanent.” 65 Later versions do acknowledge that “[a]
ll medical officers remain under the professional obligation to do no harm,” but 
this is immediately followed by several redacted lines of  text and a conclusion that 
“[m]edical officers must remain cognizant at all times of  their obligation to prevent 
‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering.’ ” 66 — the OLC’s standard, not the 
Hippocratic Oath’s. 
Throughout, the guidelines repeatedly call for medical professionals to monitor the severity 
of  harm imposed by interrogators on detainees, rather than preventing any harm. For 
example, the 2003 guidelines state that “[d]etainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably 
cool environments for varying lengths of  time, ranging from hours to days.” 67 They provide 
several paragraphs of  instructions (largely redacted) for monitoring temperatures to prevent 
hypothermia. Later versions include more specific instructions regarding “water dousing” — 
soaking detainees in cold water.68
The guidelines’ requirements with regard to stress positions, shackling and sleep deprivation 
are heavily redacted. The 2003 guidelines say that shackling “in a non-stressful position 
requires only monitoring for the development of  pressure sores with appropriate treatment 
and adjustment of  the shackles as required,” and that being shackled upright for up to 72 
hours “can be approved if  the hands are no higher than head level and weight is borne fully by 
the lower extremities.” 69 The approval for “standard” sleep deprivation is also 72 continuous 
hours, with or without shackling, but this could apparently be repeated after only a short rest. 
Clinicians were instructed that examinations of  detainees undergoing sleep deprivation “should 
include the current numbers of  hours without sleep; and if  only a brief  rest preceded this 
period, the specifics of  the previous deprivation also should be required.” 70 Later versions of  
the guidelines restrict “standard” sleep deprivation and shackling to 48 hours.71 
OMS’s representations about the medical safety of  the techniques and clinicians’ role in 
monitoring detainees were essential to the OLC’s 2005 re-affirmation of  the legality of  several 
CIA techniques. Three memos, signed in 2005 by the OLC’s acting head, Steven Bradbury, again 
and again rely on OMS to ensure that detainees are not subjected to severe physical suffering or 
prolonged mental harm. One of  the memos, for example, states with regard to sleep deprivation:
The primary method of  sleep deprivation involves the use of  shackling to 
keep the detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is 
handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by a length of  chain to the ceiling. 
The detainee’s hands are shackled in front of  his body, so that the detainee has 
approximately a two-to-three foot diameter of  movement. The detainee’s feet 
are shackled to a bolt in the floor. Due care is taken to ensure that the shackles 
are neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety. We understand from 
discussions with OMS that shackling does not result in any significant physical 
pain for the subject.72
Bradbury wrote that detainees were continually monitored by closed-circuit television to ensure 
that they would not fall asleep and dangle from their shackles, and monitored for edema, 
swelling in the lower legs:
“... the longest 
consecutive period 
a detainee was 
deprived of sleep 
was 180 hours.” 
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OMS has advised us that this condition is not painful, and that the condition 
disappears quickly once the detainee is permitted to lie down. Medical personnel 
carefully monitor any detainee being subjected to standing sleep deprivation for 
edema or other physical and psychological conditions.73
Because several detainees did experience edema as a result of  standing sleep deprivation, 
the CIA, in consultation with OMS, developed an alternative protocol for “horizontal sleep 
deprivation,” which involved shackling detainees’ arms and legs to the floor far enough away 
from their bodies that the limbs “cannot be used for balance or comfort” but not so far as to 
“force the limbs beyond natural extension or create tension on any joint.” The CIA assured 
OLC that this was “not significantly painful, according to the experience and professional 
judgment of  OMS and other personnel.” 74 
While they were being shackled in a standing position for purposes of  sleep deprivation, 
detainees were kept in diapers rather than being unshackled or allowed to use a bucket or 
latrine. The CIA told OLC in 2005 that releasing a detainee from shackles during sleep 
deprivation to urinate or defecate “would interfere with the effectiveness” of  the sleep 
deprivation technique.75 The May 2004 OMS guidelines list diapering “generally for periods 
not greater than 72 hours” as a standard measure, “prolonged diapering” as an enhanced 
measure, and states that only the medical limitation on diapering is “[e]vidence of  loss of  skin 
integrity due to contact with human waste materials.” 76 In 2005, however, the CIA assured 
OLC that diapers were regularly checked and changed if  soiled, and detainees had not 
developed skin lesions.77
According to the Bradbury memos, the longest consecutive period a detainee was deprived of  
sleep was 180 hours.78 
The OMS guidelines describe waterboarding as “by far the most traumatic of  the enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” and the only one requiring the presence of  a physician as opposed 
to a physician’s assistant. It discusses serious risks based on the CIA’s previous experience 
administering the waterboard:
[F]or reasons of  physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the subject 
may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of  the airways and loss of  
consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and 
the interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If  this 
fails to restore normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. 
Any subject who has reached this degree of  compromise is not considered an 
appropriate candidate for the waterboard.79
Before this degree of  harm is reached, however, OMS stated that “a series of  several relatively 
rapid waterboard applications is medically acceptable. … Several such sessions per 24 hours 
have been employed without apparent medical complication.” OMS recommended a careful 
medical assessment before more than 15 waterboard applications within a 24 hour period, and 
warned of  “cumulative” effects after three to five consecutive days of  intense waterboarding.80 
The 2005 OLC memos contain more details about potential medical complications of  
waterboarding, and precautions taken to avoid them. These included: (1) feeding detainees 
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liquid diets beforehand to reduce the risk of  vomiting, and (2) using saline solution instead of  
water to reduce the risk of  pneumonia. The memo also states that equipment for emergency 
resuscitation and medical supplies for performing a tracheotomy are available for detainees 
subjected to waterboarding.81
Throughout the 2005 memos, Bradbury placed great reliance on OMS’s assurances about the 
safety of  the techniques and their role in monitoring interrogation and modifying techniques 
as needed. A May 10 memorandum on the legality of  individual techniques under the Torture 
Statute cited a CIA assurance that medical and psychological personnel are continuously 
present and that “[d]aily physical and psychological evaluations are continued” during the 
entire period of  use for “enhanced” techniques. 82
OMS’s participation was especially crucial to Bradbury’s finding that waterboarding and sleep 
deprivation enforced by shackling did not violate the Torture Statute. Footnote 31 stated that 
OMS had assured OLC that “although the ability to predict is imperfect — they would object 
to the initial or continued use of  any technique if  their psychological assessment of  the detainee 
suggested that the use of  the technique might result in post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
chronic depression, or other conditions that could constitute prolonged mental harm.” 83 The 
memorandum concluded with a paragraph again emphasizing the crucial role of  medical and 
psychological personnel, and OLC’s assumption that in addition to monitoring interrogations 
and stopping or adjusting techniques when needed, “medical and psychological personnel are 
continually assessing the available literature and ongoing experience with detainees.” 84 
A second memo, on whether combined techniques would rise to the level of  torture, states of  
medical professionals’ evaluations of  detainees and monitoring of  interrogations that “these 
safeguards, which were critically important to our conclusions about individual techniques, are 
even more significant when techniques are combined.” The same memo later states that OMS’s 
role is “essential to our advice” that the CIA program does not violate the Torture Statute.85 
A third memo, regarding whether the CIA program constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, places similar reliance on OMS.86
It is unclear whether the limits discussed in the OMS guidelines and the 2005 OLC memos 
were consistently applied in practice.87 Steven Bradbury, the author of  the memoranda, later 
told DOJ investigators that he had deferred to the CIA’s representations regarding the precise 
implementation and effectiveness of  the “enhanced” techniques, because “[i]t’s not my role, 
really, to do a factual investigation.” 88 The CIA IG’s Office has conducted several reviews on 
the program since its initial 2004 report, but they are all fully classified. 
High-Value Detainee Accounts and Red Cross 
Findings on the CIA Interrogation Program
In 2006, 14 high-value detainees (HVDs) were transferred from CIA prisons to military custody 
at Guantánamo Bay, where they met with representatives of  the International Committee 
of  the Red Cross (ICRC) for the first time. The ICRC’s account of  their interviews has been 
published. The detainees’ accounts of  their treatment are highly consistent with one another, 
although they had limited if  any ability to coordinate their statements. According to the ICRC, 
“the consistency of  the detailed allegations provided separately by each of  the 14 adds particular 
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weight” to the claims. The detainees’ accounts of  interrogation techniques and the role of  clinicians 
are broadly, though not entirely, consistent with the officially released documents on the CIA 
program. But the detainees’ characterizations of  the level of  pain and suffering resulting from their 
treatment are dramatically different from that of  OMS. 
Several of  the detainees described “doctors” monitoring their condition, and in some cases 
instructing interrogators “to continue, to adjust, or to stop particular methods.” 89 The medical 
personnel did not identify themselves, and they may well have been physicians’ assistants or para-
professionals as opposed to licensed physicians. 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed described during waterboarding sessions “a person he assumed 
to be a doctor” regularly checking a device attached to one of  his fingers, which the ICRC 
concluded was likely a pulse oxymeter. Mohammed alleged “that on several occasions the 
suffocation method was stopped on the intervention of  a health person who was present in the 
room.” 90 It is not clear whether this intervention was by a physician or by another medical 
person, such as a physician’s assistant.
According to the ICRC, waterboarding “caused considerable pain” for all three detainees who 
experienced it, and resulted in vomiting and incontinence in Abu Zubaydah’s case. Mohammed 
alleged that he suffered injuries to his wrists and ankles as a result of  struggling against his restraints 
during waterboarding.91 
Regarding shackling in a standing position, the ICRC reported that the technique was used 
“for periods ranging from two or three days continuously, and for up to two or three months 
intermittently,” always while naked. As a result, many detainees had suffered leg or ankle swelling. 
While the detainees were frequently checked by U.S. personnel, three alleged that they had fallen 
asleep in the position and were temporarily suspended from their shoulders, causing painful injuries. 
Walid bin Attash, who had an artificial leg, alleged that interrogators sometimes removed it to 
increase the stress and fatigue of  being shackled to the ceiling. As a result, his good leg sometimes 
collapsed and his handcuffs cut into his wrists. Four detainees, including bin Attash, alleged that 
they had to remain standing in their own excrement because their diapers were not replaced. Four 
detainees also alleged that they were doused with cold water while shackled in a standing position, 
and “[s]everal thought this was in order to clean away the feces which had run down their legs when 
they defecated while held in the prolonged stress standing position.” 92 
Bin Attash reported that during a later period of  forced standing, his lower leg was measured daily 
with a tape measure to check for swelling by someone he assumed was a doctor. Eventually, the 
doctor allowed him to sit, though he remained shackled in a way that was “very painful on my 
back.” Detainee Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) also alleged that a doctor had eventually put an 
end to a period of  forced standing, telling him, “I look after your body only because we need you 
for information.” Laid Saidi, a detainee held in a CIA-run prison in Afghanistan, told The New York 
Times that after his legs had become painfully swollen after an extended period of  being shackled in a 
standing position, a doctor had treated him with an injection.93
Nine detainees alleged that they were beaten by interrogators, including being punched and kicked as 
well as being slapped and having their heads slammed into walls. One detainee alleged being beaten “to 
the extent that I was bleeding.” Abu Zubaydah alleged that he was slammed into a solid wall before being 
slammed against a wall that had been covered with plywood sheeting to absorb some of  the impact.94 
217
Chapter 6 - The Role of Medical Professionals in Detention and Interrogation Operations
The Constitution Project
The ICRC wrote that the ethical obligations of  doctors and other health professionals forbade
ruling on the permissibility, or not, of  any form of  physical or psychological 
ill-treatment. The physician, and any other health professionals, are expressly 
prohibited from using their scientific knowledge and skills to facilitate such 
practices in any way. … [T]he participation of  health personnel in such a 
process is contrary to international standards of  medical ethics.95
The ICRC reported after an initial period that ranged from weeks to months, the detainees’ 
treatment became less harsh and conditions began to improve.96 There were limits to the 
improvements, though. Even when not undergoing sleep deprivation, detainees alleged that 
they were continuously kept handcuffed and/or shackled in their cell, for periods of  up to 19 
months. One detainee stated that his ankle shackles had to be cut off  twice because they had 
rusted shut. Eleven of  the detainees also alleged that they were kept naked for extended periods, 
ranging from weeks to months, often in cells that were excessively cold.97 
Several detainees alleged during their CSRTs 98 that they suffered continued ill health, mental 
or physical, as a result of  their treatment by the CIA, which they all termed “torture.” Abu 
Zubaydah’s allegations are noted above. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri stated, “Before I was arrested 
I used to be able to run about 10 kilometers. Now I cannot walk for more than 10 minutes. 
My nerves are swollen in my body.” 99 Majid Khan stated that at Guantánamo, he has twice 
“chewed my artery” and been forced to wear an anti-suicide smock as a result.100 
Again, the medical records that could verify these claims, or provide other evidence of  the 14 
HVDs’ current medical conditions, are classified.101 With the exception of  the ICRC report, 
which was leaked to the press without authorization, and excerpts from the CSRTs, the HVDs’ 
descriptions of  their own treatment are also classified. Except for the CIA OIG report, almost 
all of  the CIA documents that would corroborate or refute these claims are likewise classified.
As a result of  the secrecy surrounding the program, the OMS personnel involved in medical 
and psychological evaluation of  detainees and monitoring of  interrogations have never been 
publicly identified or interviewed. It is unclear whether they are medical doctors or physicians’ 
assistants, and whether they were government employees or contractors.102 
What can be said is that the detainees’ accounts in the ICRC report are far more consistent 
with medical literature on the effects of  ill treatment on prisoners than the OMS guidelines are. 
According to two experts on the subject, Leonard Rubenstein of  Physicians for Human Rights 
and retired Brigadier General Stephen Xenakis, M.D. 
The OMS endorsement that these methods do not cause severe mental or 
physical pain or suffering is contrary to clinical experience and research. The 
OMS failed to take account of  pertinent medical and nonmedical literature 
about the severe adverse effects of  enhanced methods, including the cumulative 
effects on prisoners subjected to practices such as sensory deprivation, sleep 
deprivation, waterboarding, and isolation103
The CIA’s representations about the medical effects of  its program also disregarded an older 
body of  literature about the effects of  communist interrogation techniques on American 
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POWs. For example, a 1957 article by Albert Biderman about methods used to extracting 
false confessions from U.S. airmen during the Korean War describes “one form of  torture 
experienced by a considerable number of  Air Force prisoners of  war” as follows:
The prisoners were required to stand, or sit at attention, for exceedingly 
long periods of  time — in one extreme case, day and night for a week at a 
time with only brief  respites. In a few cases, the standing was aggravated by 
extreme cold.104
Biderman wrote that POWs “who underwent long periods of  standing and sitting … report no 
other experience could be more excruciating.” 105
Communist Control Techniques, a 1956 study on the effects of  KGB and communist Chinese 
detention and interrogation commissioned by the CIA and authored by psychologists Harold 
Wolff  and Lawrence Hinkle, reached similar conclusions about a regime of  total isolation, cold 
temperatures, sleep deprivation and food deprivation:
The effects of  isolation, anxiety, fatigue, lack of  sleep, and chronic hunger 
produce disturbance of  mood, attitudes, and behavior in nearly all prisoners. 
The living organism cannot entirely withstand such assaults. The Communists 
do not look upon these assaults as “torture.” Undoubtedly, they use the 
methods which they do in order to conform, in a typical legalistic manner 
to overt Communist principles which demand that “no force or torture be 
used in extracting information from prisoners.” But these methods do, of  
course, constitute torture and physical coercion. All of  them lead to serious 
disturbances of  many bodily processes.106
Wolff  and Hinkle described the method of  
requiring the prisoner to stand throughout the interrogation session or to 
maintain some other physical position which becomes painful. This, like other 
features of  the KGB procedure, is a form of  physical torture, in spite of  the fact 
that the prisoners and KGB officers alike do not ordinarily perceive it as such. 
Any fixed position which is maintained over a long time ultimately produces 
excruciating pain.107 
Wolff  and Hinkle also discussed the risk of  swelling and edema, which contrary to OMS 
guidance they describe as “intensely painful,” and state:
Men have been known to remain standing for periods as long as several days. 
Ultimately they develop a delirious state, characterized by disorientation, 
fear, delusions, and visual hallucinations. This psychosis is produced by a 
combination of  circulatory impairment, lack of  sleep, and uremia.108 
As discussed further in Chapter 8, the ICRC report is also consistent with clinical evaluations 
and other former detainees’ reports on the harmful effects of  “enhanced” interrogation in CIA 
or military custody.
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The Guantánamo BSCTs
Medical and mental health professionals also had a key role in the use of  brutal interrogation 
techniques by the Department of  Defense (DOD), particularly at Guantánamo Bay. At 
Guantánamo, Behavioral Science Consultant Teams (BSCTs), composed of  psychologists, 
psychiatrists and mental health technicians (who were apparently not psychiatrists or 
psychologists), had a central role. The BSCTs signed memos requesting authorization to use 
SERE techniques against Guantánamo detainees, monitored interrogations, and advised 
interrogators about techniques. They and other members of  the interrogation team had access 
to detainees’ medical records, and detainees have repeatedly alleged that their medical care 
depended on cooperation with interrogators. 
The BSCTs, unlike the SERE psychologists affiliated with the CIA program, did not seek to 
become involved with interrogation. In June 2002, psychiatrist Major Paul Burney, psychologist 
Major John Leso, and a psychiatric technician, whose name and rank have never been made 
public, deployed to Guantánamo Bay. Leso and Burney thought their mission would be to treat 
U.S. servicemembers. Instead, Burney later told the Senate Armed Services Committee, they 
were hijacked and immediately in processed into Joint Task Force 170, the 
military intelligence command on the island. It turns out we were assigned to 
the interrogation element. … Nobody really knew what we were supposed to 
do for the unit.109
Burney stated that he and Leso had never received any training on interrogation, nor was there 
a standard operating procedure in place for the BSCT clinicians when they arrived.110
There had been another, very different BSCT working at Guantánamo before Leso’s and 
Burney’s. It was affiliated with the DOD’s Criminal Investigation Task Force, a group of  
military criminal investigators charged with determining which detainees would be prosecuted. 
A member of  that team, Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) psychologist Michael 
Gelles, explained that he and his fellow BSCT members reviewed files, watched interrogations 
and provided advice about specific detainees, but “[p]sychologists don’t go in. … [T]here 
was no reason for psychologists to be in the room.” 111 Gelles said that he had over a decade 
of  experience doing similar consultation for law enforcement interrogations, including the 
investigation into the USS Cole bombing; “[t]hat’s what I did for a living.” His colleagues 
were similarly experienced, and were focused on obtaining information that would be legally 
admissible in court.112
Gelles said Major General Michael Dunlavey, the commander of  Guantánamo’s interrogation 
group, wanted his team based at Guantánamo full time. When Gelles told Dunlavey this was 
not possible, Dunlavey’s response, Gelles said, was “ ‘Fine. Then I’ll get my own.’ And then he 
went out and asked the army to give him some psychiatrists and psychologists … and he built a 
behavioral science team.” 113 Gelles said that the new BSCT team lacked appropriate training 
for the assignment they were given.114
Dunlavey has disputed this account. In 2007, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
he was in the hospital for much of  the month of  June, and did not know who created the BSCT.115 
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On August 6, 2002, the U.S. Southern Command issued a new confidentiality policy for health 
care providers at Guantánamo, which stated that communications between detainees and 
doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists and therapists “are not confidential and are not subject to 
the assertion of  privileges by or on behalf  of  detainees.” Rather, medical and mental health 
personnel were instructed to “convey any information concerning … a military or national 
security mission” obtained during treatment of  detainees to “non-medical military or other 
United States personnel with an apparent need to know the information.” This exchange of  
information could occur either at the initiative of  medical personnel or interrogators.116 Gelles 
confirmed that interrogation personnel had access to medical records both in Afghanistan 
and Guantánamo in 2002, though the NCIS did not use them for fear that it would render 
detainees’ statements inadmissible in court.117 Standard operating procedures for the BSCTs 
from the fall of  2002 indicate that the BSCTs were assigned to act as the liaison between 
interrogators and medical staff, and “[d]escribe the implications of  medical diagnoses and 
treatment for the interrogation process.” 118 
In September 2002, the three BSCT members and four interrogators received training in SERE 
techniques at Fort Bragg, N.C. According to the trainees, the trainers discussed both physical 
and psychological pressures used in SERE school that could be used on detainees, including 
“disrupt[ion of] prisoner sleep cycles,” “invasion of  personal space by a female,” solitary 
confinement, walling, hitting in a way that avoided injury, the use of  military dogs to enhance 
exploitation, hooding, and exploitation of  fears.119 According to Burney, the instructors stressed 
time and time again that psychological investigations have proven that harsh 
interrogations do not work. At best it will get you information that a prisoner 
thinks you want to hear to make the interrogation stop, but that information is 
strongly likely to be false.120
The instructors and the chief  psychologist for the Army’s Special Operations Command, 
Lieutenant Colonel Louie “Morgan” Banks, told investigators that they did not remember 
discussion of  physical pressures, and Banks later wrote to Burney and Leso with a “strong 
recommendation … that you do not use physical pressures.” 121 It is less clear what Banks’ and 
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency’s (JPRA) position was on psychological pressures such as 
isolation and sleep deprivation. 
On October 2, 2002, the BSCT wrote a memo requesting authorization to use additional 
interrogation techniques. “Category II techniques” included stress positions; the use of  isolation for 
up to 30 days (longer periods could be authorized by the chain of  command); deprivation of  food for 
12 hours; handcuffing; hooding; and consecutive 20-hour interrogations once a week. “Category III” 
techniques included daily 20-hour interrogations; isolation without access to medical professionals or 
the ICRC; removal of  clothing; exposure to cold or cold water; and “the use of  scenarios designed to 
convince the detainee he might experience a painful or fatal outcome.” 122 
The October 2 BSCT memo also made recommendations about harsher conditions in the 
cell blocks, stating that “all aspects of  the [detention] environment should enhance capture 
shock, dislocate expectations, foster dependence, and support exploitation to the fullest extent 
possible.” It proposed that detainees who were not cooperating with interrogators receive only 
four hours of  sleep a day; be deprived of  sheets, blankets, mattresses, washcloths; and that 
interrogators control access to their Korans.123 
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“Al Qahtani was 
interrogated for 
approximately 20 
hours a day for 
seven weeks ... ”
Even as it requested authorization to use these techniques, the October 2 memo 
recommended against their use. This was partially on grounds of  efficacy and the 
danger of  false confessions, but the BSCTs also warned:
The interrogation tools outlined above could affect the short term and/or 
long term physical and/or mental health of  the detainee. Physical and/or 
emotional harm from the above techniques may emerge months or even 
years after their use. It is impossible to determine if  a particular strategy 
will cause irreversible harm if  employed.124
Burney told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he and his colleagues requested 
authorization to use the techniques despite this warning because there was “a lot of  pressure to 
use more coercive techniques,” and any memo that did not request them “wasn’t going to go 
very far.” 125 The BSCTs’ warning about the dangers of  the techniques was removed when their 
proposal for coercive techniques was transmitted up the chain of  command.126
Also on October 2, Burney and Leso participated in a meeting with interrogation personnel, 
legal advisor Diane Beaver, and CIA attorney Jonathan Fredman. According to Beaver’s 
minutes, the BSCTs discussed Mohammed al Qahtani’s response to “certain types of  
deprivation and psychological stressors.” 127
Al Qahtani, detainee number 63, was suspected of  being the intended 20th hijacker in the 
September 11 attacks. In October 2002, he was interrogated with military dogs present, 
deprived of  sleep, and placed in stress positions, all while in isolation.128 When this failed to yield 
intelligence, Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170) halted the interrogation and began developing a 
new “Special Interrogation Plan.” Al Qahtani remained in isolation, however, and according 
to an FBI agent by the end of  November he was “evidencing behavior consistent with extreme 
psychological trauma (talking to non-existent people, reportedly hearing voices, crouching in a 
corner of  the cell covered with a sheet for hours on end).” 129 
A publicly released interrogation log, dated from November 23, 2002, to January 11, 2003, 
shows that his treatment only became harsher.130 Al Qahtani was interrogated for approximately 
20 hours a day for seven weeks; subjected to strip searches, including some in the presence of  
female interrogators; forced to wear women’s underwear; led around on a leash; made to bark 
like a dog; and subjected to cold temperatures. Al Qahtani was also forcibly injected with large 
quantities of  IV fluid and forced to urinate on himself, and given repeated enemas. (According 
to the log, this was due to al Qahtani’s refusal of  fluid and constipation, but interrogators also 
used the prospect of  being given IV fluid and enemas as a threat.) On December 7, 2002, al 
Qahtani’s heartbeat slowed to 35 beats per minute, and he had to be taken to the hospital for a 
CT scan of  his brain and ultrasound of  a swollen leg to check for blood clots.131 On December 
13, al Qahtani’s pulse again slowed to 38 beats per minute, but when it rose to 42 beats per 
minute a doctor determined that no medical intervention was necessary.132 His interrogation log 
also showed rapid fluctuations in weight, possibly due to forcible hydration.133 The log makes 
multiple references to swelling of  the hands and feet, and to al Qahtani needing bandages 
due to chafing from hand and leg cuffs.134 The log also describes al Qahtani’s psychological 
condition deteriorating. There are frequent references to al Qahtani crying,135 and some entries 
suggest possible hallucinations.136
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The log makes several references to the presence of  a BSCT, and two to “Maj. L” — likely 
Major John Leso. It states that at one point when al Qahtani began crying, “[t]he BSCT 
observed that the detainee was only trying to run an approach on the control and gain 
sympathy,” and at another point the BSCT member suggests putting him in a swivel chair to 
ensure he does not fall asleep.137
According to a January 2005 sworn statement from a member of  the BSCT team with the 
rank of  major (likely Burney or Leso), “through all of  the interrogation with AL QATANEE, 
at least one of  the members of  the BSCT was always present and witnessed his interrogation. 
Cumulatively this logged hundreds of  hours of  observations.” 138 The BSCT stated that the 
interrogation techniques used had been approved by commanders, and that both General 
Michael Dunlavey and General Geoffrey Miller believed that “coercive methods would be 
the best method of  collecting information if  given enough time. One of  Gen. Miller’s favorite 
quotes was, ‘We’ve got more teeth than they have ass.’ ” 139
Asked whether he felt that detainees were abused while he was at Guantánamo, the BSCT 
member replied,
That is a hard question to answer. I do believe it is possible for some detainees to 
have some kind of  long-term or unintended difficulties because of  the interrogation 
practices, but I did not see detainees being subjected to pointless cruelty.140
Gelles and two of  his colleagues at NCIS, Mark Fallon and David Brant, disagreed. They 
showed Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora extracts of  the al Qahtani interrogation log 
as well as memos approving harsh techniques. Mora’s reaction was, as he later described it, 
“dismay,” 141 as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1. 
Colonel Larry James, who succeeded Leso as a BSCT psychologist at Guantánamo, has written 
that Leso’s role in interrogations took a personal toll on him. According to James, when he arrived 
to relieve Leso in January 2003, he found that Leso was “traumatized” and “devastated” because:
He witnessed many harsh and inhumane interrogation tactics, such as sexual 
humiliation, stress positions, detainees being stripped naked, and the use of  K-9 
dogs to terrorize detainees. He had no command authority, meaning he felt as 
though he had no legal right to tell anyone what to do or not do.142 
Nevertheless, James believed that Leso “was successful in cutting back on some of  the 
abusive practices.” 143
By his own account, James was able to do more by the time he left Guantánamo that May, 
teaching interrogators the effectiveness of  lawful, rapport-building techniques and restricting 
their access to medical files. According to James, a Navy nurse explained to him that it was
perfectly legal for any interrogator, regardless of  rank, educational 
background, or age, to have legal open access to any detainee’s medical 
record. What I discovered was that on any given day, FBI, CIA, Army, Navy, 
and contract interrogators would go to the hospital and demand to see 
detainees’ records immediately.144 
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If  the doctors hesitated, James wrote, interrogation personnel would “help 
themselves” to the records anyway. James said that he declared “that the hospital 
and all doctors and nurses were completely off-limits to anyone from the intel 
community” except the BSCTs. The BSCTs maintained access to this information, 
he said, “to eliminate the possibility that any ill or fragile detainee would be harmed 
as a result of  some abusive interrogation technique.” 145 James derided as “complete 
bullshit” ICRC and press reports that BSCTs were using medical records “in effect, 
to tell interrogators exactly where to poke the prisoner with a sharp stick.” 146 
But the ICRC’s reports, well-documented cases such as the Jawad interrogation 
discussed below, and many other prisoners accounts suggest otherwise.
It is plausible that conditions at Guantánamo improved on James’s watch. Gelles 
noted improvements as well, though he attributed them primarily to Mora’s 
intervention. Gelles said that in the short run the DOD decided not to go forward with the most 
coercive techniques being considered and “toned down” the next harshest category. In the long 
run, they realized that coercion “didn’t work.” 147
There are credible reports, though, that neither abusive techniques nor BSCTs’ role in coercive 
interrogations ended. In July 2003, Major General Miller submitted a request for approval for 
a “Special Interrogation Plan” for Mohamedou Ould Slahi, which was approved by Secretary 
Rumsfeld on August 13. 148 Interrogators apparently began implementing the plan before 
securing formal approval. They subjected Slahi to isolation, sleep deprivation, uncomfortable 
temperatures and darkness, threatened him with disappearance “down a very dark hole,” and 
threatened to bring his mother to Guantánamo.149 
The Senate Armed Services Committee uncovered documents suggesting that interrogators 
eventually became concerned about Slahi’s mental state. On October 17, an interrogator emailed 
Lieutenant Colonel Diane Zierhoffer, a BSCT psychologist, that Slahi “told me he is ‘hearing 
voices’ now. … He is worried as he knows this is not normal. … [I]s this something that happens 
to people who have little external stimulus such as daylight, human interaction etc???? Seems a 
little creepy.” 150 Zierhoffer responded that this was plausible: “[S]ensory deprivation can cause 
hallucinations, usually visual rather than auditory, but you never know…” 151 It is unclear what 
action she took, if  any, in response to the report that Slahi was hallucinating. A Guantánamo 
prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Couch, eventually refused to prosecute Slahi because he 
concluded that his statements to interrogators were tainted by torture and coercion.152 
Zierhoffer was later accused of  encouraging interrogators to exploit a juvenile detainee, 
Mohammed Jawad, through a program of  isolation and sleep deprivation. According to 
Jawad’s military commission–appointed defense counsel David Frakt, a document obtained 
during the proceeding 
revealed the involvement of  a BSCT psychologist in the interrogations of  
Jawad and strongly suggested that she had been directly responsible for 
some of  the abuses that he experienced and that led to his suicide attempt in 
December 2003. I attempted to call this Army psychologist as a witness, but the 
prosecution informed me that the officer had invoked her right against self-
incrimination and refused to testify.153






to the records 
anyway.”
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News reports identify Zierhoffer as the psychologist in question.154 Jawad was eventually 
acquitted and released, in part due to the military commission’s finding that his incriminating 
statements were the product of  coercion.
Several Guantánamo detainees have alleged that doctors or psychologists administered 
psychotropic drugs for purposes of  interrogation. A DOD inspector general’s report on 
these allegations, released in response to a Freedom of  Information Act request filed by 
Task Force staff, and others found that detainees had not been administered drugs for 
interrogation purposes. However, the same report found that detainees who were diagnosed 
with schizophrenia and psychosis received involuntary injections of  Haldol and other powerful 
antipsychotics, and were interrogated while experiencing the effects of  this treatment.155 This 
raises questions about the reliability of  those detainees’ statements under interrogation.
The ICRC reported after a January 2003 visit to Guantánamo that the “cumulative effects 
of  isolation, repeated interrogation,” overly harsh detention conditions and harassment were 
a “major cause of  deterioration of  mental health” of  detainees. By June 2004, the regime 
had become “more refined and repressive,” and had been applied for so long, with the clear 
purpose of  gaining intelligence, that the ICRC characterized it as “tantamount to torture.” 
Detainees showed four times the rate of  psychological distress as U.S. personnel. They did not 
trust doctors or mental health clinicians because they correctly believed that they would not 
keep their communications confidential, and sometimes there were health personnel present in 
interrogations. The ICRC reported that files were “literally open to interrogators,” in “flagrant 
violation of  medical ethics.” 156 
According to the ICRC, most detainees were locked up 24 hours a day, and a quarter were in 
solitary confinement. A new unit called Camp 5, consisting of  112 isolation cells with solid walls 
of  concrete, steel, and aluminum, was constructed in early 2004, and detainees were often kept 
there for extended periods. Other interrogation techniques included shackling in uncomfortable 
positions; altered or shortened sleep schedules; exposure to loud noise, music, and cold 
temperature; and some beatings.157 
In 2005, Dr. Steven Sharfstein, president of  the American Psychiatric Association visited 
Guantánamo after reading disturbing reports on mental health clinicians’ role in interrogations. 
He met with some of  the BSCTs and discussed their work. Sharfstein described them as “two 
young women, very nice. … I don’t think they were malevolent in any way,” and “the issue 
wasn’t so much abuse when I was down there.” Nonetheless, what he heard about their role 
made him uncomfortable, because they were clearly “part of  the interrogation team” rather 
than clinicians. As he understood it, by that time the BSCTs were “not in the room, but in real 
time communication with the interrogators” whom they advised.158
BSCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan
Much less is known about health and mental health professionals’ role in interrogation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but it is clear that in some cases BSCTs were used, and that interrogators had 
broad access to medical records. 
Colonel James recounted conversations with the chief  Army SERE psychologist, Colonel 
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Morgan Banks, shortly after the Abu Ghraib scandal became public, in which Banks told him 
that part of  the problem was “[w]e don’t have a biscuit psychologist at that place,” 159 and 
assigned James to deploy there. But while there may have been no BSCT at Abu Ghraib when 
the scandal broke, there had been a psychiatrist assisting with interrogations for part of  the 
period when the abuse photographs were taken. 
From August 31 to September 9, 2003, Guantánamo commander Major General Geoffrey 
Miller led a team of  interrogation personnel to assess intelligence gathering in Iraq. One of  
Miller’s findings was that interrogators in Iraq should have access to a BSCT.160 On November 
15, 2003, Major Scott Uithol, a psychiatrist, reported to Abu Ghraib to fill that role.161 He 
served with the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade for the next month. When he arrived, “I 
didn’t know what a Biscuit was,” he later told Dr. M. Gregg Bloche.162
Another source has described a psychiatrist having a role in interrogation at Abu Ghraib. 
Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of  the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, said that a 
doctor and psychiatrist would evaluate detainees’ written interrogation plans and “have the final 
say as to what is implemented.” According to Pappas, the psychiatrist would also sometimes go 
in with interrogators to evaluate detainees “and provide feedback as to whether they were being 
medically and physically taken care of.” 163 
JPRA instructor Terrence Russell, who advised Special Forces troops at Camp Nama about 
SERE techniques in September 2003, has described a discussion about the use of  “physical 
pressures” in interrogation with the “TF-20 SERE psychologist.” 164 A criminal investigative 
file from May 2004 contains an allegation from an interrogator who reported abuses by Special 
Forces task forces at Camp Nama, near the Baghdad airport. The interrogator said he “felt the 
actions were inhumane even though every harsh interrogation was approved by … the medical 
personnel prior to its execution.” 165
A 2005 DOD investigation by the inspector general of  the Navy, Admiral Albert T. Church, 
reported that, 
[a]nalogous to the BSCT in Guantánamo Bay, the Army has a number of  
psychologists in operational positions (in both Afghanistan and Iraq), mostly 
within Special Operations, where they provide direct support to military 
operations. They do not function as mental health providers, and one of  their 
core missions is to support interrogations.166
Church found, based on interviews with clinicians in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that 
interrogators sometimes had easy access to medical information. In several cases, medical 
information and reports from interrogations were kept in a single file, which Church noted 
“makes it impossible to control or even monitor access to detainee medical information.” 167
Medical Personnel and Abuse Reporting
There have been allegations about medical personnel failing to report and document abuses in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
A 2005 report by the U.S. Army surgeon general found that during the period when the most 
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intense abuses were committed against detainees at Guantánamo, Iraq and Afghanistan, from 
2001 to 2004, there were no rules that specified health professionals’ obligations to report abuse 
or any mechanisms to do so. Army policies requiring reporting were not issued until late 2004, 
and specific procedural directives for units were not available until late 2004 and early 2005. 168 
Clinicians were not regularly informed or trained on the duty to report abuse until then, and 
only 37 percent of  previously deployed medical personnel understood that they had a duty to 
report suspected cases of  abuse.169 In 2005, after receiving training, the number of  medical 
personnel who said a detainee had alleged abuse to them quintupled, from 5 percent to 25 
percent — despite widespread testimony that the worst abuses occurred before the Abu Ghraib 
scandal and the new guidance on reporting.170 
The surgeon general’s report was based on an investigation conducted between November 2004 
and April 2005 involving interviews of  military medical personnel, including physicians, nurses, 
and non–health professional personnel such as medics and technicians in various training 
settings and theaters of  operation. 
Of  60 medical personnel assigned to detention operations in Afghanistan who were interviewed 
for the surgeon general’s report, only one claimed to have observed abuse or had an allegation 
of  abuse reported to him or her.171 At Guantánamo Bay, among the seven interviewed, no 
previously deployed and only two currently deployed medical personnel surveyed claimed to 
be aware of  any abuse.172 FBI agents assigned to Guantánamo in 2002, by contrast, repeatedly 
reported witnessing abuse and raised their concerns to the highest levels of  the agency.173 
In some cases there seems to have been overt pressure on clinicians not to report suspected 
abuse. The surgeon general’s report, for example, notes that one interviewee stated that
on two separate occasions, he was pressured by OGA personnel into filling out 
death certificates on Iraqi Detainees. Stated he was not given the opportunity to 
examine the dead. Causes of  death were later found to be inaccurate.174 
Despite these findings, the surgeon general’s report concluded that medical personnel were 
“exceptionally vigilant in reporting actual or suspected detainee abuse.” 175
Major General George Fay’s August 2004 report into abuses at Abu Ghraib found evidence of  
two medics (not physicians) witnessing and failing to report abuse at Abu Ghraib in November 
and December 2003. Fay also found that, more generally, “medical personnel may have been 
aware of  detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and failed to report it,” but could not draw conclusions 
about the full scope of  this problem because they had “requested, but not obtained” detainees’ 
medical records. The Fay report noted that detainee medical records likely were not being 
maintained in accordance with Army regulations.176 A number of  criminal investigative files 
in other cases reviewed by Dr. Steven Miles contain evidence of  medical signs of  abuse going 
unreported or uninvestigated.177
Problematic record-keeping, and failure to report suspicions of  abuse, extended to homicides. In 
several cases, prisoners were initially reported to have died of  natural causes when their deaths 
actually resulted from abuse. The death of  Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is one 
example. An initial Pentagon press release about Mowhoush’s death stated that “Mowhoush 
said he didn’t feel well and subsequently lost consciousness. The soldier questioning him found 
no pulse, then conducted CPR and called for medical authorities. According to the on-site 
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surgeon, it appeared Mowhoush died of  natural causes.” 178 A later autopsy, however, revealed 
that Mowhoush had died of  asphyxia and chest compression after an interrogator stuffed him 
into a sleeping bag and sat on his chest. He had suffered “massive” bruising on his torso, arms, 
and legs (though not his head or face), and five broken ribs.179 
Army pathologists found the death of  Nagem Sadoon Hatab near Nasariya on June 5, 2003, 
to be a homicide caused by strangulation. However, the body was not properly refrigerated 
before or after the autopsy, and body parts were lost due to a “miscommunication” between 
the doctor who examined the body and her assistant. As a result, a military judge excluded the 
medical evidence of  the cause of  Hatab’s death, and efforts at prosecution collapsed.180 The 
investigation of  another suspicious case, Abdul Malik Kenami’s death in Mosul in December 9, 
2003, was closed without any autopsy being performed at all.181
Vincent Iacopino of  Physicians for Human Rights and retired Brigadier General Stephen 
Xenakis, M.D., reviewed the medical records of  nine Guantánamo detainees who had alleged 
abuse. Xenakis and Iacopino found that all of  the allegations were credible. In three cases, 
the detainees had physical injuries that were “consistent or highly consistent” with allegations 
of  abuse, including bruises, lacerations, bone fractures, nerve damage, and sciatica, with “no 
mention of  any cause for these injuries.” Eight of  the nine detainees suffered psychological 
symptoms, including nightmares in five cases; suicidal ideation in four cases and suicide 
attempts in two; depression in two cases; dissociative states in two cases; and hallucinations 
in three cases. These symptoms were correlated in time with detainees’ allegations of  abuse. 
However, “[t]he medical doctors and mental health personnel who treated the detainees at 
GTMO failed to inquire and/or document causes of  the physical injuries and psychological 
symptoms they observed.” 182
Hunger Strikes
Hunger Strikes and Force-feeding at Guantánamo 
One of  the most controversial aspects of  medical personnel’s treatment of  detainees has been 
their role in force-feeding prisoners on hunger strikes. Detainees at Guantánamo have used 
hunger strikes to protest their confinement since shortly after the camp opened, in February 
2002. The first reported incidents of  detainees being force-fed occurred in May 2002, after 60 
or 70 days of  hunger strikes.
The largest wave of  hunger strikes began in the summer of  2005. The strike began on August 
8, and by September 131 detainees were refusing food. An increasing number of  them were fed 
involuntarily. In October 2005, prison officials told a delegation of  visiting medical organizations 
that 25 prisoners were currently on a hunger strike, 22 of  whom were being fed by nasogastric 
tube, most while in their cells and almost all of  them acquiescing to the procedure.183 
Detainees, through their lawyers, filed motions asking federal courts to stop the involuntary 
feeding, which they claimed was carried out in a punitive, brutal fashion. They alleged that 
doctors used excessively large feeding tubes that made inserting and extraction extremely 
painful, and causing bleeding, vomiting and loss of  consciousness in some cases.184 
Sami al-Hajj, a journalist who heads the Liberties and Human Rights Affairs section of  Al 
Jazeera, was held for nearly seven years in Afghanistan and Guantánamo. At Guantánamo, 
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he undertook a 480-day hunger strike, during which he was force-fed by the military.185 In an 
interview with Task Force staff, al-Hajj described his force-feedings as punitive exercises:
They’re supposed to feed you [with] two cans, small cans … but they feed 
us 24 cans and 24 bottle of  water, continuous. And we [were] throwing up, 
it continues and we throwing up and it continues. This is one feeding; [it] 
would take 8 hours like that, you are in chair. Until your cell become full of  
[vomit]. And after that, when they come and [remove the feeding tube from the 
esophagus], they [would grab the tube and just walk away with it]. Then there 
was blood coming. And [the guard] takes it from you and he goes to another 
[detainee] directly and [inserts it] … without cleaning.186
An October 19, 2005, declaration from Captain John Edmondson, then commander of  
Guantánamo’s hospital, denied that force-feeding was intended to punish detainees. “Medical 
personnel do not insert or administer nasogastric tubes in a manner intentionally designed to 
inflict pain or harm on the detainee,” Edmondson said, but
whenever nasogastric tubes are used, there may be occasional minor bleeding and 
nausea as a result. … Occasional sores may occur in the throat, but those sores 
have not been severe and have been treated. The sores have not kept the patients 
from talking or otherwise functioning within the camp or the detention hospital. 
In all of  the procedures done in order to feed patients enterally during the hunger 
strike, only one patient has passed out, and that was due to hyperventilation.187
Edmondson emphasized that once the feeding tube was inserted, “the detainee himself  controls 
the flow of  nutrition so that any discomfort is minimized,” and that detainees were generally 
able to move around their cells during a feeding. He noted that feeding schedules had also been 
changed to accommodate detainees’ fast during Ramadan. 188
On November 10, 2005, Captain Stephen Hooker succeeded Edmondson as the officer in 
charge of  the medical staff  at Guantánamo, and determined that detainees were being given 
too much control over their feeding. In a sworn declaration, Hooker alleged that
[t]here were several small violent group demonstrations in the Detention 
Hospital by the hunger strikers. … The doctors, nurses, and medics, were 
commonly verbally and physically assaulted, including being spit upon and 
having urine thrown on them. The prior Officer-in-Charge of  the Detention 
Hospital was spit upon and had urine thrown on him. Two nurses were 
punched in the face.189
Hooker stated that despite being fed involuntarily, detainees were increasingly malnourished, 
because they were “sabotaging the feeding efforts” by negotiating for less formula or deliberately 
vomiting after a feeding.190 By December 15, 19 of  29 hunger strikers being force-fed “had 
become significantly malnourished (less than 75% of  their Ideal Body Weight) and were at great 
risk for serious complications.” 191 
In December of  2005, a forensic psychiatrist and three consultants from the Federal Bureau of  
Prisons (BOP) visited Guantánamo and made recommendations for changing the hunger strike 
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protocol. According to Hooker, they all recommended the use of  a “restraint chair” 
for enteral feedings.192 The restraint chair was manufactured by a small company 
in Iowa, ERC Inc., which shipped five chairs to Guantánamo in early December 
and 20 more on January 10, 2006. The company’s website advertises the chairs 
as a useful tool for safe confinement or transportation of  a “combative or self-
destructive person. … It’s like a padded cell on wheels.” 193 The chair completely 
immobilizes a person strapped into it, using a lap belt and straps that immobilize 
the head as well as wrist and ankle restraints. 
Dr. Emily Keram, who did a medical evaluation of  hunger striker Ahmed Zuhair in 2009, 
recounted his allegations:
When the restraint chairs were first introduced Mr. Zuhair was kept in the 
restraint chair for two hours after feeding ended. His requests to use the 
bathroom were refused. He soiled himself  with urine and feces. Guards started 
putting diapers on Mr. Zuhair, refusing to allow him to do this himself. Some 
detainees ended their hunger strike. Mr. Zuhair was once kept in a restraint 
chair for six hours, exceeding the two hour maximum time limit recommended 
for the detainee’s safety. … Mr. Zuhair expressed his conviction that the 
restraint chairs were introduced as a means of  punishing hunger striking 
detainees and forcing them to end their hunger strikes.194
By the end of  December 2005, only four or five detainees (including Zuhair) were still on 
hunger strike. 
The military has maintained, in a series of  sworn declarations by Guantánamo commanders 
and medical officers, that the use of  the restraint chair for force-feeding is not a form of  
punishment of, or retaliation against, detainees. Rather, its use was modeled after procedures 
used in U.S. federal prisons that visiting officials from the BOP had recommended that 
Guantánamo adopt. Force-feeding was only used “when medically necessary,” and detainees are 
kept in restraint chairs for “approximately 120 minutes or less,” twice a day.195 In a declaration 
filed on May 13, 2006, Major General Jay Hood acknowledged that detainees had soiled 
themselves in restraint chairs, but portrayed this as an attempt at manipulation:
Since we began using the restraint chair system, over 700 meals have been 
fed to 29 detainees. In all of  those feedings, records establish that only four 
detainees have urinated or defecated for a total of  20 occasions. Once these few 
detainees found that the tactic of  soiling the chair would not work to delay their 
feeding, the incidents ceased.196 
Although most detainees ended their hunger strikes when the restraint chairs were introduced 
in 2005, a few did not. At times, the number of  hunger strikers being fed in restraint chairs 
rose to several dozen. Two detainees, Saudis Ahmed Zuhair and Abdul Rahman Shalabi, were 
force-fed daily for close to four years. After suffering serious medical complications from their 
prolonged fast and the force-feeding, both were evaluated by outside doctors in 2009. Zuhair 
and Shalabi both stated that while not as brutal as when it was first introduced, the feeding chair 
made them feel “like an animal,” and caused physical pain and hemorrhoids due to pressure 
on the tailbone.197 Both expressed a very strong preference for being tube-fed in a hospital bed, 
“Saudis Ahmed 
Zuhair and Abdul 
Rahman Shalabi, 
were force-fed 
daily for close to 
four years.”
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even in restraints. The evaluating psychiatrist, Dr. Emily Keram, found that Zuhair was suffering 
from some symptoms of  anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that were 
worsened by the restraint chair, though these did not rise to the level of  full blown PTSD or major 
depression.198 She found that Shalabi suffered from full-blown PTSD, triggered in part by the 
restraint chair.199 She recommended that both be fed in hospital beds.200 
Keram observed Zuhair’s force-feeding in the restraint chair in January 2009. She stated that 
medical staff  complied with the guidelines for using the restraint chair. She also interviewed 
medical staff  and guards, who did not express a hostile or punitive attitude toward the hunger 
strikers; one told her: “It’s their decision. It’s like smoking.” Keram noted, though, that 
“[r]estraint chairs were used for all detainees’ enteral feedings, regardless of  their disciplinary 
history, unless there was a medical contraindication. … There was no behavioral reward system 
by which a detainee could work his way up to another venue.” The guards and the deputy 
commander of  the detention group at Guantánamo told her that they did not know why 
compliant detainees could not be fed in hospital beds.201 
The rationale given in a 2007 declaration by Captain Ronald Sollock was that even when a 
detainee was compliant, 
there is simply no way to tell if  or when he will become uncompliant and 
violent again and threaten the safety and welfare of  the Detention Hospital 
medical staff. Accordingly, the use of  the restraint chair is required.202
Many medical ethicists view any form of  force-feeding as unethical. The World Medical 
Association’s 1975 Declaration of  Tokyo, strongly endorsed by the American Medical 
Association (AMA), states that “[w]here a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered 
by the doctor as capable of  forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning 
the consequences of  such a voluntary refusal of  nourishment, he or she shall not be fed 
artificially.” 203 The same organization’s Declaration of  Malta, adopted in 1991 and revised 
in 2006, contains more extensive and detailed policies on force-feeding. The Declaration of  
Malta notes that physicians must ensure that prisoners are competent and their refusal of  
nourishment is voluntary, and does not result from peer pressure, but concludes that “forcible 
feeding is never ethically acceptable.” Regarding end-of-life issues, the Declaration of  Malta 
states: “Consideration needs to be given to any advance instructions made by the hunger 
striker. Advance refusals of  treatment demand respect if  they reflect the voluntary wish of  the 
individual when competent. … It is ethical to allow a determined hunger striker to die in dignity 
rather than submit that person to repeated interventions against his or her will.” 204 
Despite this, the BOP has adopted a policy of  involuntarily feeding prisoners in some 
circumstances, which is codified in the Code of  Federal Regulations and has been upheld by 
U.S. courts. Federal prisons are known to use restraint chairs for inmates who are physically 
dangerous to themselves, other inmates, or guards, but at most federal prisons, the chairs are 
apparently not used for forced feeding.
Based on those facts, and the government’s affirmation that the use of  the restraint chair for 
enteral feeding was modeled after procedures in federal prisons, Judge Gladys Kessler of  the 
U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia upheld the force-feeding procedure in 2009.205 
A 2009 DOD review of  conditions of  confinement at Guantánamo, ordered by the Obama 
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administration, similarly found that the use of  restraint chairs for force-feeding was “lawful and 
humane” in part because the process “is similar to that used by the US Bureau of  Prisons, and 
has been upheld in US federal courts.” 206 
But at least some federal prisons handle hunger strikes very differently, and far less coercively, 
than at Guantánamo. In 2007, federal prisoner Sami al-Arian went on a water-only hunger 
strike for 60 days. Near the end of  the strike, his family reported that his weight dropped from 
202 pounds to 149 pounds, he was unable to walk, and trembled constantly. He was transferred 
to a medical prison, but was not force-fed, though BOP spokesmen publicly said officials 
considered doing so.207 In contrast, based on court documents and press reports about the 
Guantánamo hunger strikes, detainees have been force-fed in a matter of  days or weeks after 
they start refusing meals — long before their lives were in serious danger.  
The written federal guidelines for force-feeding make no mention of  restraints, and include 
several safeguards that are not in place in Guantánamo. Prison guidelines require the warden 
to notify a sentencing judge of  involuntary feeding, with an explanation of  the background of  
and reasons for involuntary feeding, as well as videotaping of  force-feeding. BOP requires that 
“treatment is to be given in accordance with accepted medical practice.” 208 Accepted medical 
practice requires an individualized assessment of  the patient’s situation that appears to be 
absent at Guantánamo. It also requires individualized counseling of  the detainee, but based on 
medical records Guantánamo that “counseling” is frequently limited to a boilerplate warning 
about the dangers of  hunger strike.
The BOP’s written policy on the use of  restraints also conflicts with the restraint-chair protocol 
at Guantánamo. In federal prisons, restraints can be used “to gain control of  an inmate who 
appears to be dangerous because the inmate is assaulting another individual, destroying 
government property, attempting suicide, inflicting injury upon himself  or herself, or displaying 
signs of  imminent violence.” 209 The use of  four-point restraints must be authorized by the 
prison warden if  he finds that they are the “only means available to obtain and maintain 
control over an inmate,” and he cannot delegate this decision. In general, restraints are to be 
used “only when other effective means of  control have failed or are impractical,” and are to be 
removed when an inmate exhibits self-control.210 The regulations make no provision to routine 
or categorical use in cases, regardless of  an individual inmate’s behavior, or the use of  restraints 
in force-feeding. There is no generalized written policy on the use of  the restraint chair, but 
according to the United States’ 2005 report to the Committee Against Torture, “[BOP’s] use of  
restraint chairs is intended only for short-term use, such as transporting an inmate on or off  of  
an airplane.” 211 
At least one federal prison has used restraint chairs for force-feeding: ADX Florence, the highest 
security federal prison in the United States. Press reports frequently refer to the Florence 
“Supermax” as “the Alcatraz of  the Rockies,” and describe it as the most secure prison in the 
world.212 Inmates are sent there if  they cannot be safely housed at other maximum security 
prisons. Many have been convicted of  terrorist attacks, mass-murders, or murders of  guards or 
other inmates at other prisons. 
One former warden at Florence, Robert Hood, told CBS News that he had authorized over 
“350, maybe 400” involuntary feedings of  inmates, and CBS found records of  900 involuntary 
feedings in the prison’s H-wing, which houses convicted terrorists. (As Hood told CBS, the 
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number of  individual prisoners force-fed is likely much lower, because “you could have one 
person, three meals a day for, you know, two months. That adds up.”)213 According to Laura 
Rovner, a clinical law professor who represents several ADX inmates, use of  the restraint 
chair to force-feed inmates is “a pretty widespread practice” at the Florence Supermax. The 
government has redacted descriptions of  the process in court documents, so details of  the 
procedure are unknown. Rovner said that two safeguards that do exist are requirements to 
notify a prisoner’s sentencing judge, and to videotape the force-feeding process.214 
It is unclear when the use of  restraint chair began in Florence. An August 2006 OLC memo 
by Steven Bradbury refers to a recent “coordinated hunger strike among several convicted al 
Qaeda terrorists” held at ADX Florence, in which terrorists “developed a sophisticated method 
to resist compulsory feeding.” 215 The Bradbury memo does not give a specific date for that 
hunger strike, however.
Hunger strikes and force-feeding in the restraint chair continue to this day at Guantánamo, 
as confirmed by a February 14, 2012, visit to the base by Task Force staff. A PowerPoint 
displayed to visitors who tour Guantánamo lists hunger strikes as a means of  detainees 
“continuing the fight.” According to veteran Guantánamo correspondent Carol Rosenberg 
of  The Miami Herald, as of  March 19, 2013 the military acknowledged there were 24 prisoners 
on hunger strike. Eight of  them were being force-fed in restraint chairs. 
Ideal Management of Hunger Strikes
The involvement of  physicians is essential for the management of  hunger strikes. Their roles 
include: recognition and diagnosis of  the hunger strike; assessment of  the competence of  the 
individual, whether the individual is suicidal, or whether there is pressure or coercion from 
other detainees involved; informing and advising the hunger striker regarding expected medical 
developments and outcomes and making decisions about management; treating and dealing with 
medical issues during the course of  the fast; managing periods of  refeeding after fasting; and 
dealing with medical crises and terminal, end-of-life situations. The physician should be involved 
as the hunger striker’s physician, in a trusted, physician-patient relationship with the individual’s 
medical interest held as paramount.
During the course of  the hunger strike, serious medical situations may arise that call for feeding or 
the provision of  nutrition by other means to prevent permanent injury or death. Such situations 
are most likely to occur at the end of  a prolonged hunger strike. Total fasting with ingestion of  
water may go on for weeks and months without immediate risk of  permanent injury or death, 
which usually occurs 55–85 days from the onset of  fasting.216 
At those times, in the context of  continued determination of  competence and absence of  
suicidal intent, physicians should advise the individual of  the medical situation and the need 
for feeding or other forms of  nutrition. The competent, nonsuicidal individual may elect 
to continue the fast or alter it by agreeing to some form of  supplemental nutrition. If  the 
physician determines that the striker is no longer competent, the physician, in the absence 
of  advance directives to the contrary, may elect to proceed with feeding or nutrition. In 
such circumstances, the administration of  nutrition or feeding without the consent of  the 
individual is termed involuntary or force-feeding.
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If  hunger strikers are strong enough to physically resist forced feeding, it is unlikely that they are 
near death. Forced feeding is medically uncalled for in such situations.
Prolonged hunger strikes that proceed to the point of  the likelihood of  permanent injury 
or death pose challenging situations for all. The hunger striker may have maintained the 
commitment to fast understanding the possibility of  death — a commitment that should be 
repeatedly examined and documented during the course of  the hunger strike. Even though the 
individual may not, at the end, be competent or capable of  reiterating that commitment, it may 
have been clearly expressed in an advance directive document declared at a previous time when 
the individual was competent and not suicidal. If  no such directive exists, the physician is left 
to interpret the individual’s wishes. At that point, acting on behalf  of  the best interest of  the 
individual, the physician may elect to institute or recommend the administration of  nutrition. If  
an advanced directive exists, the administration of  nutrition would be contrary to the directive 
with medical and presumably ethical implications. Reportedly, in some cases physicians 
have elected to proceed with or recommend feeding. At such times, all such decisions should 
involve those responsible for the setting or institution. It is at this point also that the responsible 
institution, e.g., a detention center, may elect to order feeding.
Analysis of Ethical Obligations of Health 
Personnel Toward Detainees Undergoing 
Interrogation
The Ethical Obligations of Medical Professionals Toward Detainees
Health care professionals — whether they are psychiatrists, other physicians, physicians’ 
assistants, psychologists, or nurses — have certain obligations to people under their care. The 
most famous statement of  these obligations is the approximately 2000-year-old Hippocratic 
Oath, which promises in part, “In every house where I come, I will enter only for the good of  
my patients.” 
Most medical students recite some form of  the oath before their graduation. Modern ethics 
codes reiterate the fundamental obligations to do good, and not harm, to patients; to respect 
patients’ autonomy and not impose treatments without their consent; and to safeguard their 
confidences.217 Psychologists and other health professionals share these obligations, though they 
do not formally recite the Hippocratic Oath.218
In keeping with these principles, doctors are forbidden from using their professional knowledge to 
help inflict torture or cruelty on anyone. The World Medical Association’s (WMA) Declaration of  
Geneva is a physician’s oath, adopted in the wake of  revelations about atrocities by Nazi doctors, 
that promises “even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of  
humanity.” 219 The WMA’s Declaration of  Tokyo, adopted in 1975, states that a doctor “shall not 
countenance, condone or participate in the practice of  torture or other forms of  cruel, inhuman or 
degrading procedures, whatever the offense of  which the victim of  such procedures is suspected, 
accused or guilty, and whatever the victim’s beliefs or motives, and in all situations, including armed 
conflict and civil strife.” The Declaration of  Tokyo further forbids doctors from being present when 
torture is inflicted or threatened, or providing any “premises, instruments, substances or knowledge 
to facilitate the practice of  torture. … A doctor must have complete clinical independence in 
deciding upon the care of  a person for whom he or she is medically responsible.” 220
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In 1982, the U.N. General Assembly adopted similar principles that applied to all health 
personnel, though with particular force to physicians, stating in part, “It is a contravention of  
medical ethics for health personnel, particularly physicians, to be involved in any professional 
relationship with prisoners or detainees the purpose of  which is not solely to evaluate, protect 
or improve their physical and mental health.” 221 The same document specifically forbids health 
personnel from participation in
any procedure for restraining a prisoner or detainee unless such a procedure is 
determined in accordance with purely medical criteria as being necessary for 
the protection of  the physical or mental health or the safety of  the prisoner or 
detainee himself, of  his fellow prisoners or detainees, or of  his guardians, and 
presents no hazard to his physical or mental health.222
The American Psychological Association and American Psychiatric Association adopted a joint 
resolution supporting these principles in 1985.223 The American College of  Physicians similarly 
stated in its 1992 ethics manual, “Under no circumstances is it ethical for a physician to be used 
as an instrument of  government to weaken the physical or mental resistance of  a human being.” 
The AMA adopted the following policy in December 1999: 
Torture refers to the deliberate, systematic, or wanton administration of  cruel, 
inhumane, and degrading treatments or punishments during imprisonment 
or detainment. Physicians must oppose and must not participate in torture for 
any reason. Participation in torture includes, but is not limited to, providing 
or withholding any services, substances, or knowledge to facilitate the practice 
of  torture. Physicians must not be present when torture is used or threatened. 
Physicians may treat prisoners or detainees if  doing so is in their best interest, 
but physicians should not treat individuals to verify their health so that torture 
can begin or continue. Physicians who treat torture victims should not be 
persecuted. Physicians should help provide support for victims of  torture and, 
whenever possible, strive to change situations in which torture is practiced or 
the potential for torture is great.
Separation of DOD and CIA Medical Personnel from Their Professional 
Ethical Obligations
Soon after September 11, the military adopted a policy that key professional obligations, 
including the duty not to harm, do not apply in situations where the health professional has 
no clinical relationship with the patient. Current military guidelines claim that only medical 
personnel “charged with the medical care of  detainees have a duty to protect detainees’ physical and 
mental health and provide appropriate treatment for disease” 224 (emphasis added). Health 
personnel who do not provide these clinical services, the military asserts, only have an obligation 
to obey the law as it applies to detainees. In 2004, David Tornberg, then the deputy assistant 
secretary of  defense for health affairs, stated that when a doctor participates in interrogation, 
“he’s not functioning as a physician.” 225 In keeping with this position, the Defense Department 
changed key words in the U.N.’s standards of  medical ethics in drafting its own standards for 
treatment of  prisoners.226 While the U.N. principles state that it is a contravention of  medical 
ethics for a physician to have “any professional relationship” with prisoners other than to 
evaluate or seek to improve the individual’s health, the DOD replaced the key language with the 
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more limited phrase, “any patient-clinician relationship.” 227 As discussed further below, every 
professional medical association has rejected this distinction.
The DOD instruction governing medical support of  detainee operations does not require 
health professionals who are not in a clinical relationship with detainees to preserve detainees’ 
well-being and avoid harm. Instead, it refers only to legal requirements: these health 
professionals have an obligation “to uphold the humane treatment of  detainees and to ensure 
that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of  the Department of  Defense, 
regardless of  nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, in accordance with and as defined in U.S. law.” 228 This simply restates a requirement 
to refrain from potentially criminal acts of  cruelty that applies to all service members.
The Department of  Defense does not require that licensed health professionals in its employ 
adhere to the ethical standards set by their professional associations, stating: 
The DOD requires that all military professionals perform their duties in an 
ethical manner, consistent with their professional ethics although they are 
neither required to join nor adhere to the policies of  any specific professional 
organization.229 
Instead, the Army Medical Command and Office of  the Surgeon General have made their 
own determinations about whether military health professionals’ conduct complies with their 
professional obligations. The Office of  the Surgeon General has determined that acting as 
BSCTs is an “ethical practice consistent with medical and psychological ethics,” 230 and that,
[a]lthough physicians who provide medical care to detainees should not be 
involved in decisions whether or not to interrogate because such decisions are 
unrelated to medicine or the health interests of  an individual, physicians who 
are not providing medical care to detainees may provide such information if  
warranted by compelling national security interests.231
DOD asserts that these policies are consistent with an AMA call for “balancing obligations to 
society against those to individuals.” 232 As discussed below, this is not accurate. 
Far less is known about the CIA’s ethical guidance concerning the role of  medical and mental 
health personnel in interrogation and detainee treatment, due to the level of  secrecy that 
surrounds the program. The only available documentation of  the CIA’s policies are the 
OMS guidelines discussed above, which outline a role for clinicians that clearly conflicts with 
their professional obligations. The alleged participation of  “psychologists/interrogators” in 
administering brutal techniques like waterboarding is an even clearer conflict.
Doctors and psychologists serving in the field were forbidden from revealing what was 
happening, or discussing these issues with civilian practitioners. Even those disturbed by 
abusive interrogations could not discuss their objections outside the chain of  command. As 
Gelles stated, “it was classified. …There are laws about talking about classified information in 
unclassified arenas.”
Because of  these restrictions, the medical and mental health professions had little awareness of  
widespread U.S. mistreatment of  detainees before Abu Ghraib. There was even less knowledge 
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of  the role of  medical and mental health professionals in that treatment. The first reports of  
clinicians’ complicity in abuse at Guantánamo were published in late 2004, and the military 
vehemently denied them. The corroborating evidence emerged over the course of  several years. 
James Mitchell’s and Bruce Jessen’s role in designing the CIA interrogation program was not 
reported until 2007, and the official documents confirming clinicians’ essential role in the CIA 
program were released still later.
Revisions to Professional Guidelines Regarding Participation in Abuse After 
September 11
When clinicians’ role in abusive interrogations did become public, the American College of  
Physicians, American Medical Association, and American Psychiatric Association reacted with 
dismay. All three associations rejected the government’s argument that medical professionals 
advising interrogators were not acting as doctors and were exempt from their normal 
professional ethical standards. Instead, they further tightened their restrictions, to forbid 
members from participating in any interrogation. 
In November 2005, the American College of  Physicians wrote to the Department of  Defense, 
rejecting the distinction DOD drew between doctors who “have a provider-patient treatment 
relationship” with detainees and those who do not, because “[t]his distinction leaves open the 
possibility for physician involvement in interrogations, which is inconsistent with ACP policy 
regarding the physician’s role as healer and promoter of  health and human rights.” 233 In 
2008, it revised its ethics manual to state more clearly that “[p]hysicians must not conduct, 
participate in, monitor, or be present at interrogations, or participate in developing or evaluating 
interrogation strategies or techniques.” 234 
The American Psychiatric Association issued a formal resolution in 2006, declaring that 
physicians should not conduct, monitor or directly participate in the interrogation of  prisoners 
or detainees, regardless of  whether torture or abuse is occurring. The full resolution states:
1. The American Psychiatric Association reiterates its position that 
psychiatrists should not participate in, or otherwise assist or facilitate, the 
commission of  torture of  any person. Psychiatrists who become aware that 
torture has occurred, is occurring, or in a position has been planned must 
report it promptly to a person or persons to take corrective action.
2. a) Every person in military or civilian detention, whether in the United 
States or elsewhere, is entitled to appropriate medical care under domestic 
and international humanitarian law. 
b) Psychiatrists providing medical care to individual detainees owe their 
primary obligation to the well-being of  their patients, including advocating 
for their patients, and should not participate or assist in any way, whether 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in the interrogation of  their 
patients on behalf  of  military or civilian agencies or law enforcement 
authorities. 
c) Psychiatrists should not disclose any part of  the medical records of  any 
patient, or information derived from the treatment relationship, to persons 
conducting interrogation of  the detainee. 
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d) This paragraph is not meant to preclude treating psychiatrists who 
become aware that the detainee may pose a significant threat of  harm to 
him/herself  or to others from ascertaining the nature and the seriousness 
of  the threat or from notifying appropriate authorities of  that threat, 
consistent with the obligations applicable to other treatment relationships.
3. No psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of  persons held 
in custody by military or civilian investigative or law enforcement authorities, 
whether in the United States or elsewhere. Direct participation includes being 
present in the interrogation room, asking or suggesting questions, or advising 
authorities on the use of  specific techniques of  interrogation with particular 
detainees. However, psychiatrists may provide training to military or civilian 
investigative or law enforcement personnel on recognizing and responding 
to persons with mental illnesses, on the possible medical and psychological 
effects of  particular techniques and conditions of  interrogation, and on other 
areas within their professional expertise235
Dr. Sharfstein, former president of  the American Psychiatric Association, said that psychiatrists 
found participating in interrogation “without the consent of  individuals” in “highly coercive 
settings” to be incompatible with doctors’ Hippocratic commitment to do no harm, and “the 
trust that people need to put into us.” He said that while the controversy over Guantánamo was 
what prompted the resolution, the issue “when we thought about it … clearly was beyond just 
the war on terror.” 236 
When the American Psychiatric Association adopted its position, Sharfstein noted that it was 
a position statement rather than an enforceable ethical rule, and assured military psychiatrists 
that they “wouldn’t get in trouble with the APA” for following orders that violated it.237 Dr. M. 
Gregg Bloche, a law professor as well as a psychiatrist, has criticized this assurance as a way for 
the psychiatric association to appear to take a strong position while signaling to the military that 
they would look the other way if  psychiatrists continued to participate.238 
In response to these criticisms, Sharfstein said, “We’re a voluntary association. There is an 
ethics process” for complaints, but “the only sanction available” is to reprimand, sanction, 
or expel members from the association. In general, as soon as an investigation starts for any 
infraction, “they resign, and the only thing we can do is make public the fact that they resigned 
under investigation. … We don’t have any police power like a licensing board.” He said that the 
American Psychiatric Association’s position was a philosophical position that would allow people 
in the military to say, when ordered to assist in interrogations, that it would be contrary to their 
professional ethical society’s instructions, but “[w]hether that’s effective or not, I don’t know.” 239
A few months after the American Psychiatric Association’s resolution, the American Medical 
Association adopted a very similar position. The AMA stated that:
(1) Physicians may perform physical and mental assessments of  detainees to determine 
the need for and to provide medical care. When so doing, physicians must disclose 
to the detainee the extent to which others have access to information included in 
medical records. Treatment must never be conditional on a patient’s participation 
in an interrogation.
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(2) Physicians must neither conduct nor directly participate in an interrogation, 
because a role as physician-interrogator undermines the physician’s role as healer 
and thereby erodes trust in the individual physician-interrogator and in the medical 
profession.
(3) Physicians must not monitor interrogations with the intention of  intervening in the 
process, because this constitutes direct participation in the interrogation.
(4) Physicians may participate in developing effective interrogation strategies for general 
training purposes. These strategies must not threaten or cause physical injury or 
mental suffering and must be humane and respect the rights of  individuals. 
(5) When physicians have reason to believe that interrogations are coercive, they must 
report their observations to the appropriate authorities. If  authorities are aware of  
coercive interrogations but have not intervened, physicians are ethically obligated to 
report the offenses to independent authorities that have the power to investigate or 
adjudicate such allegations.
In 2008, the American College of  Physicians adopted the following statement:
Physicians must not be party to and must speak out against torture or other 
abuses of  human rights.
Participation by physicians in the execution of  prisoners except to certify death 
is unethical.
Under no circumstances is it ethical for a physician to be used as an instrument 
of  government to weaken the physical or mental resistance of  a human being, 
nor should a physician participate in or tolerate cruel or unusual punishment or 
disciplinary activities beyond those permitted by the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners.
Physicians must not conduct, participate in, monitor, or be present at 
interrogations, or participate in developing or evaluating interrogation 
strategies or techniques.
A physician who becomes aware of  abusive or coercive practices has a duty to 
report those practices to the appropriate authorities and advocate for necessary 
medical care.
Exploiting, sharing, or using medical information from any source for 
interrogation purposes is unethical. 
The World Medical Association revised its Tokyo Declaration to similar effect.240
In contrast to the medical association’s ban on participation in interrogation, the American 
Psychological Association (APA) has taken the position that it can be ethical for psychologists to 
advise interrogators — a decision that many psychologists strongly oppose. In 2005, the APA’s 
official Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS Task Force), while 
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reaffirming its opposition to any form of  torture or cruel treatment, concluded that 
it is consistent with the APA Ethics Code for psychologists to serve in 
consultative roles to interrogation and information-gathering processes for 
national security-related purposes. … [P]sychologists are in a unique position to 
assist in ensuring that these processes are safe and ethical for all participants.241
The PENS Task Force declined to “render any judgment concerning events that may or 
may not have occurred in national security-related settings” 242 Most of  its other prohibitions 
contained similar caveats. The PENS Task Force found that psychologists had an ethical 
responsibility to report abuse to authorities, but made no recommendations about what actions 
to take if  authorities failed to adequately respond. The PENS Task Force also recommended 
that APA members “guard against the names of  individual psychologists [suspected of  abuse] 
being disseminated to the public.” Psychologists advising interrogators were forbidden from 
using “health care related information from an individual’s medical record to the detriment 
of  the individual’s safety and well-being,” but could use such information for other purposes, 
because it might be “helpful or necessary to ensure that an interrogation process remains safe.” 
Psychologists were required to tell detainees that they were not acting as health professionals, 
and that the detainees should not expect confidentiality.243 
The PENS report prohibits psychologists from engaging “in behaviors that violate the laws of  
the United States,” but notes that “such rules and regulations have been significantly developed 
and refined” in the course of  recent operations. It does not prohibit psychologists from violating 
international law (except to the extent that the “refined” version of  U.S. law incorporates it), a 
deliberate omission. 
The PENS report’s conclusions, and the process preceded them, have led to years of  bitter 
debate within the psychological profession and a number of  resignations from the APA. 
The PENS Task Force had nine voting members, whose identities and affiliations were kept 
confidential in advance of  the report. 244 Six of  the nine had some professional connection to the 
U.S. military or intelligence community.245 
The three civilian members of  the PENS Task Force have all expressed some degree of  
regret about their role in the group, although they had signed on to the original report. One 
member, Michael Wessells, resigned from the task force, and told reporter Amy Goodman 
that he regarded it as “predominantly a national security establishment operation” rather 
than a “representative dialogue” of  psychologists.246 Another, Jean Maria Arrigo, became so 
disillusioned with the report that she released her notes and the PENS email Listserv to the 
public despite a prior vote by task force members that the proceedings would be confidential.247 
She has been one of  the leading voices calling for the report’s nullification. 
Before the report was finalized, the civilian members of  the PENS Task Force were not aware of  
psychologists’ central role in designing and implementing coercive interrogations. When Arrigo 
asked the group whether the APA should “exclude from membership psychologists who intentionally 
or negligently contribute to coercive interrogation,” 248 Larry James wrote in response:
it was psychologists who fixed the problems and not caused it. This is a 
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factual statement! the fact of  the matter is that since Jan 2003, where ever 
[sic] we have had psychologists no abuses have been reported.249
Morgan Banks reassured Arrigo, in response to a question about potential offensive use 
of  SERE techniques, that the Army’s SERE school makes clear that it is illegal for U.S. 
forces to apply the techniques. Michael Gelles warned in general terms about potential 
ethical pitfalls for psychologists, but could not discuss the specific abuses that had occurred. 
Gelles said that he was comfortable with the PENS report, and his position has always been 
that “psychologists should be involved, no two ways about it. They should just have the 
appropriate training and the appropriate experience with the appropriate controls in play.”250 
Stephen Soldz, a psychologist at the Boston Graduate School of  Psychoanalysis, was one of  
the founders of  the Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, which opposes any participation of  
psychologists in interrogation. Soldz said in an interview that he regards the PENS report as 
“a rigged committee and a rigged process,” and the product of  an undisclosed relationship 
between the APA and U.S. intelligence agencies.251 
In 2007, in response to critics of  the PENS report, the APA passed a resolution specifying 
techniques that it considered torturous or cruel, and adopting the standards of  the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment. In 2008, it amended the resolution to address concerns about potential loopholes. 
The text currently bans 
mock executions; water-boarding or any other form of  simulated drowning 
or suffocation; sexual humiliation; rape; cultural or religious humiliation; 
exploitation of  fears, phobias or psychopathology; induced hypothermia; 
the use of  psychotropic drugs or mind-altering substances; hooding; forced 
nakedness; stress positions; the use of  dogs to threaten or intimidate; physical 
assault including slapping or shaking; exposure to extreme heat or cold; 
threats of  harm or death; isolation; sensory deprivation and over-stimulation; 
sleep deprivation; or the threatened use of  any of  the above techniques to an 
individual or to members of  an individual’s family.252
Also in 2008, APA members approved a referendum resolving that psychologists cannot work
in settings where persons are held outside of, or in violation of, either 
International Law … or the US Constitution (where appropriate), unless they 
are working directly for the persons being detained or for an independent third 
party working to protect human rights.253
Eight-thousand, seven hundred and ninety-two APA members voted for the referendum, while 
6,157 voted against.
Soldz does not consider these steps sufficient, and is still working to get the PENS report 
nullified. He stated, “what intelligence people told us over and over that what matters is 
having [psychologists] people there. Once there, they’re under command, and they’ll do 
what they’re told,” and cannot be effectively monitored because “it’s classified.” Soldz 
noted that neither the APA nor any state licensing board has ever acted on an ethics 
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complaint against psychologists.254
Complaints Against Individual Practitioners
In 2010, the APA wrote to the Texas State Board of  Examiners of  Psychologists regarding 
an ethics complaint filed against James Mitchell. The APA noted that Mitchell was not a 
member, but “[i]f  any psychologist member of  APA were proven to have committed the 
alleged acts as set forth in the Complaint before the Board, he or she would be expelled from 
the APA membership” and referred to his state’s licensing board with the “expectation that the 
individual’s state license to practice psychology would be revoked.” 255 
The Texas board dismissed the complaint against Mitchell after a hearing on February 10, 2011, 
at which Mitchell and his counsel were present. The board has not commented on the reasons 
for dismissal, saying it is legally forbidden from disclosing anything about a complaint that does 
not result in disciplinary action. Mitchell has told the press that the complaint against him was 
“riddled throughout with fabricated details, lies, distortions and inaccuracies,” but gave no specific 
details because he was “not free to discuss any work I may have done for the CIA.” 256 
Every other ethics complaint against a health professional in connection with post–September 
11 abuses has likewise failed to result in disciplinary action, including complaints against John 
Leso in New York, Larry James in Louisiana and Ohio, Diane Zierhoffer in Alabama, and John 
Edmondson in California. The APA itself  has not made any formal response to a complaint 
against Leso, which has now been pending for several years. 
Michael Gelles, despite his differences with Leso, Mitchell, Jessen, and other advocates of  
“enhanced” techniques, fully supports the lack of  any professional sanctions. Gelles said, “the 
fact that they’re still chasing these psychologists in these ridiculous court cases, whoever files 
those suits should be disciplined.” Gelles does support “the accounting of  history,” but not “an 
accountability of  individuals.” 257 
Others strongly disagree. The Texas complaint against James Mitchell noted that psychologists 
licensed in Texas are required to “report conduct by a licensee that appears to involve harm or the 
potential for harm to any individual, or a violation of  Board rule, a state law or federal law.” 258 
Stephen Xenakis, a psychiatrist and retired Army Brigadier General, and Leonard Rubenstein, 
the president of  Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), have called the failure to publicly investigate 
or discipline any health professional for involvement in torture “an unconscionable disservice to 
the thousands of  ethical doctors and psychologists in the country’s service.” 259 PHR has advocated 
on behalf  of  legislation in Massachusetts and New York that would make it easier to sanction 
health professionals who participate in unethical treatment of  detainees. 260 
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
Whether or not the APA fully abandons the PENS report, there is a clear consensus within 
the medical and mental health professions that certifying that brutal interrogation techniques 
and conditions of  confinement fall short of  torture, or participating in interrogations like Abu 
Zubaydah’s or al Qahtani’s, are grave violations of  professional ethics. Failing to report torture 
is equally unacceptable. 
What is not clear is how to enforce these norms. Professional medical and psychological 
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associations do not have authority over licensure, nor do they have any authority over clinicians 
who are not members. They can investigate allegations against members, but remedies are 
limited — and the APA has declined to pursue such investigations. More importantly, state 
licensing boards have proved unable or unwilling to discipline the individual psychologists 
accused of  abuses — likely because of  the absence of  clear rules and procedures that enable 
state boards to discipline doctors and psychologists for complicity in abuse, and the constraints of  
government secrecy. The identities of  individual physicians, nurses or physicians’ assistants who 
participated in the OMS’s medical monitoring at CIA black sites have never been made public. 
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Central to the debate on the use of  “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of  whether 
those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. If  the techniques are the only way to get actionable 
intelligence that prevents terrorist attacks, their use presents a moral dilemma for some. On the other 
hand, if  brutality does not produce useful intelligence — that is, it is not better at getting information 
than other methods — the debate is moot. This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of  the CIA’s enhanced 
interrogation technique program. There are far fewer people who defend brutal interrogations by the 
military. Most of  the military’s mistreatment of  captives was not authorized in detail at high levels, 
and some was entirely unauthorized. Many military captives were either foot soldiers or were entirely 
innocent, and had no valuable intelligence to reveal. Many of  the perpetrators of  abuse in the military 
were young interrogators with limited training and experience, or were not interrogators at all.
The officials who authorized the CIA’s interrogation program have consistently maintained that it 
produced useful intelligence, led to the capture of  terrorist suspects, disrupted terrorist attacks, and saved 
American lives. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a 2009 speech, stated that the enhanced interrogation of  
captives “prevented the violent death of  thousands, if  not hundreds of  thousands, of  innocent people.” 
President George W. Bush similarly stated in his memoirs that “[t]he CIA interrogation program saved 
lives,” and “helped break up plots to attack military and diplomatic facilities abroad, Heathrow Airport 
and Canary Wharf  in London, and multiple targets in the United States.” John Brennan, President 
Obama’s recent nominee for CIA director, said, of  the CIA’s program in a televised interview in 2007, 
“[t]here [has] been a lot of  information that has come out from these interrogation procedures. … It 
has saved lives.” However, during his February 2013 confirmation hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Brennan said his initial review of  the intelligence committee’s report “call[ed] 
into question a lot of  the information that I was provided earlier on.”
The purported efficacy of  the techniques was essential to their authorization as legal by the Justice 
Department’s Office of  Legal Counsel during the second Bush administration. It analyzed the Fifth 
Amendment’s bar on executive-branch behavior that would “shock the conscience”; such behavior, the 
Justice Department reasoned, was clearly illegal. That memo, written by Assistant Attorney General Steven 
Bradbury, acknowledged “use of  coercive interrogation techniques in other contexts — in different settings, 
for other purposes, or absent the CIA’s safeguards — might be thought to ‘shock the conscience.’ ” 
However, the memo assured, because these techniques were effective and were “limited to further a vital 
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government interest and designed to avoid unnecessary or serious harm, we conclude that it cannot be said 
to be constitutionally arbitrary.”
Others, including experienced interrogators and those with personal knowledge of  the CIA program, 
are extremely skeptical of  these claims. For example, President Obama’s former National Director 
of  Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair is reported to have told colleagues in a private memo, “High 
value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used and provided a deeper 
understanding of  the al Qa’ida organization that was attacking this country.” Blair amended his 
remarks in a written statement several days later and said: 
The information gained from these techniques was valuable in some instances, but there 
is no way of  knowing whether the same information could have been obtained through 
other means. … The bottom line is these techniques have hurt our image around the 
world, the damage they have done to our interests far outweighed whatever benefit they 
gave us and they are not essential to our national security.1 
Others who have seen the intelligence remain unimpressed. Critics with top secret security clearances 
who have seen the intelligence and remain skeptical include Robert Mueller, the director of  the FBI.2 In 
2009 President Obama asked Michael Hayden, then the CIA director, to give a classified briefing on the 
program to three intelligence experts: Chuck Hagel, former Republican senator from Nebraska and, now, 
newly confirmed as secretary of  defense; Jeffrey Smith, former general counsel to the CIA; and David 
Boren, a retired Democratic senator from Oklahoma.3 Despite Hayden’s efforts, the three men left the 
briefing very unconvinced.4 
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the claims about efficacy given the amount of  information about the CIA 
program that remains classified. Given their central role in Al Qaeda, it is certainly plausible that high-
value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave up some useful intelligence after their brutal treatment. 
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Assertions of Useful Information 
Obtained Through Coercion
The Death of Osama bin Laden
After Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in May 2011, defenders of  the CIA program 
were quick to claim that enhanced interrogation was essential to the operation. Their claim has 
seeped into and been reinforced in popular culture. Most recently, in late 2012, the Kathryn 
Bigelow-directed Hollywood film, Zero Dark Thirty, portrayed enhanced interrogation as having 
led to valuable intelligence leading to bin Laden’s capture. 
The CIA located bin Laden through his most trusted courier, a man known within Al Qaeda by 
the nom de guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti (or Sheikh Abu Ahmed) and to neighbors in Pakistan as 
Arshad Khan. According to journalist Peter Bergen, his real name was Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed.5 
The courier was fluent in both Pashto and Arabic, and was a trusted aide of  Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libi as well as bin Laden.
Days after the raid in Abbottabad, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey wrote an op-ed titled 
“The Waterboarding Trail to Bin Laden.” The intelligence that led to the raid, Mukasey asserted,
began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who broke 
like a dam under the pressure of  harsh interrogation techniques that included 
waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of  information — including eventually the 
nickname of  a trusted courier of  bin Laden.6
It later became apparent that this account was wrong. KSM hadn’t revealed the courier’s 
alias. According to an American official familiar with KSM’s interrogation, KSM wasn’t 
asked about al-Kuwaiti until the fall of  2003, months after his waterboarding had concluded.7 
KSM reportedly acknowledged having known al-Kuwaiti but told his interrogators al-Kuwaiti 
was “retired” and of  little significance.8 Supporters of  enhanced interrogation nevertheless 
continued to claim that the program had led to bin Laden’s death. A month after the raid, 
former CIA director Michael Hayden acknowledged that Mohammed had never revealed the 
courier’s name, but wrote that “it is nearly impossible to imagine” how bin Laden could have 
been captured or killed without intelligence gained from the CIA program.9 Hayden compared 
those who dispute the efficacy of  the techniques to “9/11 ‘truthers’ who, lacking any evidence 
whatsoever, claim that 9/11 was a Bush administration plot” or “the ‘birthers’ who, even in the 
face of  clear contrary evidence, take as an article of  faith that President Obama was not born in 
the United States.”10
The first detainee to tell U.S. officials about al-Kuwaiti appears to have been Mohammed al 
Qahtani, whose military interrogation, including torture, at Guantánamo in November and 
December 2002 is discussed elsewhere [see Chapters 1 and 6]. According to a government 
intelligence assessment of  al Qahtani, in 2003 al Qahtani told interrogators that he had 
received computer training in Pakistan from an operative named Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.11 Al 
Qahtani said al-Kuwaiti had taken him to an Internet café in Karachi to show him how to 
use email.12 
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But according to Bergen, there was “no sense as of  yet” that al-Kuwaiti was bin Laden’s trusted 
courier, and his “was just one of  many hundreds of  names and aliases of  Al Qaeda members 
and associates that interrogators were learning in 2002 and 2003” from Guantánamo and 
elsewhere.13 Some of  this information was contradictory, or false. Mohamedou Ould Slahi, like 
al Qahtani identified as a high-value detainee and subjected to a brutal “special interrogation 
plan” at Guantánamo, told interrogators that Ahmed al-Kuwaiti was wounded fleeing Tora 
Bora and died in the arms of  another Guantánamo captive.14 
More important than al Qahtani’s information seems to have been the interrogation of  Hassan 
Ghul, apprehended in Iraq on January 23, 2004.15 The Associated Press first reported on Ghul’s 
role in identifying al-Kuwaiti, quoting an intelligence official who said that “Hassan Ghul was 
the linchpin.” 16 Ghul had told interrogators that al-Kuwaiti was close to Abu Faraj al-Libi, but 
both al-Libi and KSM vehemently denied his importance. 
Former CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jose Rodriguez gave a similar account in his 
memoir defending CIA interrogations. Rodriguez does not identify Ghul by name, but does 
refer to an Al Qaeda operative captured in 2004 who was delivering information between Al 
Qaeda and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network in Iraq:
We moved him to a black site and began the effort to find out what other 
information he might have that we could exploit. Initially, he played the role of  
a tough mujahideen and refused to cooperate. We then received permission to 
use some (but not all) of  the EIT procedures on him. Before long he became 
compliant and started to provide some excellent information. …
He told us that bin Ladin [sic] conducted business by using a trusted courier 
with whom he was in contact only sporadically. … We pressed him on who 
this courier was and he said all he knew was a pseudonym: “Abu Ahmed al 
Kuwaiti.” This was a critical bit of  information about the man who would 
eventually lead us to Bin Laden.17
Much remains unknown about the details of  Ghul’s time as a CIA prisoner. Some officials 
familiar with the still-classified records of  Ghul’s interrogation argue that the case that the 
information Ghul provided was as a result of  “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs) is far 
from proven.18 In May 2011 Sen. Dianne Feinstein told Reuters about a CIA detainee who “did 
provide useful and accurate intelligence.” But she added at the time: “This was acquired before 
the CIA used their enhanced interrogation techniques against the detainee.” Three U.S. officials 
told Reuters that Feinstein was referring to Ghul.19
Rodriguez acknowledged that Abu Faraj al-Libi and KSM refused to provide further information 
about the courier, but wrote that even their emphatic denials were valuable confirmation of  his 
importance.20 Armed with Ghul’s account of  the courier’s significance, interrogators asked KSM 
again about al-Kuwaiti.21 KSM stuck to his story that he had given months earlier.22 After al-
Libi was captured in May 2005 and turned over to the CIA, al-Libi denied knowing al-Kuwaiti 
and gave a different name for bin Laden’s courier, whom he called Maulawi Jan.23 CIA analysts 
would never find such a person and eventually concluded that the name was al-Libi’s invention.24 
According to Rodriguez, an even-clearer signal came when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed attempted 
to send another detainee a warning to “tell them nothing about the courier.”25 
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Here we have a curious instance of  Rodriguez arguing that after waterboarding  
and sleep deprivation had rendered KSM compliant, he attempted to deceive his    
interrogators. But Rodriguez argued that deceptiveness proved the usefulness of  the 
technique. It’s at least as plausible that KSM would have been equally motivated 
to withhold information about bin Laden, and instruct others to do the same, 
without being waterboarded 183 times. Rodriguez nevertheless maintains that the 
techniques were necessary because “without EITs [Al Qaeda] operatives would 
have little incentive to tell us anything.”26 
As discussed further below, however, there is considerable evidence of  suspects 
giving intelligence to interrogators in the absence of  coercion. Rodriguez himself  
has acknowledged that traditional interrogation can produce results “when you 
have all the time in the world,” but argued that
We didn’t have that luxury. We feared and anticipated a second wave of  
devastating attacks on the United States. You could not see a time bomb, but 
we could not miss the sound of  one ticking.27
It was, of  course, years after these interrogations that bin Laden was found. To the extent timing 
was a factor, many times in the years between 2003 and 2011 the trail for bin Laden went 
cold. Tommy Vietor, spokesman for the National Security Council, told The New York Times: 
“The bottom line is this: If  we had some kind of  smoking-gun intelligence from waterboarding 
in 2003, we would have taken out Osama bin Laden in 2003.” Vietor continued, “It took 
years of  collection and analysis from many different sources to develop the case that enabled 
us to identify this compound, and reach a judgment that bin Laden was likely to be living 
there.” 28 When detainees provide false information so as to avoid mistreatment or the threat 
of  mistreatment, resources are diverted to track down false information and torture becomes 
counterproductive. Former FBI agent and interrogation expert Joe Navarro told Task Force 
staff  “You spend time on bad leads. [Bad leads] eat up time.” 29
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Carl Levin, chairs of  the committees on Intelligence and Armed 
Services, have bluntly stated that Hayden’s, Rodriguez’s and Mukasey’s assertions about the role 
of  torture in the bin Laden raid are “wrong” and uncorroborated by CIA records. According 
to Feinstein and Levin, based on the Intelligence Committee’s staff  investigation of  the CIA 
program, the original lead information on the bin Laden courier
had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the 
courier that was collected from a variety of  classified sources. While the CIA’s 
enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM and al-Libbi, the pair 
provided false and misleading information during their time in CIA custody.30 
Feinstein and Levin stated that a third detainee, presumably Hassan Ghul, “did provide relevant 
information” about al-Kuwaiti, but “he did so the day before he was interrogated by the CIA 
using their coercive interrogation techniques.” They also noted that “[d]etainees whom the CIA 
believed to have information on [bin Laden’s] location provided no locational information, even 
after significant use of  the CIA’s coercive interrogation techniques.”31
“The bottom 
line is this: If we 




2003, we would 
have taken out 
Osama bin Laden 
in 2003.” 
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The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah
Abu Zubaydah was the first detainee subjected to coercive interrogation by the CIA, at a 
“black site” in Thailand, and accounts of  his interrogation are central to the dispute about the 
efficacy of  brutal interrogations. Supporters and opponents of  the CIA program — including 
FBI interrogators and CIA officials with firsthand knowledge — have given vastly different 
accounts of  his interrogation and the intelligence it produced. These are differences that have 
legal as well as policy implications; the purported efficacy of  the CIA’s techniques on Abu 
Zubaydah and other high-value detainees was essential to their re-authorization by the Justice 
Department’s Office of  Legal Counsel (OLC) in 2005. 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, the CIA sought review of  its interrogation program by OLC 
at several points in the years after September 11. Initially, in 2002, OLC had told the CIA its 
proposed techniques were within the law. In 2004 OLC withdrew that advice to the CIA, and 
re-examined the lawfulness of  the techniques that the CIA had already used. As part of  OLC’s 
review process, the CIA provided Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury with information 
on the prior effectiveness of  the enhanced interrogation program. Some of  the CIA’s claims 
were clearly false. One CIA memo to OLC asserted:
Abu Zubaydah provided significant information on two operatives, Jose Padilla 
and Binyam Mohammed, who planned to build and detonate a “dirty bomb” 
in the Washington D.C. area. Zubaydah’s reporting led to the arrest of  Padilla 
on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003.32
In fact, Padilla had been arrested in May of  2002, not May of  2003, and OLC had not signed 
off  on the CIA program until August 2002.
Bradbury’s May 30, 2005, memo relied on this and several other inaccurate or contested CIA 
assertions about information gained from the use of  enhanced techniques on Abu Zubaydah. 
Among the contested assertions were:
 • “The CIA used the waterboard extensively in the interrogations of  KSM and Zubaydah, but 
did so only after it became clear that standard interrogation techniques were not working.” 33 
 • “Interrogations of  Zubaydah — again, once enhanced techniques were employed 
— furnished detailed information regarding al Qaeda’s ‘organizational structure, key 
operatives, and modus operandi’ and identified KSM as the mastermind of  the September 
11 attacks. … You have informed us that Zubaydah also ‘provided significant information 
on two operatives, [including] Jose Padilla[,] who planned to build and detonate a dirty 
bomb in the Washington DC area.’ ” 34
Based on these and similar assertions, Bradbury concluded the high-value detainee program 
was not “conduct that would shock the contemporary conscience,” and thus would not 
violate the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment or Article 16 of  the Convention Against Torture’s 
prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Bradbury acknowledged that the 
“use of  coercive interrogation techniques in other contexts — in different settings, for other 
purposes, or absent the CIA’s safeguards — might be thought to ‘shock the conscience.’ ” But 
he found that due to the strength of  the government’s interest in protecting the nation, and the 
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CIA’s belief  that coercive interrogation “has been a key reason al-Qa’ida has failed to launch 
a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001,” the program “cannot be said to be 
constitutionally arbitrary.”
When Bradbury was later interviewed by the DOJ’s Office of  Professional Responsibility (OPR), 
he acknowledged having relied entirely on the CIA for its representations on the effectiveness of  
its program and did not question the information he was given. Bradbury told OPR “it’s not my 
role, really, to do a factual investigation of  that.” 35 Former CIA Acting General Counsel John 
Rizzo, a defender of  the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program, told Task Force staff
I trusted the people that were conducting the program, not just the people, 
the interrogators, but the analysts that were taking the information, vetting it, 
preparing it into other reports. …
I trusted, I knew the people who were doing this, I trusted their integrity, 
their judgment. When they conclude that the information they were getting is 
reliable and actionable, I agreed to accept it.36
Rizzo also told Task Force staff  the controversy on the effectiveness of  the techniques “has 
gotten very long legs” and he now supports declassifying as much information as possible 
about the CIA program in light of  the Obama administration’s decision to declassify the Bush 
administration’s OLC memoranda on the subject.37 
According to Ali Soufan, one of  the FBI agents who first interrogated Abu Zubaydah at the 
black site in Thailand, the OLC memo and the CIA representations on which it relied were 
riddled with falsehoods. In an interview with Task Force staff, Soufan said that Abu Zubaydah 
“identified KSM as a mastermind” of  September 11 before even the [CIA personnel and 
contractors] arrived” at the black site.38 Jose Rodriguez acknowledged in his memoirs that Abu 
Zubaydah named KSM as “Mukhtar,” the mastermind of  September 11 “long before he was 
subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” 39
Abu Zubaydah’s revelation about Jose Padilla came later. Soufan said it occurred after CIA 
contractors had begun using nudity and sleep deprivation on Abu Zubaydah, but long before 
waterboarding and the full range of  enhanced techniques were approved. As Soufan noted, the 
actual date of  Padilla’s arrest appears to confirm this; Padilla was arrested in May 2002, and 
waterboarding was not approved until August 2002. 
Jose Rodriguez suggests in his book that depriving Abu Zubaydah of  sleep contributed to 
his identification of  Jose Padilla. Soufan wrote in his memoir that the opposite was true. Abu 
Zubaydah stopped talking when CIA contractors began to use nudity and sleep deprivation. 
He said that Abu Zubaydah’s refusal to talk was the only reason the CIA had authorized 
Soufan and his partner to interrogate Abu Zubaydah again.40 Soufan said in an interview that 
the information Abu Zubaydah revealed during the early period of  his interrogation was not 
restricted to KSM’s alias and Padilla: “[I]t’s not only Padilla, it’s basically everything. Everything 
that we know about Abu Zubaydah came from when we arrested him until May.” 41
Many details of  Soufan’s account of  the Abu Zubaydah interrogation were redacted from his 
book on national security grounds by the CIA’s Publication Review Board — including, it seems, 
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every instance where Soufan used the pronouns “I” or “we,” and most of  the descriptions 
of  intelligence that Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI. Soufan told Task Force staff  that he 
believed these redactions were unjustified by the need to protect national security: “They are 
declassifying documents that were found in bin Laden’s house, for heaven’s sake, you want to tell 
me that my notes on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation now are so classified?” He noted that most 
of  the operatives named are either “dead or in Gitmo,” and other information discussed was 
similarly dated. He said that if  his notes showed that 
I waterboarded the guy and he gave me the information, then it won’t be off-
limits. Then they would probably put me on every TV station. … [I]f  I said I 
waterboarded him, they would be like absolutely, put it in, it’s unredacted, you 
can do whatever you want with it. 42
Rodriguez’s book does contain some unredacted anecdotes about Soufan’s interrogation of  
Abu Zubaydah, as well as detailed assertions about the application of  enhanced interrogation 
techniques to individual detainees, the techniques’ effects on detainees and their reactions to 
them, and detainees’ conditions of  confinement. Rodriguez’s book also includes a number of  
purported quotations from Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, other CIA detainees, 
and their interrogators at the black sites, though their precise sourcing is unclear. Rodriguez 
wrote that Abu Zubaydah later told CIA interrogators that 
he respected all of  our team … except for a Muslim FBI agent, who had 
offended him early on. The agent, it turned out, had tried to debate Islamic 
theory with AZ [Abu Zubaydah], who thought the agent had insufficient 
grounding in the facts. …
At one point the Bureau guys decided to try to “recruit” AZ. In a meeting 
with the terrorist, the Arab-American agent told AZ, “Don’t pay attention to 
those CIA people … you work with me,” and he gave him a candy bar. AZ was 
offended that the agent would think that he could be bought for a Snickers bar. 
The FBI man tried to use his Arab heritage as an opening to get AZ to talk, but 
it turned out to be counterproductive. “You are the worst kind of  Arab,” AZ 
told him, “you are a traitor!”
Soufan said all of  this was inaccurate. He said that while he had successfully interrogated other 
Al Qaeda operatives by discussing Islam with them, he did not do that with Abu Zubaydah 
because Abu Zubaydah seemed less religiously motivated than many other detainees. At times, 
Soufan said, “I felt that [I was] talking to a Che Guevara, from what I read about Che, rather 
than talking to an Islamic extremist.” He received long lectures from Abu Zubaydah about 
“how corporations are actually running the world, running America.” Regarding the claim 
about the candy bar, Soufan pointed out that when he first interrogated Abu Zubaydah he 
couldn’t have offered him a candy bar, “the guy was almost dying. We had a special diet planned 
for him, we couldn’t even give him water, for heaven’s sake, we used to put ice on his lips.” 43 
Rodriguez’s book said that the most valuable intelligence from Abu Zubaydah came after he 
was waterboarded, but is vague about the details of  what was disclosed. The most specific 
example given is the assertion that Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation led to the capture of  Ramzi 
bin al Shibh in Karachi on September 11, 2002. President George W. Bush made the same 
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claim in his 2006 speech acknowledging the CIA black sites, as does George Tenet in his 
memoirs. (The Tenet and Rodriguez memoirs share the same co-author credit, Bill Harlow, 
the former CIA spokesman.) They do not specify precisely what information Abu Zubaydah 
disclosed about bin al Shibh, however, and other sources have given different accounts of  what 
led to the 2002 raid. 
Ramzi bin al Shibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave a 48-hour interview to an Al Jazeera 
journalist, Yosri Fouda, in April 2002, in which they admitted their role in the September 11 
attacks. According to Ron Suskind, Fouda’s supervisors at Al Jazeera relayed the details of  the 
encounter, including the approximate location in Karachi where the interview occurred, to the 
emir of  Qatar in mid-June. The emir in turn told George Tenet. Ali Soufan, in his book, said 
that additional information came from the FBI’s interrogation of  a detainee named Ahmed 
al-Darbi at Bagram Air Field. He did not rule out the possibility that Abu Zubaydah had 
contributed some helpful intelligence, noting that Abu Zubaydah “gave us a lot of  information 
based on phone numbers that we had” from detainees’ “pocket litter,” but he was extremely 
skeptical of  the claim that Abu Zubaydah was the main source. In general, Soufan said, “it’s 
a combination of  information” that leads to a successful operation, not a “Hollywood type” 
scenario based on a single dramatic revelation.
The immediate catalyst for the bin al Shibh raid seems to have been a raid the day before 
on a different safe house run by Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani. According to a U.S. intelligence 
assessment of  Rabbani at Guantánamo, Rabbani’s driver cooperated and “provided 
information on other safe houses, which led on the following day” to the arrests of  bin al Shibh, 
Hassan bin Attash, and other Al Qaeda members (as well as Rabbani’s brother). Neither bin 
Attash’s, bin al Shibh’s, nor the Rabbanis’ Guantánamo assessments mention Abu Zubaydah 
providing intelligence that contributed to their capture, but that does not prove his information 
played no role.
Some of  the best evidence of  exactly what happened during Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation has 
been destroyed, on Jose Rodriguez’s orders. The CIA made 92 videotapes of  Abu Zubaydah’s 
interrogation, including his waterboarding sessions. The tapes were reportedly quite graphic. 
John Rizzo told the BBC that a colleague who viewed them in Thailand said Abu Zubaydah 
“was reacting visibly in a very disturbing way” to waterboarding, which made the tapes “hard to 
watch.” The BBC reported that they showed Abu Zubaydah “vomiting and screaming.” 44 
Rodriguez was investigated for ordering the destruction of  the videotapes, but after the 
statute of  limitations expired the Department of  Justice announced that it would not charge 
him with any crimes. As is generally the case, DOJ did not explain its reasons for declining 
prosecution. Rodriguez claimed to have been unaware the tapes should have been preserved 
at the time he ordered their destruction, a claim John Rizzo disputed in his interview with 
Task Force staff. “[W]e would talk about [destroying the tapes] at least once a week because 
he would keep raising it. … I tried to play straight with him and at the last minute he goes 
around my back and does it anyway.” 45 In his memoirs, Rodriguez argues that several CIA 
officials had reviewed the videotapes and concluded that they did not contain any information 
that was not memorialized in the daily cables from the black sites, and by ordering their 
destruction, “I was not depriving anyone of  information about what was done or what was 
said. I was just getting rid of  some ugly visuals that could put the lives of  my people at risk.” 
Rodriguez wrote that his primary motivation was the fear — accentuated by the Abu Ghraib 
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scandal — that if  an image from the tapes leaked, terrorists “would use the photo to track 
down Agency officers and exact revenge on them or their families.” In a press interview after 
the release of  his book, he said:
You really doubt that those tapes would not be out in the open now, that they 
would not be on YouTube? ... They would be out there, they would have been 
leaked, or somebody would have ordered their release.46
But the videotapes were far more closely held than the Abu Ghraib photographs, which low-ranking 
soldiers stored on their own cameras and used as computer screensavers. Only one copy of  the tapes 
existed, at the CIA field location in Thailand. Many CIA documents describing the same events, 
which have not been destroyed and were distributed more widely than the videos, remain secret. 
Soufan said that during the portion of  Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation that he witnessed, the 
interrogators who were present during coercive techniques wore ski masks designed to obscure 
their identity.47 In the declassified CIA documents regarding the decision to destroy the tapes, 
the danger to individual interrogators is not discussed. In one email sent to CIA Executive 
Director Dusty Foggo, a colleague concurs in Rodriguez’s view that 
the heat from [destroying] it is nothing compared to what it would be if  the 
tapes ever got into public domain — he said that out of  context, they would 
make us look terrible; it would be “devastating” to us.48 
There is other evidence of  Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, however. Soufan said he took detailed 
notes, and the Senate Intelligence Committee has access to them. They also have access to 
CIA cables and other contemporaneous documents regarding Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. 
Without primary sources, and with eyewitnesses (including Abu Zubaydah himself) forbidden 
from disclosing the details of  the interrogation, it is not possible to resolve fully the differences 
between Soufan’s and Rodriguez’s accounts.
Despite public controversy about the effectiveness of  the CIA techniques against Abu Zubaydah 
and others, in a July 2007 memo by Steven Bradbury the effectiveness of  the CIA’s EIT 
program was again front and center in OLC’s analysis of  its legality.
For example, we understand that enhanced interrogation techniques proved 
particularly crucial in the interrogations of  Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and 
Abu Zubaydah. Before the CIA used enhanced interrogations on Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad, he resisted giving any information about future attacks, 
simply warning, “soon, you will know.” As the President informed the Nation 
in his September 6th address, once enhanced techniques were employed, 
Muhammad provided information revealing the “Second Wave,” a plot to crash 
a hijacked airliner into the Library Tower in Los Angeles — the tallest building 
on the West Coast. Information obtained from Muhammad led to the capture 
of  many of  the al Qaeda operatives planning the attack. Interrogations of  
Zubaydah — again, once enhanced techniques were employed — revealed two 
al Qaeda operatives already in the United States and planning to destroy a high 
rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in Washington, 
D.C. The techniques have revealed plots to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge and to 
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release mass biological agents in our Nation’s largest cities.49 
Bradbury is not the only individual who relied upon the intelligence community’s 
representations as to the effectiveness of  the program. President Bush, Michael Mukasey, 
Michael Hayden, John Yoo and others derived the information they had on the efficacy of  
the techniques from briefings, intelligence reports and other second-hand sources. Ali Soufan 
observed to our staff:
[M]ost of  the people who actually fight tooth and nail for EITs are people 
who were appointed after the EIT program [had] been shelved. Mukasey, he 
was appointed as the Attorney General after the EIT program was shelved. 
Hayden, after the EIT program was shelved, not before. …
It’s so highly classified that they probably cannot even read it in their own 
offices, you know, they have to take them to a SCIF inside a SCIF inside a 
SCIF.50 And then you read into a document, [“]Wow, yes, we saved hundreds of  
thousands of  lives[.”] But where? Give me the hundreds of  thousands of  lives.51
Former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo said that he thought some additional details about the 
CIA program could be disclosed without harm to national security: “The argument originally 
was don’t declassify any of  it. … And now that this much has been opened up, yeah. … I’d be 
for declassifying as much as possible.”
The Library Tower Plot
Opponents of  a complete ban on torture have often cited a hypothetical “ticking bomb” 
scenario, in which a captured terrorist has information needed to prevent an imminent nuclear 
attack on an American city, which he will only reveal through torture. 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has cited the TV show “24,” whose protagonist Jack Bauer 
frequently tortured suspects to defuse ticking bombs, as an example of  why an absolute ban on 
torture is unrealistic. “Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles. … He saved hundreds of  thousands of  lives,” 
Justice Scalia said at a conference in Ottawa. “Are you going to convict Jack Bauer?” 
The most often cited example of  a “ticking time bomb” allegedly averted by the CIA high-
value detainee program is a plot to crash planes into the highest skyscraper in Los Angeles, the 
73-story Library Tower.52 Marc Thiessen, a former Bush speechwriter and frequent defender of  
the CIA program, has written in reference to the Library Tower plot that “without enhanced 
interrogations, there could be a hole in the ground in Los Angeles to match the one in New 
York.” 53 Deroy Murdock wrote in the National Review that America “should be proud of  
waterboarding,” because without it “the Pacific Coast’s highest skyscraper might have become 
a smoldering pile of  steel beams.” 54 The 2005 and 2007 Bradbury memos also repeatedly cite 
KSM’s revelation of  “a plot to crash a hijacked airliner into the Library Tower in Los Angeles” 
as an example of  enhanced interrogations keeping the country safe.
President Bush first detailed the plot in a February 2006 speech, before the CIA detention and 
interrogation program was officially acknowledged:
[I]n October 2001, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad — the mastermind of  the 
254
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
September the 11th attacks — had already set in motion a plan to have terrorist 
operatives hijack an airplane using shoe bombs to breach the cockpit door, 
and fly the plane into the tallest building on the West Coast. We believe the 
intended target was [the Library]55 Tower in Los Angeles, California.
Rather than use Arab hijackers as he had on September the 11th, Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad sought out young men from Southeast Asia — whom he 
believed would not arouse as much suspicion. To help carry out this plan, he 
tapped a terrorist named Hambali, one of  the leaders of  an al Qaeda affiliated 
group in Southeast Asia called “J-I.” JI terrorists were responsible for a series 
of  deadly attacks in Southeast Asia, and members of  the group had trained 
with al Qaeda. Hambali recruited several key operatives who had been training 
in Afghanistan. Once the operatives were recruited, they met with Osama bin 
Laden, and then began preparations for the West Coast attack.56
In this speech, Bush did not give extensive details about how the plot was disrupted, but gave 
most of  the credit to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. He stated that the plan 
was derailed in early 2002 when a Southeast Asian nation arrested a key al 
Qaeda operative. … This critical intelligence helped other allies capture the 
ringleaders and other known operatives who had been recruited for this plot. 
The West Coast plot had been thwarted.57
Similarly, Frances Fragos Townsend, Homeland Security adviser to President Bush, stated at 
a news conference in February 2006 that “[t]he cell leader was arrested in February of  2002, 
and … at that point, the other members of  the cell believed that the West Coast plot [had] 
been canceled, was not going forward.” 58 Later on, though, Bush and other officials would 
repeatedly credit the CIA’s interrogation program with derailing the plot. In 2007, he stated that 
the CIA program “has produced critical intelligence that has helped us stop a number of  attacks 
— including … a plot to hijack a passenger plane and fly it into Library Tower in Los Angeles, 
California.” 59 In his memoirs, Bush stated that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had 
provided information that led to the capture of  Hambali, the chief  of  al 
Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliate in Southeast Asia and the architect of  the 
Bali terrorist attack that killed 202 people. He provided further details that led 
agent’s to Hambali’s brother, who had been grooming operatives to carry out 
another attack on the United States, possibly a West Coast version of  9/11 in 
which terrorists flew a hijacked plane into the Library Tower in Los Angeles.60
According to The Associated Press, the original pilot for the Library Tower plot, a Malaysian 
citizen named Zaini Zakaria, pulled out after seeing images from the September 11 attack. 
He cut off  contact with the members of  the cell before his arrest in December 2002. Zakaria 
reportedly told Malaysian security forces that he realized he “didn’t want that kind of  jihad” 
and was not prepared to martyr himself.61
The cell leader, Masran bin Arshad, was arrested in February 2002 and was interrogated 
by Malaysian security forces. According to reports of  U.S. intelligence assessments, Arshad 
revealed in 2002 that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had selected him and three other Malaysians 
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to help plan an attack on “the tallest building in California.” Arshad named the 
other members of  his cell as Mohammad Farik Amin (aka Zubair), Bashir bin Lep 
(aka Lillie), and Nik Abd-al Rahman bin Mustapha (aka Afifi). Arshad said that 
his cell was to provide support, while another group would be directly responsible 
for piloting the plane into the building. He told interrogators that the plan was 
put on hold after “shoe bomber” Richard Reid’s arrest exposed their potential 
methodology for hijacking. Other sources — including Zubair and bin Lep, who 
were eventually interrogated in CIA custody — said that it was bin Arshad’s arrest 
that derailed the plot. 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was arrested well after bin Arshad had been detained 
and revealed his co-conspirators’ names and the plan to drive airplanes into the 
tallest building on the West Coast. Zubair and bin Lep, however, were arrested 
some months after KSM. Defenders of  the CIA program have argued that the plot 
was not truly derailed until after they and their associates were arrested, and they 
were taken into custody as a result of  Mohammed’s interrogation. 
More specifically, according to Jose Rodriguez and to CIA documents, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed admitted to his interrogators that he had asked a detainee named Majid Khan to 
deliver $50,000 to Riduan Isamuddin. Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, was the head of  
the Southeast Asian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the 2002 Bali 
bombings. Bin Lep, bin Arshad, Afifi and Zubair were also Jemaah Islamiyah operatives.
Majid Khan, a former resident of  Baltimore, was captured at approximately the same time as 
KSM. He confirmed that he had couriered the money to Hambali. Khan said he had passed 
it on through a Malaysian named Zubair, and gave CIA interrogators Zubair’s phone number. 
This was extremely helpful for intercepting Jemaah Islamiyah’s communications as well as 
tracking Zubair, who was detained in June 2003. According to the CIA, Zubair led the CIA 
to bin Lep and Hambali, who were captured in Thailand in August of  2003.62 The date on 
which Khan revealed Zubair’s phone number, and the interrogation methods used on him 
beforehand, are not publicly known. Khan later alleged that he was tortured in CIA custody. He 
told the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) that he had been shackled naked in 
a standing position three consecutive days at a prison in Afghanistan. Most other details of  his 
treatment remain classified.
The CIA and its former officials allege that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed next named Hambali’s 
brother, Rusman “Gun Gun” Gunawan, as a potential successor for the leadership of  Jemaah 
Islamiyah. Gunawan was taken into custody and interrogated at a black site, and provided 
information about a group of  Jemaah Islamiyah members in Karachi, known as the “Ghuraba 
cell.” According to CIA documents, 
Hambali admitted that some members of  the cell were eventually to be groomed 
for U.S. operations — at the behest of  KSM — possibly as part of  KSM’s plot to 
fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the U.S. west coast.63
The CIA inspector general’s 2004 report similarly stated that Hambali “provided information 
that led to the arrest of  previously unknown members of  an Al Qa’ida cell in Karachi. 
They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attacks inside the United States.”64 Later, the 
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report stated that detainees had revealed a plan to “hijack and fly an airplane into the tallest 
building in California in a west coast version of  the World Trade Center attack.” However, 
the report did not find evidence that the West Coast attack or the others discussed in the 
report were imminent.65
FBI agent Ali Soufan’s account of  the Jemaah Islamiyah arrests was largely redacted by the 
CIA’s publications review board, but the unredacted portions differ from the CIA’s version in 
three major respects. First, Soufan noted that Southeast Asian intelligence services were doing 
their own investigation into Jemaah Islamiyah, and these were crucial in breaking up Hambali’s 
network. Second, he argued that CIA officials had exaggerated the threat from the Ghuraba 
cell, all of  whom were sent back to their own countries instead of  being charged or interrogated 
by the United States. Third, he noted that the interrogation of  various detainees about the 
money KSM provided to Jemaah Islamiyah did not prevent that money from being used in a 
successful suicide bombing in Jakarta in August 2003. 
Soufan wrote that the CIA’s version of  Hambali’s arrest was “[t]o put it charitably … a loose 
interpretation of  what happened.” He said that Indonesian authorities were doing their own 
investigation of  Jemaah Islamiyah after the Bali nightclub bombings, and “by July 2003, more 
than eighty-three suspects were under arrest, and Hambali was on the run.” Soufan also said 
that the CIA had tried to “boost the importance of  Gun Gun and the al-Ghuraba cell:” 
Many of  the students were trained in both religious studies and military 
and terrorist skills, and were being groomed to be the next generation of  JI 
leaders. A few had traveled to Afghanistan for guerilla training and had met 
with Bin Laden in Kandahar. As it turned out, the cell had not yet committed 
any attacks and weren’t plotting anything; they were training and studying. In 
November the eighteen students were repatriated to their home countries.66
Soufan did not believe that the Ghuraba cell was involved in any attempt on the Library 
Tower, despite the CIA’s assertion that they would have “possibly,” or “eventually” 
participated in U.S. operations:
This “eventually” and “possibly” was the best analysts could conclude, despite 
183 sessions of  waterboarding. … The reality is that the al-Ghuraba cell wasn’t 
involved, which is why the U.S. didn’t request the arrest of  its members and 
they were sent to their home countries.67
Soufan said in an interview with Task Force staff  that he thought the redactions were unjustified. 
The redacted information did not come from any information accessed through his FBI work or 
security clearance, but from his and a research assistant’s efforts to learn as much possible about 
the plot from open sources and conversations with Southeast Asian law enforcement.
Press reports confirm that the Ghuraba students were sent home rather than taken into custody 
by the United States. Many of  them were released after their return. Others were held for several 
years, but none was ever charged in connection with any plot against the United States. 68 
According to Ken Conboy, a security consultant in Indonesia who has written several books about 
Jemaah Islamiyah and the Indonesian intelligence service, after 2001 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
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had lobbied unsuccessfully to have Ghuraba members deployed in suicide operations:
Thinking aloud, he fancifully contemplated using them in more airplane plots, 
possibly in the United States. 
Hambali, who was in Karachi by that time, had other ideas. He had come 
to see al-Ghuraba as a sleeper cell of  future Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, not 
cannon fodder to be wasted in some act of  desperation by KSM. Fending 
off  the advances by al-Qaeda, he successfully argued that they would not be 
operationally ready for at least another two years.69
Conboy wrote that before 2001, in addition to weekly lectures at a safe house in Karachi, 
Ghuraba members began receiving training at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan “during their 
university breaks.” Some of  them met Osama bin Laden. When September 11 occurred, four 
members of  the cell were in Kandahar. Rather than join the jihad in Afghanistan, though, they 
quickly returned to Karachi and they stayed there throughout 2002. 
According to Conboy, the Ghuraba cell members did have an active plot when they were 
detained, but it did not involve crashing planes into skyscrapers. Rather, there was a plan to 
kidnap a Western oil executive in Karachi as revenge for Hambali’s capture. One attempt on 
September 8, 2003, had failed when the kidnappers got “a collective case of  cold feet” and slept 
through the target’s arrival at the airport, but it was only the group’s arrest that ensured that no 
kidnapping occurred.
Thus, the available public record, limited as it is, simply does not support a claim that 
waterboarding prevented the Library Tower from being reduced to rubble. This is not to 
diminish the importance of  the capture of  Zubair, bin Lep, Hambali and their associates 
(though exactly what role CIA “enhanced interrogations” played in their capture remains 
ambiguous). Jemaah Islamiyah was a dangerous group, responsible for hundreds of  civilian 
deaths — but it was most dangerous in Southeast Asia. If  there were a ticking bomb that could 
have been defused by intelligence from Zubair, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Majid Khan, it 
would have been in Jakarta, not Los Angeles. On August 5, 2003, a suicide bomber detonated a 
truck bomb outside of  the lobby of  the Jakarta Marriott Hotel, killing 11 people and wounding 
at least 81. 
In February 2012, Majid Khan pleaded guilty to conspiracy and murder in violation of  the 
laws of  war in a military commission this year, in return for a reduced sentence in the future 
if  he cooperated in providing testimony against other detainees in the CIA program. (Khan’s 
sentencing was postponed to ensure his cooperation at trial). One of  the charges centered around 
the $50,000 that Majid Khan had arranged to be transferred from KSM to Hambali through 
Zubair. According to Khan’s indictment, the money was used to finance the Marriott bombing. 
Hambali and bin Lep were only captured after the Marriott bombing, and Khan has said he 
did not know any of  the details of  the operation or the Jemaah Islamiyah personnel involved. 
But according to Khan’s indictment and Zubair’s Guantánamo intelligence assessment, Zubair 
participated in the funds transfer and relayed a message from Hambali to Dr. bin Hussein 
Azahari, one of  the lead co-conspirators in the Marriott bombing.70 Ali Soufan argues plausibly 
that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, as Al Qaeda’s military commander, must have also known 
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about the cell in Jakarta, as well as those responsible for train bombings in Madrid in 2004 and 
London in 2005.
It is impossible to be certain whether other interrogation methods would have stopped these 
attacks. But it is equally impossible to be certain that the information that captives revealed after 
being tortured could not have been obtained by any other means.
The Danger of False Confessions
At the same time the CIA was adapting SERE techniques (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and 
Escape) for its interrogation program, the first season of  the wildly popular TV show “24” was 
wrapping up on television. The first season’s finale aired May 21, 2002. The show was familiar 
to many at Guantánamo in 2002. “We saw it on cable,” Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver 
recalled. “People had already seen the first series. It was hugely popular. … [Jack Bauer] gave 
people lots of  ideas.” 71 Retired FBI interrogator Joe Navarro told Task Force staff  
Keep in mind there are 17,000 different police departments across the country 
so there’s quite some variance, but the average law enforcement officer in 
the United States in their career receives between eight and fifteen hours 
of  [suspect] interview training. What fills in the rest? People use words and 
techniques from popular culture and what’s trendy.”72
The SERE techniques that the CIA adapted for its interrogation program had their origins 
in Communist techniques used to extract false confessions. As former Air Force interrogator 
Steven Kleinman testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee:
Many of  the methods used in SERE training are based on what was once 
known as the Communist Interrogation Model, a system designed to physically 
and psychologically debilitate a detainee as a means of  gaining compliance. 
… [T]hat model’s primary objective was to compel a prisoner to generate 
propaganda, not intelligence.73
After serving as an interrogator and intelligence officer in the Air Force, Kleinman worked 
as the director of  intelligence for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency’s SERE program at 
Fairchild Air Force Base near Spokane, Wash. From his work with SERE, he knew James 
Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the contract psychologists who later designed the CIA program. 
(Mitchell and Jessen declined the Task Force’s interview request through their counsel). 
Kleinman said that Mitchell and Jessen were not the only people associated with SERE 
who “couldn’t wait” to apply the techniques to the enemy. “I had the conversation with 
so many people,” he said. In his experience, SERE instructors tended to “see themselves 
as interrogators” because, although they were not interrogators, they were “really good at 
portraying an interrogator.”74 One career SERE professional told Kleinman “One day after 
people are tired of  getting attacked they won’t care how we got the information.” 75
Bryce Lefever, a SERE psychologist who has defended Mitchell and Jessen, told Dr. Gregg 
Bloche that “[w]e all knew from experience that these techniques, these SERE training 
techniques, were pretty effective not only at training but … at exposing vulnerabilities in our 
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own students.” Lefever said that SERE trainees were given specific “secrets” to keep from 
“interrogators” in the training exercise, and routinely failed: “It was kind of  an astonishing 
thing. … You could have truly brave American patriots, even in a training setting, talking 
rather freely about stuff  they shouldn’t have been talking about.” 76 Former CIA Acting 
General Counsel John Rizzo told Task Force staff  he “distinctly recalled [CIA officers from 
the Counterterrorism Center] tell me that they had some data to indicate that these techniques 
worked and produced reliable intelligence,” though he didn’t believe that efficacy data was 
related to the SERE program.77 
Kleinman confirmed that SERE students often reveal information they are supposed to 
withhold, and so the SERE techniques feel like they are effective to both trainees and trainers. 
But, in Kleinman’s words, “training and the real world are not the same thing.” SERE 
instructors have no experience and receive no training in how to ensure that prisoners are telling 
the truth, instead of  what they think interrogators want to hear. Instructors are not trained 
to avoid leading questions, which telegraph to a detainee the answer an interrogator wants. 
SERE instructors often know in advance the information they are trying to solicit and they have 
the option of  calling a soldier’s unit to verify the information he reveals — something that is 
obviously impossible in a real interrogation.78 Kleinman said that some SERE instructors likely 
believe they can tell based on behavioral cues whether someone is telling the truth, but scientific 
studies show that behavioral indicators of  deception are faint and unreliable. In the controlled 
environment of  SERE, there is also no need to worry about coercion undermining a source’s 
ability to accurately recall information — but this is a major concern in a real interrogation. 
According to Bloche, the architects of  the CIA program understood that inducing compliance 
was not enough if  they wanted accurate intelligence, and that it was also important to “shape 
compliance” by rewarding truthful answers and punishing falsehood.79 But how, exactly, they 
attempted to distinguish truthful and false information remains ambiguous. Bloche stated in 
an interview with Task Force staff  that it is impossible to scientifically evaluate the efficacy of  
SERE techniques on captives. Even if  the relevant evidence were not classified, the sample 
size is too small, and “to have the scientific answer, one would have to have the result of  a 
randomized study.” Conducting such a study on prisoners would be “unimaginable,” because 
medical and psychological ethics forbid such brutal experiments on captives.80
It is unclear whether the architects of  the CIA’s interrogation program accounted for, or were even 
aware of, what experienced interrogators saw as a central flaw in using torture. Torture disorients 
intelligence subjects and can affect memory. Stress, pain and a lack of  sleep affect a subject’s 
ability to accurately recall and relate experiences and facts. Experienced interrogators weren’t 
the only ones aware of  these efficacy limitations. According to Dr. Stephen Xenakis, a retired 
Army Brigadier General and psychiatrist “In the case of  sleep deprivation, the evidence is clear 
psychological disorientation kicks in by 72 hours and by 96 [hours] there can be serious psychiatric 
episodes.” 81 As discussed further in the Medical and Consequences chapters (Chapters 6 and 8) of  
this report, abuse of  detainees, at least in some instances, resulted in psychosis and eliminated any 
hope that useful intelligence could be gained from the subject. The belief  that learned helplessness 
would compel detainees to disclose information was simply wrong, according to Xenakis:
Tactics that are intended to diminish consciousness and affect alertness 
may induce mood states like depression but are not helpful to elicit more 
information. … Being in a helpless state is not the same as being in a state of  
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mind where you are going to disclose information. People don’t, when they’ve 
given up all hope, suddenly decide to [disclose information].82 
Prior medical studies had shown when mental or physical capacity had been reduced, so too had 
memory been reduced. Sleep deprivation of  physicians led to disorientation and reduced awareness 
amongst the subjects in the study. Studies from the 1950s and 1960s that used hallucinogenic drugs 
to study memory produced false memories. As Xenakis explained to Task Force staff: 
There is no professional literature that links the two. … I’ve not been able to 
find any study of  any kind that if  you induce the circumstances [of  the CIA 
EIT program] that you get information that you wouldn’t get otherwise and 
when I look at the active ingredients of  those techniques there is, respectively, 
research that shows you will not get good information.83 
Jose Rodriguez wrote that whatever a detainee revealed, the CIA “would not accept it on blind 
faith but checked it out in many different ways,” “checked and double-checked,” and “double-
checked the information six ways from Sunday”: 
The people who were asking the questions, and the people who were analyzing 
the answers, were among the leading experts on al-Qa’ida in the world. Often 
they knew the answers to questions before they were asked. … As we got more 
and more al-Qa’ida leaders in custody, we were able to play one off  against the 
other. We would ask a question, get a response, and then say, “Oh really? That’s 
not what KSM said, he said X.” We would ask factual questions, such as “Where 
did you travel to in 1999?” When the detainee said, “Nowhere,” we would say, 
“No, actually you went to Tanganyika and stayed at the Hill Top Hotel.” They 
quickly learned not to mislead us. Still, we never assumed that what a detainee 
was telling us was true. But after you caught them in a few lies, and the specter of  
renewed EITs (which they didn’t know we were very unlikely to return to) arose in 
their minds, they generally gave you something close enough to the truth.84
According to the CIA inspector general, though, these safeguards were not foolproof. 
Particularly at the start of  the program,
The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and had very 
little hard knowledge of  what particular Al-Qa’ida leaders — who later became 
detainees — knew. This lack of  information led analysts to speculate about 
what a detainee “should know,” vice information the analyst could objectively 
demonstrate the detainee did know [six lines redacted]
[W]hen a detainee did not respond to a question posed to him, the assumption 
at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back and knew more; 
consequently, Headquarters recommended resumption of  EITs.85 
Soufan said that he saw this play out during the interrogation of  Abu Zubaydah: “Abu Zubaydah 
is not an al-Qaeda member. We knew that at the time, but the moment we arrested Abu 
Zubaydah, the President was saying he’s the number three guy in al-Qaeda.” 86 According to 
Soufan, this contradicted both the intelligence about Abu Zubaydah from the investigation of  the 
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millennium plot, and documents captured with Abu Zubaydah. But CIA analysts 
“convinced themselves he’s number three” and that “[i]f  he’s not admitting he’s 
number three, then he’s not cooperating. Well, 83 sessions [of  waterboarding] and he 
admitted he’s number three.”
Abu Zubaydah alleged during his Guantánamo combatant status review tribunal 
that after being tortured,
I say, “yes, I was partner of  BIN LADEN. I’m his number three in al Qaida 
and I’m his partner of  RESSAM.” I say okay but leave me. So they write 
but they want what’s after, more information about more operations, so I 
can’t. They keep torturing me.87
Abu Zubaydah claimed that at some later point, “they told me sorry we discover 
that you are not number three, not a partner even not a fighter.” 88
The risk that a suspect would make a false confession under torture seems to have been 
heightened in cases where the CIA rendered a subject to foreign custody. The most notorious 
example of  this is the case of  Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, a Libyan jihadist who led the Khalden 
training camp in Afghanistan. Al-Libi’s false claim about there being a link between Iraq and 
Al Qaeda on the development of  chemical weapons has been cited as a primary source for the 
faulty prewar intelligence that the Bush administration repeated leading up to the war in Iraq. 
In an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, President Bush stated Iraqis had trained members 
of  Al Qaeda on the development and use of  chemical and biological weapons.89 Al-Libi, whose 
real name was Ali Abdel-Aziz al-Fakheri, was captured in December 2001 and questioned at 
Bagram by FBI agents Russell Fincher and George Crouch and New York City detective Marty 
Mahon. Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent in New York, advised the interrogators by telephone. 
According to Soufan and several press accounts quoting FBI sources, al-Libi was cooperating, 
particularly with Fincher. He reportedly provided intelligence about Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard 
Reid, and several active plots, including a planned attack against the U.S. embassy in Yemen that 
was close to execution. The CIA, however, was convinced that he was withholding even more 
valuable information because he denied knowledge of  any imminent attacks in the United States 
or links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. One CIA officer reportedly told al-Libi,  
“[y]ou’re going to Egypt,” and “[b]efore you get there, I am going to find your mother and fuck 
her.” Garrett Graff, a journalist who spoke to a number of  FBI agents about al-Libi’s interrogation 
and other counterterrorism operations, reported that Fincher and Mahon witnessed this exchange:
Fincher, eyes wide, jumped off  the picnic table, slammed into the CIA 
operative, and shoved him out the door with a “What the fuck are you doing?” 
Furious about the new plan, the Bagram FBI team, including the military 
and other intelligence agencies present (minus, though, the CIA) wrote a rare 
joint memo to Washington, still classified today, attesting to al-Libi’s forthright 
cooperation and urging the continuation of  the FBI interrogation.90
But the FBI was overruled, and al-Libi was sent to Egypt. He made a number of  confessions, and 
provided false information about ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda that Colin Powell would later 
cite in his presentation to the United Nations.91 According to a Senate Intelligence Committee 
“I never 
encountered a 
single source in 
all my years of 
interrogating, that 
I felt I needed to 
do something to or 
with that I would 
be ashamed to tell 
my mother I did.”
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report sourced to CIA cables, when al-Libi returned to U.S. custody, he reported that
[REDACTED] After his transfer to a foreign government [REDACTED], 
al-Libi claimed that during his initial debriefings “he lied to the [foreign 
government service] [REDACTED] about future operations to avoid torture.” 
Al-Libi told the CIA that the foreign government service [REDACTED] 
explained to him that a “long list of  methods could be used against him which 
were extreme” and that “he would confess because three thousand individuals 
had been in the chair before him and that each had confessed.”
[REDACTED] According to al-Libi, the foreign government service 
[REDACTED] “stated that the next topic was al-Qa’ida’s connections with 
Iraq. … This was a subject about which he knew nothing and had difficulty 
even coming up with a story.” Al-Libi indicated that his interrogators did not 
like his responses and then “placed him in a small box approximately 50 cm x 
50 cm.” He claimed he was held in the box for approximately 17 hours. When 
he was let out of  the box, al-Libi claims that he was given a last opportunity to 
“tell the truth.” When al-Libi did not satisfy the interrogator, al-Libi claimed 
that “he was knocked over with an arm thrust across his chest and he fell on his 
back.” Al-Libi told CIA debriefers that he then “was punched for 15 minutes.”
(U) Al-Libi told debriefers that “after the beating,” he was again asked about 
the connection with Iraq and this time he came up with a story that three 
al-Qa’ida members went to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons. Al-Libi said 
that he used the names of  real individuals associated with al-Qa’ida so that he 
could remember the details of  his fabricated story and make it more believable 
to the foreign intelligence service. Al-Libi noted that “this pleased his [foreign] 
interrogators, who directed that al-Libi be taken back to a big room, vice the 50 
square centimeter box and given food.”
[REDACTED] According to al-Libi, several days after the Iraq nuclear 
discussion, the foreign intelligence service debriefers [REDACTED] brought 
up the topic of  anthrax and biological weapons. Al-Libi stated that he “knew 
nothing about a biological program and did not even understand the term 
biological.” Al-Libi stated that “he could not come up with a story and was 
then beaten in a way that left no marks.” According to al-Libi, he continued “to 
be unable to come up with a lie about biological weapons” because he did not 
understand the term “biological weapons.”92
The United States later sent al-Libi to Libya, where he allegedly committed suicide in prison. 
Several other renditions also produced faulty intelligence. In one notorious case, the United 
States rendered Canadian citizen Maher Arar to Syria, partly on the strength of  confessions that 
two other Canadians, Ahmed el-Maati and Abdullah Almalki, made under torture in Syrian 
intelligence’s notorious Palestine branch. Arar in turn was tortured, and made a false confession.93 
Arar was later exonerated by a Canadian government investigation. El-Maati and Almalki were 
also eventually sent back to Canada, where they have not been charged with terrorism.
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Effective Interrogation Without Torture
Defenders of  coercive interrogations often argue that, while flawed, it is the only technique that 
could plausibly work against fanatical terrorists. In his article “Psychologists and Interrogations: 
What’s Torture Got to Do with It?” Kirk Hubbard, a CIA psychologist who introduced Mitchell 
and Jessen to the agency, mocked the idea of  interrogators gaining intelligence by building 
rapport or outsmarting Al Qaeda members:
Are we to think the terrorist has the following thoughts: “You know, nobody has 
ever been as nice to me as these people — I’m going to turn my back on my 
God and my life’s work and tell them what they want to know.” Alternatively, 
maybe the terrorist will think “What a clever way of  asking that question. Now 
that they put it that way, I have no choice but to tell them what they need to 
know to disrupt my plans.” Unfortunately, it is difficult to envision scenarios 
where useful information will be forthcoming. … For terrorists who do not care 
if  they live or die and have no fear of  prison, there is little or no incentive to 
work with interrogators.
But Hubbard was not an interrogator, nor were Mitchell and Jessen. Before September 11, the 
CIA generally did not conduct interrogations. Stuart Herrington, a decorated Army human 
intelligence officer and interrogator who gained invaluable intelligence over his 30-year career 
during the Vietnam, Panama, and the 1990 Gulf  War, said in an interview with Task Force staff  
that the CIA had avoided interrogation since “they got burned” by South Vietnamese allies’ 
use of  torture during the Vietnam War. According to Herrington, CIA colleagues used to call 
interrogation “the I word.” 94 
Retired FBI agent Joe Navarro has also written that “[i]t was only after 9/11 that the CIA began 
detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects. At that time, the CIA had literally no detention 
and interrogation experience.” 95 On September 11, 2001, Navarro was one of  perhaps 20 
interrogators in the United States qualified to conduct interrogations of  senior Al Qaeda suspects. 
According to Navarro “the memo to [law enforcement and intelligence agencies] saying ‘give us 
your best interrogators’ never went out. It never went out because it doesn’t exist. It was never 
written.” According to Steven Kleinman, “the single point of  failure” regarding the use of  
SERE techniques against detainees was that no one in a real position of  authority had enough 
experience, in either HUMINT [human intelligence] generally or interrogation specifically, to 
understand that SERE techniques would not work in the real world.96
Ali Soufan said that some CIA officials did have useful experience and insight, but they were 
overridden. In his book, Soufan describes a veteran CIA polygrapher with interrogation training, 
“Frank,” as sharing his concerns about the Abu Zubaydah interrogation. Soufan said that “it 
annoys the heck out of  me” when people portray the disputes over coercive techniques as “FBI 
versus CIA,” because it was CIA personnel whose objection to the program led to the critical 
inspector general’s report and the end to the most brutal techniques.97 Soufan said that when he 
was deployed overseas, he needed to depend on the other Americans with him, regardless of  what 
agency employed them: “I worked with these people, they protected my back, I protected their 
back. … [W]e don’t care about any of  these things, we’re all Uncle Sam.”98
Soufan, Kleinman, Navarro and Herrington all rejected the view that Islamic extremists will 
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not reveal useful information without brutality. “The Hanoi Hilton teaches us that if  you 
brutalize prisoners you harden them in their resolve [against] you.” Herrington told Task 
Force staff  in an interview that, despite his own personal feelings of  revulsion about many of  
the detainees he interrogated, 
[detainees] are human, they’re very human. And if  you don’t acknowledge that 
right up front, that this is another human being, and your job is going to be to 
cultivate a relationship with him, man to man, captor to prisoner … you don’t 
have any business being there. Period.99
Moreover, Herrington pointed out, traditional interrogation techniques have worked on 
members of  Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. “I never encountered a single source in 
all my years of  interrogating, that I felt I needed to do something to or with that I would be 
ashamed to tell my mother I did.” 100 Similarly Navarro has said: 
[A]s an interrogator, I need only three things, (1) a quiet room (2) I need to 
know what the rules are for where the interrogation is taking place because I 
don’t intend to get into trouble and (3) I need time to build a rapport with the 
subject and become his only friend. If  you give me those three things I’ll get 
[the information]. I don’t need to be rough. I get Christmas cards every year 
from guys I’ve sent to prison for life.” 101
Besides his assertions about al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah, Soufan’s memoirs describe useful 
FBI interrogations of  a number of  Al Qaeda figures. These included Abu Jandal, a former 
bin Laden bodyguard who identified a number of  the September 11 hijackers as Al Qaeda 
members the week after the attacks; Mohammed al-Owhali, one of  the men who participated 
in the 1998 bombing of  the U.S. embassy in Nairobi; L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who was a key 
witness in the embassy bombing trials and later enrolled in the witness protection program; 
Jamal al-Badawi, who was involved in the USS Cole bombing; Fahd al-Quso, a Yemeni 
Al Qaeda member assigned to videotape the USS Cole attack; Ali al-Bahlul, an Al Qaeda 
propagandist detained in Guantánamo Bay; bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard Salim Hamdan; 
and Ibrahim al-Qosi, another Guantánamo detainee.
In June 2008, 15 senior interrogators, interviewers and intelligence officials from the U.S. 
military, the FBI and the CIA — amongst them Kleinman, Herrington, Navarro and Cloonan 
— all met, developed and released principles upon which they agreed. All agreed that the most 
effective way to obtain timely, credible intelligence from suspected terrorists and others who 
threaten the United States was to use noncoercive, traditional, rapport-based interviewing 
approaches with detainees.102 Moreover they found the use of  torture and other inhumane 
and abusive treatment resulted in false and misleading intelligence, loss of  critical intelligence, 
was unlawful, ineffective, counterproductive, and caused serious damage to the reputation and 
standing of  the United States.103
As the debate on interrogation continues, the Obama administration has, if  not changed, 
at least restructured the way it approaches the interrogation of  high-value detainees. On 
January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which required agents 
and employees of  the United States to disregard the legal advice provided by the Bush 
administration’s Justice Department and to interrogate in accordance with the Army Field 
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Manual. There are concerns amongst interrogation experts about revisions from 2006 that 
remain in the Army’s Field Manual on Interrogation today. There exists in the manual, since 
2006, the practice of  an interrogation technique called “separation” which, in its current 
incarnation, human rights groups have argued, could inflict real, significant, physical and 
mental anguish on a detainee. Under Appendix M, with the permission of  a combatant 
commander, a detainee could arguably be interrogated for 40 consecutive hours with four-
hour rest periods book-ended. Moreover, while Appendix M explicitly prohibits sensory 
deprivation, it explicitly permits the use of  goggles, blindfolds and earmuffs if  the use of  such 
items is deemed “expedient.” Furthermore, Appendix M also takes off  the table an invaluable 
interrogation approach — noncoercive separation — and puts it out of  reach in situations 
where it could be employed humanely and effectively. Stuart Herrington gained invaluable 
military intelligence in the nation’s conflicts in Vietnam, Panama and the first Gulf  War. On the 
changes to the military’s rules for interrogation, Herrington was frank with Task Force staff  :
The truth of  the matter is there are some rules of  the road now that they 
put out there as a reaction to what happened [in the public aftermath of  the 
reporting of  torture by U.S. forces] that the two projects that I have described 
in such detail [in Panama and the first Gulf  War], I couldn’t do them today.104
The January 2009 executive order also created a task force, the Special Task Force on 
Interrogations and Transfer Policies, which was to be chaired by the attorney general and 
whose membership included the director of  national intelligence, the secretary of  defense, the 
secretary of  state, the secretary of  homeland security, the director of  the CIA, and the chairman 
of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff. On August 24, 2009 the Special Task Force recommended that the 
Obama administration establish a specialized interrogation group that would bring together 
officials from law enforcement, the military and the U.S. intelligence community on the conduct 
of  interrogations. The High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) was to channel the 
experience from these different branches of  the government, develop a set of  best interrogation 
practices, and disseminate them for training purposes. HIG was at the center of  controversy in its 
first year of  existence.
On December 25, 2009 Al Qaeda operative Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear 
bomber,” attempted to detonate a bomb aboard a commercial aircraft bound for the United 
States. Abdulmutallab’s plan failed and he was interrogated by the FBI in Detroit. Not only 
did HIG fail to participate in his interrogation, National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair 
admitted HIG was not even operational yet, four months after its creation. Controversially, FBI 
agents had briefly questioned Abdulmutallab and, it was reported, he had provided intelligence 
before he was read Miranda rights. Once he was read Miranda rights, Abdulmutallab asked for 
a lawyer and stopped talking. The White House was reportedly furious when it found out the 
HIG had not been officially formed in time to question Abdulmutallab despite a direct order 
from the president to do so in the fall of  2009.105 
By the spring of  2010, HIG was operational and was involved in the interrogation of  the man 
accused of  the failed Times Square bombing plot. In May 2011, HIG was reported to be run by 
the FBI and headed by an FBI employee with two deputies — one from the CIA and one from 
the Defense Department.106 The unit has three regional teams staffed by linguists, terrorism 
analysts and professional interrogators. The teams’ duties include everything from questioning 
suspects to researching the best ways to get the most information from suspects. HIG’s research 
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committee, a multidisciplinary committee, includes Mark Fallon, Matthew Waxman, David 
Danzig (from Human Rights First), law professors, forensic anthropologists, and others. The 
organization is soliciting, and has ongoing, a number of  research projects related to evidence-
based approaches to obtaining accurate and reliable intelligence.
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
The question of  whether brutal interrogations are effective doesn’t address the legal and moral 
considerations, which, for many, override any concern as to whether such practices are effective. 
In an internationally famous 1999 ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court unanimously found 
physically coercive tactics used by Israeli interrogators — including sleep deprivation, stress 
positions, and sensory deprivation — impermissible, irrespective of  whether they were effective. 
In its ruling, written by the court’s president, Aharon Barak, the court noted 121 people had 
been killed and 707 injured in bomb attacks within Israel in the previous 2.5 years.107 The 
Israeli court referenced, in its decision, a European court’s earlier determination that British 
interrogators had been guilty of  using physically coercive tactics when questioning detainees 
suspected of  terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. The Israeli court held:
The rules pertaining to investigations are important to a democratic state. They 
reflect its character. An illegal investigation harms the suspect’s human dignity. 
It equally harms society’s fabric. …
This decision opened with a description of  the difficult reality in which Israel 
finds herself. We conclude this judgment by revisiting that harsh reality. We 
are aware that this decision does [not] make it easier to deal with that reality. 
This is the destiny of  a democracy — it does not see all means as acceptable, 
and the ways of  its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must 
sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has 
the upper hand. The rule of  law and the liberty of  an individual constitute 
important components in its understanding of  security. At the end of  the day, 
they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties.108
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Detainee operations since 2001 have been lengthy and fraught with complications including the numer-
ous prisoner abuse scandals in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, and those associated with the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program. The detention program continues to evolve in response to internal and 
external criticisms. 
Legal and Political Consequences of                
U.S. Detention Operations
International Legal Consequences
U.S. and international human rights groups have launched campaigns to have President George 
W. Bush, along with key administration officials, arrested abroad. In 2011, Bush was forced 
to call off  a planned trip to Switzerland amidst fears of  large anti-torture demonstrations 
and threats from human rights organizations that had sent a dossier of  detention-related 
information to Swiss prosecutors to trigger a criminal investigation.1 “What we have in 
Switzerland is a Pinochet opportunity,” said a spokesman for the European Centre for 
Constitutional and Human Rights, who along with the U.S.-based Center for Constitution 
Rights and Amnesty International, supported Bush’s arrest in Switzerland.2 “Bush will be 
pursued wherever he goes as a war criminal and torturer.” 3 
Rumsfeld has faced numerous threats of  arrest in the years since the Abu Ghraib scandal. In 
2005, Rumsfeld was threatened with arrest in Germany, where he was planning to attend a 
defense conference.4 The charges of  war crimes were filed by U.S. lawyers for Iraqi detain-
ees at Abu Ghraib and stemmed from the torture and abuses that occurred there.5 Rumsfeld 
eventually attended the conference after the German prosecutor dismissed the charges on 
the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to show that the United States was unable or 
unwilling to prosecute Rumsfeld.6 (This argument has seemingly been eliminated by President 
Obama’s clear statement regarding prosecutions or inquiries). In 2007, another lawsuit alleging 
war crimes was filed in Germany against Rumsfeld and 13 other former Bush administration 
officials, along with a lawsuit in France against Rumsfeld alone.7 Both lawsuits were dismissed 
on the grounds of  immunity, but not before Rumsfeld was reportedly forced to flee a breakfast 
meeting in France when his staffers learned of  the court filing.8
In 2009, the Center for Constitutional Rights also initiated two investigations at the National 
268
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Court of  Spain: the first concerning the use of  torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
(CID) treatment or punishment at U.S. detention facilities, and the second a criminal complaint 
against the so-called “Bush Six” — David Addington, Jay Bybee, Doug Feith, Alberto Gonzales, 
William Haynes, and John Yoo.9 The first investigation is ongoing, while the second was 
temporarily stayed following an April 2011 transfer of  the case by the Spanish judge to the 
U.S. Department of  Justice for continuation.10 The second investigation was finally dismissed in 
February 2013 following a ruling by the Spanish court that there was sufficient legal recourse in 
the United States.11 Human rights groups have also attempted to have charges brought against 
Bush and Cheney in Canada.12
In May 2012, Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and five of  the “Bush Six” (excepting Doug Feith) were, 
in absentia, convicted of  war crimes in a specially convened tribunal in Malaysia.13 Although 
the ruling was largely symbolic, the tribunal heard testimony from a number of  witnesses and 
former detainees before issuing its verdict.14
Similar to the Italian convictions of  23 CIA officials for rendition and torture [see Chapter 5], 
the Malaysian verdict and the ongoing attempts to hold Bush administration officials legally 
accountable for torture and CID reflect the outrage in the international community over the 
excesses of  U.S. detention operations since 2001. A spokesman for the Vatican pronounced the 
evidence of  torture by U.S. forces “[a] more serious blow to the United States than Sept. 11. 
Except that the blow was not inflicted by terrorists but by Americans against themselves.” 15 
British judge Lord Bingham (former Senior Law Lord in the House of  Lords), severely criticized 
U.S. detention operations in Iraq and Guantánamo Bay, saying that “[p]articularly disturbing 
to proponents of  the rule of  law is the cynical lack of  concern for international legality among 
some top officials in the Bush administration.” 16 
In addition to the lawsuits abroad against U.S. officials, lawsuits have been filed against 
foreign governments and officials for their roles in detention operations and particularly the 
extraordinary rendition program. On December 13, 2012, the European Court of  Human 
Rights ruled in favor of  former detainee Khaled El-Masri in his lawsuit against Macedonia for 
their responsibility for his torture and rendition by the CIA17 [see Chapter 5 for further details]. 
There are currently three similar cases pending against rendition partners Poland, Lithuania, 
and Romania before the European Court of  Human Rights, and one case ongoing against 
Djibouti before the African Commission of  Human and Peoples’ Rights.18 
In 2010, the United Kingdom issued a settlement in a case brought by 12 former detainees for 
the government’s complicity in their renditions and torture/abuse.19 Additionally, the UK issued a 
£2.2 million (approximately $3.5 million) settlement with Libyan national Sami Al Saadi over his 
allegations that MI-6 was involved in his rendition back to Muammar el-Gaddafi’s Libya.20 Al Saadi 
was allegedly tortured while imprisoned in Libya.21 There have been a number of  inquiries by UK 
bodies into the rendition program to date, including one by the House of  Commons’ Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and one by the All-Party Parliamentary Group, headed by Conservative MP Andrew 
Tyrie.22 Prime Minister David Cameron has pledged that there will be an official government inquiry 
following the culmination of  pending litigation by Libyan national Abdel Hakim Belhadj against 
former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw regarding his rendition to Libya by the CIA and MI-6 in 
2004.23 Further incentive for a UK inquiry can be found in Lord Peter Goldsmith’s (former British 
attorney-general) statement of  January 2012, noting his view that “that Guantánamo was damaging 
us, too. It was one of  the images that was causing the radicalization of  young Britons.” 24 
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International Political Consequences: Libya Case Study
The treatment of  several Libyan detainees by U.S. forces and allies provides a valuable 
demonstration for policymakers of  the potential problems of  short-term tactical thinking and 
actions. History can take sudden turns and decisions that may have seemed reasonable or even 
clever in the moment can bring unfortunate consequences when circumstances change. 
This is what occurred when the perception of  Libya’s ruler, Muammar el-Gaddafi, shifted in 
the West; he went from being regarded as a dangerous and unstable despot to someone who 
was to be courted as a valuable ally in the war against terrorism and an example of  a leader 
renouncing dangerous weapons. Then, when he tried to crush a rebellion, the view of  him 
shifted again as he was regarded once more as a dangerous tyrant whose overthrow we were 
proud to have aided.
During the course of  these changes, several leaders of  the principal nationalist Libyan movement 
were abused in U.S. custody — and in some cases, their wives were as well. One of  the detainees 
was even subjected to waterboarding by U.S. forces. Then, in an effort to reward el-Gaddafi 
during the time he was in favor with the West, they were secretly handed over to his regime, where 
they faced further abuse. One of  the detainees, Sada Hadium Abdulsalam al-Drake, estimated 
that about a dozen members of  the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), were handed over to 
Libya by the Americans and British authorities during the period the West was trying to improve 
relations with el-Gaddafi. Those Libyan detainees who were mistreated and likely tortured by U.S. 
or allied forces had been in exile in Afghanistan or Pakistan before September 11. 
Within a few years, those same Libyan nationalists who suffered under allied detention and 
rendition to el-Gaddafi became figures of  some importance to the United States. They were 
even regarded as heroic democratic examples in the West as they toppled el-Gaddafi. There is 
a deep and unsettling irony in this as the United States would soon become instrumental in the 
NATO effort to help Libyans overthrow el-Gaddafi, and that meant depending on those same 
individuals who had been rendered and abused (some by U.S. forces) just a few years prior.
The worst of  the potential consequences of  the earlier U.S. actions appears to have been 
averted. In interviews with Task Force staff, the leaders of  the revolt that overthrew el-Gaddafi 
expressed surprisingly little bitterness or even anger toward America. (Their attitude toward 
Britain is a different story.) This is significant and fortunate as the U.S. struggles to make sense 
of  current Libyan politics. 
However, it is difficult to evaluate the assertions of  the Libyan nationalists interviewed who said 
they bear no lingering animosity to the United States. As to whether they were ever any threat to 
the United States, two of  the leaders provided to Task Force staff  fascinating accounts of  their 
direct dealings and conversations with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan before September 11. 
These encounters, they say, demonstrate that the Libyan rebels had mistakenly been regarded as 
threats to the United States from the beginning. In their accounts, bin Laden tried persistently 
and unsuccessfully to bring their nationalist movement into the Al Qaeda fold and he became 
exasperated when they declined. The accounts below provide some details of  those conversations. 
The history recounted in this section indicates that some Libyans who have been recently 
regarded as important national figures by American policymakers (such as U.S. Ambassador J. 
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Christopher Stevens, murdered by genuinely anti-American terrorists) are people we appear to 
have previously tortured or turned over to el-Gaddafi for torture. It is a complicated story — 
some of  the people we apparently tortured were not mistreated by el-Gaddafi, and vice versa.
Apparently someone (almost certainly at the CIA) thought that since the United States was 
sending people all around the world in our secret rendition program to combat terrorism aimed 
at the United States, it would be a good idea to take advantage of  the system to transfer some 
people to Libya in an effort to gain favor with that country’s rulers at a time we were having a 
diplomatic rapprochement with the el-Gaddafi regime. The evidence that this was the thinking 
behind these renditions — that we and the British government thought we were buying favor 
with el-Gaddafi’s secret service — is in seized cables found in the headquarters of  Libya’s 
former secret service chief  after Tripoli fell. The cables were found in a remarkable discovery by 
researchers for Human Rights Watch who had the foresight to rush to the office of  the chief  of  
Libya’s security service in downtown Tripoli after its sudden downfall. The files were discovered 
left unsecured in the haste of  the retreat and translated. They were included in a September 
2012 Human Rights Watch report, “Delivered Into Enemy Hands.” 25 
In that report, one of  the LIFG leaders, Mohammed al-Shoroeiya, provided an account of  how 
he was subjected to waterboarding at the hands of  Americans in Afghanistan. Al-Shoroeiya 
was not one of  the three people the CIA has acknowledged waterboarding. Another LIFG 
leader, Khalid al-Sharif, provided Task Force staff  with an account of  being subjected to a 
similar water-suffocation procedure (which did not involve an actual board). Al-Sharif ’s account 
seemed credible to the Task Force staff  for several reasons: He did not know anyone was coming 
to interview him when he was approached in Tripoli; he told the story of  the water suffocation 
matter-of-factly in the middle of  the interview; and he seemed to recall the terror he faced as he 
recounted the incidents. He was asked if, after he was subjected to water suffocation thesecond 
or third time, the procedure began to seem less threatening as he realized they did not intend to 
kill him, just torment him.
“It wasn’t the idea of  killing me,” he said through a translator. “You know the person doesn’t 
want to kill you. But the torture is harder than death.”
Human Rights Watch’s disclosures of  al-Shoroeiya’s waterboarding and al-Sharif ’s suffocation 
by water caused some consternation at the CIA, which had always maintained that only three 
people had been waterboarded.
Asked his occupation, al-Sharif  said he was in the National Guard. When asked his rank, he 
responded that he was the commander. He is, in fact, the leader of  the 8,000-member Libyan 
National Guard, a force relied upon by U.S. authorities. During the interview with Task 
Force staff, he took a call from the American embassy. This and other interviews with Libyan 
nationalists were conducted in Libya in August and September 2012.
Abdel Hakim Belhadj
Belhadj was interviewed by Task Force staff  at his political party’s headquarters on the outskirts 
of  Tripoli on September 5, 2012. As a senior rebel military commander, he led the successful 
assault on Tripoli in the summer of  2011. 26
Yet in 2004, Belhadj and his wife, Fatima Bouchar, were seized by U.S. agents in Thailand, 
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questioned harshly, and within days bundled aboard a plane to be delivered to el-Gaddafi. It 
was an operation conducted with the cooperation of  British intelligence.
Belhadj told the Task Force interviewer that he bore no continuing anger toward the United 
States, but noted that it has been especially difficult for him to reach that view because of  how his 
wife was treated. “What happened to my wife is beyond belief,” he said through a translator. She 
was not part of  his political life, he said, and “what my wife went through doubled my pain.” 27
In an account given to the Guardian newspaper, his wife, Fatima Bouchar, said that when she and 
Belhadj were seized, she was 4½ months pregnant. She said they were taken to a secret prison 
near the Bangkok airport where they were separated. “They took me to a cell and they chained 
my left wrist to the wall and both my ankles to the floor,” she told the Guardian. She was given 
water but no food over the next five days.
At the end of  that period, she was forced to lie on a stretcher and was wrapped tightly from 
head to toe with tape. When they got to her head, she said, she made the mistake of  keeping 
one eye open and it was taped in that position. It remained that way for the duration of  a long 
flight to Libya, later determined to have lasted about 17 hours. “It was agony,” she said.28
Belhadj said he was shackled to the floor of  the plane in an uncomfortable position for the 
journey and occasionally kicked.29 
When they landed in Tripoli, they were driven separately to Tajoura prison where Bouchar would 
spend the next four months in a cell. She was released just before giving birth to a son. Belhadj would 
spend another five years in prison before being released.30 
He described the treatment he and his wife endured as barbaric and said, “I can confirm to you 
that if  I wanted revenge or wanted to rally people around me who would seek revenge, I would 
have done it. But I didn’t and I will never think about the idea of  revenge.” 31 
Instead, he said, he would be grateful to all who had helped in the overthrow of  el-Gaddafi and 
indicated that he distinguished between the Bush and Obama administrations. “The American 
government and the new administration had a positive role in backing this revolution,’’ he said. 
“And we thank them for that.” 32
Belhadj’s son born during his imprisonment is now almost nine years old and he and Bouchar 
have since had a baby girl born to them. He told the Task Force interviewer that he had met 
several times with Ambassador Stevens, the U.S. envoy who would be killed less than a week after 
the interview. “During all those meetings what we talk about is the mutual common interest we 
have, the relationship between Libya and the world, including the United States,” he said. 33
Asked about the relationship between the LIFG, the Libyan nationalist movement, and Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan, he replied: “There was never a relationship. On the contrary, I have met 
with Osama bin Laden on many occasions and whenever we met and discussed ideas, I make 
sure to say these ideas (of  killing) are not acceptable to Muslims.” 34 He also said that he argued 
with bin Laden over Al Qaeda’s tactics. “I told him, ‘how is it possible that Islam allows killing 
non-Muslims who are civilians? In what part of  our Koran does it say that?’ ” 35
The documents found in the office of  el-Gaddafi’s intelligence chief, Moussa Koussa, included 
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messages from British intelligence officials whose contents were deeply embarrassing for Britain.36 
One particular message found in the bombed office of  Gaddafi’s intelligence chief  was 
from Mark Allen, then head of  MI-6’s anti-terrorism unit, who wrote to Moussa Koussa: “I 
congratulate you on the safe arrival of  [Belhadj as identified by his nom de guerre]. This was the 
least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have 
built over the years.” 37
Two weeks after Belhadj and his wife were rendered to Libya, Tony Blair visited Tripoli and 
praised el-Gaddafi, declaring that Libya had come to recognize “a common cause with us in 
the fight against al Qaeda extremism.” 38 Around the same time, the Guardian reported, Shell, 
the Anglo-Dutch oil conglomerate, announced it had signed a lucrative deal to obtain gas 
exploration rights off  the Libyan coast.39 Within days of  the Blair visit and the Shell contract, 
British agents helped render a second leading member of  the Libyan resistance to el-Gaddafi.40 
Belhadj is suing Mark Allen and Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary at the time. He told the 
Task Force interviewer that he would not have brought suit or sought damages if  the British 
government had simply apologized to him.41
Sami Al Saadi
If  Belhadj was the military leader of  the Libyan nationalist militant group, LIFG, Sami Al Saadi 
was its chief  intellect and religious figure. He was interviewed by Task Force staff  in Tripoli on 
Sept. 5, 2012. 
Al Saadi came from a wealthy merchant family, one of  the oldest in Tripoli. He said that most 
of  the family wealth was seized by el-Gaddafi and his supporters. Both of  his brothers were 
killed in a notorious massacre at Abu Salim prison in 1996.42
He first went to Afghanistan in 1988, he said, as part of  the Libyan exile group (LIFG) opposed 
to el-Gaddafi. There were many such groups in Afghanistan, he said and, “[i]n the 90’s, we were 
asked by al Qaeda to join them. We had refused because we were concentrating on the resistance 
against the Libyan regime. … All of  the groups and the Arabs who were in Afghanistan at the 
time, they know us as a group we were opposing the ideology of  Al Qaeda.” 43
Al Saadi said that he had a few meetings with Osama bin Laden, the last in Kandahar a month 
before September 11. The subject was the legitimacy of  using Afghanistan as a base to stage 
strikes against the United States. Al Saadi described the meeting as being in a big tent where 
lunch was served. The Libyans arrived late, he said, but bin Laden gestured to him to come sit 
by him at the center of  the gathering. “I said I was uncomfortable here, but he gestured I must 
sit next to him,” Al Saadi recounted. He said that bin Laden knew that the Libyan group did 
not support Al Qaeda, especially in using Afghanistan as a base to launch strikes. “He said he 
heard about our stand and wanted to discuss it.” 44
Al Saadi said that bin Laden argued he was justified in using Afghanistan as a base even if  the 
Taliban government did not approve. He eventually got up to walk out and bin Laden followed 
him and said, “I wish you would review your stand.”
“I told him, ‘this is our stand and we had discussed this so many times’ and that was the last 
time I met with Osama bin Laden.” 45
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On September 11, 2001, he was walking to buy some bread when someone urged 
him to get into a car and listen to the news about a strike in the United States. 
Asked if  he and others were happy, he said the mood was not one of  celebration 
but of  analyzing what would happen next. The next day he and other Libyans left 
Afghanistan for Pakistan to avoid what they expected would be a swift reaction 
from U.S. forces. Al Saadi then traveled with his family to Malaysia and then China 
where he was arrested about February or March, 2004. He arrived in Libya on 
March 28, 2004.46
Al Saadi, his wife and four children spent months in Tajoura prison. The family members were 
released in a few months, but he stayed there for three years before being transferred to Abu 
Salim prison, where he remained for another three years.47 He said he was tortured in Tajoura 
with beatings on his hands and feet using electrical wires. After he was transferred to Abu Salim 
prison, he was visited by some outside groups — he believes that the International Committee of  
the Red Cross (ICRC) was among them — and he credits the awareness of  prison authorities that 
his conditions were being monitored with the cessation of  torture. However, on March 23, 2010, 
he was sentenced to death by a court inside the prison and given a certificate attesting to that.48
Both Belhadj and Al Saadi, along with other members of  the LIFG, were eventually pardoned 
through the efforts of  el-Gaddafi’s son, Seif  al-Islam, who had been assigned to broker some peace 
with the rebels.49 In December 2012, Al Saadi received a £2.2 million (approximately $3.5 mil-
lion) settlement (without admission of  liability) from the UK government over his claims that MI-6 
was involved in his rendition back to Libya and responsible for his subsequent torture.50
Khalid al-Sharif
Another leader of  the LIFG who was rendered to Libya, Khalid al-Sharif, said that while in 
the custody of  U.S. forces in Afghanistan, he was subjected to a treatment that was very much 
like waterboarding (described above). Here is a partial transcript of  al-Sharif ’s interview as 
conducted through a translator: 
Q: You were waterboarded? How?
Al-Sharif: They lay you down this way, on your back. On a big piece of  plastic 
and there will be personnel holding the plastic from the corner so the water 
wouldn’t get out. The piece of  plastic. It’s like a carpet but it’s made out of  
plastic. 
Q: Are you lying on this? 
[Clarification by translator]: He’s lying on this. 
Al-Sharif: There are people holding the plastic from the edges so the water 
doesn’t get out. And then the interrogator starts pouring the water on your face 
and your face is, of  course, covered — there’s a cover on your face. 
Q: Covered like with a cloth? 
Al-Sharif: It’s that bag that they put on the detainees. 
“You know the 
person doesn’t 
want to kill you. 
But the torture is 
harder than death.”
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Q: A hood? 
[Clarification by translator] The whole face. 
Q: What is it made of, is it cloth? 
Al-Sharif: Yes, it’s cloth. You can’t see from it but you can breathe and water 
could obviously come in.
Q: There’s a bag on your face and the water is poured on it?
Al-Sharif: Yes. So with the constant pouring of  water on your face you start 
suffocating. 
Q: Did you think you were going to drown?
Al-Sharif: Of  course, because you start moving your face to the right and left 
and looking to breathe and you completely smothered by the water pouring on 
you. 
Q: How long did this go on?
Al-Sharif: Depends on the interrogation. 
Q: How many times did it happen? They were asking questions at the same 
time?
Al-Sharif: While pouring the water they are asking questions.
Q: How many times?
Al-Sharif: I don’t remember. It was several times. 
Al-Sharif  said he was tortured during the three months he was held by 
Americans but the water torture was only in the beginning.
Q: After it was repeated, did you then realize they weren’t going to kill you?
Al-Sharif: It wasn’t the idea of  dying or killing me, the problem was how many 
times they bring you close to death because you start looking for air.
Q: It did not make it better that you knew you weren’t going to die? 
Al-Sharif: You know the person doesn’t want to kill you, but the torture is harder 
than death. 
Q: This was at the airbase? Were there Americans in uniform?
Al-Sharif: Some people were wearing the uniform, some people weren’t. For example, one 
of the people who were torturing was the prison warden and he was wearing a uniform. 
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Q: And this was Afghanistan?
Al-Sharif: Yes. 
Q: What was the room like where this occurred?
Al-Sharif: There were basically two rooms. The first room was for when they ask 
you the questions. The room had carpets all over its walls — red carpets — all 
over its walls. The wall and the ceiling, it was all covered with carpet. Red car-
pet, to be exact. And it had headlights pointed at you. 
That’s for the interrogation.
The other room was for the torture. 
Q: What questions were asked in the interrogation? Questions about Al Qaeda?
Al-Sharif: Basically they would ask you — the first question is whether you’re 
Al Qaeda and they would ask you about what are the next operations that Al 
Qaeda will carry out in the States. All the questions about the operations and 
people from Al Qaeda even though I told them from the first day that I was not 
Al Qaeda that I belong to a different group. This group is solely an opponent 
to the Libyan regime. We left our country in the 1980s and couldn’t go back — 
that’s why we live here.51 
The ongoing release of  information regarding U.S. detention operations, including CIA 
operations abroad, have stilted relations between the United States and other countries in several 
notable cases, and have had the potential to destroy relations with post-el-Gaddafi Libya. The 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Ireland and Finland have also requested further information from 
the United States about alleged rendition flights through their territories, and have imposed strict 
regulations on CIA aircraft, which have frustrated U.S. authorities52 [see Chapter 5]. It can be 
expected that the continued release of  information regarding U.S. detention operations spanning 
the globe will trigger further inquiries and lawsuits abroad in the next few years. 
Operational Consequences for the U.S. Military 
As detailed in this report [see Chapters 2 and 3], the use of  harsh techniques that sometimes amounted to torture 
had widespread consequences. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, detention operations, including use of  torture by 
U.S. forces, were changed dramatically after they contributed to rising insurgencies and breakdowns in command 
authority. Aside from these strategic changes, U.S. personnel were affected by the abuse in two ways: The 
negative mental consequences for them after engaging in abusive tactics and negative practical consequences for 
their collaborations with foreign military personnel. Both influenced the efficiency and success of  U.S. military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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The Impact of Abuse on U.S. Personnel
Although Abu Ghraib was the most visible example of  soldiers abusing detainees, there were many 
similar situations in Bagram Detention Facility in Afghanistan, Camp Bucca in Iraq, National 
Directorate of  Security detention facilities throughout Afghanistan, and detainee deaths at the point 
of  capture in the field.53 The culture of  abuse, in turn, spawned further insurgency movements.
In 2003, after the release of  the Abu Ghraib photos, a reporter asked a young 
Iraqi man about the reasons for the rise in violence against U.S. soldiers. His re-
sponse emphasized the imperative for revenge: ‘It is a shame for foreigners to put 
a bag over their heads, to make a man lie on the ground with your shoe on his 
neck. … This is a great shame for the whole tribe. It is the duty of  that man, and 
of  our tribe, to get revenge on that soldier — to kill that man. Their duty is to at-
tack them, to wash the shame. The shame is a stain, a dirty thing — they have to 
wash it. We cannot sleep until we have revenge.’ 54 
At Camp Bucca in Iraq, six sailors were accused of  abusing detainees by means that included 
throwing them into a cell they had filled with pepper spray.55 When appointed to command 
detention operations in Iraq, Major General Doug Stone placed improved treatment in detention 
at the heart of  the larger strategy to win over public support. Poorly conceived and executed 
“detention [operations] would kill the war [and] the service … there is no question,” he told Task 
Force staff. 56 
An often-overlooked problem, perhaps because of  the dearth of  empirical studies, is the impact 
of  detainee abuse on the U.S. forces involved. As explained by Jennifer Bryson, a former 
Guantánamo interrogator, 
Engaging in torture damages the torturer. The starting point for torture is the 
dehumanization of  a detainee. Those who dehumanize others corrupt themselves 
in the process; dehumanization of  other is a paradigm shift in how two people 
relate to each other, and as such it has an impact on both sides of  the relationship. 
Once the detainee’s human status no longer matters in the mind of  the torturer, 
he or she can unleash personal, even national, aggression. The detainee is sub-
jected to suffering and the torturer lets go of  reason, one of  the marks of  human-
ity, and descends into rage.57 
Psychologists Mark Costanzo and Ellen Gerrity point out that studies examining the effects of  
torture on the torturers extend back to post-World War II: “It may be only later, outside of  that 
specific environment, that the torturer may question his or her behavior, and begin to experience 
psychological damage resulting from involvement in torture and trauma. In these cases, the 
resulting psychological symptoms are very similar to those of  victims, including anxiety, intrusive 
traumatic memories, and impaired cognitive and social functioning.” 58 
There is abundant anecdotal evidence of  psychological trauma affecting U.S. forces who engaged 
in abuse of  detainees. Damien Corsetti, a notorious former interrogator, was responsible for the 
death of  the detainee named Dilawar [see Chapter 2] and the alleged abuse of  then-teenager 
Omar Khadr.59 He is now a disabled veteran of  two wars, suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).60
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Ben Allbright, a former prison guard in Iraq who arrived in 2003 at the beginning 
of  U.S. operations, reported the techniques he was ordered to use to “soften up” 
detainees during interrogations, which were often “crowded with guards, military-
intelligence officers, and OGAs [CIA officials].” 61 The techniques included 
banging pots and pans to scare the detainees, blaring loud music, and severe 
beatings.62 “The sounds were meant to disorient, but also to mask the screams.” 63 
If  the detainees sustained injuries during beatings, the military intelligence officers 
who had medical training “could stitch up or bandage injuries, avoiding a call to 
the medics and an entry in the logbooks that the Red Cross could read.” 64
From there, Allbright’s experiences became only grimmer.
In the summer of  2003, the interrogators threw a detainee against a concrete 
wall, punched him in the neck and gut, kicked him in the knees, threw him 
outside, and dragged him back in by his hair. For the entire two-hour ordeal, 
the prisoner wouldn’t talk; Ben later found out he spoke Farsi and couldn’t 
understand the interrogators’ English and Arabic. Afterward, Ben hid behind 
a building and cried for the first time since his dad’s death. ‘It was like a loss of  
humanity. Like we were trading one dictator in for another. I had to weigh my 
integrity against my duty. Why couldn’t I stand up more? Why was I hesitant?’65
When Allbright returned from Iraq in 2004, he had “nightmares and couldn’t remember 
things. … A psychiatrist diagnosed him with PTSD, but he refused medication. Instead he blew 
$14,000 on bar tabs his first four months home.” 66 
At a 2008 meeting of  the American Academy of  Forensic Sciences, psychologist John Smith 
(a retired Air Force captain) described treating former Guantánamo guards. One guard in 
particular, a National Guardsman in his early 40s, served at Guantánamo in the initial months: 
Mr. H reported that he found conditions at the camp extremely disturbing. For 
example, in the first month two detainees and two prison guards committed 
suicide. ‘He was called upon to bring detainees, enemy combatants, to certain 
places and to see that they were handcuffed in particularly painful and difficult 
positions, usually naked, in anticipation of  their interrogation,’ said Smith. 
On occasion he was told to make prisoners kneel, naked and handcuffed, on 
sharp stones. To avoid interrogation the prisoners would often rub their wounds 
afterwards to make them worse so that they would be taken to hospital. Some of  
the techniques used by interrogators resulted in detainees defecating, urinating, 
vomiting and screaming. … The prisoners also threatened Mr. H. ‘They would 
tell him … they would see to it that his family suffered the consequences.’67 
When the guardsman returned to the United States, he was “suffering from panic attacks, 
insomnia, nightmares, flashbacks and depression.” 68
Former military intelligence specialist Tony Lagouranis, who served in Iraq in 2004–05, bluntly 
admits: “I tortured people. You have to twist your mind up so much to justify doing that.” 69 The 
techniques used by Lagouranis included beatings, stress positions, mock executions and extreme 
hypothermia.70 While still in Iraq, Lagouranis began suffering from panic attacks as a result of  
“Engaging in 
torture damages 
the torturer. Those 
who dehumanize 
others corrupt 
themselves in the 
process.”
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his torture of  detainees, and was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and honorably discharged 
from the Army.71 He continued to experience extreme anxiety attacks and psychological 
episodes.72 When Lagouranis was diagnosed by an Army psychologist, he was told that he 
needed to leave the Army (the cause of  the stress) because otherwise, he “would continue to be a 
discipline problem and a drain on morale.” 73 
In September 2003, Army Specialist Alyssa Peterson died at the Tal Afar base near the Syrian-
Iraqi border following what was initially reported to be a “non-combat weapons discharge,” 
which often connotes accidental or friendly fire.74 The details of  the investigation into her 
death were made public in 2005 following a request under the Freedom of  Information Act.75 
According to the investigation, Peterson opposed the interrogation techniques being used 
by U.S. forces, and the official report noted that she had been “reprimanded” for showing 
“empathy” to the detainees.76 Peterson also refused to participate in interrogations after two 
days of  involvement.77 Army spokespersons refused to describe the specific techniques to 
which Peterson objected.78 However, a colleague of  Peterson’s, Kayla Williams, described the 
interrogations she witnessed in Tal Afar as including burning prisoners with lit cigarettes and 
stripping prisoners naked to humiliate them.79 The official report of  Peterson’s death stated that 
“[Peterson] said that she did not know how to be two people; she … could not be one person 
in the cage and another outside the wire.” 80 Finally, the official report acknowledged that days 
after refusing to participate in the interrogations, Peterson had committed suicide.81 Williams 
told the press that “[a]t the memorial service, everyone knew the cause of  [Peterson’s] death.” 82
The Impact of Torture on Collaboration with Allied Personnel
The abuse of  detainees by U.S. forces also had a significant impact on relations with foreign 
militaries. In an interview with Task Force staff, former General Counsel of  the Navy Alberto 
Mora described the changes in cooperation: 
“The country doesn’t really understand the cost. … [O]ne JAG officer came 
in and said that British military captured a terrorist — not a terrorist suspect, a 
terrorist — in Basra and released him. They gave him 48 hours head start and 
only then notified American authorities. They did not have detention facilities [at 
that time], and they did not trust either the United States or the Iraqi forces not 
to abuse this individual. So rather than engage in potentially aiding and abetting 
criminal activity, [the British forces] thought that the least worst option was to 
release a terrorist back into the field.”
Mora continued, 
British deputy commander of  NATO operations in Afghanistan would get up 
and leave any meeting in which detention operations were discussed, because 
he would not take a role in all of  this. Australian Navy refused to train with the 
United States Navy in detention operations [because of  the abuse]. I was [at] 
the Pacific Military Law Conference [in Singapore], the premier meeting of  
international military lawyers in the world. At one point I get cornered … by 
the uniformed TJAGs of  the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And 
they’re around me, fingers in my chest, and they say, “We’ve trained with the 
United States military all our lives, and we deeply respect everything you do … 
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but you need to know that our issues with detainee treatment and interrogation, 
we can’t go along with that. Our countries won’t do it. It’s not a question 
of  failure of  communication; we know what you’re doing. It’s a question of  
criminal activity in our countries and we can’t be party to this.
Speaking to Task Force staff, Mora concluded, “So towards the end of  my tenure, [I told the 
service vice-chiefs that] we need to document the operational impact of  these war on terror 
legal decisions [on interrogation techniques], because it’s sizeable. I always knew that this was 
extracting a cost.”
Even defenders of  the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” technique program have recognized 
that relationships with allies can weigh in the decision of  whether to engage in such practices. 
At a panel discussion on January 29, 2013, at the American Enterprise Institute, former 
CIA Director Michael Hayden acknowledged: “Look, even though we say it is effective, the 
consequences of  doing it vis-à-vis our allies could outweigh any benefit we might gain.”
No empirical study has been done on the consequences in terms of  operational 
impact of  U.S. forces suffering from torture-related mental problems.  
Impact on Detainees
The detainees from the “War on Terror,” whether held at Guantánamo or abroad, occupy a unique position in the 
international legal framework — that is to say, none at all. They are not criminals or convicts in the traditional sense, 
nor are they accorded the rights and protections of  armed combatants under the Geneva Conventions [see Chapter 4, on 
Legal Process]. Detainees have not traditionally been objects of  sympathy, but it is undeniable that a significant number 
are innocent and have suffered undeserved and life-shattering consequences that remained unaddressed.
The detainees in U.S. custody since 2001 bear the greatest resemblance in treatment to criminals in a prison 
system. Those who undertake hunger strikes to protest their detention are force-fed according to long-standing 
U.S. policy; they are not allowed food or clothing shipments; and as demonstrated in this report, they have often 
been the victims of  violence and intimidation. Most importantly, when detainees are released from the Guantánamo 
Bay Detention Facility or from detention abroad, they retain the designations of  “No Longer Enemy Combatants,” 
which carries the clear implication that they were, at one time, enemy combatants of  the United States and therefore 
previously involved in acts of  terrorism.83 Released prisoners from jails in the United States also forever carry the 
stigma and record of  having been imprisoned for crimes committed. The key difference is that those prisoners have been 
tried and convicted for their crimes. Most detainees at Guantánamo Bay or any of  the many former CIA prisons and 
proxy detention sites abroad have never been accorded a trial, although most have been cleared for release. The legal 
framework currently allows for this “twilight state” for detainees, whereby they have not been proven guilty, but are yet 
not considered innocent. Allowing this system of  release without exoneration carries problematic ambiguities. 
Although empirical studies on post-release effects are nearly impossible to conduct, given the international spread 
of  former detainees, Task Force staff  interviews along with NGO reports support the assertion that those 
individuals have been placed in extremely difficult situations. They are often tarred by social stigma, unable to 
obtain work or social benefits, without financial support, and suffering from a number of  post-detention physical 
and mental issues stemming from their treatment while detained. Former detainees have, in many cases, been left 
in worse situations than before they were captured, leaving them vulnerable to health issues and family troubles. As 
Senator Dick Marty of  the Council of  Europe84 said in his 2006 report on U.S.-administered secret detention, 
“Personal accounts of  this type of  human rights abuse speak of  utter demoralization … on a daily basis, stigma 
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and suspicion seem to haunt anybody branded as ‘suspect’ in the ‘war on terror.’ ” 85 The most common refrain 
among former (uncharged and released) detainees seems to be the request for an apology for their treatment.
Practical Issues Upon Release
In 2007, the U.S. Federal Bureau of  Prisons (BOP) released a statement on their “Release 
Preparation Program” for convicted inmates. The document states that “The Bureau of  Prisons 
recognizes that an inmate’s preparation for release begins at initial commitment and continues 
throughout incarceration and until final release to the community.” 86 Moreover, “[t]he Release 
Preparation Program’s purpose is to prepare each inmate to re-enter the community successfully 
and particularly, the work force.” 87 The statement includes the use of  “appropriate community 
resources” and creation of  “employment folders” for releasing inmates to assist them upon 
release.88 The purpose of  all of  these efforts and use of  resources by the U.S. government: 
“Inmate recidivism will be reduced through participation in unit and institution Release Preparation Programs 
and contact with community resources.” 89
In stark contrast to the BOP’s careful procedural guidelines for convicted criminals, and despite 
the U.S. government’s concern about recidivism among the released detainees [see Chapter 9], 
there are no agreed-upon public guidelines whatsoever regarding reintroduction of  detainees 
into communities, primarily because they retain a new and ill-defined status in a “law of  war” 
context, in contrast to domestic prisoners. Many of  them may also not properly fall into the 
category of  “recidivists,” having never taken up arms against U.S. forces. A 2008 study by the 
Berkeley Human Rights Center and International Human Rights Clinic entitled “Guantanamo 
and Its Aftermath,” discussing the after-effects of  detention on former detainees, detailed: 
With one exception, none of  those yet released from Guantánamo has been con-
victed or punished for a crime by the U.S. government. [Three convicted detainees 
have now been released from Guantánamo; David Hicks, Salim Hamdan, and 
Omar Khadr, although Hamdan’s conviction was overturned in October 2012.] 90 
Nor have they received any official acknowledgement of  their innocence. The U.S. 
government has repeatedly stated that its decision to release detainees is not an 
admission that they are cleared of  wrongdoing or that U.S. forces committed an 
error in capturing them or later detaining them in Guantánamo. Without a formal 
exoneration, people in some communities to which former detainees have returned 
have regarded them as suspect, even a threat to public safety. 91
The problem is compounded by the fact that each receiving country takes different approaches 
to resettling former detainees, although some American and European groups are lobbying to 
standardize release procedures.92 Even the best of  circumstances, when families were supporting 
the detainees in every way possible during detention, has yielded difficulties post-release due 
to the “great sacrifices” many families made in obtaining legal counsel and making lobbying 
efforts.93 “[My father] sold our land in order to seek my release,” one [former detainee] 
reported. And another said: “[T]hey spent all the money I had at home just looking for me. … 
And at the moment, there isn’t anything I have to survive on or to make a better life.” 94 The 
Berkeley study states that most of  the former detainees they interviewed “said they received little 
or no support from any group — government or private — upon their arrival in their country 
of  origin or a third country. One respondent in Europe noted that convicted criminals in his 
country receive more assistance than he did.” 95
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Enduring Stigma
The struggle to resettle/return detainees begins with the stigma associated 
with being held on terror suspicions by the United States, as detailed to Task 
Force members by former detainee Moazzam Begg, director of  British charity 
CagePrisoners (which raises awareness about Guantánamo prisoners). “I’ve gone 
to many governments within Europe and asked for them to accept GTMO prisoners who can’t 
return to their homes. … [O]ne of  the things I’ve been presented by the governments, whether 
it’s Luxembourg or Germany, is that ‘The United States is not taking these people, why should 
we?’ And I say to them in response almost incredulously ‘You’ve taken refugees from Bosnia, to 
Afghanistan, to Iraq. … [T]he problem here is you’re using the same language [as] the United 
States government, to determine us not as victims but rather still as terrorist suspects — as 
convicted terrorists, in fact.’ ” 96
The Berkeley study confirms the impact of  the stigma in former detainees’ home countries, stating: 
The stigma of  Guantánamo interfered with the ability of  several … former 
detainees to regain their former positions. Those who were government 
employees found they could not reclaim their jobs. “The government authorities 
think we are terrorists,” said one respondent. “I want my job back,” exclaimed 
another. “I want my rights, like the salaries that I was supposed to receive, and 
I want [a] promotion.” Another respondent, a highly-educated man, expressed 
frustration that his time in Guantánamo indelibly marred his reputation and 
career. He was a practicing physician, who had operated a clinic before his arrest. 
Now he had to “start again from a drugstore so that people can trust me.” 97
Another released Guantánamo detainee reported the same stigma: “It doesn’t matter I was 
found innocent. It doesn’t matter that they cleared my name by releasing me. We still have this 
big hat on our heads that we were [considered] terrorists.” 98 “The big problem is after their 
release,” said Lal Gul, a Kabul lawyer who heads the Afghan Human Rights Organization. 
In an interview with Task Force staff, Lal described how prisoners released by Americans who 
go back to their villages are typically left in a difficult position, often saddled with psychiatric 
problems and no position. “They have a bad name in society,’’ because of  their imprisonment. 
“They are unable to settle back in. That’s why some of  these people have been easily forced to 
go back to the Taliban.” 99
Former Moroccan detainee Kassim el-Britel faced the stigma after his release from CIA proxy 
detention in Morocco after nearly 10 years of  imprisonment (following a sham trial) and 
gruesome torture [see Chapter 5].100 El-Britel had been held in Morocco since May 2002 and 
was abruptly released in April 2011, following a royal pardon. He rejoined his wife in Italy 
shortly thereafter.101
[I wasn’t told that I was being released] until the very last minute, when they 
called me to release me. I wasn’t expecting to be released until September 2012, 
when the sentence was finished. There was no reason given for my early release, 
but I think it was because of  the Arab Spring riots … probably a political move 
to calm the rage that was felt in Morocco as well as other countries. I returned 
home [to Italy] after about nine days from Morocco.102
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Also disappointing to el-Britel was the lack of  assistance from NGOs following his release. As 
Khadija Anna told Task Force staff, “In Italy, no NGOs have offered any real help. People don’t 
know about Kassim’s case; they know more in the rest of  the world than in Italy.” 103 In the ab-
sence of  any monetary, legal, or social support, el-Britel’s life post-release has been “very bad.” 104 
Although he has attempted to continue his former Arabic translation business, his wife 
says that “he now has trouble because his Italian is not as good as it used to be after his 
imprisonment.” 105 El-Britel has searched for work, but said: 
If  you want work, you cannot find work. I’ve been free now for 1.5 years, but I 
still don’t have a job, not able to find a job. The problem [with job applications] 
is that one has to submit a curriculum vitae, and I have a ten year gap which 
dissuades anyone from calling me back. There was one case where I tried to 
explain my situation to a co-op where I was looking for a job. They went to 
visit my website [“Giustizia per Kassim” (“Justice for Kassim”) at http://www.
giustiziaperkassim.net], but as soon as they saw the “terrorist” charge, they were 
very scared and didn’t call me back.106 
El-Britel and his wife participated in the Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan lawsuit,107 which was 
thrown out of  the Ninth Circuit after the government’s invocation of  the State Secrets Doctrine 
[see Chapter 5], and they continue to explore their legal options with respect to the United 
States, Italy and Morocco.108 
Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib echoed el-Britel’s dismay over the stigma following him 
post-release:
When I first came back to Australia, I was deeply disappointed by the reaction 
of  many people, especially fellow Muslims. I had naively thought that, once 
people knew I had been kidnapped, sent to Egypt by the Americans and 
Australians, tortured, sent back to Afghanistan, and finally to Guantánamo Bay, 
people would be outraged. Instead many asked, “But what were you doing in 
Afghanistan? Explain yourself.” Despite my having been held for nearly four 
years by the Americans in Guantánamo Bay and having been interrogated 
continually — with not a shred of  evidence to support their terrorist accusation 
ever being produced — some people were still uncertain about me. … 
Any suspicions that people do have about me have been fomented by the 
government, which still treats me as a terror suspect.109
As can be seen by the economic hardship and limits on mobility faced by former detainees, the 
stigma associated with being a former detainee released from U.S. custody permeates every 
aspect of  life post-release.
Economic Hardship
Despite the fact that educational/language programs are now provided to most detainees 
at Guantánamo or in detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq [see “Operational 
Consequences,” above], many former detainees are released without any contacts, money, or 
guidance on job opportunities.110 In its report Broken Laws, Broken Lives, the group Physicians for 
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Human Rights [PHR] noted: “All the former Guantánamo detainees [interviewed] 
reported losing their employment or being in a precarious financial situation as a 
result of  their detention. All former Guantánamo detainees reported having been 
unable to find employment since release.” 111 As recounted by Begg, “I think one of  
the things we get is constant phone calls and messages from people who have been 
released from GTMO who need help, financial, medical, and finding a job, and we 
try to do from our limited resources as much as we can.” 112
Former Guantánamo Bay detainee Sherif  El-Mashad, an Egyptian national, had 
been living and working in Italy for four years before his capture in Afghanistan 
while on what he described as a business and charity trip (for which he had booked 
a round-trip ticket from Italy).113 El-Mashad, who had arrived in Afghanistan in 
July 2001, tried to leave after September 11, but when he made it over the Pakistani 
border, he was captured and handed over to U.S. authorities.114 He spent the next 
8.5 years in U.S. custody, first in Kandahar and then at Guantánamo Bay.115 He 
was cleared of  any charges in military review boards at Guantánamo Bay, and by President 
Obama’s Interagency Task Force, and released to Albania in February 2010.116 In an interview 
with Task Force staff, El-Mashad described his release (along with Saleh Bin Hadi Asasi and 
Rauf  Mohammed Omar Abu Al-Qusin, two other GTMO detainees):
I didn’t care where I was going; the most important thing for me was to leave. 
[On the flight leaving Guantánamo] I was blindfolded, there was something in 
my ears, and I was in chains. But it was only 12 hours, easier than the flight to 
Guantánamo. When we arrived, we were in Albania. An Albanian official came 
to meet us at the plane. We took a bus to a refugee camp [the Babrru Reception 
Centre outside Tirana]. Everyone at the camps were from neighboring coun-
tries; they were normal refugees. We had no money, and were told by Albanian 
officials at the camp that we could try to find work, but it never happened. We 
were never allowed any identity documents; we just eat and sleep in the camp 
and that’s it. If  you go to the hospital, there’s no space, and if  you want to buy 
medicine you have to pay for it yourself. The Albanians give me $400 per month 
as allowance, which is hardly enough for ten days. I pay everything from that; 
utilities, medicine. All of  Albania knows that we are from Guantánamo — even 
the children in the street. The reaction has been totally negative and we feel as if  
we are not human beings. The surveillance is so excessive. Sometimes the Alba-
nians walk behind you, just a meter behind you. I just wish they would let us live 
a semi-normal life now.
The Berkeley study contains details regarding other detainees released to Albania, which closely 
mirror El-Mashad’s account.117 They were initially transferred to the Babrru Reception Cen-
tre: “None of  the refugees spoke Albanian, and language instruction was halting, making social 
integration particularly difficult. The new arrivals struggled to learn the language, but twice the 
language course offered at the refugee center was discontinued. At the time of  the interviews, 
none of  the refugees was employed and their job prospects were bleak, especially since some 
potential employers did not want to hire anyone who had been held in Guantánamo.” 118 El-
Mashad still resides in Albania, albeit more recently in his own house, but has not been allowed 
to work for wages.119 Until August 2012, he was told, without explanation, that he would not be 
allowed to leave Albania, even though he wished to return to Egypt where his family resides. He 
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was informed in late August 2012 that he would finally be allowed to return to Egypt, but had not 
yet been issued travel documents.120 His goal, as told to Task Force staff, is to go back to school and 
start a new business in Egypt.121
Each former detainee’s account is slightly different, but for those transferred to third countries, 
the theme of  being left without contacts or resources is constant. Former detainee Mohammed 
el-Gharani was captured in Pakistan in 2001, aged 14 at the time.122 He was released from 
Guantánamo in 2009 at age 22 (after a U.S. federal court determined that the accusations against 
him were based on unreliable testimony).123 He had been born and lived his entire life in Medina, 
Saudi Arabia, and his family was still there.124 However, el-Gharani was a Chadian citizen through 
his parents, who were (legal) foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, and he was therefore sent to Chad 
from Guantánamo.125 Upon arrival, el-Gharani was imprisoned for a week and questioned about 
his nationality, then released without any identification papers so he was unable to travel to see his 
family.126 He tried to enroll in English classes, but could not do so without identification.127 He was 
also assaulted by armed men in N’Djamena who believed that he had been given a multi-million 
dollar settlement by the U.S. government — which was untrue.128 After release, el-Gharani relied 
on “handouts from friends to support himself,” and said that he has “no job.” 129 “I have a hard 
time finding somewhere to live.” 130
Economic hardship is not limited to detainees released to new countries. The Berkeley study 
details how
[m]any Afghan former detainees in particular said they were destitute and had 
little hope of  recouping lost capital. They had lost wealth in a variety of  ways: their 
property was destroyed or confiscated during capture or seized in their absence, 
sold by their families, or expended by family members to pay bribes or search for 
them. Several also remarked they were struggling to buy medicines prescribed in 
Guantánamo for their mental health. Recalled one Afghan respondent: “I am now 
needy and destitute. … I even have to ask people to lend me money to buy medi-
cines.” For some, physical impairments compounded difficulties in paying off  debt 
and supporting their families. One former detainee lost not only his business and 
built up debts to his family while he was in U.S. custody, he also lost the use of  his 
leg from an untreated injury sustained when he was arrested.131
Monetary post-release problems were also reported by British ex-detainees Moazzam Begg, 
Bisher al-Rawi, and Omar Deghayes, who met with Task Force members Asa Hutchinson and 
David Irvine and Task Force staff  in April 2012.132 The three former detainees insisted that 
“we are the more privileged ones, in the UK,” following a 2010 settlement from the British 
government made on the basis of  claims of  British involvement in their abuse or torture.133 
However, as al-Rawi described, “When I was [first] released from Guantánamo, I did not have 
a penny and I did not have any clothes. That’s a fact, I only had the clothes that were on me. 
Nothing else and not a penny in my pocket. And I was [47] years old … and not a penny in my 
pocket. And I didn’t really feel very comfortable asking my family. [Luckily], CagePrisoners gave 
me a gift of  [around] 300 pounds. I had a couple of  friends who also gave me something. And 
my mom supported me … I didn’t feel comfortable asking my mom to support me. [Most of  the 
people] leaving GTMO … they haven’t got anything. There must be a system to assist them to 
become normal.” 134
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Deghayes also described a piecemeal approach to reintegration, noting that Cage-
Prisoners had given him £1000 (approximately $1600) upon release.135 However, 
outside of  the UK and select NGOs, many former detainees are left to the charity 
of  friends and acquaintances. Al-Rawi, who assists with resettling former detain-
ees in Britain, said: “Although [some have said it can be] easy to collect money for 
people who left Guantánamo, I think that was on a small scale. In fact, I’ve found 
it very, very difficult to be able to help people from Guantánamo because generally 
when people hear you were in Guantánamo, they run away from you.136
Limited Mobility
Former detainees are also severely limited in mobility. The Luxembourg Agreement makes 
special provision for European countries (whose borders are normally open to other Schengen 
member states) to share information such that nonreceiving states can voice concerns about the 
resettlement or movement of  former detainees.137 In practice, a number of  former detainees like 
El-Mashad and el-Gharani, have been released without identification documents, which make 
travel an impossibility, even for those, like El-Mashad, who wish to return home to their families. 
However, even those with valid passports must tread carefully. Former detainees have never been 
allowed to enter the United States [see Chapter 5, on Rendition], as Khaled El-Masri and Maher 
Arar learned when they needed to testify on their own behalf  in lawsuits against former Bush 
administration officials and rendition flight operators.138 They both testified via video link.139 
Begg, who speaks internationally about his experiences in U.S. custody, also recounted his 
problem traveling post-release:
I have been refused entry into two countries [Canada and Qatar]. [Both] 
said their reasons for why they weren’t letting me in is because “You were a 
Guantanamo prisoner.” I don’t know any free former Guantanamo prisoner 
who’s ever walked on the shores of  North America, anywhere. … [B]eing a 
former Guantanamo prisoner is enough to deny you, and that’s certainly what 
the Canadians told me. It wasn’t just that I came to immigration and they saw 
my passport and they said “Oh sorry, we can’t let you in,” — they had a team 
of  armed police walk onto this [landed] plane, full of  five hundred people, took 
me off. … I couldn’t argue it any stronger than when I was refused entry into 
Canada. I said to them, “Do you understand what you are doing? That you 
are refusing entry based upon the fact that I was a Guantanamo prisoner and 
based upon evidence or statements that have come out under duress or under 
torture?” and so forth, i.e. the content of  my “confession,” and they said “Well, 
we have the right to do so.” The more concerning one … was Qatar. I’d been 
invited to Qatar to discuss the possibility of  Qatar accepting some GTMO 
prisoners who are unable to return to their countries for fear of  persecution. I 
was surprised when they said that my name had come up on a [watch] list, and 
I did ask them almost in tongue in cheek “Whose list is this?” and they said “It’s 
not a Qatari list.” 140
“I tortured people. 
You have to twist 
your mind up so 
much to justify 
doing that.” 
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Establishing Post-Release Procedures
Efforts to address post-release problems have met with some success in Europe.141 The British 
NGO Reprieve, which represents a number of  current and former detainees, has refocused 
post-release efforts on receiving countries, rather than the United States.142 The 2009 
Luxembourg Agreement established, among member states of  the European Union, modes of  
“information-sharing” regarding former detainees released to EU states, given the open borders 
of  the Schengen.143 However, the procedures established by the Luxembourg Agreement did not 
deal directly with former detainees.
To encourage the standardization of  procedures regarding the treatment of  former detainees 
in Europe, Reprieve first identified the “key challenges” facing former detainees in Europe. 
These include dealing with stigma (faced equally by resettled detainees and those sent to their 
native countries); seeking justice and reparations; contending uncertain legal status; finding 
accommodation; education/skills training and employment; and, accessing appropriate health 
care.144 The Reprieve report discussed methods of  offsetting these challenges, in particular the 
necessity of  detailed conversations between the European delegations sent to Guantánamo Bay 
and the soon-to-be-released detainees prior to resettlement.145 
“Best practices” were also highlighted from certain countries. For example, for the purpose of  
relieving former detainees of  stigma, Reprieve highlighted that in Switzerland, “the government 
stressed that [the former detainee] is a free man who has never been charged with any offense; 
he has committed to learning one of  the national languages and intends to look for work to 
support himself.” 146 Based on Reprieve’s work with former detainees who lack resources, the 
report also issues a policy recommendation that “[a]ccommodation and a living stipend should 
be provided for 3 years to ensure the men have time to recover from their long incarceration 
without the threat of  destitution. Other costs, such as family reunion, medical costs, language 
and vocational training should be budgeted for. If  further funding is needed, host governments 
could consider making requests to the United States government.” 147
The Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia runs a rehabilitation program for former detainees that 
incorporates a number of  these ideas. The Care Rehabilitation Center, located outside Riyadh, 
is part of  a counterterrorist campaign launched by the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia following 
a series of  terrorist attacks beginning in 2003. At the center, detainees formerly engaged in 
terrorism participate in sports and art therapy, visit and even temporarily stay with family 
members, and make day trips outside the center — all opportunities designed to prepare a 
detainee for life in Saudi society. 148
Once released from the center, the men are offered various forms of  social support, such as as-
sistance in finding a job and other benefits, including additional government stipends, a car and an 
apartment. 149 Single men are also encouraged to get married. “The important thing is that these 
men should not be idle and frustrated, because that could send them back to their old haunts, their 
old friends,” said Brigadier General Mansour al-Turki, spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry, 
which runs the rehab program.150 Although the detainees continue to be monitored occasionally 
by authorities, their families are primarily responsible for ensuring the detainees do not return to 
terrorism. The program has largely been praised by groups outside Saudi Arabia, although no 
specific statistics regarding recidivism from the Saudi program are available.151
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Because many former detainees were never engaged in terrorist activity, the effects of  a lack of  
social support upon release can be even more devastating.152 In Sen. Dick Marty’s 2006 rendition 
report, he notes, following extensive interviews with rendition victims, that “[l]inks with normal 
society appear practically impossible to restore.” 153 Al-Rawi seems more hopeful, while empha-
sizing the importance of  supportive programs for former detainees post-release: “I got married 
after my release. … I have two kids now. And [because of  that], I actually don’t much look back 
at Guantanamo; I actually try to have Guantanamo as something very, very distant. And I think 
… people who have actually moved on and started a new life, got married, have kids, they’ve left it 
behind them. But if  people linger where they are and they’re not doing anything useful with their 
lives, I think they will always look back at Guantanamo. [In terms of  eliminating the stigma], even 
just giving non-governmental bodies the green light to assist those people, re-education, getting 
married, starting up a small business [would be helpful]. That’s my number one priority in my life 
today … for people who’ve left GTMO to have a fresh start in life.” 154
Lasting Impact: Physical and Mental Consequences
Even with more robust procedures in place to reintegrate former detainees, certain 
complications will continue to persist — physical and mental reminders of  the years of  
detention and abuse. Exhaustive empirical studies have not been conducted due to the difficulty 
in locating and interviewing many former detainees post-release. However, the enormous 
amount of  anecdotal evidence available provides a guide to the physical and mental issues faced 
by current and former detainees, and the Task Force highlights them here.
Physical Effects
According to the 2008 Berkeley study:
Many [former detainees] complained of  a range of  physical impairments, 
which they attributed to their incarceration by U.S. forces. The most common 
ailment was pain in the wrists, knees, back, and ankles as a result of  prolonged 
short shackling, hanging, or stress positions. Another complaint was deteriorat-
ing eyesight. Some reported chronic pain, fatigue, or a generalized deterioration 
that interfered with their ability to perform physical labor for extended periods. 
One respondent, comparing his current state of  health to his condition before 
Guantánamo, said, “I was a strong man. But at the moment, I am nothing.” 155
In Broken Laws, Broken Lives, Physicians for Human Rights detailed how all of  the individuals they 
evaluated reported that “after their incarceration they suffered from headaches ranging from 
occasional to chronic, occurring as often as three times a day or lasting up to three hours at a 
time. … [T]hese reports were highly consistent with a history of  head trauma. One detainee 
also reported hearing loss, which he believed was due to the loud music that was blared at him 
in Abu Ghraib.” 156 In addition: “All of  the former detainees … reported [suffering from] diffuse 
musculoskeletal pain that they did not experience prior to detention. Many of  the persistent 
pain reported, as well as the descriptions of  the abuse that caused these injuries, were supported 
by findings from the physical examination.” 157 In particular: 
One individual reported arm numbness and weakness following suspension by his arms, which 
is highly consistent with a brachial plexus injury often resulting from the type of  suspension 
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he described enduring. Since his release from Abu Ghraib prison, he has been suffering from 
chronic pain in his neck, legs, right shoulder, and feet, all of  which he attributed to, and are 
consistent with, reports of  injuries sustained during his incarceration (e.g., beatings, being 
suspended in stress positions).158
British resident Omar Deghayes’s eyesight was permanently affected by his detention at 
Guantánamo. According to Deghayes, his right eye was gouged by a guard when he refused to 
come out of  his cell because he said he feared the sexual humiliation tactics used by the guards 
during cavity searches.159
I was chained to the floor and the guards were holding my head. … [T]here 
were many of  them, seven or six or more, they were holding me down to the 
floor so there was no fear of  [me] fighting [back] or anything like that. Both 
eyes were completely open so [one of  the guards] put his fingers and … started 
to push inside my eyes. … I could feel the coldness of  his fingers [as] he was 
pushing hard digging into my eyes and I didn’t want to scream because I didn’t 
want to frighten the people in the other cells and then the other thing is I 
didn’t want to give them that satisfaction of  me screaming on the floor. I didn’t 
scream, so he was pushing even harder digging inside my eyes. The officer 
standing was saying “More, more” and this guard was saying “I am, I am,” 
shouting to the officer. And then, what I know is lots of  liquid coming out from 
both of  my eyes, I couldn’t see anything for three days, I think. I was thrown 
back into the cell and food was thrown, because [I was in] an isolation cell, the 
food was thrown from the bean hole and I was eating food and just sleeping. I 
couldn’t see anything, there was lots of  pain in my eyes. And then slowly one 
of  them recovered sight. … [T]here was [no medical care] till after couple of  
months, a medical doctor came in and all his advice was that he would be will-
ing to take the eye out from my head because he thought it looks really bad.160
Deghayes declined to have his right eye removed, but never regained his sight in that eye. 
Sami al-Hajj, a journalist who heads the Liberties and Human Rights Affairs section of  Al 
Jazeera, was held for nearly seven years in Afghanistan and Guantánamo, during which he was 
subjected to severe beatings, sleep deprivation, and at one time undertook a 480-day hunger 
strike at Guantánamo, during which he was force-fed by the military.161 [See Chapter 6 for 
further details of  al-Hajj’s account.] To this day, al-Hajj said to Task Force staff, “I have some 
problem … at the beginning of  the stomach here [bottom of  the esophagus], there is something 
[that should close], that now [does] not close.” Al-Hajj takes medicine for the resulting reflux, 
and said that he knew other former detainees whose stomachs were so bad that they would not 
accept food.162 Following his release, al-Hajj also walked with a limp and used a cane “because 
of  injuries he says were incurred when he was pushed from a military helicopter blindfolded 
after his arrest in 2001.” 163
Adel Fattough Ali Al-Gazzar, an Egyptian national, signed up as a volunteer with the Red 
Crescent after September 11, 2001, to assist Afghan refugees from the bombings.164 Shortly 
after he crossed the border from Pakistan, he was caught in an airstrike that injured his leg.165 
Al-Gazzar spent a month in a Pakistani hospital, but he was abruptly “moved” with several 
other patients to U.S. custody in Kandahar before he could undergo a necessary operation 
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on his leg.166 He was held in Kandahar for 11 days and subjected to forced nudity, extreme 
temperatures, and beatings where guards “kicked my injured leg and I was screaming in agony, 
but they just laughed and danced like it was a joke.167 Al-Gazzar elaborated:
I was … concerned about my leg, because I had severe pain and the environ-
ment was dirty so I was worried that it might get infected. The American 
doctors were telling me it had to be amputated. I resisted, arguing with them 
about what the Pakistani surgeons had said, that they could save my leg. I even 
showed them the X-rays that I had kept. The Americans just laughed and said 
the Pakistanis didn’t know anything about medicine and treatments. In the end 
one of  them admitted that they could save my leg but the operation would cost 
thousands of  dollars and that America was a “poor country.” 168
After transfer to Guantánamo, Al-Gazzar again tried to explain to the doctors at Camp X-Ray 
that his leg could be saved.169
I got the same as answer as I’d had in Kandahar: Pakistanis didn’t know anything, 
the leg had to go. As the days passed the pain increased and the colour of  my 
leg started to turn grey — almost black. I asked them to clean the wound, and 
to change the dressing every day and night but they wouldn’t do it. When I 
asked them in the morning for a new dressing they said they will do it in the 
afternoon, and in the afternoon they said they will do it in the morning, like that. 
… The wound was open and big — without any kind of  treatment besides basic 
dressings. They forced us to take showers so the wound got wet many times — 
the pain became almost unbearable. … [M]ost of  the other prisoners advised me 
correctly that I had no option but to accept the amputation as it had passed the 
stage of  being saved and had become gangrenous and could spread higher up the 
leg the longer it was left. I finally gave in.170
Al-Gazzar was given a prosthetic leg six months later. He was released from Guantánamo and 
sent to Slovakia in 2010 after eight years of  detention. 171 Al-Gazzar has said that at least 13 
other detainees received amputations at Guantánamo while he was there.172 In 2011, Al-Gazzar 
returned home to Egypt, but was arrested and detained upon arrival under a prison sentence 
issued in absentia while he had been detained at Guantánamo.173 Although his co-defendants 
were cleared after a judicial finding that the conviction had relied on false statements, Al-Gazzar 
remained in detention for seven months largely “[b]ecause of  his status as a Guantanamo 
prisoner,” according to his lawyers.174 He was finally released on bail in January 2012. Deghayes 
also attested that he knew of  numerous “broken arms” and at least one other detainee who lost 
an eye: “People lost their limbs [at Guantánamo].” 175
Mental Effects
The category of  “torture/CID survivors” is increasingly applied to anyone who was in 
U.S. custody in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, Iraq, or the “black sites” when enhanced 
interrogation techniques such as isolation, extreme temperatures, sleep deprivation, and sexual 
humiliation were used.176 The category must also include individuals placed in CIA proxy 
detention in Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, or other areas where torture techniques were 
routinely used. Over the past five years, research has emerged showing that the psychological 
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effects of  torture and abuse, even more than the physical effects, “can in fact have serious long-
term mental health consequences.” 177
Former detainees who were held incommunicado, for extended periods of  time, or abused face 
very real mental trauma [see Chapter 6]. In their exhaustive examination of  mental effects of  
torture or CID on Guantánamo detainees, Break Them Down, PHR stated that “[t]he lack of  
physical signs can make psychological torture seem less significant than physical torture, but 
the consensus among those who study torture and rehabilitate its victims is that psychological 
torture can be more painful and cause more severe and long-lasting damage even than the pain 
inflicted during the physical torture.” 178 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture confirms 
this: “Even when the most brutal physical means are used, the long term effects may be mainly 
psychological. … A common effect is the disintegration of  the personality.” 179 As al-Rawi 
has said, following the sleep deprivation, isolation, and beatings/strippings he endured and 
witnessed at Guantánamo: “I came out of  Guantanamo and physically, I could not show 
anything. But I have to tell you, the pain I carry inside and the memories I have are really very 
great, and I have nothing to show.”
Moreover, “psychological torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment can have 
extremely destructive health consequences for detainees.” 180 As described by Sen. Dick Marty 
in his 2006 rendition report, “[Rendition] victims have described to us how they suffer from 
flashbacks and panic attacks, an inability to lead normal relationships and a permanent fear of  
death. Families have been torn apart.” 181 Al-Rawi agrees:
I thought actually before I was released, “I can cope with this, no problem, I’ve 
survived Guantanamo, I can survive normal life.” Actually, I found normal life 
at that stage was harder than Guantanamo. I could deal with — I learned how 
to deal with GTMO. I can deal with the officers, I can deal with the guards, I 
can deal with the six or seven people who come into my cell and have a fight 
with me, but actually I could not deal with [normal] people.182
Difficulty reconnecting with families is a constant theme among former detainees. Begg recounted 
his experience of  coming home to teenage children after nearly three years of  detention:
[Y]ou now have to face … children who don’t know their father, who are now 
going through the ages of  adolescence where they would already be rebelling. 
[Now you enter the family], where you are and for several years have been a 
stranger. Your introduction to the family and the fabric of  family life doesn’t 
help to keep it together, it actually starts to break it apart. And there is nothing, 
no amount of  compensation, psychiatric treatment, communal help, societal 
reference, whatever, that will ever fix that. And for those who are still in 
Guantánamo and those who have recently returned, it is a terrible ordeal.183
The difficult of  reintegration combined with the years of  detention and abuse have resulted in 
acute mental illnesses in current and former detainees. PHR noted that “[s]ymptoms shown by 
victims of  psychological torture are typically those associated with anxiety disorders, including 
acute stress disorder, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]. … One-third of  
PTSD sufferers fail to recover even after many years.” 184 PHR further describes how most, 
if  not all, of  the 11 former detainees in their 2008 Broken Laws, Broken Lives study suffer from 
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diagnosed severe depression, PTSD, and other disorders.185 “It is like in my head 
I have never left Abu Ghraib,” said one former detainee to PHR.186 Additionally, 
“[t]he persistent nature of  PTSD symptoms may eventually lead to personality 
changes in torture survivors.” 187
Kassim el-Britel experienced such a personality change following his rendition and 
torture for nine years in CIA proxy detention in Morocco. His torture allegedly 
included a Moroccan interrogation technique known as “bottle torture,” whereby 
a broken bottle is forced into the anus of  a prisoner.188 “I can’t bear the injustice I 
suffered; I will not find peace until justice is served. I have to take antidepressants 
and sometimes I feel aggressive and sometimes I feel depressed. It was very hard to 
bear. Of  course, nothing can erase all the torture, there is no way to recover the years 
I have lost in prison.” 189 During the Task Force staff ’s interview with el-Britel, he 
became visibly disturbed when asked about the lasting mental and physical effects of  
his detention, responding only that “[t]here are clinical results that show the effects of  
my trauma.” 190
El-Britel’s wife, Khadija Anna, also attests to the changes in her husband.
[I]t’s hard to [live a normal life], given the circumstances. It is hard to 
understand the moments of  depression and sadness that Kassim experiences. 
He went through some horrible experiences, which no human being should 
ever suffer. … Kassim still experiences deep exhaustion. What happens is that 
people who seem normal, still suffer from the consequences [of  torture]. It is 
hard to live in society, because you feel as if  you are always alone even though 
you live in a modern society. When something like this happens, it eats at 
something inside of  you, so the pain and sorrow is very deep.191
Sami al-Hajj reported similar social problems. “When I get my release, it’s not easy for me 
to talk. I can’t talk continuously. Even movie[s] [are] difficult for me, even to deal with other 
people, even my family. I don’t want [them] to talk to me, too much noise, I don’t want noise. … 
Even with my child, it’s not easy.” 192 Al-Hajj confirmed that he has post-traumatic stress disor-
der, and that to this day he continues to see therapists.193
Anecdotes like these abound among former detainees. In 2009, doctors with PHR met with a 
former detainee using the name Adeel in Pakistan. Adeel had spent four years in U.S. custody 
in Afghanistan and Guantánamo, and subjected to sexual humiliation, isolation, extreme 
temperatures, loud music, and stress positions.194 According to Adeel, since his release, “the 
sound of  approaching footsteps or the sight of  someone in a uniform can trigger bad memories 
and set off  a panic attack. … ‘I feel like I am in a big prison and still in isolation. I have lost all 
my life.’ ” 195 The doctors diagnosed him with PTSD and severe depression.196
In a March 2012 article for Annals of  Internal Medicine, Dr. Sondra Crosby described meeting a 
former detainee, “Rashid,” during a visit to Pakistan on behalf  of  Physicians for Human Rights. 
According to Crosby,
[Rashid] described the horrors of  his arrest, during which he was beaten so badly 
that he was admitted to a hospital with multiple fractures and internal injuries. 
“There are 
accounts, 
however, of the 
six confirmed 
suicides that have 
taken place at 
Guantánamo Bay 
in the 10 years 
since it opened, 
along with the 
hundreds of 
suicide attempts”.  
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He described how he was kidnapped from his hospital bed and survived a five-
year ordeal in U.S. custody in multiple detention sites, including Afghanistan. … 
[H]e detailed the methods of  his torture: severe beatings, prolonged painful stress 
positions, prolonged solitary confinement, forced nakedness and humiliation, 
sleep deprivation, withholding of  food, sexual assault (anal rape and sodomy), 
forced intravenous medications during interrogations that he thought might 
be a truth serum, and painful shackling. At times, he was denied medical and 
psychiatric care. Rashid’s prominent symptoms [post-release] included extreme 
sleep disturbance, sadness, loss of  appetite with substantial weight loss, and 
difficult interacting with other people (including family and friends), resulting in 
profound isolation. The lack of  self-sufficiency has caused further depression, 
feelings of  inadequacy, and shame and humiliation when he has to rely on his 
family for his basic needs. … [H]e meets diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic 
stress disorder and major depression, but those Western-based diagnoses do not 
adequately characterize his palpable suffering.197
At Crosby’s behest, the U.N. Voluntary Fund for Victims of  Torture (which has handled a 
number of  post-release detainee cases) was able to arrange for Rashid’s treatment.198 The 
United States is not currently a donor to the fund.199
German detainee Khaled El-Masri is another compelling PTSD case that supports the 
argument for medical and reintegration assistance for former detainees. El-Masri returned to his 
home in 2003 after five months of  confirmed rendition and abuse by the CIA, which allegedly 
included beatings, sodomy, and malnourishment [see Chapter 5]. He found that his wife and 
children had moved to Lebanon, believing that he had abandoned them.200 
In the nine years since his release, El-Masri’s mental state has drastically deteriorated and 
manifested in a string of  incidents, despite having no criminal record prior to his rendition. 
In 2007, El-Masri was convicted of  arson, having set fire to an electronics store that had 
refused to allow him to return an allegedly faulty purchase.201 His lawyer, Manfred Gnjidic, 
argued that he had pleaded with doctors and the government to get El-Masri psychiatric 
care prior to the fire, but “no one had offered to take him.” 202 Gnjidic also pointed out that 
El-Masri “live[d] cooped up most of  the time in his apartment and in constant fear that his 
children could be shot. He has suffered a complete nervous breakdown.” 203 During the trial, 
prosecutors also claimed that El-Masri had allegedly attacked a driving instructor who had 
criticized him for not attending lessons.204 The court gave El-Masri a two-year suspended 
sentence on the grounds that he had been severely traumatized by his rendition and abuse, 
and had no prior record.205
El-Masri ran into further trouble in 2009, after attacking the mayor of  Neu-Ulm, his town in 
Germany. Taking three of  his children with him, El-Masri stormed into the mayor’s office (after 
first being turned away by police), punched the mayor repeatedly, and threw a chair at him.206 
This time, El-Masri was sentenced to two years in prison.207 During a trial, a psychiatrist “deemed 
el-Masri responsible for his actions, but noted his abduction had caused him great suffering.” 208 
These anecdotes illustrate only a few of  the possible effects of  prolonged detention and abuse 
on detainees. For those who endured sexual abuse while in U.S. or proxy detention, such as El-
Masri, Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes, and Binyam Mohammed [see Chapters 1, 2 and 5], clinicians 
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at a Berlin psychological center, “who treat a large population of  Muslims, have 
found that Muslim victims of  sexual torture forever carry a stigma and will often 
be ostracized by the community.” 209 More generally, the International Committee 
of  the Red Cross (ICRC) publicly warned the Bush administration in 2003 that 
“a system in which detainees were held indefinitely would inevitably lead to 
mental health problems.” During the ICRC’s June 2004 visit to Guantánamo, they 
“found a high incidence of  mental illness produced by stress, much of  it caused by 
prolonged solitary confinement.” 210 
The most extreme manifestation of  the mental effects of  abuse and prolonged 
detention are the suicides and attempted suicides that have occurred among current and 
former detainees. In Broken Laws, Broken Lives, the PHRs states: “Seven of  the eleven individuals 
evaluated disclosed having contemplated suicide as a result of  the abuses they suffered while in 
US custody. Suicidal ideation is particularly significant and pathological in these cases given the 
strict prohibition against suicide in the Muslim religion.” 211 No empirical figures are available 
on self-harm incidents or suicides post-release. 
There are accounts, however, of  the six confirmed suicides that have taken place at 
Guantánamo Bay in the 10 years since it opened, along with the hundreds of  suicide 
attempts.212 The Department of  Defense has not regularly released statistics on “self-harm 
incidents” at Guantánamo, but there were over 350 such attempts in 2003 alone.213 In 
September 2012, 32-year-old Yemeni detainee Adnan Latif  was found dead of  suicide in his 
cell at Guantánamo after 11 years of  detention.214 Latif  had made several previous suicide 
attempts, including slitting his wrists in 2009.215 It also may be significant that he and the six 
men who committed suicide, along with dozens of  other detainees who have attempted suicide, 
were long-term hunger-strikers in the prison, protesting the reasons, length, and conditions of  
their detention.216
Latif  had been recommended for release three times, twice by the Department of  Defense and 
once by President Obama’s Special Task Force for Guantánamo, on the grounds that he was 
“not known to have participated in any combatant/terrorist training.” 217 Latif  consistently 
argued that he had been sold for bounty while he was in Pakistan for cheap medical care 
following a car accident in his native Yemen.218 His immediate release was ordered by a U.S. 
district court in 2010, but the decision was overturned after the Department of  Justice appealed, 
arguing essentially that the government’s evidence was entitled to a “presumption of  accuracy” 
without accounting for the corroboration of  and correction for interpretation/transcription 
errors and redactions that had terminated the DOJ’s case at the lower court.219 Latif  had 
a history of  “depression and erratic behavior,” and was “mentally fragile and was at times 
sedated, placed on suicide watch and sent to the prison’s psychological ward.” 220 According to 
his lawyer, David Remes: “Every hope held out to him was dashed. … He felt that his spirit was 
dying, that he couldn’t continue to bear his conditions.” 221
In one of  his last letters to Remes (from December 2010), Latif  wrote
Do whatever you wish to do, the issue [of  release] is over. … This is a prison 
that does not know humanity, and does not know [anything] except the 
language of  power, oppression and humiliation for whoever enters it. It does 
not differentiate between a criminal and the innocent. … Hardship is the only 
“This is a prison 
that does not 
know humanity, 
It does not 
differentiate 
between a criminal 
and the innocent”
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language that is used here. Anybody who is able to die will be able to achieve 
happiness for himself, he has no other hope except that … [e]nding it is a 
mercy and happiness for this soul. I will not allow any more of  this and I will 
end it. … A world power failed to safeguard peace and human rights and from 
[sic] saving me.” 222
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
The April 2012 meeting between Task Force members Asa Hutchinson and David Irvine,223 
and al-Rawi, Begg, and Deghayes in London seemed to be the first time that high-ranking 
former U.S. officials had come face-to-face with former detainees.224 The long and often difficult 
discussion about the experiences of  the three former detainees yielded samples of  the challenges 
faced by all detainees.
Hutchinson later stated that “There is no doubt in my mind that these individuals suffered 
treatment that amounted, if  not to torture, then cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.” 225 
At the end of  the meeting, Irvine emphasized that the discussion had been enormously 
helpful, and commented that “I suspect that my country is at the beginning point of  a long 
process of  beginning to say ‘I’m sorry.’ ” All three men thanked Hutchinson and Irvine 
profusely, and noted that Irvine was “the most senior person who’s ever said something of  that 
nature,” in keeping with the understanding that many former detainees are simply looking for 
acknowledgement of  or apology for the abuse received at the hands of  U.S. forces. 
Deghayes added:
I always thought Guantanamo was [a missed] opportunity for the American 
government to explain the better side of  the United States. To many youngsters 
who were imprisoned, seventeen years old, twenty years old, from all over the 
Middle East, to show them that there were other good things in America rather 




The U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), began receiving detainees from the U.S. 
“War on Terror” on January 11, 2002.1 As of  January 14, 2012, 603 detainees have been released 
or transferred, and 166 remained in detention.2 
The Defense Intelligence Agency provides periodic updates on GTMO detainees released or transferred 
from the base and either confirmed or suspected of  “re-engaging” in terrorism. The generic designation/
description of  conduct in question has been referred to as “return to the battlefield,” 3 “re-engaging in 
terrorist or insurgent activities” 4 and “anti-coalition militant activities.” 5 The Department of  Defense 
does not provide a list of  criteria or the methodology employed in classifying individuals as “re-engaging 
in terrorism.” 6 The public must rely on a combination of  broad terms and specific examples of  re-
engagement in order to understand the framework employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, but 
the word “recidivism” has been used in application to all of  the above categories. The dissection by 
non-governmental organizations and the media of  the information provided by the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, as well as statements made by a broad spectrum of  government officials, highlight the lack of  
reliable and explicit data necessary for a rigorous policy discussion on the consequences of  transfer and 
release of  GTMO detainees. “Recidivism” has become a controversial term, with former CIA officials 
such as Gary Berntsen declaring that “the number, as far as we know, is 33 percent. And those are only 
the ones we know about!” 7 On the other hand, groups such as the New America Foundation have said 
that the number is closer to 6 percent.8 
“Return to the battlefield” implies engagement on the battlefield before capture and detention. For 
many of  the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay, prior involvement in the fight has been poorly, if  at 
all, established.9 According to the unclassified summaries of  the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, 
only 21 detainees (4 percent) have been alleged to be on the battlefield before their capture.10 The term 
itself, “recidivism,” does not comport with the acknowledgement by General Michael Dunlavey, former 
commander of  Joint Task Force Guantánamo, that “easily a third of  the Guantánamo detainees were 
mistakes,” as those detainees can therefore not be properly classified as recidivists.11 That estimate was 
later raised by General Dunlavey to half  of  the detainees held at Guantánamo.12  
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Department of Defense Data
The information available relies in large part on the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
terrorism report updates provided to the Department of  Defense, and summaries of  the 
director of  national intelligence submitted pursuant to the requirements of  the Intelligence 
Authorization Acts. The following is the list of  data provided by the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and the Director of  National Intelligence: 
 • On July 10, 2006, the DIA provided an update to the Department of  Defense general 
counsel on the status of  GTMO detainees “known/suspected of  returning to terrorism 
after release.” 13 The paper identified seven individuals as released from GTMO and having 
returned to terrorism.14 
 • A December 4, 2007, DIA report stated there were 31 released detainees (7 percent of  
those transferred from U.S. custody) confirmed or suspected of  re-engagement in terrorist 
activities.15 The DIA report, further stated that the rate of  the re-engagement for the period 
from 2004-2007 rate was between 5 and 8 percent. 
 • A May 12, 2008, DIA report raised the number to 36 detainees confirmed or suspected of  
re-engagement in terrorist activities.16 The rate of  re-engagement remained between 5 and 
8 percent. 
 • A January 7, 2009, DIA report released two separate numbers for released detainees 
confirmed (18, or 3.4 percent) or suspected (43, or 8 percent) of  re-engaging in terrorism. 
The 2004–2008 rate of  re-engagement was between 4 and 8 percent with overall re-
engagement rising to 11 percent.17 
 • An April 8, 2009, DIA report raised the number confirmed of  re-engaging in terrorist 
activities to 27, and the number suspected to have done so to 47, with a corresponding re-
engagement rate of  14 percent.18 
 • As of  October 1, 2010, according to the director of  national intelligence, 81 detainees 
(13.5 percent) were confirmed, and 69 (11.5 percent) were suspected to have re-engaged in 
terrorism. Of  the 150 detainees confirmed or suspected of  re-engagement, 13 are dead, 54 
were in custody, and 83 were at large.19
 • As of  December 29, 2011, according to the director of  national intelligence, 95 detainees 
(15.9 percent) were confirmed, and 72 (12 percent) were suspected to have re-engaged in 
terrorism. Of  the 162 released detainees confirmed or suspected of  re-engagement, 14 are 
dead, 54 were in custody, and 99 were at large.20 
 • As of  July 19, 2012, according to the director of  national intelligence, 95 detainees (15.8 
percent) were confirmed, and 73 (12.1 percent) were suspected to have re-engaged in 
terrorism. Of  the 168 released detainees confirmed or suspected of  re-engagement, 17 are 
dead, 52 were in custody, and 99 were at large.21 As of  January 14, 2013, according to the 
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director of  national intelligence, 97 detainees (16.1 percent) were confirmed, and 72 (11.9 
percent) were suspected to have re-engaged in terrorism. Director of  National Intelligence, 
Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 
(March 5, 2013) available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/March%202013%20
GTMO%20Reengagement%20Release.pdf. 
The rate of  re-engagement per year remained between 3 and 8 percent through 2008, 
according to DIA figures. Starting in 2009, the rate of  re-engagement rose to 11 percent in 
January and to 14 percent in April. After the April 2009 report, updates do not address the rise 
over time in the rate of  confirmed or suspected re-engagement of  detainees, which is currently 
at 27 percent.22 It should be noted, however, that the Summary of  Reengagement issued by the 
director of  national intelligence in September 2012 lists only three confirmed recidivists out 
of  70 released since January 22, 2009.23 There is a reported lag time between the release of  a 
detainee and the intelligence either confirming or suggesting re-engagement. According to the 
2006 Defense Intelligence Agency report, the lag time was one year.24 According to the fiscal 
year 2010 report, the time between release and first report of  confirmed or suspected terrorist 
activity was 2.5 years.25 There is no information provided to account for the change in average 
lag time between release and first report of  re-engagement. 
Methodology / Criteria
The specific methodology of  how the Defense Intelligence Agency assesses re-engagement in 
terrorism is not publicly available. In the context of  a Freedom of  Information Act litigation, the 
Department of  Justice explained: “[to] allow for the proper flexibility in analyzing all available 
evidence, DIA does not endeavor to create any sort of  firm guidelines for identifying a detainee 
as having returned to the fight. The data collected to support this determination simply varies 
too greatly to allow for categorical simplification.” 26 The best official indicators of  the criteria 
employed in providing the re-engagement numbers are the definitions provided by the DIA 
reports for “confirmed” and “suspected.” The 2007 update provides the following definitions:
Definition of  “Confirmed” — A preponderance of  evidence — fingerprints, 
DNA, conclusive photographic match, or reliable, verified or well-corroborated 
intelligence reporting — identifies a specific former Defense Department 
detainee as directly involved in terrorist activities. 
Definition of  “Suspected” — Significant reporting indicates a former Defense 
Department detainee is involved in terrorist activities, and analysis indicates the 
detainee most likely is associated with a specific former detainee or unverified 
or single-source, but plausible, reporting indicates a specific former detainee is 
involved in terrorist activities.27 
The 2011 DIA report provides the following definitions: 
Definition of  “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities. Activities such as the 
following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning 
terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition 
or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing 
terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for 
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movement of  individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include 
mere communications with individuals or organizations — including other 
former GTMO detainees — on issues not related to terrorist operations, such 
as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past 
terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or 
articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. 
Definition of  “Confirmed.” A preponderance of  information which identifies 
a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent 
activities. For the purposes of  this definition, engagement in anti-U.S statements 
or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 
Definition of  “Suspected.” Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting 
indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or 
insurgent activities. For the purposes of  this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. 
statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.28
These definitions paint a general picture of  the framework used in compiling the data presented 
by the DIA on re-engagement. The reports prior to 2010 provided illustrative examples of  
individual cases that fill in some of  the details. The examples range from broad statements 
to specific conduct and include the following: “participating in an attack on U.S. Forces near 
Kandahar” while carrying a letter of  good standing in the Taliban;29 claiming responsibility 
for a hotel bombing;30 press reports referring to the individual as a Taliban leader;31 reportedly 
organizing a jail break; killed while fighting U.S. forces; killed by Afghan security forces; arrested 
and sentenced by the Russian government for gas line bombing;32 “renewed his association with 
Taliban and al-Qaida members and has since become re-involved in anti-coalition militant 
activity”;33 convicted by Moroccan officials for terrorist network recruiting;34 committing suicide 
to evade capture by Pakistani forces;35 arrested by Turkish authorities for leading an Al Qaeda 
cell;36 conducting a suicide bombing; releasing a video announcing himself  as the leader of  an 
Al Qaeda cell.37 The official statements do not indicate which of  the above listed acts constitutes 
suspicion of  re-engagement and which constitutes a confirmation. 
Congressional Report
Following the DIA updates, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of  the House 
Committee on Armed Services issued a report in March of  2012 on detainees released or 
transferred from GTMO. The report specifically focused on the decision to close the base and 
transfer low-risk detainees and the subsequent re-engagement of  released/transferred detainees 
in terrorism or insurgent activities.38 According to the report, 27 percent of  those released or 
transferred had re-engaged. The House Committee report provided three illustrative examples 
—  Abdallah Saleh Ali al-Ajmi (repatriated to Kuwait in 2005), Said Ali Al-Shihri (transferred 
to Saudi Arabia in 2007), and Abdullah Zakir (transferred to Afghanistan in 2007) — but no 
additional details on the individuals that make up the purported 27 percent re-engagement rate.39 
While the House report focuses predominantly on the political, legal and security pressures that 
led to the decision in both the Bush and Obama administrations to close GTMO and to establish 
a presumption in favor of  transfer or release,40 it does not provide any lengthy analysis of  re-
engagement, its causes, consequences or alternatives. 
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In a dissenting statement, Rep. Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., criticized the report for its methodology, 
asserting that it relied too heavily on “press clippings and interview[s] [of] a handful of  officials” with 
the goal of  writing “ghost stories designed to scare voters.” 41 Rep. Cooper also took issue with the 27 
percent rate of  re-engagement, stating “the current rate of  confirmed reengagement of  transferees 
under the Obama Administration is closer to 3%.” 42 Additionally, in the “Dissenting Views of  
Minority Members” section of  the report, the Democratic members focused on the confirmed 
rate of  re-engagement (13.5 percent) rather than the combined confirmed and suspected rate (27 
percent).43 Of  the combined confirmed and suspected re-engagers, 44 percent have been re-captured 
or are dead. Therefore, the number of  released detainees actively engaged on the battlefield is closer 
to 9 percent.44 
NGOs, the Academy, the Media
The evaluation of  Defense Intelligence Agency reports by academics and NGOs has focused on 
the need for systematic and detailed data to corroborate the summary broad statistics claiming 
substantial re-engagement. To date, the information disclosed has been characterized as inaccurate, 
incomplete and unsubstantiated.45 No agency has released a comprehensive list of  the individuals 
that make up the alleged 27 percent.46 There is no data on how many of  the detainees making up the 
recidivism percentage were released versus transferred to a third nation’s authority. There is limited 
specific data on the countries to which these individuals were transferred or what evidence led to 
their transfer.
According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, based on information provided by 
both official sources and independent media sources, the indicated re-engagement rate of  detainees 
involved in conduct harmful to the United States is 6 percent rather than the widely reported 27 
percent.47 The 6 percent rate is made up of  36 identified individuals, 12 confirmed, eight suspected, 
and 16 not listed by the Department of  Defense but identified independently. Research conducted by 
Professor Mark Denbeaux at Seton Hall University School of  Law finds further problems with the 
DIA data, namely: names provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency have gone from confirmed to 
suspected;48 some have been removed from the confirmed list altogether;49 some names provided do 
not appear on the official list of  detainees held at Guantánamo;50 and the reports make no attempt 
to account for the released detainees who have gone on to live productive lives;51 Additionally, while 
the DIA’s definition of  re-engagement declares “engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda 
does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity,”52 according to Professor Denbeaux’s research, vocal 
opposition to U.S. policies is the only conduct that led to certain individuals’ names appearing on the 
list of  detainees who have re-engaged in terrorism.53 
The Defense Intelligence Agency data has further been criticized for conflating focused on 
the “confirmed” and “suspected” categories. The 27 percent re-engagement rate includes 
both categories, while the level of  intelligence and corroborating evidence is vastly different 
between the two.54 Even a Pentagon spokesman took issue with the conflation of  the suspected 
and confirmed categories, saying “[s]omeone on the ‘suspected’ list could very possibly not be 
engaged in activities that are counter to our national security interests.” 55 Moreover, the acts 
described in the definition of  “terrorist” and “insurgent activities” are vague; violent attacks 
against the United States, criminal conduct in detainees, their home states, or merely voicing 
criticism all could be included. 56 Such imprecise categories and definitions are dangerous 
because they paint an inaccurate picture of  detainees leaving Guantánamo and returning to the 
battlefield with the aim of  killing and harming American soldiers.57 
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The DIA report of  March 2012 states: 
We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will 
communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist 
organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or 
organizations — including other former GTMO detainees — an indicator 
of  reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of  each 
communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual 
has reengaged.58 
While the DIA report states that mere communication among detainees cannot constitute 
re-engagement, or the suspicion of  it, because the other indicators of  re-engagement remain 
classified, there is no way to  determine whether a combination of  highly circumstantial 
elements is sufficient to label a released detainee a recidivist. Is the combination of  
communicating with former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations sufficient? 
Is the content of  the communication enough? Is the identity of  the other party to the 
communication enough? How many organizations are deemed to be terrorist organizations 
for the purposes of  determining re-engagement? Is there a distinction between organizations 
waging a fight against the United States and those waging a fight against other parties, e.g., 
Russia, China, etc.? The implicit answer to these questions is: “we know it when we see it, leave 
it to us.” 
The data on re-engagement of  released or transferred GTMO detainees remains incomplete 
and ambiguous. The rate of  re-engagement as reported by the government has risen 
dramatically and rapidly in the past few years without accompanying corroborating or specific 
data to substantiate the rise in numbers. There is, obviously, a potential problem in that 
such data could be used as a justification for long-term detention or greater deference to the 
executive branch based on fears of  a high level of  re-engagement, indicating conduct directly 
harmful to the national security interests of  the United States. 
Finally, hesitation to publicize explicit definitions of  re-engagement (and the accompanying 
guarantee that speech is excluded) is a symptom of  the lack of  public information of  how 
these broad standards find practical expression. Two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 
interpretation of  a federal criminal statute on providing “material support” to terrorism, threaded 
the legal needle through First Amendment jurisprudence to distinguish speech and support: 
The First Amendment issue before us is more refined than either plaintiffs or 
the Government would have it. It is not whether the Government may prohibit 
pure political speech, or may prohibit material support in the form of  conduct. 
It is instead whether the Government may prohibit what plaintiffs want to do 
— provide material support to the PKK and LTTE in the form of  speech.” 59 
Given the reframing of  the speech/conduct distinction by the Supreme Court in the national-
security context, the guarantees of  the Defense Intelligence Agency on the precise classified 
application of  the publicly disclosed standards leaves open questions without the means to 
conduct a rigorous policy analysis in search of  the answers. 
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PUBLICLY AVAILABLE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS CONFIRMED OR SUSPECTED OF 
RE-ENGAGEMENT
Name Date Released Suspected Acts Source1
1. Mohammed Ismail 2004 Made verbal claims of 
being a Taliban member, 
was recaptured in 
Kandahar. Confirmed. 
DIA — 2006 Report 
DIA — 2007 Report  
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
2. Said Mohammed Alim 
Shah, aka Abdullah 
Mahsud
2004 Press reports referring to 
Mahsud as a member of 
the Taliban. Committed 
suicide to avoid capture, 
and reportedly directed 
other suicide attacks. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — 2006 Report  
DIA — 20007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
3. Mohamed Yusif Yaqub 
(Yousef Muhammed 
Yaaqoub), aka Mullah 
Shazada 
2003 Reportedly linked to Tali-
ban activities, including 
a jail break in Kandahar. 
Killed in 2004 while 
fighting U.S. forces. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — 2006 Report 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
4. Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar, 
aka Sabi Jahn Abdul 
Ghafour
2002–2003 Reportedly linked to 
Taliban activities in 
Afghanistan. Killed in 
2004 by Afghan security 
forces. Suspected. 
DIA —  2006 Report 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report  
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
5. Mohammed Nayim 
Farouq
2003 “Renewed his asso-
ciation with Taliban and 
al-Qaida members.” 
Suspected. 
DIA — 2006 Report 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
6. Ravil Shafeyavich 
Gumarov
2004 Arrested for a line 
bombing incident in 
Russia. Found guilty 
by Russian Court. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — 2006 Report 
DIA —  2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA —  April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
7. Timur Ravilich Ishmu-
rat
2004 Arrested for a line 
bombing incident in 
Russia. Found guilty 
by Russian Court. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — 2006 Report 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA —  April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
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Name Date Released Suspected Acts Source1
8. Ibrahim Bin Shakaran Convicted in Morocco 
for recruiting others to 
fight in Iraq. Confirmed. 
DIA —  2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report  
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
9. Mohammed Bin 
Ahmad Mizouz
Convicted in Morocco 
for recruiting others to 
fight in Iraq. Confirmed. 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
10. Ruslan Anatolivich 
Odizhev
The Russians suspected 
Mr. Odizhev of 
involvement in terrorism 
in the Caucasus. Killed 
during attempted arrest 
by Russia’s Federal 
Security Service. 
Suspected. 
DIA — 2007 Report 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
11. Ibrahim Shafir Sen 2003 Arrested in Turkey for 
involvement with Al 
Qaeda. Confirmed. 
DIA — 2008 Report 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
12. Abdallah Saleh Ali 
al-Ajmi
2005 Carried out a suicide 
bombing in Iraq. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
House Armed Services 
Report of 2012 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
13. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi 
al-Shihri
2007 In an Al Qaeda video 
released claiming 
leadership of the cells in 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
Confirmed. One of three 
referred to in the 2012 
House Armed Services 
report; named Said Al-
Shihri. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
House Armed Services 
Report 2012 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
14. Abu al-Hareth 
Mohammad al-Awfi, 
aka Muhammed Atiq 
al-Harbi
2007 In an Al Qaeda video 
released claiming 
leadership of the cells in 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
15. Shah Mohammed 2003 “Killed fighting U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan.” 
Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011 
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16. Abdullah Kafkas 2004 “Suspected involvement 
in an attack against a 
traffic police checkpoint 
I Nalchik.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
17. Almasm Rabilavich 
Sharipov 
2004 “Associated with 
terrorist group Hizb ut-
Tahrir.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
18. Abdullah Ghofoor 
(Listed separately in 
the same report as 
Jahn Abdul Ghafour, 
therefore presumably 
different detainee) 
2004 Suspected Taliban 
commander killed by 
Afghan security forces. 
Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
19. Isa Khan 2004 “Associated with Tehrik-
i-Taliban.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
20. Muhibullah 2005 “Association with the 
Taliban.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
21. Abdullah Majid al-
Naimi
2005 Arrested. “Involved in 
terrorist facilitation; has 
known associations with 
al-Qaida.” Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
22. Saad Madhi Saad 
Hawash al Azmi
2005 “Association with al-
Qaida.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
23. Majid Abdullah Lahiq 
al Joudi
2007 “Terrorist facilitation.” 
Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
24. Humud Dakhil Humud 
Said al-Jadan
2007 “Association with known 
terrorists.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
25. Abd al Razaq 
Abdallah Hamid 
Ibrahim al Sharikh 
2007 “Arrested in September 
2008 for supporting 
terrorism.” Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
26. Abd al Hadi Abdallah 
Ibrahim al Sharikh
2007 “Arrested in September 
2008 for association 
with terrorist members; 
supporting terrorism.” 
Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
27. Zahir Shah 2007 “Participation in terrorist 
training.” Confirmed. 
DIA — April 2009 Report 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011 
305
Chapter 9 - Recidivism
The Constitution Project
Name Date Released Suspected Acts Source1
28. Abdullah Ghulam 
Rasoul 
2007 “Taliban military 
commander for 
Afghanistan; Organized 
an assault on U.S. 
military aircraft 
in Afghanistan.” 
Suspected. Used as one 
example out of three 
of re-engagement in 
the 2012 House Armed 
Services report. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America 
Foundation 2011                                        
House Armed Services      
Report 2012
29. Haji Sahib Rohullah 
Wakil 
2008 “Association with 
terrorist groups.” 
Suspected. 
DIA — April 2009 Report  
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
30. Abdul Rahman Noor 2003 “Fighting against U.S. 
forces in Kandahar.” 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
31. Abdul Rauf Aliza 2007 “Aide to Abdul Qayyum, 
top deputy of Mullah 
Omar.” 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
32. Hani Abdul Muslih    
al-Shulan 
2007 “Field Commander in 
AQAP.” 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
33. Ibrahim Sulaiman 
Mohammed Ar-
Rabeish aka Abu 
Mohammed, Saad 
Al Ansari, Ibrahim 
Sulayman Al 
Rabeesh, Ibrahim 
Sulaiman Al Rubaish, 





2006 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
34. Yusuf Muhammad 
Mubarak al-Jebairy 
al-Shehri, aka Yusif 
Muhammad it 
Mubarak al-Shihri, 
Abu al-Harith, Abdul 
Aziz, Abu Hakim 
al-Shihri, Yusef 
Mohammed Aziz Saad 
Modaray
2007 Wanted by the govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia for 
involvement in terrorist 
activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
35. Fahd Jubran Ali al-
Faify aka Jaber Alfefey
2006 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
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36. Fahd Saleh Suleiman 
al-Jutayli , aka Kamza 
Aqeedah,  Hamza 
Al Nejdi, Hamza El 
Qassimi, Thamir, 
Hamza, and Hamzah 
Agida
2006 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
37. Murtadha Ali Saeed 
Magram , aka Abul-
Baraa al-Hadrami,  
Murtada Ali Said 
Magram, Murtadah 
Ali Said Qawm, Abu 
al-Bara Murtada Bin 
al-Hadrami, Khallad 
al-Muritani, Abdul 
Malik Abu al-Baraa 
al-Maghribi, Abu 
Masab, Abu Shaheed, 
Murtada Ali Said 
Qagam
2007 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011




2003 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
39. Adnan Mohammed Ali, 
aka Adnan Muhammad 
Ali Al Saigh, Abu 
Malik Al Ta’ifi, Adnan, 
Al Ansari Maalek, 
Haydardi Al Lubnani, 
Al Saeh Adnan 
Mohammad, Al Saigh, 
Al Sayigh, Al Makdad 
Al Ta`ifi, Abu Malik, 
Abu Marzyah, Ibn Ul 
Mubarak,and Adnan 
Mohammed Ali Saig
2006 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
40. Turki Mashawi 
Zayid al-Assiri, aka 
Al-Mutasim al-Makki, 
Turki Mash Awi Zaggd 
al-Asiri, Mutasim al-
Mecci
2007 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
41. Othman bin Ahmed 
bin Othman al-
Ghamdi aka Othman 
al-Omairah
2006 Wanted by the 
government of Saudi 
Arabia for involvement in 
terrorist activities.
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
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42. Mohammad Ilyas aka 
Qari Jaml, Qari Jamil
2004 Alleged involvement in 
various terrorist plots 
with links to Al-Qaida 
according to Pakistani 
authorities. 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
43. Hafizullah Shabaz 




2007 “Allegedly took part in 
a rocket attack against 
U.S. base in Afghanistan 
in 2007; re-arrested by 
Afghan police in 2008 
for treating sick Taliban.” 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
44. Ali Husayn Abdullah al 
Tays aka Ali Hussain 
alTais, Ali Hussein al-
Taiss aka Abu Hussein
2006 “Joined AQAP before 
surrendering to Yemeni 
authorities in August 
2010”
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
45. Mehdi Mohammed 
Ghezali
2004 Alleged Al Qaeda 
contact, detained by 
Pakistani authorities. 




2006 Sentenced by a 
Moroccan court for 
terrorist activities 
(criminal gang violence)
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
47. Mubarak Hussain Bin 
Abul Hashem 
2006 “Detained in Bangladesh 
for ‘suspected anti-state 
activities.’ ” 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
48. Abdul Rahim Mulsim 
Dostaka, aka Abdul 
Rahim Muslimdost, 
Rahim Muslim Dost, 
Abdul Rahim Mannan
2005 Part of an exchange 
of prisoners between 
Pakistan and the 
Taliban. 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
49. Usama Hassan 
Ahmed Abu Kadir 
(Usama Hassan 
Ahmed Abu Kabir)
2007 Sentenced for planned 
attacks on Israel. 
New America Foundation 
Report 2011
50. Slimane Hadj 
Abderrahmane
2004 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda 
or criticism.” Under 
surveillance in Denmark. 
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
51. Ruhal (Rhuhel) Ahmed 
(Tipton Three) 
2004 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009 
Road to Guantánamo. 
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52. Shafiq Rasul         
(Tipton Three) 
2004 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009 
Road to Guantánamo. 
53. Asif Iqbal                 
(Tipton Three)
2004 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009 
Road to Guantánamo. 
54. Adel Abdulhehim 
(Albania Uighur), aka 
Muhammad Qadir, 
Abu Bakr Qasim
2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda 
or criticism.” Uighurs 
cited as an example of 
re-engagement by the 
DOD.2 
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
55. Ahmed Adil (Albanian 
Uighur), aka Oblekim 
Abdurasul, Oblekim 
Abdursal
2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda or 
criticism.” Uighurs cited 
as an example of re-
engagement by the DOD.
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
56. Haji Mohammed Ayub 
(Albanian Uighur) aka 
Haji Mohammed Ayub
2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda or 
criticism.” Uighurs cited 
as an example of re-
engagement by the DOD.
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
57. Akhdar Qasem Basit 
(Albanian Uighur), aka 
Niyas Muhammed
2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda or 
criticism.” Uighurs cited 
as an example of re-
engagement by the DOD.
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
58. Abu Bar Qasim 2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees 
involved in anti-
American propaganda 
or criticism.” Uighurs 
cited as an example of 
re-engagement by the 
DOD.
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
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59. Salim Mahmoud 
Adem Mohammed 
Bani Amir, aka Benny 
Ah-Amir, Abu Ahmed, 
Abu Abdul Salem
2007 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
60. Adel Hasan Hamad 2007 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
61. Moazzam Begg 2005 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
62. Mourad Benchellali, 
aka Abdullah Mihoub, 
Jean-Baptiste Mihoub
2004 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
63. Jumah al-Dossari 2007 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
64. Mustafa Ibrahim Mus-
tafa al Hassan, aka 
Mustafa Ibrahim al-
Qufa, Abu Attica, Abu 
Safwan, Abdul Jami 
Khoday Nazan
2008 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
65. Muhammad Saad 
Iqbal, aka Hafez Qari 
Mohamed, Saad Iqbal 
Madni
2008 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
66. Sadeq Mohammed 
Saeed Ismail
2007 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
67. Abdurahman Khadr, 
aka Abdul Khadr
2003 Listed under a category 




New America Foundation 
Report 2009
310
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Name Date Released Suspected Acts Source1
68. Murat Kurnaz 2006 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees in-
volved in anti-American 
propaganda or criti-
cism.”
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
69. Binyam Moham-
med aka Talha al 
Kini, Fouad Zouaoui, 
Binyam Ahmed 
Mohammad, Moham-
med Ahmed Binyam, 
Binyam Mohamed 
al Habashi, Talha al-
Nigeri, Ben, Benjamin 
Ahmad Muhammad, 
John Samuel, Fouad 
Zouaoui, Nabil, Binya-
min Zouioue
2009 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees in-
volved in anti-American 
propaganda or criti-
cism.”
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
70. Adil Kamil Abdullah al 
Wadi
2005 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees in-
volved in anti-American 
propaganda or criti-
cism.”
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
71. Mullah Abdul Salam 
Zaeef
2005 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees in-
volved in anti-American 
propaganda or criti-
cism.”
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
72. Lakhdar Boumediene 
aka Ahmed al-Munta-
sir
2009 Listed under a category 
of “former detainees in-
volved in anti-American 
propaganda or criti-
cism.”
New America Foundation 
Report 2009
(Footnotes)
1  When there are references to multiple DIA reports there is seldom, if  ever, additional information since first reported. 
Later reports summarize and restate of  previously reported cases of  re-engagement. 
2  National Security Deserves Better, supra note 51, at 15 (“In the July 2007 DoD news release, the five Uighurs relo-
cated to Albania were listed as examples of  recidivist activity. … Since their release — following three years of  incarceration 
at GTMO — the five men have lived at the same refugee camp in Tirana, Albania.”) (The press release was removed by the 




During the 2008 campaign, President Obama repeatedly denounced the Bush administration’s treatment 
of  detainees. Candidate Obama promised to close Guantánamo, and to “reject torture — without 
exception or equivocation.” In 2007, he wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that his administration 
would end
the practices of  shipping away prisoners in the dead of  night to be tortured in far-off  
countries, of  detaining thousands without charge or trial, of  maintaining a network of  
secret prisons to jail people beyond the reach of  the law.
In February 2008, Obama criticized the decision to try the six detainees accused of  plotting the 
September 11 attacks before a military commission:
These trials will need to be above reproach. … These trials are too important to be 
held in a flawed military commission system that has failed to convict anyone of  a 
terrorist act since the 9/11 attacks and that has been embroiled in legal challenges.
Obama argued that in order to “demonstrate our commitment to the rule of  law,” the co-conspirators 
should instead be tried in civilian court or court-martialed. 
Obama was more circumspect in statements regarding the possibility of  criminal prosecutions for detainee 
abuse. In response to one reporter’s question, he said he would “have my Justice Department and my 
Attorney General immediately review the information that’s already there and to find out are there 
inquiries that need to be pursued.… [I]f  crimes have been committed, they should be investigated.” He 
added, though, that “I would not want my first term consumed by what was perceived on the part of  
Republicans as a partisan witch hunt because I think we’ve got too many problems we’ve got to solve.”
Obama criticized the previous administration for excessive secrecy, including the repeated invocation 
of  the state-secrets privilege to get civil lawsuits thrown out of  court. In a 2007 speech at DePaul 
University, he said he would lead “a new era of  openness”:
I’ll turn the page on a growing empire of  classified information, and restore the 
balance we’ve lost between the necessarily secret and the necessity of  openness in a 
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democratic society by creating a new National Declassification Center. We’ll protect 
sources and methods, but we won’t use sources and methods as pretexts to hide the truth. 
The Obama administration has fulfilled some of  these promises, and conspicuously failed to fulfill others 
— in some cases because Congress has blocked them, but in other cases for reasons of  their own. 
The CIA is now prohibited by executive order from using “enhanced interrogation techniques,” or any 
technique not included in the Army Field Manual. The secret prisons have been closed, and access by 
the International Committee of  the Red Cross to detainees has dramatically improved. But Guantánamo 
remains open, and releases and transfers of  detainees have declined sharply due to congressional 
opposition. In 2011 and 2012, nearly as many detainees have died in Guantánamo (three total, two 
in suspected suicides) as been transferred (five). After a failed effort to bring them to the United States 
for civilian trial, the alleged September 11 co-conspirators are being tried in a military commission 
that still has critics who say it will not provide a fair trial, despite some modifications to the Military 
Commissions Act in 2009. The Justice Department opened a criminal investigation into two detainee 
homicides, but closed it without charging anyone. The administration asserts it retains the right to render 
detainees to foreign custody in reliance on “diplomatic assurances” that they will not be tortured, with 
some increased safeguards to ensure detainees’ humane treatment, but it is not clear if  any renditions have 
occurred. And there has been no apparent lessening of  official secrecy. 
313




Two days after taking office, President Obama signed several major executive orders 
related to detainee treatment. 
The first, Executive Order 13491,1 ordered the CIA to close any detention facilities 
under its operational control “as expeditiously as possible,” and not to open any 
such future facilities. It prohibited officials from subjecting any detainee under 
effective U.S. control to any interrogation technique not listed in the current Army 
Field Manual on interrogation, Army Field Manual 2-22.3. Executive Order 13491 
also re-affirmed the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provided the minimum standards for 
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody, while preventing the executive branch from 
relying on the Bush-era Office of Legal Counsel’s interpretations of Common Article 
3 or the rest of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
and the federal criminal prohibitions on war crimes and torture. It required “all departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government [to] provide the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) with notification of, and timely access to, any individual detained in any armed 
conflict.” Finally, the order established an interagency task force to examine interrogation and 
transfer policies, with representatives from the military, CIA, and the departments of Justice 
(DOJ), State (DOS), Defense (DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS). According to a DOJ 
press release, the task force completed its report and issued recommendations to the president 
on August 24, 2009. The Obama administration has not, however, made the report or 
recommendations public. 
Executive Order 134922 called for the closing of detention facilities at Guantánamo “as soon 
as practicable,” and specifically “no later than 1 year,” and for the “immediate” review of 
the status of all Guantánamo detainees, including “a thorough review of the factual and legal 
bases for [their] continued detention.” A second task force was placed in charge of the review. 
Pending its completion, the executive order halted all proceedings in military commissions.
A third executive order, E.O. 13493,3 created an Inter-Agency Task Force on Detention Policy 
Options, whose membership overlapped with the task force on interrogation and transfer.
A majority of the public supported these steps, though not by a particularly wide margin. The 
day President Obama signed those orders, ABC News and The Washington Post released the 
results of a poll on detainee issues. Fifty-eight percent of those surveyed agreed with Obama’s 
position that the United States should never use torture, while 40 percent said that there were 
cases where “the United States should consider torture against terrorism suspects.” Forty-
two percent favored continuing to hold terrorism suspects at Guantánamo, while 53 percent 
supported closing the prison. Fifty percent favored an Obama administration investigation 
into “whether any laws were broken in the way terrorism suspects were treated under the Bush 
administration,” while 47 percent opposed such an investigation.4 
“In most cases, 
though, detainees 
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In an interview with Task Force staff, former White House Counsel Greg Craig said he also 
did not encounter much congressional opposition when he initially briefed several relevant 
committees about the executive orders. At the time, Craig said, “[n]o one seemed to have any 
problems” with the proposals.5 Craig noted that President George W. Bush had also expressed 
support for closing Guantánamo, and said the White House “thought it was not going to 
be an issue. It wasn’t an issue in the campaign.” 6 Craig did remember Democratic Sen. 
Sheldon Whitehouse telling him “as a friend” that based on conversations among members 
of  the Intelligence Committee, the administration might have underestimated the difficulty in 
transferring detainees from Guantánamo to the United States.7 Whitehouse’s concerns proved 
to be prescient. 
Seventeen of  the inmates at Guantánamo when Obama took office were Uighurs, Turkic-
speaking Muslim dissidents from Xinjiang province in northwest China. The U.S. government 
has long condemned the Chinese government’s repression of  the Uighur minority in Xinjiang. 
One prominent critic of  China’s actions in Xinjiang is Republican Rep. Frank Wolf, who 
represents the 10th District of  Virginia and is co-chair of  the U.S. Congress Tom Lantos 
Human Rights Commission. In 2008, after a trip to China, Wolf  noted that “[t]he Chinese 
government has a long record of  criminalizing any form of  political dissent expressed by 
Uyghurs,” and that Uighurs had been harassed, beaten and jailed for practicing their religion.8 
The Uighurs at Guantánamo had fled China, in some cases simply to escape, in others to 
receive military training to fight the Chinese government. Several had received basic weapons 
training at a camp in Afghanistan before fleeing the United States’ airstrikes; others said they 
had not done so. They eventually walked over the border to Pakistan, where they allege that 
bounty hunters sold them to the United States military. By 2003, most of  them had been 
cleared for release from Guantánamo; several recounted being told by their interrogators that 
they would soon be released. But the Uighurs could not safely be repatriated to China because 
they were at risk of  torture and execution. Five Uighur detainees were resettled in Albania 
in 2006, but both the Bush and Obama administrations had difficulty convincing any other 
countries to offer them asylum, despite a court order for their release.
In the early days, Craig thought that resettling some Guantánamo detainees in the United 
States would greatly increase other countries’ willingness to accept other detainees. The 
administration decided that two of  the Uighurs would be especially good test candidates.
There had been agreement among a group of  officials working at the very 
highest levels of  government that … eight be brought, eight Uighurs of  the 
seventeen, and that we start with two. And then, if  it goes well, and there’s no 
security concerns, than we can bring the rest.9
According to press reports, that decision was reached in a meeting on April 14, 2009, chaired by 
White House Chief  of  Staff  Rahm Emanuel.10 CIA Director Leon Panetta, Attorney General 
Eric Holder, FBI Director Robert Mueller, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, and intelligence 
advisors Dennis Blair and John Brennan were also present.11
The administration did not, however, notify Congress of  the proposed transfer — including 
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Wolf, in whose district the Uighurs were likely to be resettled due to the large 
Uighur community there. On April 22, Wolf  met with Matthew Olsen, the chair 
of  the Guantánamo Review Task Force. Wolf  asked Olsen about reports that had 
leaked to him about resettling the Uighurs in his district; Olsen replied that nothing 
had been finalized and he was not authorized to discuss specifics about the Uighurs 
or any other individual detainees.12 According to journalist Daniel Klaidman, Wolf  
responded that the detainees were “terrorists,” and were never coming into his 
district or anywhere in the United States.13
Craig said that Olsen “got his head handed to him” by Wolf, and this surprised him 
because of  Wolf ’s record of  concern about Chinese human rights violations:
I was surprised to see that Frank Wolf  didn’t understand that these Uighurs 
that were coming into his jurisdiction reinforced everything that he stood 
for in terms of  being critical of  the Chinese human rights records. Well, 
I don’t know if  anybody had talked with him about that, or pointed that out 
to him. I don’t know if  anybody in the Uighur community had been brought 
to him, saying, “We want these people to come, we want to be part of  solving 
the War on Terrorism, these are not terrorists, Bush doesn’t believe they’re 
terrorists, they were never enemy combatants, they do not threaten the United 
States.” I don’t know if  anybody ever had that conversation with him.14
Wolf  and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell publicly objected to the Uighurs’ transfer. 
On the House floor, Wolf  characterized the Uighurs as “terrorists” who were “more dangerous 
than the public has been led to believe,” and denounced the administration for refusing to 
provide him with information about the potential transfer:
After learning that this decision was imminent, I requested briefings from 
a number of  relevant agencies, but all the agencies have told me that our 
Department of  Justice is now preventing them from speaking to me directly on 
this issue. So much for being open. So much for disclosure.15
In the face of  Wolf ’s opposition, the plan to transfer the Uighurs was quickly shelved. 
According to The Washington Post, Emanuel made the decision.16
The White House’s reversal on the Uighurs did not lessen congressional opposition to its plans 
for Guantánamo. Instead, facing a united Republican caucus and hearing little from the White 
House, Democratic congressional support for closing the prison evaporated. On May 20, 2009, 
the Senate voted by a 90–6 margin to strip $80 million of  funding for closing Guantánamo 
out of  a Defense Department appropriations bill, and to bar any funds being used to transfer 
detainees to the United States.17 The Guantánamo closing funds had already been removed 
from the corresponding House bill the week before. Some Democratic senators and members 
of  Congress said that they were open to funding closure if  the administration provided detailed 
plans for it, but as discussed further below, over time Congress has only increased the legal 
hurdles to closing the prison.
All but three of  the Uighur detainees have now left Guantánamo, and have been resettled in 
Bermuda, Palau, Switzerland, El Salvador and Albania.18 But the refusal of  the United States 
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to allow any detainees into the country increased European allies’ resistance to accepting 
detainees. A State Department cable from January 2009, for example, stated that France would 
consider accepting Guantánamo detainees but “first, the U.S. must agree to resettle some of  
these same low-risk DETAINEES in the U.S.” 19 In an interview with Task Force staff, Harold 
Hongju Koh, then DOS’s legal advisor, said that bringing the Uighurs to the United States 
would have made a major difference in other countries’ willingness to help resettle detainees 
and close the prison at Guantánamo.20 
Disclosure of the Torture Memos, Nondisclosure of Abuse Photographs
At approximately the same time as the controversy over the Uighurs, the Obama administration 
similarly reversed its position on public disclosure of  evidence of  detainee abuse.
On April 16, 2009, President Obama ordered the disclosure of  several Office of  Legal Counsel 
(OLC) memoranda that described the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” in detail. He 
did so over the objections of  several current and former intelligence officials. 
In releasing the OLC memos, Obama reassured the intelligence community that “this is a time 
for reflection, not retribution,” and assured “those who carried out their duties relying in good 
faith upon legal advice from the Department of  Justice (DOJ) that they will not be subject to 
prosecution” — statements that were strongly criticized by human rights activists and civil 
libertarians.21 He nonetheless argued that the release of  the “Torture Memos” was “required by 
the rule of  law,” for three reasons:
First, the interrogation techniques described in these memos have already been 
widely reported. Second, the previous Administration publicly acknowledged 
portions of  the program — and some of  the practices — associated with these 
memos. Third, I have already ended the techniques described in the memos 
through an Executive Order. Therefore, withholding these memos would only 
serve to deny facts that have been in the public domain for some time. This 
could contribute to an inaccurate accounting of  the past.22
The OLC memos were disclosed, in part, because of  Freedom of  Information Act (FOIA) 
litigation by the ACLU. In the same lawsuit, the ACLU also sought disclosure of  previously 
unreleased photographs of  detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, and won a court order 
calling for the photos’ release. On April 23, 2009, DOJ notified the court that it would release 
the images by May 28.23 
But on May 13, the administration reversed its position and informed the U.S. Court 
of  Appeals for the Second Circuit that upon “further reflection at the highest levels of  
government,” it would instead appeal to the Supreme Court to prevent release of  the 
photos.24 Multiple press reports said that Obama had changed his mind after receiving 
personal pleas from General Ray Odierno and General David McKiernan, the top military 
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, that releasing the photos would endanger U.S. troops.25 
Obama said: 
The publication of  these photos would not add any additional benefit to 
our understanding of  what was carried out in the past by a small number of  
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individuals. … [T]he most direct consequence of  releasing them, I believe, would 
be to further inflame anti-American opinion and to put our troops in danger.26
The DOJ had made similar arguments against releasing the photographs during the Bush 
administration. The Second Circuit had rejected them in 2008, writing that “the public interest 
in disclosure of  these photographs is strong” despite previously released written evidence of  the 
same misconduct. The court held that to justify withholding the documents the government had 
to demonstrate danger to at least one named individual rather than “some unspecified member 
of  a group so vast as to encompass all United States troops, coalition forces and civilians in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.” 27
But in October 2009, Congress passed and Obama signed legislation to override FOIA and 
permit the Defense Secretary to withhold photographs if  he determined that their disclosure 
would endanger U.S. citizens or members of  the Armed Forces. The Supreme Court vacated 
the lower court’s ruling ordering release of  the photos, 28 and they have never been disclosed. 
The amendment to FOIA only applied to the photographs, but the Obama administration’s 
reversal on public disclosure of  past abuses did not. As discussed further below, the release of  
the OLC memos with minimal redaction was a high-water mark for the disclosure of  evidence 
that the CIA or military wanted to remain secret. Other important evidence was released after 
more delays, with more redactions — and a great deal has never been released.
Military Commissions, Civilian Courts and Detention Without Trial
On May 15, 2009, two days after the reversal on detainee abuse photos, President Obama 
announced that his administration would continue to prosecute detainees in military 
commissions, albeit ones that he said would provide greater protections for the accused.29 
Obama outlined his rationale for the decision in a speech at the National Archives on May 21. 
Obama said that “whenever feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal 
laws in federal courts.” But he also stated that some would be
best tried through military commissions. Military commissions have a history 
in the United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary 
War. They are an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of  the 
laws of  war. They allow for the protection of  sensitive sources and methods of  
intelligence-gathering; they allow for the safety and security of  participants; 
and for the presentation of  evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot 
always be effectively presented in federal courts.30
Obama promised that his administration would bring
our commissions in line with the rule of  law. We will no longer permit the use 
of  evidence — as evidence statements that have been obtained using cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading interrogation methods. We will no longer place the 
burden to prove that hearsay is unreliable on the opponent of  the hearsay. And 
we will give detainees greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more 
protections if  they refuse to testify.31 
The administration proposed these changes — genuine improvements that still fell short of  the 
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standards in federal criminal trials — in the 2009 Military Commissions Act, which became law 
that October. 
In his May 2009 National Archives speech, in addition to restoring military commissions 
Obama announced that there was another category of  detainees who would be held without 
being tried in any forum:
[T]here may be a number of  people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in 
some cases because evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat 
to the security of  the United States. … We must have clear, defensible, and lawful 
standards for those who fall into this category. We must have fair procedures 
so that we don’t make mistakes. We must have a thorough process of  periodic 
review, so that any prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified.32
When the administration’s Guantánamo Review Task Force issued its final report in January 
2010, it stated that there were 48 detainees who could neither be tried nor safely released. The 
task force reported:
While the reasons vary from detainee to detainee, generally these detainees 
cannot be prosecuted because either there is presently insufficient admissible 
evidence to establish the detainee’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in either 
a federal court or military commission, or the detainee’s conduct does not 
constitute a chargeable offense in either a federal court or military commission.33
The Guantánamo Review Task Force did not give the names of  individual detainees in this 
category, or specify the reasons why they could not be tried. In an interview with Task Force 
staff, Harold Hongju Koh, the DOS legal advisor at the time, stated that the review had been 
an “incredibly fact based and elaborate process,” where all of  the government’s available 
information on a detainee across agencies was gathered and reviewed.34 
A government official who participated in the review said that the Guantánamo review included 
information obtained under duress, but the fact that information was coerced was given 
“appropriate weight.” The official said that in some cases detainees could not be tried in part 
because the evidence against them was tainted by coercion. In most cases, though, detainees 
could not be tried because the relevant criminal statutes “didn’t apply extraterritorially at the 
time of  the conduct” for non-U.S. persons.35 
The Obama administration never articulated a clear basis for which cases would be brought in 
civilian courts and which in military commissions. Military commissions are only authorized to 
try detainees for war crimes. But even after the 2009 amendments, the Military Commissions Act 
included several offenses — such as conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization — 
that violate the U.S. criminal code but are not internationally recognized war crimes.36 
On November 13, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(KSM) and four alleged co-conspirators would be tried in federal court in New York City for the 
September 11 attacks. The same day, Secretary of  Defense Robert Gates announced that Omar 
Khadr would be tried by military commission. Khadr, a Canadian citizen whose family has multiple 
connections to Al Qaeda, was 15 years old at the time of  his capture. He was accused of  killing 
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U.S. Army combat medic Sergeant Christopher Speer by throwing a grenade at him 
in a firefight, in which Khadr himself  was also wounded. Although Khadr eventually 
pleaded guilty, many experts have argued that killing a soldier in battle was not a war 
crime.37 In contrast, deliberate massacres of  civilians such as the September 11 attacks 
clearly do violate the laws of  war. 
Holder’s decision to try the September 11 suspects in Manhattan sparked intense 
opposition from the start — from White House Chief  of  Staff  Rahm Emanuel, as 
well as from congressional Republicans and even some Democrats.38 In an interview 
with Task Force staff, Sen. Lindsey Graham said he “objected to the high heavens” 
to trying KSM in federal court because: “[i]f  he’s not an enemy combatant, who 
would be? If  the guy who planned the attacks on our country doesn’t fall into that 
category, who would be?” 39 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was initially 
supportive, stating that it was “fitting that 9/11 suspects face justice near the World 
Trade Center site where so many New Yorkers were murdered.” 40
But Bloomberg and many others changed their mind after an attempted terrorist 
attack on Christmas Day in 2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian-born 
operative for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to ignite a bomb 
concealed in his underwear on board a plane to Detroit. The attack was unsuccessful and the 
plane landed safely, but the intelligence community had missed several warning signals about 
Abdulmutallab — including a warning from Abdulmutallab’s own father to the U.S. embassy 
in Nigeria. Republican leaders criticized these lapses, and the decision to read Abdulmutallab 
his Miranda rights shortly after his capture and try him in civilian court. Former Vice President 
Dick Cheney accused Obama of  “trying to pretend that we are not at war. … He seems to 
think that if  we give terrorists the rights of  Americans, let them lawyer up, and read them their 
Miranda rights, we won’t be at war.” 41 
The Bush administration had in fact frequently tried and convicted terrorism suspects in civilian 
court after September 11 — including Richard Reid, who in December 2001 had attempted to 
bring down a plane by detonating explosives in his shoe. Reid is currently serving a life sentence 
at ADX Florence, the federal “supermax” prison in Colorado.
Despite being read his rights, Abdulmutallab would later provide a great deal of  useful 
intelligence about both his plot and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, including the role of  
U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in that organization.42 But the criticism took its toll, and led to 
changes from the administration. On January 5, 2010, President Obama announced that the 
United States would suspend transfers of  Yemeni detainees — the largest group of  prisoners 
in Guantánamo — to their home country.43 They have never been resumed. Near the end of  
January 2010, Bloomberg reversed his position on the September 11 trial, and Sen. Charles 
E. Schumer, Democrat of  New York, quickly followed suit. The White House asked Holder to 
look into other locations for the trial, which was eventually transferred back to the Guantánamo 
military commissions system. 
Guantánamo, of  course, remains open today. Congress has imposed restrictions forbidding 
not only detainees’ release in the United States, but also their prosecution in federal court. It 
has forbidden overseas transfers unless the secretary of  defense makes a series of  certifications 
that the detainee cannot possibly constitute a future threat. President Obama has repeatedly 
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objected to these restrictions, but has also regularly signed into law defense bills that include the 
provisions — most recently on January 2, 2013.44 This has slowed transfers from Guantánamo 
sharply. Since the restrictions on overseas transfers first became law on January 7, 2011, four 
detainees have been transferred from Guantánamo — two of  whom had won their habeas cases, 
and two of  whom were transferred to fulfill a military commission plea agreement.45 
Detainee Transfers and Proxy Detention
President Obama’s early executive orders closed the CIA’s “black sites,” but their effect on the 
CIA’s rendition of  detainees to foreign custody was less clear. Executive Order 13491 required a 
task force to “to study and evaluate the practices of  transferring individuals to other nations in 
order to ensure that such practices … do not result in the transfer of  individuals to other nations 
to face torture.” 
In his confirmation hearings for the post of  CIA director, Leon Panetta said that President 
Obama had prohibited “extraordinary rendition — when we send someone for the purpose 
of  torture or actions by another country that violate our human values.” But Panetta said 
“renditions where we return individuals to another country where they prosecute them under 
their laws” were “an appropriate use of  rendition.” 46 Rendition for the purpose of  torture has 
always been formally forbidden, though. All renditions under President Bill Clinton and many 
renditions under President George W. Bush were ostensibly for the purpose of  prosecution 
(rather than solely for interrogation); many nonetheless resulted in torture. 
On August 24, 2009, the Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies issued a press 
release outlining its transfer recommendations.47 Despite the history of  renditions resulting in torture, 
the task force announced that the United States could continue to transfer individuals based on 
“assurances” from the receiving country that they would not be tortured. They recommended “that 
the State Department be involved in evaluating assurances in all cases,” and that the inspectors 
general from DOS, DOD and DHS “prepare annually a coordinated report on transfers conducted 
by each of  their agencies in reliance on assurances.” 48 They also recommended 
that agencies obtaining assurances from foreign countries insist on a monitoring 
mechanism, or otherwise establish a monitoring mechanism, to ensure 
consistent, private access to the individual who has been transferred, with 
minimal advance notice to the detaining government.49
It is not clear whether these recommendations have been fully implemented. The interrogations 
and transfer task force’s recommendations as to transfers by the CIA remain classified, and its 
full recommendations and report have never been released. 
The Obama administration has not abandoned the Bush administration’s argument that Article 
3 of  the CAT — which prohibits refoulement of  prisoners to countries where they are in serious 
danger of  torture — is not legally binding for transfers occurring entirely outside the United 
States. The Department of  Defense and the CIA have never publicly adopted implementing 
regulations for Article 3 of  CAT.
In an interview with Task Force staff, Harold Hongju Koh said the process of  obtaining 
diplomatic assurances regarding detainee treatment is overseen by DOS, and that the CIA no 
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longer had the authority to transfer suspects to foreign intelligence services without 
DOS’s approval. Koh noted that some of  the most controversial renditions under 
the Bush administration occurred without DOS involvement.50
Within DOS, both the Legal Advisor’s Office and the Bureau of  Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor now must approve any transfers that require diplomatic assurances. 
Koh said that he and Michael Posner, head of  the Bureau of  Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, were scrupulous about evaluating assurances:
The day the Obama administration transfers someone to a condition where 
they will be tortured, without adequate assurances, is the day I leave the 
administration. … I’m saying unequivocally it has not happened since 
I’ve been here, and that’s three years. It’s not going to happen while I’m 
here. It’s not going to happen while Posner is here. I believe you can have 
confidence in that.51
Under the Obama administration, there have been no public allegations of  suspects 
being tortured after the United States transferred them across an international 
boundary. (This excludes transfers within Afghanistan, discussed below.) But there 
have been credible reports of  the United States providing intelligence and assisting in 
transfers and interrogations carried out by allies.
In 2011, The Nation reporter Jeremy Scahill wrote that the CIA was interrogating Al 
Qaeda-affiliated prisoners in
a secret prison buried in the basement of  Somalia’s National Security Agency 
(NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of  being Shabab members 
or of  having links to the group are held. Some of  the prisoners have been 
snatched off  the streets of  Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. 
While the underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, US 
intelligence personnel pay the salaries of  intelligence agents and also directly 
interrogate prisoners.52
Former detainees did not allege that they were beaten or physically tortured, but did describe 
being held for extended periods without counsel, in squalid conditions. 
Somali intelligence officials and former detainees told Scahill that Americans conducted 
interrogations at the prison. One detainee, Kenyan citizen Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, told 
fellow detainees that he had been rendered “Guantánamo style” on a plane from Nairobi to 
Mogadishu. A U.S. intelligence official told Scahill that the United States “provided information 
which helped get Hassan — a dangerous terrorist — off  the street” but did not carry out the 
rendition itself.53 The United States denied that the CIA was running a secret prison in Somalia, 
but acknowledged providing “support to the [Somali government] during debriefings of  terror 
detainees” on “rare occasions.” 54
An American teenager, Gulet Mohamed, was detained, interrogated, and allegedly beaten and 
deprived of  sleep by Kuwaiti authorities in late 2010 after being placed on the United States’ 
no-fly list. Mohamed and his family alleged that he had been interrogated by FBI agents in 
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Kuwait even after attempting to assert his right to counsel, and claimed that he was being 
detained at the United States’ behest. A State Department official denied this. Mohamed was 
eventually allowed to return to the United States after suing the United States, when it appeared 
that a federal judge would shortly order his return. Another American citizen, Sharif  Mobley, 
has made similar allegations about a threatening interrogation by U.S. officials in Yemen.55 
Another case of  proxy detention involves a Yemeni journalist, Abdulelah Haider Shaye. Shaye, 
who had reported on civilian deaths resulting from U.S. targeted killings in Abyan province 
and interviewed Anwar al-Awlaki, was convicted of  terrorism charges by a Yemeni state secu-
rity court in January 2011, after a trial criticized by some human rights groups. His attorneys 
alleged that he had been kept in solitary confinement and tortured in prison. It is unknown 
whether the United States had any role in his initial arrest, but in February 2011 President 
Obama intervened to prevent the Yemeni president  from pardoning Shaye.56
Even more troubling than those cases is the evidence that Afghan detainees have been tortured 
after U.S. forces turned them over to the Afghan National Directorate of  Security (NDS). An 
October 2011 report from the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found 
compelling evidence that 125 detainees (46 percent) of  the 273 detainees 
interviewed who had been in NDS detention experienced interrogation 
techniques at the hands of  NDS officials that constituted torture, and that 
torture is practiced systematically in a number of  NDS detention facilities 
throughout Afghanistan.57
The U.N. reported that coalition forces were involved in the capture or transfer of  19 individuals 
who were subsequently tortured in NDS custody.58 (Coalition forces transferred approximately 2,000 
individuals to Afghan security in 2009 and 2010, most of  whom the U.N. team did not interview.)
Torture was especially pervasive in Department 124, the NDS’s facility for “high-value detainees” 
in Kabul. Of  28 former detainees at Department 124, 26 told UNAMA they had been tortured 
by methods such as “beating, suspension, and twisting and wrenching of  genitals.” Seventeen of  
those 26 had been captured by coalition forces. Five of  the 26 were children.59
According to The Washington Post, Department 124 is across the street from the United States’ 
military headquarters in Kabul, and was built with U.S. funds.60 Afghan and U.S. officials 
said that CIA officials met with Department 124’s leadership once a week, and reviewed their 
interrogation reports.61 In contrast, the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the United Nations, and Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 
had no access to the facility, and the ICRC had warned the United States about reports of  
torture there. Several Afghan intelligence officials told the Post that the CIA knew of  detainees’ 
mistreatment, though they disapproved of  it.62 
 The CIA’s relationship with the NDS is long-standing. Leaked government documents show 
that it was only in 2008 that the government of  Afghanistan, rather than the CIA, began 
supplying the agency’s budget. Allegations of  the NDS’s torture of  prisoners are equally long-
standing, and were included in several of  DOS’s annual human rights reports on Afghanistan. 
For example, the 2010 report relayed an allegation from Human Rights Watch that in 
December 2009, a detainee named Abdul Basir
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died as a result of  abuse in a National Directorate of  Security (NDS) 
detention facility. Although NDS authorities claimed that Basir committed 
suicide, small dark circles on his forehead, cuts on his back, bruising in 
several places, and a large cut on the shin were found on Basir’s body.63 
In an interview with Task Force staff, a former U.S. official who served in Afghanistan 
said that “everyone has always had concerns about NDS.” 64 Canadian Diplomat 
Richard Colvin put it more bluntly in 2009 testimony to the Canadian parliament: 
“[T]he NDS tortures people, that’s what they do. And if  we don’t want our detainees 
tortured, we shouldn’t send them to the NDS.” 65 
Despite having the strongest ties to NDS, the United States was slower than its allies 
to respond to allegations of  torture. In September 2007, the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark exchanged letters 
with the Afghan government stating that coalition forces could access NDS facilities 
to monitor the treatment of  detainees they transferred.66 At the time, the Netherlands, the 
U.K. and Canada already had bilateral agreements with Afghanistan for monitoring detainees’ 
treatment after a transfer. By February 2010, according to a DOS cable, the United States had 
the “dubious distinction” of  being “the only detaining nation in Afghanistan that does not have 
a monitoring program” for detainees transferred to Afghan custody.67 President Obama’s task 
force on interrogation and transfers recommended that the U.S. embassy in Kabul “develop a 
plan to physically monitor the status of  detainees transferred by U.S. forces,” 68 but as of  spring 
2012 that recommendation had not been fully implemented.69
In an interview with Task Force staff, the former U.S. official said that there was “ample reason 
why the U.S. government should’ve had a monitoring program in place” before it did, and 
that “[t]here’s no doubt in my mind that more torture took place in Afghanistan due to the 
[government’s] failure to put in place, at a sooner date, a monitoring program.” 70 But until 
the 2011 U.N. report, there was very little public or press outcry about allegations that U.S. 
forces had transferred detainees to be tortured by the NDS. This was in contrast to several 
allies, particularly Canada. On December 30, 2009, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
suspended Parliament until March, a move the opposition denounced as “almost despotic,” in 
an attempt to evade a parliamentary investigation into Canadian complicity in abuse by the 
NDS.71 
The United States’ allies in Afghanistan consider themselves to have a binding legal obligation 
under CAT Article 3 not to transfer a detainee to a country where he will be at serious risk of  
torture. To enforce this prohibition, a Canadian court ordered a halt to transfers to certain NDS 
facilities in 2008, and a British court did the same in 2010.72 By contrast, the United States ex-
ecutive branch takes the position that Article 3 of  CAT is not legally binding overseas, and so its 
prohibition on refoulement is a matter of  policy rather than a legal requirement.73 The former 
official said that the United States would likely have acted on reports of  the NDS torturing de-
tainees “long before it did” if  the government applied Article 3 of  CAT as a matter of  law.74
The United States eventually did respond to the allegations of  torture by NDS. In mid-July 2011, it 
banned transfers to the NDS facility in Kandahar.75 Before the UNAMA report was published, the 
mission’s human rights chief  briefed U.S. officials on its findings. After that briefing, the former official 
said, “it took the military only a few days” to suspend transfers to the NDS, and only a few more weeks 
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In order for transfers to an NDS facility to resume, the United States would interview detainees 
about whether they or fellow prisoners had been abused, making every possible effort to 
protect the detainees’ identities and prevent retaliation for reporting torture. The guards and 
interrogators had to attend a human rights training course. If  a second round of  detainee 
interviews also revealed no indications of  abuse, transfers could resume subject to ongoing 
monitoring by the United States and/or the AIHRC. Having left Afghanistan, the former 
official did not know the details of  the monitoring program’s implementation, but thought the 
military personnel who designed it “were doing a good job. … I wish the State Department 
could’ve moved at the speed the military did.” 77 
Despite these steps, a March 2012 report by the AIHRC and the Open Society Institute 
(OSI) identified several gaps in the United States’ monitoring of  detainee transfers. First, 
the post-transfer monitoring program only applied to U.S. forces under the command of  the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan, not to Special Forces troops 
assigned to counterterrorism missions. The State Department had not yet created a monitoring 
program for transfers by non-ISAF U.S. military forces, and the AIHRC was not informed of  
non-ISAF detainees’ transfers to NDS custody.78 
Second, there was evidence that the military’s restrictions on transfers were not being applied to 
transfers by the CIA. Eleven detainees told AIHRC researchers that they had been detained by 
U.S. personnel and transferred to the NDS detention facility in Kandahar, despite a July 2011 
ban on U.S. military transfers to that prison.79 Four of  the detainees told AIHRC that they were 
subsequently tortured by the NDS in Kandahar: 
According to one detainee, “I was severely beaten by cable in the head and 
neck. I was shackled and they connected the shackles to an electrical current 
and shocked me until I was unconscious. They also beat me on the back and 
waist very hard. As a result, my left hand is still hurting and even my tongue is 
severely damaged from the electric shock.” Three other transferred detainees 
also alleged that they were abused in NDS Kandahar, including being subjected 
to beatings with cables.80
AIHRC and OSI found these allegations credible.81 
U.S. military officials told OSI that the prohibition on transfers to NDS-Kandahar remained 
in effect and was binding on special forces as well as the regular military. But this left open the 
possibility that it was not binding on the CIA, and that the CIA was continuing to transfer 
detainees to the NDS facilities where there was a high likelihood of  torture.82 Notably, several 
of  the detainees who were transferred to NDS-Kandahar told AIHRC that before they were 
transferred they were taken to “Mullah Omar’s House.” According to OSI, “Mullah Omar’s 
House” is a local nickname for Firebase Maholic, a facility that the press has reported the CIA 
used as a base for operations in Kandahar.83 OSI reported that an unidentified but credible 
source confirmed in December 2011 that U.S. intelligence and Special Forces personnel 
continued to operate out of  the facility, as does a U.S.-trained paramilitary force.84 
None of  the above reports suggest that the United States transferred detainees to the NDS for 
the purpose of  torture. But there is strong evidence of  transfers occurring when the United 
States knew or should have known that torture was a likely outcome. That is a violation of  
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Article 3 of  CAT, regardless of  which U.S. forces are responsible for the transfer, and regardless 
of  whether it begins on U.S. soil or takes place entirely overseas. 
A former U.S. official argued that the United States’ responsibility should not arise only from 
“putting the handcuffs on someone.” 85 Rather, “[i]f  the U.S. is going to put its reputation and 
resources on the line working hand in glove with another country’s security forces, they need to 
have a clear understanding regarding what’s acceptable treatment of  detainees.” 86 This meant 
a detailed, independent assessment of  the intelligence services’ human rights records — the 
source pointed out that the U.S. government is in a far better position than NGOs or journalists 
to conduct such an evaluation given the secret nature of  these services — ongoing oversight, 
and a willingness to “step back” when serious violations occur.87 
These steps are especially important given serious allegations that Asadullah Khalid, who 
became head of  the NDS in late 2012, has personally taken part in detainee abuse. The 
Canadian diplomat Richard Colvin alleged in testimony in 2009 that Khalid was
an unusually bad actor on human rights issues. He was known to have had a 
dungeon in Ghazni, his previous province, where he used to detain people for 
money, and some of  them disappeared. … [I]n Kandahar we found out that he 
had indeed set up a similar dungeon under his guest house. He acknowledged 
this. When asked, he had sort of  justifications for it, but he was known to 
personally torture people in that dungeon.88
Khalid has denied these allegations, stating “this is just propaganda about me,” 89 but human 
rights groups believe they are credible.90 
A June 2012 document released by the British Ministry of  Defence reported that according to 
the director of  the UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit, there was “systematic abuse taking place 
in Kandahar … of  many times the magnitude of  the problem elsewhere” and Khalid was one 
of  the “principal culprits.” 91 Based in part on this evidence, the British High Court ruled in 
November 2012 that the Ministry of  Defence could not resume transfers to the NDS.92 
Most recently, in January 2013 the United Nations released a follow-up report on treatment of  
detainees in Afghan custody, which found that torture continues to be a serious problem. Of  the 
prisoners it interviewed, UNAMA found that “178 out of  514 detainees held in NDS facilities, 
or 34 percent, experienced torture or ill-treatment, down 12 percent from the previous year.” 93 
The rate of  torture by Afghan National Police or Afghan Border Police actually increased, from 
35 percent to 43 percent.94 
Abuse was more systematic in Kandahar than in any other location. Half  of  the detainees 
the U.N. interviewed in Kandahar provided graphic, detailed descriptions of  torture.95 There 
were also credible reports of  the enforced disappearance of  81 detainees in Kandahar.96 Five 
detainees in Kandahar alleged that they were tortured at “Mullah Omar’s House” by being 
repeatedly beaten with a pipe or stick on the soles of  their feet.97 (The U.N. report did not 
address the AIHRC/OSI report that “Mullah Omar’s house” is a local nickname for a base also 
used by U.S. intelligence forces.) 
UNAMA found that despite NATO coalition members’ efforts at monitoring and preventing 
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abuse, there was “reliable and credible evidence that 25 of  the 79 (31 percent) detainees 
transferred by international forces experienced torture” — an increase from 2011.98 According 
to the U.N. report, restrictions on transfers better monitoring by international forces had led 
to “early improvement in some NDS facilities with a decrease in allegations of  torture. … 
However, after ISAF resumed transfers to these facilities and reduced its monitoring, UNAMA 
observed an increase and resumption in incidents of  torture.” 99
Some detainees were tortured after international forces sent them to prisons where the U.S. and 
allied militaries had not lifted the prohibition on transfers. According to the U.N. report, 
following investigations into the cases referred … ISAF maintained in all 
instances that international military forces, including U.S. Special Forces, had 
not been involved in the capture or transfer of  the detainees in question. ISAF 
recommended that UNAMA attempt to confirm the allegations of  capture and 
transfer with an “other government agency.” 100
“Other government agency” is a commonly used government euphemism for the CIA. The 
U.N. report and OSI and AIHRC’s reporting suggest that the CIA continues to transfer 
detainees to Afghan prisons where torture is known to be widespread, in violation of  the 
Convention Against Torture. Detainees likely have also been transferred to torture prisons by 
the military, despite genuine efforts to prevent this from occurring. 
The CIA has not publicly commented in response to the new U.N. report. The U.S. military 
has once again halted transfers to the facilities where the U. N. alleges that torture has 
occurred, and has asked Afghanistan to investigate allegations of  torture by U.S.-trained 
units.101 Past requests for investigation have had little effect, though. According to press 
reports, General John Allen, the commander of  U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said his staff  had 
requested that Afghanistan investigate 80 specific allegations of  detainee abuse. “To date, 
Afghan officials have acted in only one instance,” Allen said, and the official responsible was 
transferred rather than fired.102 
As of  January 2013, Asadullah Khalid was receiving medical treatment in the United States 
after an assassination attempt in December. President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon 
Panetta both visited him in the hospital. In response to human rights groups’ criticism of  
the visit, White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said it was “appropriate” given that “Mr. 
Khalid and the team he oversees work closely with the United States to protect Afghan 
citizens and American civilians and military service members in Afghanistan.” 103
Red Cross Access and “Separation” of Detainees
Under the first executive order issued by President Obama on January 22, 2009, U.S. forces 
cannot use any interrogation technique not listed in the 2006 Army Field Manual. But the Field 
Manual may leave the door open for certain inhumane practices.
First, the 2006 Field Manual deleted language from the 1992 version specifically prohibiting the use 
of  sleep deprivation and stress positions. The 1992 manual listed “forcing an individual to stand, 
sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of  time” as a form of  physical torture, and 
“abnormal sleep deprivation” as an example of  “mental torture.” 104 Both of  these references were 
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deleted from the 2006 version. Second, a new section of  the manual, Appendix M, describes the 
“restricted interrogation technique” of  separation. The rationale given for separation is 
to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to 
keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information 
to support a cover story; decreasing the detainee’s resistance to interrogation.105
Separation is also meant to “[p]rolong the shock of  capture … and foster a feeling of  futility.” 106
Appendix M also authorizes sleep deprivation as part of  the separation regime, without 
explaining the rationale for doing so. It says that separation “must not preclude the detainee 
getting four hours of  continuous sleep every 24 hours.” 107 Human rights groups and former 
interrogators have pointed out that this 
could be interpreted to permit interrogators to bookend the detainee’s rest around a 
40-hour interrogation period. And there is no prohibition against stringing these 40-
hour sessions along indefinitely — for a period of  months or even years — as long 
as it is approved by the combat commander every 30 days.108
Appendix M forbids “sensory deprivation,” which it warns “may result in extreme anxiety, 
hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and anti-social behavior.” 109 But in the next 
paragraph, it permits field interrogators to use “goggles or blindfolds and earmuffs … to 
generate a perception of  separation” for up to 12 hours. Blindfolds, earmuffs and goggles may 
also be used for longer periods for security purposes.110
Because it can be used in combination with blindfolding and extended periods of  sleep deprivation, 
the Field Manual states that separation can be approved only for “unlawful enemy combatants,” 
not prisoners of  war. Interrogators are required to draft written plans for its use, which must be 
approved by the first general officer in their chain of  command.111 The Field Manual does allow 
“segregation” (as opposed to separation) of  detainees from one another without these restrictions, but 
a Department of  Defense directive states that segregation may only be used for 
purposes unrelated to interrogation, including administrative, health, safety, or 
security reasons or law enforcement questioning. … [S]egregation may not be 
requested or conducted for the purpose of  facilitating interrogation.112
In an interview with Task Force staff, veteran Army interrogator Colonel Stuart Herrington 
said the restrictions on separating detainees from one another were “ridiculous.” 113 He said 
Appendix M would have outlawed the humane, successful interrogation centers he ran in 
Panama during the 1989 U.S. military operation there and Iraq during the First Gulf  War.114 
Herrington has said: 
In all interrogation centers I have worked in or commanded, we separated the 
guests from one another. Most welcomed this. A prisoner might cooperate if  
decently and cleverly treated, but only if  we could provide a discreet environment 
where he could feel comfortable spending long hours talking with us. That meant 
each “guest” had to have a private room, and could not be exposed to any other 
detainee (encounters in the hallways, for example). This was critical. Housing 
high-value detainees communally is fatal to successful interrogation.115 
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Herrington said that there was a “huge difference” between giving detainees individual cells 
and “throwing you in a dark room to punish you. … And unfortunately, that difference has been 
obfuscated a bit” in Appendix M.116 
There is very limited public evidence about how U.S. interrogators have employed “separation” 
in practice under the Obama administration. Conditions of  detention at the U.S. prisons in 
Bagram and Guantánamo have improved, but most interrogation likely occurs at other sites, 
closer to the point of  capture. 
To its credit, the administration has improved procedures for ICRC notification and access to 
detainees, a crucial safeguard against abusive implementation of  the “separation” technique. 
The New York Times reported in August 2009 that according to three military officials, “the 
military for the first time is notifying the International Committee of  the Red Cross of  
the identities of  militants who were being held in secret at a camp in Iraq and another in 
Afghanistan run by United States Special Operations forces.” 117 The Times said:
Under Pentagon rules, detainees at the Special Operations camps can be 
held for up to two weeks. Formerly, the military at that point had to release a 
detainee; transfer him to a long-term prison in Iraq or Afghanistan, to which 
the Red Cross has broad access; or seek one-week renewable extensions from 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates or his representative.
Under the new policy, the military must notify the Red Cross of  the detainees’ names 
and identification numbers within two weeks of  capture, a notification that before 
happened only after a detainee was transferred to a long-term prison. The option to 
seek custody extensions has been eliminated, a senior Pentagon official said.118
In May 2010, a Red Cross representative confirmed this policy change to the BBC, stating: 
The ICRC is being notified by the US authorities of  detained people within 14 
days of  their arrest. … This has been routine practice since August 2009 and is 
a development welcomed by the ICRC.119
Despite these safeguards, a number of  former detainees have alleged mistreatment at a 
facility they called the “Black Jail” or “Tor Jail,” located at Bagram Air Base but separate 
from the main prison there. On November 28, 2009, The Washington Post reported allegations 
from two Afghan juveniles, Issa Mohammed and Abdul Rashid, that they were “beaten by 
American guards, photographed naked, deprived of  sleep and held in solitary confinement 
in concrete cells for at least two weeks while undergoing daily interrogation.” The nakedness 
was reportedly part of  a medical examination, but Rashid said that it occurred in front of  
about six soldiers who “took pictures, and they were laughing and laughing.” 120 
On the same day, The New York Times published an article about the prison, based on interviews 
with three other detainees. The men the Times interviewed did not allege beatings but did say 
they were held incommunicado for up to 35 or 40 days, denied contact with anyone but their 
interrogators, and deprived of  sleep. The detainees had been held at Tor Jail before the August 
policy change regarding ICRC notification, but the Times said that the military still did not allow 
the Red Cross “face-to-face access to the detainees” at the classified facility.121 
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The Atlantic reported in May 2010 that the facility was operated by the DIA’s 
Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC), which 
was performing interrogations “for a sub-unit of  Task Force 714, an elite 
counter-terrorism brigade.” 122 Other reports have stated that Task Force 714 was 
commanded by Admiral William McRaven, the head of  Joint Special Operations 
Command from 2008 to 2011 and now the commander of  the U.S. Special 
Operations Command.123 
In October 2010, the OSI published a report based on interviews with 18 former 
detainees at Tor Jail, nine of  whom said they were detained there in 2009 or 
2010. OSI reported that the detainees “repeatedly and consistently described” 
being exposed to cold temperatures, which some said made it impossible to sleep for a few 
hours a night. Detainees also described being kept in constantly lighted isolation cells with 
no exposure to natural light, which made it impossible to pray or track the passage of  time. 
Detainees had no contact with the Red Cross or each other, and were blindfolded and ear-
muffed when taken to interrogation rooms or to the bathroom.124 
In response to the OSI report, a Pentagon spokesperson told reporters that “the 
Department of  Defense does not operate any ‘secret prisons,’ ” but acknowledged that 
it operates classified “temporary screening detention facilities.” The spokesperson said 
that the ICRC knew about the sites, and conditions there complied with the Geneva 
Conventions and the Army Field Manual.125 
In April 2011, the Associated Press reported that the maximum amount of  time any detainee 
had spent at the temporary detention center was approximately nine weeks:
After the first two weeks in temporary detention, the first possible extension is for 
three weeks, for reasons including “producing good tactical intel” to “too sick to 
move,” according to a U.S. official familiar with the procedure. The next extension 
is for an additional month, adding up to a total of  roughly nine weeks.126
An intelligence official told the Associated Press that further extensions would require an appeal 
to either the secretary of  defense or the president, and the military had never requested one.127 
An ICRC spokesman, Simon Schorno, would not comment on conditions at the detention 
facilities but said the Red Cross “has a transparent relationship with the Department of  Defense 
and is satisfied with progress made as regards access to detention facilities.” 128
In addition to facilities in Afghanistan, “separation” has likely been used in interrogations 
of  suspects aboard naval vessels. Admiral McRaven testified to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on June 28, 2011, that when U.S. forces captured a suspect in Yemen, Somalia or 
other locations besides Afghanistan, “[i]n many cases, we will put them on a naval vessel, and 
we will hold them until we can either get a case to prosecute them in a U.S. court,” transfer 
them to foreign custody or release them.129 
The only confirmed case of  U.S. detention and interrogation aboard a naval ship involves 
Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a terrorism suspect accused of  involvement with Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and the Somali terrorist group Al Shabab. U.S. forces captured Warsame in 
international waters in the Gulf  of  Aden on April 19, 2011, and interrogated him for two months 
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aboard a naval ship. The Los Angeles Times reported that his initial interrogation was conducted by a 
High-Value Interrogation Group, which includes FBI, CIA and DOD personnel.130 
According to The New York Times, at some point, the United States notified the Red Cross of  
Warsame’s capture. After about two months of  interrogation a Red Cross representative was 
permitted to meet with him aboard ship. The visit occurred during a four-day break between 
Warsame’s questioning by the High-Value Interrogation Group and his questioning by the FBI. 
FBI agents gave him a Miranda warning before resuming questioning, but Warsame waived his 
rights and continued to speak to the FBI.131 
In early July 2011, Warsame was indicted on terrorism charges and flown to New York. Court 
documents contain no information about his treatment in custody.132 The New York Times 
reported in May 2012 that a court filing in another terrorism case, against Eritrean suspect 
Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, cited a former Shabab commander who matched Warsame’s 
description as a cooperating witness. Both the prosecution and defense declined to comment on 
the witness’s identity, and Ahmed pleaded guilty before his case went to trial.133
Secrecy and Accountability
Despite the president’s opposition to “looking backwards” regarding torture allegations, on 
August 24, 2009, Attorney General Holder announced he would open “a preliminary review 
into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of  specific 
detainees at overseas locations” by the CIA. Holder appointed U.S. Attorney John Durham, 
who was already investigating the CIA’s destruction of  videotapes of  interrogations at black 
sites, to conduct the review.
In November 2010, Durham concluded that he would not pursue charges in connection with 
the destruction of  the tapes.134 The Justice Department did not specify the reason for declining 
prosecution, but made the announcement the same week that the statute of  limitations on the 
relevant criminal charges expired. 
In June 2011, DOJ announced the results of  Durham’s preliminary review of  the CIA’s 
treatment of  detainees. It opened full criminal investigations into the deaths of  two detainees 
in CIA custody — Gul Rahman, an Afghan killed at the Salt Pit in November 2002, and 
Manadel al-Jamadi, the Iraqi detainee whose corpse is shown in several of  the Abu Ghraib 
photographs. Ninety-nine other cases of  alleged detainee abuse were closed without 
proceeding to a full investigation.135 
Holder announced on August 30, 2012, that no charges would be brought for al-Jamadi’s or 
Rahman’s deaths because “the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain 
a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 136 The Justice Department declined to elaborate 
further, or respond to questions. There had been previous press reports of  grand juries being 
convened to hear evidence about both cases, but it is unknown whether prosecutors ever 
presented indictments. 
The U.N. special rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez, has denounced the closure of  Durham’s 
investigations without charges as violating the obligation under CAT to hold perpetrators of  
torture accountable:
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I have to say that the decision not to investigate, prosecute and punish what 
happened when those torture memos were in effect is a refusal to accept an 
obligation in international law that the United States has. Unfortunately, 
there has been no serious investigation and recently the only investigation 
that was still going on, by Special Prosecutor [John] Durham, was 
completely terminated with a decision not to prosecute even cases in which 
the torture victims had died. … It is a very disappointing position because 
you can imagine how hard it is for the Special Rapporteur on Torture to go 
around the world saying you have to investigate, prosecute and punish when 
the first reaction is, “If  the United States doesn’t do it, why should we?” 137
Without being in a position to examine the evidence or the reasons prosecution 
was declined, it is difficult to dismiss Durham’s investigations as not “serious,” 
or comment on prosecutors’ disposition of  any individual case. But there is no 
question that many acts of  torture or complicity in torture have resulted in no 
prosecution, no conviction, or a disproportionately low sentence — even in cases 
where U.S. personnel went beyond the techniques that were legally authorized.138 
One potential reason for the lack of  prosecutions is the ongoing level of  secrecy that surrounds 
the CIA program, despite the substantial public disclosures that have occurred. The Justice 
Department’s rules for cases involving classified information greatly restrict prosecutors’ 
ability to act without the approval of  the original classifying agency. Without CIA approval, 
classified information about the circumstances of  a detainee’s death could not be discussed 
while interviewing witnesses, or presented to the grand jury. This may have been a formidable 
obstacle to prosecutions for detainee deaths in CIA custody, though it is impossible to know if  it 
was decisive without public disclosure of  the reasons DOJ declined to prosecute.
Manadel al-Jamadi’s death, for example, was the subject of  a 98-page report by the CIA’s 
Office of  the Inspector General (OIG), dated November 3, 2005. In 2011, the CIA informed 
the ACLU that the entire report was being withheld under the Freedom of  Information Act 
because: (1) it was properly classified and its disclosure would harm national security, and (2) it 
would reveal intelligence sources and methods protected under the 1947 National Security Act. 
The CIA said it made this decision after it
conducted a line-by-line review of  this document to determine whether meaningful, 
reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of  the document could be released. 
This document is withheld in full because there is no meaningful non-exempt 
information that can reasonably be segregated from any exempt information.139
The CIA withheld 10 other OIG reports relevant to detainees’ treatment on the same basis, 
including one — a December 13, 2005, Investigation on the Nonregistration of  Detainees — 
that may have been relevant to al-Jamadi’s death.140 The U.S. District Court for the District of  
Columbia has upheld CIA’s authority to keep that information secret.141
It is quite possible that there are considerations unrelated to official secrecy that led to the 
closure of  various CIA investigations without charges: the inability to locate eyewitnesses 
overseas in war zones for events that occurred almost a decade ago; destruction of  evidence; 
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authorization for the fatal techniques. But because of  the ongoing classification of  the CIA’s 
treatment of  prisoners, it is also difficult to see how prosecutors could investigate intelligence 
officers without either the cooperation of  the CIA, or the president’s willingness to override the 
CIA on classification decisions. 
In a number of  other civil and criminal cases, the Obama administration has robustly defended 
the CIA’s prerogative to keep information about its treatment of  detainees secret. Obama’s 
Department of  Justice successfully argued for the dismissal of  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc.,142 a suit by five rendition victims against a Boeing subsidiary that allegedly participated in 
flying them to torture overseas, on the basis of  the state-secrets privilege. It also successfully 
opposed Supreme Court review of  another rendition victim’s suit, Arar v. Ashcroft.143
The Obama administration has also criminally prosecuted more individuals under the 
Espionage Act for providing classified information to the press than all other presidential 
administrations combined. From its passage in 1917 until 2009, the Espionage Act was used 
in three criminal prosecutions. It has been used six times under the Obama administration, 
most recently to prosecute CIA officer John Kiriakou for unauthorized disclosures to 
journalists about the identities of  CIA personnel involved in the interrogation and torture of  
Abu Zubaydah. Kiriakou was sentenced to 30 months in prison for these revelations.
The DOJ has repeatedly and successfully argued against requiring disclosure of  evidence 
regarding CIA rendition and torture in FOIA litigation. The government’s position is that 
while the OLC memos released in 2009 revealed a great deal of  information about the CIA’s 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs):
The recently declassified OLC memoranda are legal analyses by Department 
of  Justice (DOJ) attorneys. Although they discuss the legality of  specific 
proposed intelligence activities, they do not reveal the type of  information 
in the operational documents at issue: details of  actual intelligence activities, 
sources, and methods. Even if  the EITs are never used again, the CIA will 
continue to be involved in questioning terrorists under legally approved 
guidelines. The information in these documents would provide future terrorists 
with a guidebook on how to evade such questioning. …
Additionally, disclosure of  explicit details of  specific interrogations where EITs 
were applied would provide al-Qa’ida with propaganda it could use to recruit and 
raise funds. Al-Qa’ida has a very effective propaganda operation. When the abuse 
of  Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison was disclosed, al-Qa’ida made very 
effective use of  that information. … Information concerning the details of  EITs 
being applied would provide ready-made ammunition for al-Qa’ida propaganda. 
The resultant damage to national security would likely be exceptionally grave.144 
The government has made the same argument to justify wide restrictions on what information 
former CIA detainees and their attorneys may publicly disclose in habeas corpus and military 
commissions proceedings. 
Detainees’ statements are presumptively classified until a security officer clears them for release. 
Joseph Margulies, one of  the first attorneys to represent Guantánamo detainees and currently 
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counsel for Abu Zubaydah, said that “I don’t really mind the logistical obstacles” 
to public disclosure of  detainee statements, but for former CIA detainees, it had 
become impossible to get “even the most trivial stuff  declassified.” 145 Margulies said 
the current restrictions were “preposterous … just  ridiculous,” and that it was more 
difficult for counsel to get approval to disclose detainees’ statements then it had 
been under the Bush administration.146 In January 2005, for example, Margulies 
had gotten permission to publicly file a declaration recounting his client Mamdouh 
Habib’s allegations of  rendition to torture in Egypt. This had ultimately resulted 
in Habib’s release from Guantánamo, but Margulies said “my declaration of  what 
happened to Habib never would have been cleared now.” 147 Without jeopardizing 
his security clearance, though, he could not give specific examples of  information 
that he was forbidden to disclose today.148
The attorneys representing the September 11 defendants before military 
commissions have argued that the “presumptive classification” regime has interfered 
with their relationship with their clients, and made a full factual investigation of  the 
case “virtually impossible.” 149 
In response, the government slightly modified its proposed protective order so that only certain 
categories of  information from the defendants would be presumptively classified — but this still 
included all statements from the detainees about their capture (other than the date and location), 
the countries where they were held, the people who detained and interrogated them, and
[t]he enhanced interrogation techniques that were applied to the Accused from 
on or around the aforementioned capture dates through 6 September 2006, 
including descriptions of  the techniques as applied, the duration, frequency, 
sequencing, and limitations of  those techniques; and … [d]escriptions 
of  the conditions of  confinement of  the Accused from on or around the 
aforementioned capture dates through 6 September 2006.150
Defense counsel are also explicitly prohibited from revealing their clients’ “observations and 
experiences” about their treatment in CIA custody. The ACLU has called this last restriction 
a chillingly Orwellian claim: because a defendant was “detained and 
interrogated in the CIA program” of  secret detention, torture, and abuse, he 
was “exposed to classified sources, methods, and activities” and must be gagged 
lest he reveal his knowledge of  what the government did to him.151
At a military commission hearing on October 17, 2012, Lieutenant Commander Kevin 
Bogucki, military defense counsel for Ramzi bin al Shibh argued that 
to characterize our clients as having been participants in the CIA program 
would be like characterizing an assassination victim as a participant in the 
assassination program. It is ridiculous to suggest that somehow they’ve been 
afforded access to classified information and that therefore their memories need 
to be treated as classified information.152 
At the same hearing, defense counsel argued that classifying their clients’ memories made it 
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impossible to locate and interview witnesses who might be able to corroborate their client’s 
statements.153 Despite these arguments, the court adopted the government’s proposed protective 
order on December 6, 2012.
Defense attorneys and human rights groups have also raised the possibility that the commissions’ 
rules allowing the admission of  hearsay, when combined with the ongoing classification of  the 
CIA’s treatment of  detainees and the use of  summaries in lieu of  classified evidence, might make it 
impossible for the defense to prevent the introduction of  evidence obtained through coercion.154 
It is difficult to fully evaluate whether this is a realistic possibility, because the government’s full 
“Classification Guidance for Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program Information” 
is itself  a classified document, as are many of  the court papers detailing discovery disputes. 
According to James Connell, a defense attorney for September 11 defendant Ammar al-Baluchi, 
“[t]he government has not yet provided any discovery or information about our clients’ treatment 
at the black sites. … If  the trial were tomorrow, I would have no way of  introducing it.” 155
Can It Happen Again?
The Obama administration has ended the most inhumane treatment of  detainees, though 
some troubling questions about current policies remain unanswered. But it is unclear whether 
it has taken sufficient steps to prevent a future administration from resorting to torture or 
cruel treatment, particularly if  terrorists succeed again in conducting horrific crimes against 
Americans as they did on September 11. 
Legally, the major barriers to torture are much the same as they were under the latter part of  
the Bush administration. Obama’s executive orders, while binding on the executive branch, 
could be rescinded on the first day of  any new president’s term — and this could be done 
without public notice. 
The Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions clearly outlaw torture, but 
those prohibitions were also in place in 2001. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld removes any doubt that the Geneva Conventions apply to the United States conflict 
with Al Qaeda, and that Common Article 3 is the minimum standard for treatment of  
detainees.156 Common Article 3 prohibits not only “violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of  all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture,” but also “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” The breadth of  the prohibition 
led Congress to narrow the scope of  War Crimes Act after Hamdan to apply only to certain 
narrowly defined “grave breaches” of  Common Article 3. The revised statute explicitly says, 
though, that the amendment was “intended only to define the grave breaches of  common 
Article 3 and not the full scope of  United States obligations under that article.” 157
In July 2007, the Office of  Legal Counsel nevertheless found that several of  the CIA’s “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” — including slaps to the face and body, and sleep deprivation by means 
of  shackling diapered detainees to the ceiling of  their cells for up to 96 consecutive hours — 
complied with Common Article 3.158 
Those memos, and all of  the OLC memos finding that torturous and cruel interrogation 
techniques were lawful, have been suspended. But there is no institutional barrier to future 
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OLC attorneys adopting their legal reasoning. The author of  the 2007 memo on 
Common Article 3, Steven Bradbury, was a member of  Republican presidential 
nominee Mitt Romney’s national security law subcommittee. In September of  
2012, The New York Times published a draft policy paper by members of  the national 
security law subcommittee recommending that Romney “commit his Administration 
to authorizing (classified) enhanced interrogation techniques against high-value 
detainees” analogous to those listed in the 2007 memo.159 
There have been no professional sanctions against legal, medical or mental health 
personnel who participated in or authorized cruel treatment and torture. The 
criminal laws against torture have not been enforced against any CIA employee, 
even in cases of  homicide and where the public evidence very strongly suggests 
that interrogators went beyond OLC’s and their headquarters’ authorization. The 
Uniform Code of  Military Justice also retains its clear prohibitions on mistreating 
prisoners, but the track record of  prosecutions in the military is mixed at best, 
with many serious cases leading to no jail time or no conviction at all.160 As stated 
above, without access to the case files or any classified information, the Task Force is not in a 
position to evaluate prosecutorial decisions in individual cases. But taken as a whole, the lack of  
successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of  the laws against torture and 
war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. 
Even without the risk of  prosecution, the risk of  public disclosure and disapproval might deter 
a future administration from authorizing torture. But public opposition to torturing terrorism 
suspects under any circumstances has fallen since President Obama took office. A recent poll 
commissioned by Stanford Professor Amy Zegart and run by the polling firm YouGov found 
that 41 percent of  Americans said the United States should use torture on terrorism suspects, 
and only 34 percent said it should not.161 
Zegart’s poll also asked the exact same questions as a January 2005 USA Today / Gallup / CNN 
poll about specific abusive techniques, and found that public support had increased for almost 
all of  them. In Zegart’s words,
Respondents in 2012 are more pro-waterboarding, pro-threatening prisoners 
with dogs, pro-religious humiliation, and pro-forcing-prisoners-to-remain-
naked-and-chained-in-uncomfortable-positions-in-cold-rooms. In 2005, 18 
percent said they believed the naked chaining approach was OK, while 79 
percent thought it was wrong. In 2012, 30 percent of  Americans thought this 
technique was right, an increase of  12 points, while just 51 percent thought 
it was wrong, a drop of  28 points. In 2005, only 16 percent approved of  
waterboarding suspected terrorists, while an overwhelming majority (82 
percent) thought it was wrong to strap people on boards and force their heads 
underwater to simulate drowning. Now, 25 percent of  Americans believe in 
waterboarding terrorists, and only 55 percent think it’s wrong.162 
Zegart thought the most likely explanation for this change was the glamorized pop-culture 
depiction of  torture in shows like “24”: “Before the 9/11 attacks, torture was almost always 
depicted in television and movies as something that bad guys did. That’s not true anymore.” 163 
If  so, the portrayal of  waterboarding as essential to finding Osama bin Laden in the recent 
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film Zero Dark Thirty — which unlike “24” purports to be a “journalistic” study of  events — will 
unfortunately likely add to the public’s support.
It is also possible that the robust public defenses of  the CIA program from Dick Cheney, 
Jose Rodriguez, former CIA Director Michael Hayden, and former Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey have convinced many people that the CIA program was carefully limited, 
unconnected from abuses by low-level troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and saved lives. As 
discussed above, much of  the evidence that might definitively contradict these sanitized 
portrayals of  torture remains classified. Since 2009, there have been no trials, civil or 
criminal, and no official commission of  inquiry. The unclassified evidence is scattered across 
hundreds of  unofficial media and NGO reports, and hundreds of  thousands of  pages of  
government documents. 
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
The strongest barrier to a return to torture and cruel treatment may be the military’s and 
intelligence community’s reluctance to engage in it again. Hayden and Mukasey have predicted 
that disavowing the OLC memos would also deter CIA personnel: 
Even with a seemingly binding opinion in hand, which future CIA operations 
personnel would take the risk? There would be no wink, no nod, no handshake 
that would convince them that legal guidance is durable.164 
In an interview with Task Force staff, former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo agreed:
I thought I had done everything, to cauterize and get all the legal and policy 
authority necessary to protect the agency and protect the people who were 
carrying out the program, but it wasn’t enough.165
Rizzo said investigations of  the CIA were “a corrosive experience,” and that many agency 
personnel believed they were “being persecuted for political purposes.” 166 Retired Colonel 
Stuart Herrington, whose disagreements with Rizzo about the CIA program are discussed in 
Chapter 7, also thought the CIA’s experience since September 11 would reinforce its historical 
risk aversion about interrogation.167 
Ali Soufan said that some CIA personnel had objected to the use of  torture long before any 
DOJ investigation, and credited them with ending the use of  the most brutal techniques in 2005. 
Soufan said that the CIA’s Office of  Inspector General’s investigation into the program had started 
because of  CIA personnel “who came and complained about the program to the IG. And that’s 
why the IG initiated an investigation and that’s why the program was shelved.” 168
Retired Colonel Steven Kleinman was less confident than the others. He said it was quite 
plausible that soldiers were using cruel techniques on detainees in a field site “somewhere right 
now in Afghanistan. So yes it is a danger to come back.” 169 
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It is now evident that Congress did little to fulfill its primary obligations in addressing how the 
United States treated prisoners from Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries during the first few years 
of  the Bush administration. At the very least, the first job of  Congress in such a situation is oversight, 
finding out what may be going on and informing the public, through hearings and reports. 
This was in notable contrast to two previous periods in U.S. history. In 1902, regarding Filipinos, 
and 1949, regarding Germans, it had confronted the unpopular issue of  prisoner abuse openly. But 
this time Congress stepped aside, effectively ceding that task to the press. 
There was one striking exception to this passivity. In late 2005, brushing off  threats of  a veto, 
Congress passed legislation restricting the military to the interrogation techniques listed in the Army 
Field Manual on interrogation, and banning “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” by the CIA. 
But that shining moment aside, Congress’ approach to detainee treatment paralleled its reluctance to 
question the war in Iraq more generally.
That is not what the framers of  the Constitution intended. They wanted the legislative branch to be 
coequal. That is why its powers are detailed in Article I, before the executive branch. But in 1787 the 
framers did not envision political parties, and now, more than two centuries later, Congress is a hyper-
partisan institution, with lawmakers routinely placing loyalty to party above pride in their own institution.
This phenomenon flares most clearly in the attitude of  some members if  their own party holds the 
presidency. They yield to the president’s agenda and fail to exercise their historic oversight role. 
This is not specific to either party. Indeed, the GOP was largely unwilling to challenge the Bush 
administration from 2001 to 2006. But at least until recently, few Democrats expressed even a 
whisper of  doubt about President Barack Obama deciding which alleged terrorists to kill with 
drone strikes. 
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Reaction to Post-September 11 Abuses
The first time the Congress generally displayed any concern about how detainees 
were handled came after the CBS News program “60 Minutes II”, on April 28, 
2004, showed pictures of  degrading treatment of  prisoners at the Abu Ghraib 
prison near Baghdad. Outrage was heard from members of  Congress ranging from 
Senators John McCain, Republican of  Arizona, and Patrick Leahy, Democrat of  
Vermont, to Rep. Tom DeLay of  Texas, the House Republican majority leader. 
After the din of  congressional shock over Abu Ghraib, the Department of  Defense 
(DOD) pointed out that several dozen lawmakers had visited the prison but showed 
little interest in how prisoners were treated.1
This was hardly the first time Congress had heard of  prisoner abuse, though it 
was the first with dramatic photographs. The Washington Post had run front-page 
articles — in March 2002, on how the United States transported terrorism suspects 
to countries where torture was used; in December 2002, on how prisoners in 
Afghanistan were kept in stress positions, like standing or kneeling for hours; and in 
November 2003, on how the United States had sent a Canadian suspect to be tortured in Syria.2
Two explanations for the earlier diffidence came from senior Republicans. Rep. Ray LaHood, 
a blunt-spoken Illinois congressman, said: “Our party controls the levers of  government. 
We’re not about to go out and look beneath a bunch of  rocks to try to cause heartburn.” Sen. 
John Warner of  Virginia, chairman of  the Armed Services Committee, said of  the Pentagon, 
“We entrust to the department the wisdom to notify us when there is a situation that merits 
our attention.”3
Even so, when confronted by the disgusting photos from Abu Ghraib (and a New York Times 
story revealing waterboarding), Republicans promised to investigate. But Warner was quickly 
discouraged by the administration, agreeing that two hours was all Donald Rumsfeld, the 
secretary of  defense, should have to spend testifying. Warner also moved to silence Sen. Edward 
M. Kennedy of  Massachusetts when he tried to question Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary 
of  defense, about abuse of  prisoners. Congressional Quarterly questioned whether Warner had the 
“will” to “conduct more than a perfunctory inquiry.”4 
Sen. Pat Roberts of  Kansas, chairman of  the Intelligence Committee, also promised hearings 
and pledged a “more activist role” for his committee. But he never really followed through, 
leading to a remarkable confrontation months later with the committee’s Democratic vice 
chairman, Sen. Jay Rockefeller of  West Virginia. On April 21, 2005, Rockefeller told the Senate 
that it should ask the committee to investigate because until then it had been “sitting on the 
sidelines.” He said, “Despite the critical importance of  interrogation-derived intelligence and 
the growing controversy surrounding detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and 
policies, the Congress has largely ignored the issue, holding few hearings that have provided 
only limited insight.” Roberts sharply replied that the committee knew all that it needed to 
know, and the proposed investigation “will hinder ongoing intelligence collection, and I believe 
it will damage morale” and make interrogators “risk averse.” He said, “I am fast losing patience 
with what appears to me to be almost a pathological obsession with calling into question the 
actions of  the men and women who are on the front line in the war on terror.”5
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In the House, there was no serious move to investigate the issue. Rep. Duncan Hunter of  
California, chairman of  the House Armed Services Committee, even complained that Warner’s 
desultory hearings were keeping generals from fighting the war.6
A few members of  Congress had already been given information about what the administration 
called “enhanced interrogation techniques,” although there is a partisan disagreement about 
how much. CIA records list six briefings of  the chairman and ranking minority member of  
the Senate and House intelligence committees (sometimes called the “Gang of  Four”) between 
September 2002 and September 2003, long before the Times broke the story on waterboarding.7 
Jose Rodriguez, the former director of  the CIA’s National Clandestine Service, later wrote: 
“A briefing was given on September 4, 2002, to the chairman of  the House Intelligence 
Committee, Congressman Porter Goss, and the ranking member, Congresswoman Nancy 
Pelosi. … We went through each of  the specific techniques used in the interrogation of  Abu 
Zubaydah that had been used for a couple of  weeks in August. … We held nothing back.”8
Pelosi denied that account in April 2009, when she was no longer the senior Democrat on the 
committee, but Speaker of  the House. She told a news conference: “[W]e were not — I repeat 
— were not told that waterboarding or any of  these other enhanced interrogation methods 
were used. What they did tell us is that they had some legislative counsel — the Office of  
[Legal] Counsel opinions that they could be used, but not that they would. And they further — 
further the point was that if  and when they would be used, they could brief  Congress at that 
time.”9 Pelosi also said, “The only mention of  waterboarding at that briefing was that it was not 
being employed.” 10 
Rep. Porter Goss of  Florida, the House Intelligence Committee’s 2002 chairman and later the 
head of  the CIA, said Pelosi was suffering from “amnesia” about the briefing they received. 
Goss said that his colleagues “understood what the CIA was doing,” and he could not “recall a 
single objection from my colleagues” about the CIA’s interrogation techniques.11 Goss, however, 
declined to specify whether the CIA told members of  Congress that they had already used 
techniques including waterboarding on Abu Zubaydah.12 Former Sen. Bob Graham, Democrat 
of  Florida, then the chair of  the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that when the CIA briefed 
him on detainee interrogations in September 2002, “There was no discussion of  waterboarding, 
other excessive techniques or that they had applied these against any particular detainees.” 
Graham, who is known for keeping detailed, meticulous notes of  his daily activities in spiral 
notebooks, said that nothing the CIA told him “surprised me or has subsequently proven to be 
incorrect…It was a matter of  omission, not commission.”13 CIA documents show that agency 
personnel briefed Goss and Pelosi about interrogations on September 4, 2002, but due to 
redactions, omissions and errors in the publicly available documents, they do not resolve the 
discrepancy between Pelosi’s and Rodriguez’s accounts.14
The rules for such briefings are basically set by an administration, which decides whom to tell 
and how much. And whatever Pelosi and six other lawmakers were told in 2002 and 2003, 
the conditions of  their briefings prohibited taking notes or discussing what they heard with 
other members, and clearly barred them from legislating on the subject. Yet even without 
their insights or any serious congressional investigation, some senators outside the intelligence 
committees had heard and read enough and were ready to act.
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The first attempt to set higher standards for treating prisoners came on June 16, 
2004. Without opposition or even a roll call, the Senate adopted an anti-torture 
amendment to the DOD authorization bill. It was proposed by Sen. Richard J. 
Durbin, the Illinois Democrat who served as his party’s whip. Sen. Warner and Sen. 
Carl Levin of  Michigan, the ranking Democrat on Armed Services Committee, 
joined Durbin in advocating the amendment. It said, “No person in the custody 
or under the physical control of  the United States shall be subject to torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of  the United States.”15 
The amendment was sharply opposed by the administration, presumably because 
it covered interrogations by the CIA, which by mid-2004 was handling important 
detainees and using what it termed “enhanced interrogation techniques.” It all 
but died in a House-Senate conference. The final version called on the Defense 
Department to establish firm rules on handling prisoners, which the DOD general 
counsel’s office said it had already done.16
The Senate tried again that autumn. Sen. John McCain, who was tortured as 
a POW in Vietnam, and Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of  Connecticut, 
worked with Durbin’s staff  and developed language for an amendment to a major 
bill that would reorganize the top levels of  the intelligence community, following 
recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission. Noting that the Durbin amendment was stalled in 
conference, McCain told the Senate:
We must continue pressing to ensure that America treats individuals in its custody 
humanely, as the Commission rightly advocates. As the 9/11 Commission rightly 
pointed out, allowing torture of  prisoners only makes it more difficult to build 
the alliances and support we need to defeat terrorism. Portrayals of  inhumane 
treatment of  captured terrorists hinder our ability to engage in the wider struggle 
against them. The McCain-Lieberman amendment covered many issues, but its 
language on prisoners paralleled Durbin’s.17 
This amendment, adopted on September 30, 2004, led to a higher level of  administration 
protests, in a letter from Condoleezza Rice, the president’s national security adviser, and Joshua 
Bolten, director of  the Office of  Management and Budget. While the objections to the Durbin 
provision by the Defense Department had been chiefly that it duplicated current policy, Rice 
and Bolten said the new amendment would provide “legal protections to foreign prisoners to 
which they are not now entitled under applicable law and policy.” Their letter did not mention 
the CIA. Again, House Republican conferees went along with the White House and the 
amendment died.18
The press, which basked in credit and prizes for revealing prisoner abuse, paid little attention to 
what the Senate was trying to do about it in 2004. Durbin’s amendment got some attention from 
Congressional Quarterly and The Associated Press and an editorial urging its adoption in The Washington 
Post, but no news stories in a major newspaper like the Post, The New York Times or The Wall Street 
Journal. The McCain-Lieberman amendment got no coverage at all until January 2005. Its authors 
made no effort to publicize it, fearing to bring down the entire intelligence bill, but journalists who 
had penetrated official secrecy on prisoners failed to penetrate public Senate action.19 
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That changed in 2005. First came a Times story in January reporting on the previous year’s 
intelligence measure and the administration’s effort to block the McCain-Lieberman anti-
torture amendment. The Post reported the dispute between Rockefeller and Roberts. Then 
Durbin finally succeeded in getting a ban on torture and “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” 
treatment of  prisoners into law, as part of  a supplemental appropriation for the war. It applied 
only to the military, and the administration did not fight it. The Times reported its passage.20
The central figure in Congress’s attempt to end prisoner abuse was McCain. He asked Durbin 
if  he could take the lead and Durbin agreed, recognizing that McCain’s stature as a former 
Vietnam POW who had been tortured would give the cause great authority. McCain, working 
with Warner and Sen. Lindsey Graham of  South Carolina, set out to recruit other Republicans 
in July. Their effort alarmed the administration, and Vice President Dick Cheney met with them 
and threatened a veto by President George W. Bush.21
The amendment required military personnel to follow the rules set out in the Army Field Manual. 
And it covered CIA agents by prohibiting “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment 
of  persons under the detention, custody or control of  the United States Government.”22 
A false start in July showed the administration could not win in the Senate. The majority leader, 
Sen. Bill Frist of  Tennessee, took the DOD authorization bill off  the floor to block adoption of  the 
McCain amendment. But McCain brought the measure up again when the Senate considered the 
separate Pentagon spending bill in October. The Bush administration suffered its worst defeat in 
the Senate when it passed, 90 to 9, with 46 Republicans, including Frist, voting for it.23
So the administration turned to the House, where the leadership routinely provided support. 
It sought backing for a provision allowing the president to determine that the CIA should be 
exempted from the McCain amendment. McCain had rejected that idea when Cheney pressed 
for it earlier.24
But McCain’s amendment appealed to a surprisingly large number of  the usually docile House 
Republicans. When a vote finally came in the House in December — on a motion urging 
conferees on the spending bill to accept the amendment — 107 Republicans voted yes, while 
121 voted no. The measure, proposed by Rep. John P. Murtha of  Pennsylvania, the senior 
Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, passed by a vote of  308 to 122.25 
Facing congressional majorities that could easily override a veto, Bush capitulated the next 
day. He said he had “been happy to work with” McCain and would sign the legislation. The 
final version also included a provision giving civilian interrogators protections from lawsuits 
and another, urged by Graham, barring detainees who were not U.S. citizens from access to 
federal courts.26 Graham’s amendment was an attempt to reverse the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rasul v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees could challenge their detention in federal courts 
by petitioning for a writ of  habeas corpus. However the Supreme Court later interpreted the 
restriction on habeas not to apply to already-pending cases, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.27 
Congress returned to the issue of  detainee treatment the next year, after the Supreme Court’s 
Hamdan decision. The court held that the Guantánamo military commissions were not 
specifically authorized by Congress, and violated international law — specifically, Common 
Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions.28 The Court’s decision undermined not only the military 
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commissions, but the Bush administration’s argument that detained Al Qaeda 
suspects were outside the protections of  the Geneva Conventions. At the time, the 
War Crimes Act defined any violation of  Common Article 3 as a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison.
The administration asked Congress to reinvent the commissions on the same 
terms it had used, and to add several provisions. One stated that the writ of  habeas 
corpus could not be used by detainees. Another asserted that the obligations created 
by the Geneva Conventions were satisfied as long as the United States complied 
with the McCain amendment — a provision that opponents saw as an improper 
unilateral redefinition of  the Conventions. The Bush measure also sought to create 
a limited list of  offenses against the Conventions that could be prosecuted in the 
United States under the War Crimes Act. And, it included two provisions denying 
defendants the right to be present at trial or to exclude hearsay evidence or evidence 
obtained by torture.29
Congressional Democrats largely left it to Warner, McCain and Graham to 
spearhead opposition to the Bush proposal.30 But the GOP senators quickly 
reached a compromise that gave the administration most of  what it wanted. The 
final bill, the Military Commissions Act of  2006, passed easily in both houses 
after the Senate narrowly defeated a Democratic bid to allow habeas corpus rights 
to detainees. The Military Commissions Act did not limit the obligations imposed 
by Geneva, but it did narrow the reach of  the War Crimes Act, and attempted to eliminate 
detainee’s habeas rights (though the Supreme Court invalidated the anti-habeas provision in 
2008 — as several senators predicted at the time). Another rewrite of  the law in 2009 gave 
defendants greater procedural safeguards.31
Most of  the early protests, aside from McCain’s, came from Democrats. But the Senate minority 
was not nearly as united in criticism of  detainee treatment as the majority was in defending, or 
ignoring, it. Sen. Tom Daschle of  South Dakota, who was minority leader in 2004, said some 
Democrats’ reluctance to challenge the policies was based on believing the practices were proper. 
For others, he said, fear of  political damage cautioned silence, just as it had kept all but one of  the 
Democratic senators running for president from voting against the war itself  in 2002.32
In any case, by the time Democrats regained control of  both houses of  Congress after the 2006 
elections, their leaders had little appetite for a vast public re-examination of  prisoner treatment. 
But the Senate Armed Service Committee, with bipartisan support, used staff  for an 18-month 
effort that produced a thorough, 242-page report, made public in 2008 and 2009, that rehearsed 
the history of  how the military used harsh methods to interrogate detainees. It put the blame 
squarely on Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of  defense when the policies were shaped.33 The 
Senate Intelligence Committee’s study of  the CIA’s detention and interrogation program was 
completed and adopted in December 2012. It is reportedly even more detailed than the Senate 
Armed Services Committee’s report, but has yet to be publicly released in any form. 
The only time Congress can be said to have acted swiftly and decisively about detainees came 
in 2009, when it blocked Obama’s plans to try some detainees in federal district courts, and 
to resettle some innocent prisoners in the United States [see Chapter 10.] However, at John 
Brennan’s confirmation hearing for the post of  CIA Director, several Senators expressed 
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frustration with the CIA for concealing or providing inaccurate information to Congress 
about the interrogation program. Senator Barbara Mikulski said that on her ten years in the 
intelligence committee, “with exception of  Mr. Panetta, I feel I’ve been jerked around by every 
CIA director,” and that the CIA had “evaded” and “distorted” in response to the committee’s 
questions about the interrogation program. Senator Jay Rockefeller asked why the CIA had 
briefed only the “gang of  four” and not the full committee or committee staff, and described the 
restrictions placed on briefings he did receive when he was the ranking Democratic member of  
the intelligence committee: “I can remember driving with Pat Roberts when he was chairman 
and I was vice chairman, we weren’t allowed to talk to each other driving up or driving back. 
You weren’t allowed to do that. Staff  were a part of  nothing.” Brennan acknowledged that the 
Senate Intelligence Committee’s still-classified report about the interrogation program “talked 
about mismanagement of  the program, misrepresentation ... providing inaccurate information.” 
Brennan said he wanted to read he CIA’s response to the report before drawing conclusions.
Historical Perspective
This was not the first time Congress faced a decision on how to deal with accusations that 
Americans had abused prisoners in wartime. On at least two occasions — the war to subdue 
Filipino resistance against American conquest, from 1899 to 1902, and World War II — 
Congress investigated and held thorough public hearings.
The Philippine Insurrection
The Philippine-American War, or the Philippine Insurrection, as Americans called it, followed 
the Spanish-American war. The United States took the Philippines as spoils of  war in 1899, 
seeing them as a naval base in the Pacific and valuable for trade with Asia.34 But Filipinos who 
fought Spain with the Americans turned on the U.S. Army when their hopes of  independence 
were dashed.
Guerilla warfare, with its surprise attacks and ambushes and a foe who did not wear uniforms, 
was new to the Americans and there were hundreds35 of  complaints, through soldiers’ letters 
home, of  killings of  prisoners and civilians, of  burning of  houses in rebel areas, and most 
notoriously, of  the “water cure,” 36 in which gallons of  water were forced down a prisoner’s 
throat and then his captors jumped on his stomach to make him confess or give up information. 
Most of  the accusations could not be checked out. But Richard E. Welch, one of  the foremost 
scholars on the subject, found that 57, including 14 water cures, could be verified.37
The first of  these accusations was printed in 1900 in the Omaha World-Herald,38 but it had little 
impact until early in 1902. Then one of  a handful of  anti-imperialist Republican senators, 
George Frisbie Hoar of  Massachusetts, urged the Senate to investigate. He wanted a special 
committee, but the other Massachusetts senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, arranged to have the 
task assigned to a standing committee he chaired, the Committee on the Philippines.39 Lodge 
“made no secret of  his impatience with those who would slander the American soldier,” 
Welch wrote.
The hearings began with officials. William Howard Taft, governor of  the 
Philippines, testified in early February. Pressed by a Democratic senator, Taft 
conceded that “cruelties have been inflicted; that people have been shot when 
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they ought not to have been; that there have been in individual instances of  
water cure, that torture which I believe involves pouring water down the throat 
so that the man swells and gets the impression that he is going to be suffocated 
and then tells what he knows, which was a frequent treatment under the 
Spaniards, I am told — all these things are true.”40
Theodore Roosevelt’s administration in Washington, more attuned than Taft to politics and 
growing press interest in the issue, responded sharply. Secretary of  War Elihu Root told the 
committee that offenses were “few and far between” and always promptly and firmly dealt with. 
The war “has been conducted with scrupulous regard for the rules of  civilized warfare with 
careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and the non-combatant.” 41
 But the committee did not just hear from higher-ups during its sporadic hearings. On April 
14, Charles S. Riley, a Northampton, Mass., clerk who had served as a sergeant, described the 
water cure treatment administered to the chief  local official in the town of  Igbaras to get him to 
confess to being an insurgent.42 Two other soldiers from his unit testified and backed his story, 
adding that the town had been burned as punishment.43 Several other veterans testified on the 
water cure over the next weeks.44
But Roosevelt, in a Memorial Day speech, proclaimed torture “wholly exceptional” and defended 
troops against critics who denigrated them.45 Lodge refused to reopen the hearings after a summer 
break,46 and the committee dropped the subject without a report.47 In retrospect, it appears that 
the Senate hearings on atrocities had little effect on American efforts in the Philippines. Courts 
martial continued for some enlisted men, but the penalties remained light.48 In any case, the war 
was winding down, the anti-imperialists had lost, and the country wanted to forget.
The Malmedy Massacre
Forty-six years later, Congress dealt with charges of  mistreatment of  even less sympathetic 
prisoners — German SS troops convicted of  shooting and killing more than 70 American 
POWs near Malmedy, Belgium, in 1944 during the Battle of  the Bulge. It was probably the 
worst atrocity against American troops of  the war in Europe. Seventy-three members of  a 
notorious SS unit were convicted by a military court in 1946 of  war crimes in connection with 
the incident. Forty-three were sentenced to be hanged.49 
But German clergymen and Willis M. Everett, an American lawyer who had unsuccessfully 
defended the SS members, protested that the confessions that convicted them had been coerced 
and the prisoners, rounded up from many places in Europe after the war, had been tortured and 
beaten.50
Members of  Congress with heavy concentrations of  German-Americans in their constitu-
encies, including Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy of  Wisconsin, took up their cause. So did the 
National Council for the Prevention of  War, a prominent pacifist organization, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Council of  Churches of  Christ in America. Time Magazine 
was also sympathetic.51
The Senate Armed Services Committee took on the investigation through a subcommittee 
chaired by a Republican, Raymond A. Baldwin of  Connecticut, along with two Democrats. 
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Over six months, the subcommittee sent investigators to Germany and followed to hear 108 
witnesses there and in Washington, examined thousands of  documents, and produced a 1700-
page hearing record and a 35-page report.52
One of  the strongest elements of  the committee report was its belief  that the protests were 
part of  a plot “to revive the German nationalistic spirit by discrediting the American military 
government.” It suggested there might be a plot “to bring parts of  Germany into closer 
relationship with the Soviet Union.” 53 Those concerns came to the committee from a CIA 
operative who came to their quarters in Germany one night and later testified. The transcript 
of  his secret testimony later disappeared.54 
On misconduct in the prosecutions and trials — the central question before it — the 
subcommittee sided largely with the Army. It rejected claims that prisoners were beaten, 
and charges that punitive solitary confinement, inadequate food and water, threats against 
prisoners’ families, and fake hangings were used as methods to coerce confessions. But it did 
find that conducting mock trials in a candlelit room to gain confessions was a “grave mistake.” 
It concluded that trying the accused en masse was unfair and that the defense attorneys had not 
been given adequate time to prepare for trial.55
The report sparked three hours of  angry debate on the Senate floor. McCarthy, who had called 
the inquiry a “whitewash” in July, termed the report “a farce.” Baldwin insisted the Army had 
gone to great lengths to be fair.56 
Thirty-seven of  the original 43 death sentences had been commuted — chiefly because of  the 
Army’s own concerns over the trials’ fairness — when the investigation ended. By then, the 
Army had enough of  the controversy. In 1951, the remaining six death sentences were cancelled 
and by 1956 all the accused were freed.57
The Senate hearings, with their charges and denials, had been covered extensively by the 
American press. The New York Times and The Washington Post ran many articles, mostly Associated 
Press dispatches. The most exhaustive coverage came in The Chicago Tribune, which took the 
charges far more seriously than the denials and trumpeted McCarthy’s attacks. A leading 
student of  the case, Fred L. Borch, III, a former Guantánamo prosecutor, concluded: “It is clear 
that Gen. Lucius Clay and the Pentagon felt that the Senate hearings had cast such a bad light 
on the Malmedy proceedings that it would have been unwise to carry out the death sentences. 
More than anything, the Army wanted this story to go away.”58 While defending the Army, the 
subcommittee had aided the prisoners, too.
✩  ✩  ✩  ✩  ✩
History has largely forgotten the water cure and the prosecutions over the Malmedy Massacre. 
With modern communications and a worldwide web that never forgets, that hardly seems likely 
when future scholars examine how the United States treated detainees suspected of  terrorism. 
And this time, Congress’s reluctance to take on the issue will entitle it to a significant share of  
the responsibility. 
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This memo provides the raw analytical materials for determining whether such abuses may be 
characterized as torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CID). 
Is Torture Prohibited? 
Unequivocally, yes. 
Torture is illegal under the domestic law of  virtually every nation, including the United States.1 
The American legal prohibition against torture extends back to the Bill of  Rights of  the 
U.S. Constitution,2 while explicit official rejection of  its use, even during times of  national 
emergency, extends back to at least the American Civil War.3 Prohibitions against torture are so 
widespread that, according to the Supreme Court, “the torturer has become — like the pirate 
and slave trader before him — hostis humani generis, an enemy of  all mankind.” 4 
Under U.S.5 and international law,6 as well as the laws of  war, 7 the prohibition of  torture is 
absolute, allowing neither exception nor modification for any reason whatsoever, including 
for reasons related to national security.8 Under international law, the prohibition against 
torture is considered jus cogens, a non-derogable norm that may not be altered or qualified 
by state consent under any circumstances.9 This view of  torture is similarly embraced by the 
European Court of  Human Rights,10 the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights,11 the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights,12 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia,13 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,14 among many others. 
What is the Legal Definition of Torture? 
Torture is defined by various international and domestic legal instruments,15 which differ on 
their specific details, but share certain core elements. These elements are clearly stated in the 
U.N. Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), which forms the basis for many countries’ definition of  torture, including 
the United States. Article 1 of  CAT defines torture as:
•  [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of  having committed, or intimidating 
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or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of  any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of  
or with the consent or acquiescence of  a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 16
The U.S. adopted the CAT’s definition of  torture when it ratified the treaty in 1988 but 
with certain caveats, including a requirement for specific intent (rather than simple intent), 
an enumerated list of  underlying offenses associated with mental pain or suffering, and a 
requirement that the victim be within the perpetrator’s physical control, among others.17 
The definition of  torture with respect to U.S. criminal law is contained within the U.S. Torture 
Statute, passed in 1994 in compliance with CAT’s requirement to enact enabling legislation.18 
The U.S. Torture Statute defines torture as:
[A]n act committed by a person acting under the color of  law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain 
or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his 
custody or physical control.19
It further specifies what is meant by “severe mental pain or suffering” as:
[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— 
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of  severe physical pain or suffering; 
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of  
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of  imminent death; or 
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical 
pain or suffering, or the administration or application of  mind-altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.20
Unlike “severe mental pain and suffering,” “severe physical pain and suffering” is left undefined 
beyond the ordinary meaning of  the words, and without an enumerated list of  underlying 
offenses.21 U.S. courts, the Army Field Manual, military courts-martial, administrative courts, 
and other official and judicial sources have had no difficulty labeling certain acts as torture 
or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading (CID).22 Typically, judges and officials take a totality-of-
the-circumstances, common-sense approach when determining what constitutes torture,23 
an approach that reflects the reality that abusive techniques are almost always inflicted in 
combination, rarely if  ever in isolation.
The Military Commissions Act of  2009,24 the War Crimes Act,25 and the Torture Victims 
Protection Act26 incorporate similar definitions of  torture as that contained in the Torture 
Statute, but with one additional element, namely, the requirement that the act causing severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering be done with a specific purpose in mind. Such purposes 
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include: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or 
discrimination of  any kind.27 
The key difference between the CAT and U.S. definitions of  torture pertains to the requirement 
for specific intent. Unlike CAT, which requires that the act of  torture be intentionally inflicted,28 
the United States requires the act to be specifically intended.29 American courts have interpreted 
the specific-intent requirement to mean that the perpetrator must harbor “the intent to commit 
the act as well as the intent to achieve the consequences of  that act, namely the infliction of  
severe pain and suffering.” 30 The distinction is not, according to the U.S. Court of  Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, between whether or not severe pain and suffering were foreseeable, but 
strictly whether or not severe pain and suffering were the intended goals.31 U.S. courts have also 
made clear that the act need only be specifically intended to inflict severe pain and suffering, 
and not specifically intended “to commit torture.” 32 In other words, even in situations where a 
perpetrator did not intend to inflict torture per se, so long as he or she intended to cause severe 
pain and suffering, the specific-intent requirement for the crime of  torture is met. 
What is the Legal Difference Between Torture 
and CID?
CID is, like torture, banned under international and U.S. domestic law.33 Under U.S. law, CID 
is prohibited under the War Crimes Act of  1996 (WCA), the Detainee Treatment Act of  2005 
(DTA), the Military Commissions Act of  2009 (MCA), the Uniform Code of  Military Justice, 
Army Regulation 190-8, the Eighth Amendment, the Convention Against Torture, and the 
Geneva Conventions. 
The DTA and the MCA, which incorporates the DTA’s definition,34 tie the definition of  CID to 
the “cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments” of  the U.S. Constitution.35 The United States, upon ratifying CAT, 
lodged the same reservation to its interpretation of  CID.36 
The definition of  CID for purposes of  criminal law, contained in the War Crimes Act, is 
narrower than the Eighth Amendment or CAT definition. The War Crimes Act defines CID as:
The act of  a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit an act 
intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other 
than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions), including serious physical 
abuse, upon another within his custody.37 
How Did the Early Bush Administration Define 
“Severe Pain and Suffering”? 
During the Bush administration, the definition of  “severe pain and suffering” was intensely 
debated. An initial definition was articulated by the Office of  Legal Counsel (OLC) in August 
2002 in a memo by OLC Director Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales. According to the OLC’s 
original definition, “severe pain” was interpreted as pain rising to a level that “death, organ 
failure, or serious impairment of  bodily functions will reasonably result.” 38 
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“Severe pain,” according to the memo, includes only “extreme acts” and is generally of  
the kind “difficult for the victim to endure.” 39 Where the pain is physical, according to the 
original OLC analysis, it is likely to be accompanied by “serious physical injury, such as 
damage to one’s organs or broken bones.” 40
OLC derived the definition not from a treaty or criminal definition of  “severe pain” but from 
a statute regulating Medicare benefits. Moreover, as Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee’s successor as 
the head of  the OLC later pointed out, “the health benefit statute did not define ‘severe pain.’ 
Rather, it used the term ‘severe pain’ as a sign of  an emergency medical condition that, if  not 
treated, might cause organ failure and the like.” 41 Goldsmith wrote that in his opinion,  
“[i]t is very hard to say in the abstract what the phrase ‘severe pain’ means, but OLC’s clumsy 
definitional arbitrage didn’t seem even in the ballpark.” 42 
Bybee’s memo was leaked to the press, and published on The Washington Post website on June 
13, 2004. The definition of  torture contained in the Bybee memo was rejected by many 
members of  the legal community as well. A group of  nearly 130 lawyers, including law 
school professors, retired judges, seven past presidents of  the American Bar Association, and 
a former FBI director concluded that the OLC’s legal analysis of  torture “circumvent[s] 
long established and universally acknowledged principles of  law and common decency,” 
and that “[t]he position taken by the government lawyers in these legal memoranda amount 
to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating the law.” 43 Harold Hongju 
Koh, then Dean of  Yale Law School, characterized the definition as “blatantly wrong,” 
stating that it was based on “erroneous legal analysis.” 44 Cass Sunstein, a law professor at 
the University of  Chicago, and Martin Flaherty, another expert of  international law, both 
similarly rejected the OLC’s definition of  torture. Flaherty described it as “extreme, one-
sided and poorly supported by the legal authority relied on,” 45 while Sunstein described it as 
“egregiously bad,” “very low level,” and “embarrassingly weak, just short of  reckless.” Other 
commentators criticized the definition for ignoring Supreme Court precedent, straying from 
the definition contained in the CAT,46 and for representing a “pre-ordained result” requested 
by the CIA.47 
The Bybee memo’s interpretation of  “severe pain” was ultimately repudiated by the Bush 
administration itself. On June 15, 2004, Goldsmith informed Attorney General John Ashcroft 
of  his intention to withdraw the Bybee memo. In December 2004, OLC issued a superseding 
memo, written by Daniel Levin, which concluded that 
“severe” pain under the statute is not limited to “excruciating or agonizing” 
pain or pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of  bodily functions, or even 
death.” The statute also prohibits certain conduct specifically intended to 
cause “severe physical suffering” distinct from “severe physical pain.” 48
On July 29, 2009 the Justice Department’s Office of  Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
released a 289-page report documenting its 5½-year investigation into OLC relating 
to the CIA’s interrogation program. OPR concluded that John Yoo and Jay Bybee, the 
attorneys primarily responsible for the original memo “dishonored their office and the entire 
Department of  Justice” and committed “professional misconduct” when they defined torture 
in such a narrow way.49 Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis did not adopt 
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OPR’s findings of  professional misconduct, but did agree that the memo’s definition of  
“severe pain” was deficient.50 
What Specific Coercive Techniques Did the Bush 
Administration Find Not to Be Torture or CID?
The OLC issued a second memorandum signed by Bybee in August 2002 (hereinafter Bybee 
Techniques Memo) that concluded 10 specific “enhanced” techniques were not torture, and could 
be used lawfully by the CIA. The techniques were: “(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, 
(4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep 
deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.” 51 
In finding that the 10 techniques were not torture, the Bybee Techniques Memo relied not 
only on a narrow legal definition of  torture, but on factual representations about how the 
techniques would be implemented that later proved inaccurate. To give one example, the OLC 
memorandum stated the volume of  water used to waterboard a suspect would be carefully 
controlled, and that while enhanced techniques might be used more than once, “repetition will 
not be substantial.” In fact, one detainee was waterboarded 83 times, and another detainee 183 
times, by interrogators who “continuously applied large volumes of  water.” 52 
The Bybee Techniques Memo also relied heavily on the CIA’s assurance that “a medical expert 
… will be present throughout,” and “the procedures will be stopped if  deemed medically 
necessary to prevent severe mental or physical harm.” 53 
Later memoranda placed even greater reliance on medical experts from the CIA’s Office 
of  Medical Services (OMS) to ensure that the pain and suffering interrogators inflicted on 
detainees would not reach the level of  torture.54 Those memos, signed by acting OLC head 
Steven Bradbury in 2005 and declassified in 2009, give the most detailed description available 
of  the “enhanced” CIA techniques. 
In addition to the techniques listed above, the Bradbury memos approved “water dousing,” 
in which interrogators pour cold water on a detainee. In order to prevent hypothermia, 
“[a] medical officer must observe and monitor the detainee throughout application of  this 
technique” and “ambient temperatures must remain above 64°F,” and there were time limits 
placed on detainees exposure:
• For water temperature of  41°F, total duration of  exposure may not exceed 20 
minutes without drying and rewarming.
• For water temperature of  50°F, total duration of  exposure may not exceed 40 
minutes without drying and rewarming.
• For water temperature of  59°F, total duration of  exposure may not exceed 60 
minutes without drying and rewarming.55 
The Bradbury memoranda considered the legality of  two techniques under the torture statute 
— waterboarding and extended sleep deprivation by means of  shackling — to present a 
“substantial question.” 56 
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Sleep Deprivation
According to Bradbury’s memo, 
The primary method of  sleep deprivation involves the use of  shackling to 
keep the detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is 
handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by a length of  chain to the ceiling. 
The detainee’s hands are shackled in front of  his body, so that the detainee has 
approximately a two-to-three foot diameter of  movement. The detainee’s feet 
are shackled to a bolt in the floor. Due care is taken to ensure that the shackles 
are neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety. We understand from 
discussions with OMS that shackling does not result in any significant physical 
pain for the subject.57
Bradbury wrote that detainees were continually monitored by closed-circuit television to ensure 
that they would not fall asleep and dangle from their shackles, and monitored for edema, 
swelling in the lower legs:
OMS has advised us that this condition is not painful, and that the condition 
disappears quickly once the detainee is permitted to lie down. Medical 
personnel carefully monitor any detainee being subjected to standing sleep 
deprivation for edema or other physical and psychological conditions.58
Because several detainees did experience edema as a result of  standing sleep deprivation, 
the CIA, in consultation with OMS, developed an alternative protocol for “horizontal sleep 
deprivation,” which involved shackling detainees’ arms and legs to the floor far enough away 
from their bodies that the limbs “cannot be used for balance or comfort” but not so far as to 
“force the limbs beyond natural extension or create tension on any joint.” The CIA assured 
OLC that this was “not significantly painful, according to the experience and professional 
judgment of  OMS and other personnel.” 59 
While they were being shackled in a standing position for purposes of  sleep deprivation, 
detainees were kept in diapers rather than being unshackled or allowed to use a bucket or 
latrine. The CIA told OLC in 2005 that releasing a detainee from shackles during sleep 
deprivation to urinate or defecate “would interfere with the effectiveness” of  the sleep 
deprivation technique.60 Written guidelines from the CIA Office of  Medical Services in May 
2004 list diapering “generally for periods not greater than 72 hours” as a standard measure, 
“prolonged diapering” as an enhanced measure, and states that only the medical limitation on 
diapering is “[e]vidence of  loss of  skin integrity due to contact with human waste materials.” 61 
In 2005, however, the CIA assured OLC that diapers were regularly checked and changed if  
soiled, and detainees had not developed skin lesions.62
According to the Bradbury memos, the longest consecutive period a detainee was deprived of  
sleep was 180 hours.63 
Waterboarding
Waterboarding, according to written guidelines by the CIA’s Office of  Medical Services, was “by 
far the most traumatic of  the enhanced interrogation techniques.” OMS described serious risks 
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based on the CIA’s previous experience administering the waterboard:
[F]or reasons of  physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the subject 
may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of  the airways and loss of  
consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and 
the interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If  this 
fails to restore normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. 
Any subject who has reached this degree of  compromise is not considered an 
appropriate candidate for the waterboard.64
Before this occurred, however, OMS stated that “a series of  several relatively rapid waterboard 
applications is medically acceptable. … Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed 
without apparent medical complication.” OMS recommended a careful medical assessment 
before more than 15 waterboard applications within a 24 hour period, and warned of  
“cumulative” effects after three to five consecutive days of  intense waterboarding.65 
The 2005 OLC memos contain more details about potential medical complications of  
waterboarding, and precautions taken to avoid them. These included: (1) feeding detainees 
liquid diets beforehand to reduce the risk of  vomiting, and (2) using saline solution instead 
of  water to reduce the risk of  pneumonia. The memo also states that that equipment for 
emergency resuscitation and medical supplies for performing a tracheotomy are available for 
detainees subjected to waterboarding.66
Throughout the 2005 memos, Bradbury placed great reliance on OMS’s assurances about the 
safety of  the techniques and their role in monitoring interrogation and modifying techniques 
as needed. A May 10 memorandum on the legality of  individual techniques under the Torture 
Statute cited a CIA assurance that medical and psychological personnel are continuously 
present and that “[d]aily physical and psychological evaluations are continued” during the 
entire period of  use for “enhanced” techniques. 67
OMS participation was especially crucial to Bradbury’s finding that waterboarding and sleep 
deprivation enforced by shackling did not violate the Torture Statute. Footnote 31 stated that 
OMS had assured OLC that “although the ability to predict is imperfect — they would object 
to the initial or continued use of  any technique if  their psychological assessment of  the detainee 
suggested that the use of  the technique might result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
chronic depression, or other condition that could constitute prolonged mental harm.” 68 The 
memorandum concluded with a paragraph again emphasizing the crucial role of  medical and 
psychological personnel, and OLC’s assumption that in addition to monitoring interrogations 
and stopping or adjusting techniques when needed, “medical and psychological personnel are 
continually assessing the available literature and ongoing experience with detainees.” 69 
A second memo, on whether combined techniques would rise to the level of  torture, states of  
medical professionals’ evaluations of  detainees and monitoring of  interrogations that “these 
safeguards, which were critically important to our conclusions about individual techniques, are 
even more significant when techniques are combined.” The same memo later states that OMS’s 
role is “essential to our advice” that the CIA program does not violate the torture statute.70 A 
third memo, regarding whether the CIA program constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, places similar reliance on OMS.71
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In 2006, in response to revelations about the role of  mental health professionals’ involvement in 
“enhanced” interrogation, the American Medical Association adopted ethical guidelines stating 
that physicians may not “directly participate in an interrogation” or “monitor interrogations with 
the intention of  intervening in the process,” because “a role as physician-interrogator undermines 
the physician’s role as healer.” 72 Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association has stated that 
“[n]o psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of  persons held in custody.” 73
Over the objections of  some members, the American Psychological Association (APA) 
permits its members to participate in interrogation, but since 1985 it has forbidden them from 
facilitating “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” even if  it did not reach the 
level of  torture.74 In 2007, the APA forbade any participation in the following techniques:
Mock executions; water-boarding or any other form of  simulated drowning 
or suffocation; sexual humiliation; rape; cultural or religious humiliation; 
exploitation of  fears, phobias or psychopathology; induced hypothermia; 
the use of  psychotropic drugs or mind-altering substances; hooding; forced 
nakedness; stress positions; the use of  dogs to threaten or intimidate; physical 
assault including slapping or shaking; exposure to extreme heat or cold; 
threats of  harm or death; isolation; sensory deprivation and over-stimulation; 
sleep deprivation; or the threatened use of  any of  the above techniques to an 
individual or to members of  an individual’s family.75
What Specific Acts Have U.S. Courts Identified 
as Torture or CID? 
Certain patterns and themes appear in those U.S. cases in which the offense of  torture is found. 
First, if  a practice is considered a violation of  the Fifth, Eighth or 14th Amendment then it will 
likely be deemed CID at the very least.76 Second, courts focus on the duration, repetition and 
combination of  methods when considering whether torture has occurred.77 The longer and 
more repetitious a practice’s duration, particularly when combined with other abusive acts, the 
more likely it will be considered torture.78 Third, serious harm resulting from the treatment 
makes a finding of  torture more likely.79 Lasting medical conditions will make a finding of  
torture or CID more likely.80 Methods that lead to broken bones, 81 loss of  organ function, 82 
scarring,83 loss or limited use or maiming of  limbs and other appendages, 84 or ongoing mental-
health issues have been found to constitute torture or CID.85
U.S. courts, using the sort of  totality-of-the-circumstances approach discussed above, have 
determined that the following combinations of  acts amount to torture: 
• Slapping that causes temporary hearing loss; kicking with boots; physical 
beating; beating the head and chest until consciousness was lost;86
• Twenty days of  physical beatings and electric shocks through needles;87
• Brutal beating with an electric baton, a leather belt, and iron chains until the 
victim bled and lost consciousness;88
• Beatings while blindfolded by punching, kicking and hitting with the butts of  rifles;89
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• Administration of  the “water cure,” where “a cloth was placed over the detainee’s 
mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a drowning sensation;” 90
• Russian roulette;91
• Binding the victim’s hands and arms behind his back and leaving him naked 
outside for 25 days, providing very little food and water, and regularly whipping 
him until he bled;92
• Binding the victims, forcing them to lie in shallow pits of  dank water filled with 
corpses and vermin, beating them, burning them, shocking them with cattle 
prods, cutting their genitals, forcing them to play soccer with heavy stones 
while barefoot, denying them medical treatment, rape, covering them with ants 
among other practices;93
• Beatings and cigarette burns;94 
• Beatings, suffocation, dousing victims with cold water, slapping, hair-pulling, 
forcing victims to kneel for hours, sleep deprivation, binding and suspending 
victims by their arms.95
Several U.S. courts have decided cases involving allegations of  torture through the forcible 
administration of  water, though most of  the precedents predate the ratification of  the 
Convention Against Torture. In the early 20th century, U.S. Army Captain Elwin Glenn was 
court-martialed for administering the “water cure” to civilians during the combat operations in 
the Philippines.96 Japanese military personnel were convicted of  war crimes by the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East for using the “water treatment” method on POWs.97 And 
several lower-ranking soldiers were convicted of  waterboarding, a war crime, in the years 
following the war.98 
Several state courts have decided cases involving waterboarding as well. In White v. State, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court threw out a 1922 murder conviction because the defendant’s 
confession had been obtained using the “water cure.” 99 In that case, men held the appellant 
down while one stood on him and the other poured water into his nose in order to gain a 
confession.100 The court described this treatment as “barbarous” and “brutal treatment,” 
“causing pain and horror.” 101
In Cavazos v. State, the Texas Court of  Criminal Appeals similarly reversed a murder conviction 
where officers had extracted a confession by coercive means, including the water cure.102 The 
Cavazos court found in 1942 that the trial judge had improperly admitted a confession that was 
“obtained by force and physical and mental torture.” 103
Four decades after Cavazos, four Texas law-enforcement officers who had waterboarded suspects 
were convicted of  “violating and conspiring to violate the civil rights of  prisoners in their 
custody.” 104 The defendants, a sheriff  and three deputies, had “draped a towel over each man’s 
face and pour[ed] water over it until the men gagged.” 105 While not considering the nature 
of  the treatment itself  on appeal, the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1984 
repeatedly described the actions of  the sheriff  and deputies as “torture.” 106 
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While all of  the above cases were decided prior to CAT’s ratification, U.S. courts have held that 
waterboarding is a form of  torture after the U.S.’s ratification as well. For example, in In re Estate 
of  Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District Court of  
Hawaii specifically listed waterboarding (or “water cure”) as one form of  torture practiced by 
the Marcos regime, which used such techniques against political dissidents who then brought 
their claims in U.S. courts when seeking asylum.107 The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit subsequently supported this finding.108 The Marcos regime used waterboarding against 
political dissidents while it was in control of  the Philippines, and it was the basis of  many claims 
by victims in the ensuing litigation in American courts.
What Specific Acts do International and Foreign 
Cases Identify as Torture? 
International and foreign cases may also be helpful in evaluating what constitutes torture. 
War crimes tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECHR), and foreign courts have generated a large body of  case law regarding 
torture and CID. While these decisions are not binding on U.S. courts, they provide examples 
of  how other courts around the world have interpreted torture and CID. Though uncommon, 
some U.S. courts have cited foreign decisions when considering allegations of  torture or other 
violations of  international law.109 
The enacting statute for every international criminal tribunal includes torture as a punishable 
offense.110 Typically, these international tribunals have fewer required elements for torture than 
in U.S. law. These elements include: (1) an act or omission (2) intentionally inflicted (3) to cause 
severe mental or physical pain and suffering (4) for a prohibited purpose such as obtaining 
information or a confession, punishing, humiliating, coercing, or discriminating.111
Unlike most of  the U.S. torture statutes, the ICTY and the ICTR do not require that the 
perpetrator be a public official, have no explicit custody requirement, and do not require 
specific intent. 
The ICTY uses an approach similar to that used by the ECHR when evaluating claims of  
torture. The Trial Chamber of  the ICTY has stated that when assessing a claim of  torture, the 
tribunal should
take into account all circumstances of  the case and in particular the nature 
and context of  the infliction of  pain, the premeditation and institutionalization 
of  the ill-treatment, the physical condition of  the victim, the manner and the 
method used and the position of  inferiority of  the victim. Also relevant to the 
Chamber’s assessment is the physical or mental effect of  the treatment on the 
victim, the victim’s age, sex, or state of  health. Further, if  the mistreatment 
has occurred over a prolonged period of  time, the Chamber would assess the 
severity of  the treatment as a whole.112
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of  Cambodia (ECCC), a tribunal established jointly 
by the United Nations and the Cambodian government to prosecute atrocities committed by the 
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Khmer Rouge regime, has held waterboarding to be torture. In Judgment 001, the Cambodian 
tribunal convicted Kaing Guek Eav (aka “Duch”) of  the crime against humanity of  persecution, 
enslavement, imprisonment, torture and grave breaches of  the Geneva Conventions of  1949 
due to his involvement with the notorious S-21 prison camp. Waterboarding was one of  the 
acts of  torture charged, specifically “pouring water into [the victim’s] nose to induce a sensation 
of  suffocation and drowning.” 113 Applying CAT’s definition of  torture, the court found that 
waterboarding was torture since it “inflicted severe physical pain or mental suffering for the 
purpose of  obtaining a confession or punishment.” 114
In Ireland v. The United Kingdom, the ECHR found that the following practices, applied “for 
hours at a stretch” for a total period of  up to one week, constituted “inhuman and degrading 
treatment” but did not rise to the level of  torture:
• Wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for hours in a “stress position,” 
described by those who underwent it as being spread-eagled against the wall, 
with fingers placed high above the head against the wall, legs spread apart and 
feet back, causing them to stand on their toes and to put most of  the body’s 
weight on the fingers;
• Hooding: placing a dark-colored bag over the detainee’s head and, at least 
initially, keeping it there continually except during interrogation;
• Subjection to noise: pending an interrogation, holding a detainee in a room 
with continuous loud and hissing noises;
• Deprivation of  sleep: keeping detainees awake for prolonged periods prior to 
interrogation;
• Deprivation of  food and drink: subjecting detainees to a reduced diet.115
The ECHR found that the distinction between torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
“derives primarily from a difference in the suffering inflicted” and that the five practices 
enumerated above “did not occasion suffering of  the particular intensity and cruelty implied by 
the word torture as so understood.” 116 Each of  these five techniques has been used, repeatedly 
and systematically, on detainees in U.S. custody over the course of  the past decade — often for 
much longer consecutive periods than discussed in the ECHR decision.117
In Aksoy v. Turkey, the ECHR found that a man subjected to “Palestinian hanging,” whereby 
a prisoner has his hands tied behind his back and is then suspended by his arms, had been 
tortured.118 Variations of  this treatment lasted for four days, leaving him unable to use his 
hands.119 The court held that this practice was “of  such a serious and cruel nature that it can 
only be described as torture.” 120 
Most recently, in El-Masri v. Macedonia, the ECHR found that the CIA’s treatment of  German 
citizen Khaled El-Masri amounted to torture. The court credited El-Masri’s allegations that at 
the Skopje airport, he was
beaten severely by several disguised men in black. He was stripped and 
sodomised with an object. He was placed in a [diaper] and dressed in a dark 
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blue short-sleeved tracksuit. Shackled and hooded, and subjected to total 
sensory deprivation, the applicant was forcibly marched to a CIA aircraft. 
… When on the plane, he was thrown down to the floor, chained down, and 
forcibly tranquilised. While in that position the applicant was flown to Kabul. 
… In the Court’s view, such treatment amounted to torture.121
The court found that El-Masri had been further mistreated in Afghanistan, but examined 
those allegations in less detail because it was primarily concerned with evaluating Macedonia’s 
responsibility.122 
What Acts are Prohibited Under the Army Field 
Manual?
The 1992 Army Field Manual on interrogation, which remained in effect until a revision in 
2006, absolutely banned torture and CID. The 1992 Field Manual listed the following acts as 
examples of  prohibited “physical torture”:
• Electric shock;
• Infliction of  pain through chemicals or bondage (other than legitimate use of  
restraints to prevent escape);
• Forcing an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged 
periods of  time;
• Food deprivation;
• Any form of  beating;123
The 1992 Field Manual listed as examples of  banned “mental torture”;
• Mock executions;
• Abnormal sleep deprivation;
• Chemically induced psychosis.124
The 2006 revision of  the Army Field Manual lists the following (when used in connection with 
interrogation) as examples of  prohibited behavior:
• Forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual 
manner;
• Placing hoods or sacks over the head of  a detainee; using duct tape over the eyes;
• Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of  physical pain;
• Waterboarding; 
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• Using military working dogs;
• Inducing hypothermia or heat injury;
• Conducting mock executions;
• Depriving the detainee of  necessary food, water, or medical care.125 
The 2006 Field Manual makes it clear that the above list is not exhaustive. Even so, it no longer 
includes the 1992 version’s specific prohibitions on stress positions, sleep deprivation and 
improper use of  restraints.126 
What Acts has the U.S. Government Defined     
as Torture or Abuse When Performed by Other 
Governments Around the World? 
The United States has routinely and firmly condemned as torture and/or abuse many of  the 
same techniques used by U.S. personnel against detainees over the course of  the past decade. 
The Department of  State (DOS), in its annual U.S. country reports on human rights practices, 
has characterized many of  the coercive techniques used against detainees in U.S. custody in the 
post–September 11 era as torture, abuse or cruel treatment. These reports, assessing the human 
rights situation in 194 countries around the world, are submitted annually as required by both 
the Foreign Assistance Act of  1961 and the Trade Act of  1974. 
The CIA, in an internal review, acknowledged that the “[enhanced interrogation techniques] 
used by the [CIA] … are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the United States has 
taken regarding human rights.” 127
The following techniques and treatments have both been used by the U.S. against detainees 
within its control and been deemed torture, abuse or cruel treatment in DOS’s annual Human 
Rights Reports.128
Stress Positions: DOS criticized Jordan in its 2006 Human Rights Report for subjecting 
detainees to “forced standing in painful positions for prolonged periods.” In its 2000, 2001 
and 2002 reports on Iran, “suspension for long periods in contorted positions” is described as 
torture. In its 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Reports on Sri Lanka, “suspension by the wrists 
or feet in contorted positions” and remaining in “unnatural positions for extended periods” are 
described as “methods of  torture.” 
Temperature Manipulation: In its 2005 Human Rights Report on Turkey, DOS classified 
“exposure to cold” as torture. Similarly, in its 2005 human rights report on Syria, it referred to 
“dousing with cold water” as a form of  “torture and ill-treatment,” while referring to “dousing 
victims with freezing water and beating them in extremely cold rooms” as “torture.” Exposure 
to cold was similarly cited as “torture and abuse” in the 2006 reports for both Turkey and Syria, 
and as “torture and degrading treatment” in its report for China. Dousing with hot or cold 
water was similarly described as “torture” in the 2000 Human Rights Report on Egypt.
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Waterboarding: In the section entitled Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the 2003–2007 Human Rights Reports on Sri Lanka classified 
“near-drowning” as “torture and abuse.” In its Human Rights Reports for Tunisia from 1996 
to 2004, “submersion of  the head in water” is deemed “torture.” In the 2005 and 2006 Human 
Rights Reports for Tunisia, this practice is considered “torture and abuse.”
Threats of Harm to Person, Family or Friends: In its 2002 and 2006 Human Rights 
Reports for Brazil, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, DOS referred to the use of  threats against 
prisoners as a form of  torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Sleep Deprivation: In the 2005 Human Rights Reports on Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, sleep deprivation was condemned as torture or CID. In its 2000, 2001 
and 2002 reports on Pakistan, denial of  sleep is described as a common torture method.
Sensory Overload-Noise and Light: The 1999, 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Reports on 
Turkey refer to the use of  “loud music” as a “[c]ommonly employed method[ ] of  torture.” 
Interrogating prisoners for long periods of  time under “bright lights” was considered 
“mistreatment” and included under the “Torture and CID” section in the 2001 Human Rights 
Report on Burma.
Sexual Humiliation: The United States regularly criticizes other governments for subjecting 
detainees to torture through sexual humiliation. In its 2006 Human Rights Report on Egypt, 
and in its 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006 Human Rights Reports on Turkey, the State Department 
noted that detainees were subject to “torture” by forcing them to strip in front of  the opposite 
sex, subjecting them to sexual touching or insult, or threatening them with rape.
Prolonged Solitary Confinement: In the 2005 and 2006 Human Rights Reports on Jordan, 
“extended solitary confinement” is deemed “torture.”
Forced Nudity: In the 2000, 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Reports for Cameroon, the United 
States refers to the stripping of  inmates as “degrading treatment.” 
Confinement in Small Space: The 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Reports on Iraq described 
extended solitary confinement in small dark compartments as torture. In its 2002 report on North 
Korea, “confinement to small ‘punishment cells,’ in which prisoners were unable to stand upright 
or lie down, where they could be held for several weeks” is defined as a method of  torture.
Forced Prolonged Standing: In its 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Reports on Turkey, forced 
prolonged standing is described as a method of  torture.
Have Any Former Bush Administration Officials 
or Military Officials Concluded That Detainees    
in U.S. Custody Have Been Tortured? 
Yes, various Bush officials and military officials have publicly stated that certain detainees in 
U.S. treatment were tortured, though many others maintain that the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” did not rise to the level of  torture. 
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Susan J. Crawford, the convening authority for the Guantánamo military commissions from 2007 
to 2010, is one such example. According to Crawford, “We tortured [Mohammed al] Qahtani,” 
whose “treatment met the legal definition of  torture.” 129 Because of  this, Crawford refused to 
refer al Qahtani to the military commissions for trial.130 
Alberto Mora, who served as general counsel of  the Navy, strongly opposed the use of  many of  
the interrogation techniques approved by a Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld on Dec. 2, 
2002, and subsequently used in Guantánamo Bay. According to Mora, many of  these techniques, 
whether used singly or in combination, could “rise to the level of  torture.” 131 In 2006, Mora 
publically stated that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been applied in Abu Ghraib, 
Guantánamo, “and other locations” and that the treatment “may have reached the level of  torture 
in some instances.” 132
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, chief  of  staff  to Secretary of  State Colin Powell, is another 
example. According to Wilkerson: 
America’s armed forces were involved in practices that violated the Geneva 
Conventions, the International Convention Against Torture, U.S. domestic law, 
and the written and unwritten moral code of  the American soldier. Simply put, 
American fighting men and women were abusing detainees.133
He has also publically stated that “waterboarding is a war crime.” 134 
Major General Antonio Taguba, who led the U.S. Army investigation of  prisoner abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, has also publicly stated that detainees in U.S. custody there were tortured.135
Many more Bush administration officials, including President George W. Bush, Vice President 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, and CIA Directors George Tenet, Michael Hayden, and Porter Goss, have 
denied that the approved CIA techniques constitute torture or that detainees were tortured as a 
result of  administration policy. 
Has the Red Cross Referred to the Treatment of 
Detainees as Torture or Abuse? 
Yes. While most reports from the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) are typically 
confidential and not available to the public, those that have become public include allegations of  
abuse, which in some cases — in the ICRC’s words — “amount to torture” 136 or are “tantamount to 
torture.” 137 
Two reports in particular have been publicly released. The first discusses the treatment of  detainees 
in Iraq,138 and the second discusses the treatment of  14 “high-value detainees” in CIA custody.139 In 
each, the ICRC finds evidence of  detainee abuse, including torture, as further discussed below. 
In its report on detainee treatment in Iraq, the ICRC highlights a series of  “serious violations of  
International Humanitarian Law,” some of  which are “tantamount to torture.” 140 The primary 
violations occurred largely in the beginning stages of  the internment process, except for those labeled 
“high value,” who experienced mistreatment throughout their detention.141 Some of  the violations 
catalogued by the ICRC include:
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• Brutality against protected persons upon capture and initial custody, sometimes 
causing death or serious injury;
• Absence of  notification of  arrest of  persons deprived of  their liberty to their 
families causing distress …;
• Physical or psychological coercion during interrogation to secure information; 
• Prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of  daylight;
• Excessive and disproportionate use of  force against persons deprived of  their 
liberty resulting in death or injury during their period of  internment. 142
In this report, the ICRC describes the “brutality” 143 and “ill-treatment” experienced by 
detainees upon capture as “frequent,” indicating a “consistent pattern with respect to times 
and places of  brutal behavior during arrest.” 144 More specifically, those suspected of  security 
offenses or deemed to have an “intelligence value,” were at “high risk of  being subjected to a 
variety of  harsh treatments ranging from insults, threats and humiliations to both physical and 
psychological coercion, which in some cases was tantamount to torture.” 145 Among other harsh 
treatments, they were kept in strict solitary confinement in cells devoid of  sunlight for nearly 23 
hours a day, an act that, according to the ICRC, constitutes “a serious violation of  the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions.” 146 At least one allegation involved “death resulting from 
harsh conditions of  internment and ill-treatment during initial custody.” 147 However, high-value 
detainees were not the only ones subjected to ill-treatment, some of  which constituted torture. 
Indeed, the ICRC notes that “the use of  ill-treatment” against “persons deprived of  their 
liberty,” not just high-value detainees, “went beyond exceptional cases and might be considered 
as a practice tolerated” by the coalition forces, of  which the United States had the lead.148 This 
is compounded by the fact that according to the ICRC’s own estimate, which was based on 
military intelligence officers, “between 70% and 90% of  the persons deprived of  their liberty in 
Iraq had been arrested by mistake.” 149 
The report cites the 12 most frequently alleged “methods of  ill-treatment,” which were used 
“in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract information” from those suspected of  
security offenses or deemed to have an intelligence value.150 These systematically observed and 
documented methods include:151 
• Hooding. This was used to restrict vision, to disorient, and to prevent the 
detainee from breathing freely. It lasted anywhere from a few hours to 2–4 
consecutive days, and was “sometimes used in conjunction with beatings” to 
“increase anxiety as to when blows would come.”
• Extremely tight handcuffing with flexi-cuffs. At times they were made so tight 
and used for such extended periods that they caused skin lesions and long-term 
medical consequences, such as nerve damage. 
• Beatings with hard objects, such as pistols and rifles, slapping, punching, and 
kicking with knees or feet. 
• Pressing the face into the ground with boots.
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• Threats of  ill-treatment, reprisals against family members, imminent execution 
or transfer to Guantánamo. 
• Forced nudity for several days while held in solitary confinement in an empty 
and completely dark cell that included a latrine. 
• Solitary confinement combined with threats, insufficient sleep, food/water 
deprivation, minimal access to showers, denial of  access to open air, and 
prohibition of  contacts with other detainees.
• Being paraded naked outside of  cells in front of  other detainees and guards, 
while hooded or with women’s underwear over their heads.
• Acts of  humiliation such as being made to stand naked against the wall of  
the cell with arms raised or with women’s underwear over their head for 
prolonged periods, while being mocked by guards, including female guards, and 
sometimes photographed.
• Being attached repeatedly over several days, for several hours each time, with 
handcuffs to the bars of  the cell door in humiliating (naked or in underwear) 
and/or uncomfortable positions causing physical pain.
• Exposure while hooded to loud noise or music, prolonged exposure while hooded 
to the sun over several hours, including during the hottest time of  the day. 
• Being forced to remain for prolonged periods in stress positions such as 
squatting or standing with or without the arms lifted. 
Other findings reported by the ICRC include:
• Suspects being “severely beaten” by coalition forces after having their neck 
stamped on by soldiers and their money confiscated without receipt.152
• A detainee being forced to sit “on the hot surface of  what he surmised to be the 
engine of  a vehicle, which had caused severe burns to his buttocks. The victim 
lost consciousness. The ICRC observed large crusted lesions consistent with his 
allegation.” 153
• Another detainee was forced to lie face down, on a hot surface during 
transportation, causing “severe skin burns that required three months 
hospitalization,” which involved skin grafts, the amputation of  his right index 
fingers, and the loss of  use of  another finger.154
• Occasional observations of  “haematoma and linear marks compatible with 
repeated whipping or beating.” 155
The report highlights problems at the Abu Ghraib prison at a time prior to the public uproar 
over the abuses occurring there following the release of  pictures depicting torture and cruel 
conditions. The report notes that “[i]n certain cases, such as in Abu Ghraib military intelligence 
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section, methods of  physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared 
to be part of  the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain 
confessions and extract information.” 156 More specifically, several military intelligence officers 
confirmed to the ICRC that it was part of  the military intelligence process [at Abu Ghraib] to 
… use inhumane and degrading treatment, including physical and psychological coercion” in 
order to secure the detainees’ cooperation.157 
Confirming how widespread and systematic the abuses were at certain detention centers 
throughout Iraq (not just at Abu Ghraib), the report cites various memoranda given to coalition 
forces documenting episodes of  “ill-treatment.” In one such memo, “over 200 allegations of  ill-
treatment” are catalogued; in other, “approximately 50” are reviewed.158 In a description of  one 
detainee’s experience, the report states:
In one illustrative case, a [detainee] arrested at home by the [coalition forces, 
“CF”] on suspicion of  involvement in an attack against the CF, was allegedly 
beaten during interrogation in a location in the vicinity of  Camp Cropper. 
He alleged that he had been hooded and cuffed with flexi-cuffs, threatened to 
be tortured and killed, urinated on, kicked in the head, lower back and groin, 
force-fed a baseball which was tied into the mouth using a scarf  and deprived 
of  sleep for four consecutive days. Interrogators would allegedly take turns ill-
treating him. When he said he would complain to the ICRC he was allegedly 
beaten more. An ICRC medical examination revealed haematoma in the lower 
back, blood in urine, sensory loss in the right hand due to tight handcuffing 
with flexi-cuffs, and a broken rib.159
At the same time, the report makes clear that at “regular internment facilities,” the treatment of  
detainees was generally “respectful,” with a few “individual exceptions.” 160
Also in 2004, the ICRC reported that medical personnel in Guantánamo were reporting to 
interrogators about prisoners’ mental health and vulnerabilities, usually through a group of  
psychologists called the Behavioral Science Consultation Team who advised interrogators. 
The ICRC called this “a flagrant violation of  medical ethics,” and stated that it was part of  a 
systematic effort to coerce prisoners through
humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, use of  forced 
positions. … The construction of  such a system, whose stated purpose is the 
production of  intelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional 
system of  cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of  torture.161
In the 2007 ICRC report on the treatment of  14 high-value detainees held in CIA custody 
before being transferred to Guantánamo Bay under Defense Department authority, the 
ICRC concludes that the “allegations of  ill-treatment of  the detainees indicate that, in many 
cases, the ill-treatment to which they were subjected while held in the CIA program, either 
singly or in combination, constituted torture.” 162 The report then goes on to catalogue the 
various “methods of  ill-treatment” alleged by the detainees, which are variously described 
as “severe and multifaceted,” 163 “extremely harsh,” 164 and “intrusive and humiliating,” 165 
among other such descriptions. These methods, which were inflicted in combination — “either 
simultaneously, or in succession” — include: 
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• Continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention.” 166 All 
14 detainees were kept in continuous incommunicado, solitary confinement 
while in CIA custody, ranging from 16 months to 4½ years. For 11 of  the 
14 detainees, it was for more than three years.167 During this time they 
had “no knowledge of  where they were being held,” no contact with legal 
representation, no contact whatsoever with their families, no access to an 
independent third party (including the ICRC), and “no contact with persons 
other than their interrogators or guards,” the latter of  whom were typically 
masked and rarely, if  ever, communicated with the detainees.168 Essentially, 
the ICRC concludes, the detainees were “missing persons,” a phenomenon 
that “violates, or risks violating, a range of  customary [international] rules, 
most notably … the prohibition of  torture and/or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (CID).169
• Suffocation by water poured over a cloth placed over the nose and mouth, 
alleged by three of  the fourteen.
• Prolonged stress standing position, naked, held with the arms extended and 
chained above the head, as alleged by ten of  the fourteen, for periods from two 
or three days continuously, and for up to two or three months intermittently, 
during which period toilet access was sometimes denied resulting in allegations 
from four detainees that they had to defecate and urinate over themselves.
• Beatings by use of  a collar held around the detainees neck and used to 
forcefully bang the head and body against the wall, alleged by six of  the 
fourteen.
• Beating and kicking, including slapping, punching, kicking to the body and face, 
alleged by nine of  the fourteen.
• Confinement in a box to severely restrict movement alleged in the case of  one 
detainee.
• Prolonged nudity alleged by eleven of  the fourteen during detention, 
interrogation and ill-treatment; this enforced nudity lasted for periods ranging 
from several weeks to several months.
• Sleep deprivation was alleged by eleven of  the fourteen through days of  
interrogation, through use of  forced stress positions (standing or sitting), cold 
water and use of  repetitive loud noise or music. One detainee was kept sitting 
on a chair for prolonged periods of  time.
• Exposure to cold temperature was alleged by most of  the fourteen, especially 
via cold cells and interrogation rooms, and for seven of  them, by the use of  cold 
water poured over the body or, as alleged by three of  the detainees, held around 
the body by means of  a plastic sheet to create an immersion bath with just the 
head out of  the water. 
• Prolonged shackling of  hands and/or feet was alleged by many of  the 
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fourteen.” One detainee alleged to have been shackled for 19 months straight. 
Another detainee’s shackles had to be cut off  his ankles “as the locking 
mechanism [had] ceased to function, allegedly due to rust. 170
• Threats of  ill-treatment to the detainee and/or his family, alleged by nine of  
the fourteen. 
• Forced shaving of  the head and beard, alleged by two of  the fourteen.
• Deprivation/restricted provision of  solid food from 3 days to 1 month after 
arrest, alleged by eight of  the fourteen. 171
The above techniques were “further exacerbated” by the conditions of  confinement, which 
were “clearly manipulated in order to exert pressure on the detainees concerned” according to 
the ICRC.172
In the section on “prolonged stress positions,” the ICRC provides the following description: 
While being held in this position [a prolonged standing stress position involving 
being shackled to a bar or hook in the ceiling by the detainee’s wrists, typically 
while naked, for a continual period of  time, ranging from two to three days 
continuously, up to two or three months intermittently] some of  the detainees 
were allowed to defecate in a bucket. A guard would come to release their 
hands from the bar or hook in the ceiling so that they could sit on the bucket. 
None of  them, however, were allowed to clean themselves afterwards. Others 
were made to wear a garment that resembled a diaper. This was the case for 
Mr. Bin Attash in his fourth place of  detention. However, he commented that 
on several occasions the diaper was not replaced so he had to urinate and 
defecate on himself  while shackled in the prolonged stress standing position. 
Indeed, in addition to Mr. Bin Attash, three other detainees specified that they 
had to defecate and urinate on themselves and remain standing in their own 
bodily fluids. … Although this position prevented most detainees from sleeping, 
three of  the detainees stated that they did fall asleep once or more while 
shackled in this position. … When they did fall asleep held in this position, the 
whole weight of  their bodies was effectively suspended from the shackled wrists, 
transmitting the strain through the arms to the shoulders.173
The ICRC emphasizes repeatedly how the methods of  ill-treatment were always used in 
combination, never in isolation. 174 In the section of  the report discussing the practice of  placing 
detainees in small confinement boxes, the report makes this point clear: 
The boxes were used repeatedly during a period of  approximately one week 
in conjunction with other forms of  ill-treatment, such as suffocation by water, 
beatings and use of  the collar to slam him against the wall, sleep deprivation, 
loud music and deprivation of  solid food. During this period, between sessions 
of  ill-treatment he [Abu Zubaydah] was made to sit on the floor with a black 
hood over his head until the next session began.175
The report also highlights how the detainees’ conditions of  confinement, which were “clearly 
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manipulated in order to exert pressure on the detainees concerned,” “exacerbated” the “ill-
treatment to which the fourteen were subjected.” 176 These abusive conditions of  confinement 
were a core part of  the CIA’s detention regime, which was “clearly designed to undermine 
human dignity and to create a sense of  futility by inducing, in many cases, severe physical and 
mental pain and suffering, with the aim of  obtaining compliance and extracting information, 
resulting in exhaustion, depersonalisation and dehumanisation.” 177 
Such conditions involved the deprivation and restriction of  various basic needs, including: 
• Deprivation of  access to the open air 
• Deprivation of  exercise 
• Deprivation of  appropriate hygiene facilities and basic items in pursuance of  
interrogation 
• Restricted access to the Koran linked with interrogation 178
The ICRC wrote that “the consistency of  the detailed allegations provided separately by each 
of  the fourteen adds particular weight to the information provided” in the report.179 
The former detainees’ accounts of  their own torture, their medical records, and their current 
medical status are considered classified information, so it is not possible to further corroborate 
or evaluate their accounts.
Have U.S. Civilian Courts Found Evidence 
of Abuse and/or Torture of Detainees in U.S. 
Custody? 
Yes, in some cases.
In United States v. Ghailani, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of  New York 
held that the government may not use in a criminal trial “the testimony of  a witness whom 
the government obtained only through information it allegedly extracted by physical and 
psychological abuse of  the defendant.” 180 Finding such abuse, the court suppressed the 
testimony of  a key witness.181 The government itself  did not dispute that all statements made 
by defendant that related to the present motion “were coerced and obtained in violation of  his 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” 182 
Courts, evaluating the habeas corpus petitions of  detainees, have similarly found evidence of  
torture and abuse. 
In Ali Ahmed v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia suppressed the 
statements of  certain detainee witnesses due to the fact that they were subjected to torture.183 
Though the opinion, which is heavily redacted, fails to specify the details of  this torture 
in the un-redacted sections, the court makes clear that “there is evidence that [redacted] 
underwent torture, which may well have affected the accuracy of  the information he supplied 
to interrogators. [Redacted] spent time at Bagram and the Dark Prison, and alleges that he has 
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been tortured.” 184 The court further doubts the identification by the witness “due to the fact 
that it was elicited at Bagram amidst actual torture or fear of  it.” 185 The court, finding that 
the government “presented no evidence to dispute the allegations of  torture at Bagram or the 
Dark Prison,” 186 and citing the existence widespread, credible reports of  torture and detainee 
abuse” 187 at Bagram Prison, said it could not conclude “that past instances of  torture did not 
impact the accuracy of  later statements.” 188 
In Saki Bacha v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia granted the 
detainee’s unopposed motion to suppress his out-of-court statements because the statements 
were made “as a product of  torture.” 189 Ultimately, the judge granted the detainee’s petition for 
habeas corpus because of  the failure to justify the reasons for his detention.190
In Mohammed v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia suppressed the 
testimony of  a key witness, Binyam Mohammed, because it was the product of  torture.191 In 
a sworn declaration summarized by the court, Mohammed stated that he “was brutalized 
for years while in United States custody overseas at foreign facilities.” 192 Much of  the alleged 
mistreatment occurred after a rendition to Morocco,193 but some took place in the so-called 
“Prison of  Darkness” in Kabul. As summarized by the court, Mohammed’s head was banged 
against the wall of  his cell repeatedly; he was chained to the floor and locked in complete 
darkness; he was deprived of  sleep; and he was shackled frequently, “once for eight days on end 
in a position that prevented him from standing or sitting.” 194 Initially, Mohammed’s cell was 
kept dark for 23 hours a day. Showers were not permitted, and he received food once every 36 
hours. Gradually, however, conditions improved, though only slightly.195 The government did 
not challenge or deny any of  the evidence of  Mohammed’s abuse recounted above.196
In Anam v. Obama,197 the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia once again suppressed 
the majority of  the government’s evidence because they were based on statements “tainted by 
the coercive interrogation techniques which Al Madhwani was subject [to] and [therefore] lack 
sufficient indicia of  reliability.” 198 The court recounts the abuse inflicted on Al Madhwani, 
which included being blasted with music 24 hours a day where his “sole respite from the 
deafening noise was the screams of  other prisoners,”199 and being suspended in his cell from his 
left hand, causing long-term medical consequences.200 Notably, the court found that not only did 
the government fail to refute the petitioner’s descriptions of  his confinement, but it corroborated 
his “debilitating physical and mental condition … thereby confirming his claims of  harsh 
treatment.” 201 This harsh treatment involved, according to the court, “forty days of  solitary 
confinement, severe physical and mental abuse, malnourishment, sensory deprivation, anxiety, 
and insomnia.” 202 Though his treatment improved once he was transferred to Guantánamo, 
the court concluded that “the Government fail[ed] to establish that months of  less-coercive 
circumstances provide sufficient insulation from forty days of  extreme coercive conditions [while 
detained by the U.S. in Afghanistan.” 203 
In Hatim v. Obama,204 the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia similarly found 
that the detainee petitioning for habeas review “was tortured at Kandahar and that he told 
his interrogators that he had attended [an Al Qaeda terrorist camp] only to avoid further 
punishment.” 205 As before, the court also noted that the government “does not refute the 
petitioner’s allegations of  coercion or the widespread allegations of  torture of  other detainees 
prior to their arrival at [Guantánamo].” 206 The “torture” experienced by the detainee included, 
according to the allegations accepted by the court, being “severely mistreated,” being “beaten 
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repeatedly” and “kicked in the knees,” having “duct tape used to hold blindfolds on his head,” 
and being “threatened with rape if  he did not confess to being a member of  the Taliban or al-
Qaida.” 207 Given the detainee’s “unrefuted allegations of  torture,” the court stated: 
When — as here — the government presents no evidence to dispute the 
detainee’s allegations of  torture and fails to demonstrate that the detainee was 
unaffected by his past mistreatment, the court should not infer that the prior 
instances of  coercion or torture did not impact the accuracy of  the detainee’s 
subsequent statements.208
On the basis of  such unrefuted claims, the court granted the detainee’s habeas corpus petition.209 
In Abdah v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia similarly rejected the 
statements of  two detainee witnesses because of  “unrebutted evidence in the record that, at 
the time of  the interrogations at which they made the statements, both men had recently been 
tortured.” 210 Such torture included, according to the sworn testimony of  the detainees, being 
“kept in complete darkness,” and being “hooded, given injections, beaten, hit with electric 
cables, suspended from above, made to be naked, and subjected to continuous loud music.” 211 
Moreover, according to the court:
At a detention facility at Bagram, Afghanistan, Kazimi [one of  the detainee 
witnesses] was “isolated, shackled, ‘psychologically tortured and traumatized 
by guards’ desecration of  the Koran’ and interrogated ‘day and night, and 
very frequently.’ ” Both men asserted that they confessed to their interrogators’ 
allegations so that the torture would cease.212 
In another habeas petition adjudicated in Abdah, the district court acknowledged “evidence 
in the record to support the contention that Esmail [the detainee petitioning for habeas 
review] was subjected to mistreatment while in United States custody,” but found that 
the detainee had exaggerated the extent of  his mistreatment and declined to suppress his 
statements to interrogators.213 
In Salahi v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia found “ample evidence” 
that Salahi, the detainee petitioning for habeas review, “was subjected to extensive and severe 
mistreatment at Guantánamo.” 214 While admitting that Salahi had been mistreated by 
interrogators from mid-June through September of  2003, the U.S. government argued that 
subsequent statements made by Salahi should be admissible because their connection to the 
mistreatment was sufficiently attenuated through the passage of  time to remove any taint.215 
The court, however, dismissed this argument concluding instead that Salahi’s statements were 
“tainted by coercion and mistreatment.” 216
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Memo in Support of Finding #2
In the immediate aftermath of  September 11, the nation’s leaders determined that they needed 
to invoke extraordinary powers to prevent terrorists from committing similar atrocities. 
On September 16, Vice President Dick Cheney told Tim Russert on “Meet the Press” that the 
United States would have to work on “the dark side, if  you will. We’ve got to spend time in the 
shadows in the intelligence world.” Russert asked whether this meant the United States would 
lift restrictions on seeking the assistance of  human rights violators to gather intelligence, and 
Cheney replied, “Oh, I think so. … It is a mean, nasty, dangerous dirty business out there, and 
we have to operate in that arena.” 1
Cofer Black, the head of  the counterterrorism center at the CIA, expressed similar sentiments, 
explaining that he wanted to prepare operatives for a drastic change from their previous rules of  
engagement “where we were staked to the ground like a junkyard dog. … I was fully expecting a 
nasty, nasty war and I wanted the guys ready for a nasty war.” 2 
The administration began to take the steps it believed were necessary to untie the intelligence 
community’s hands. A classified presidential finding signed on September 17, 2001, gave the 
CIA broad authority to capture suspected terrorists. On November 13, the president signed an 
order authorizing the secretary of  defense to establish military commissions to try terrorism 
suspects.3 On December 28, 2001, the Office of  Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded that federal 
courts did not have habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees held at Guantánamo Bay.4 
The most crucial legal question, though, was whether captives would be protected by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which forbid all acts of  torture, cruelty, violence or degrading treatment 
of  detainees. The United States had applied the Conventions’ protections to every enemy it 
faced since 1949, even in the face of  gross violations of  the treaties by communist North Korea 
and North Vietnam. But this time, the president reached a different decision. 
The Decision Not to Apply the Geneva                
Conventions
On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush issued an order formally finding that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to the United States’ conflict with Al Qaeda, and that “Taliban 
detainees are unlawful combatants” not entitled to the Conventions’ protection. The order states:
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As a matter of  policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat 
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military 
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of  Geneva.5
This confirmed Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s earlier order overriding the military’s 
initial decision to apply Geneva in Afghanistan. General Tommy Franks, the commander of  
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, had ordered the military to apply the Conventions’ requirements on 
October 17, 2001.6 But on January 19, 2002, a little over a week after the first prisoners arrived 
at Guantánamo, Rumsfeld rescinded Franks’s order,7 in reliance on legal advice from the OLC 
that Geneva did not apply. Rumsfeld made his decision without consulting the military services’ 
judge advocates general (JAGs), who would later oppose the decision not to apply Geneva.8 
Department of  State (DOS) legal advisor William H. Taft IV also strongly disagreed with 
Rumsfeld’s decision. He acknowledged that detainees might not ultimately be entitled 
to prisoner of  war status, but argued that at least with regard to Taliban fighters, “under 
the Geneva Conventions, these persons would be entitled to have their status determined 
individually” at a hearing known as an Article 5 tribunal.9 As Taft later told the Task Force staff, 
these tribunals would have had the additional policy benefit of  determining whether detainees 
were combatants at all, or whether “actually it just turns out that he’s a person the other person 
hates, just had a family feud. … [Y]ou should be a little careful about that.” 
But the “War Council” of  lawyers closest to the White House on these issues — among them 
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, OLC attorney John Yoo, and counsel to the vice 
president David Addington — strongly disagreed with Taft, and their position ultimately 
prevailed. A January 25 memo signed by Gonzales acknowledged that “[s]ince the Geneva 
Conventions were concluded in 1949, the United States has never denied their applicability 
to either U.S. or opposing forces engaged in armed conflict, despite several opportunities to 
do so.” 10 He nevertheless recommended that the president set them aside. “The war against 
terrorism is a new kind of  war,” the memo said, in which it was essential to 
quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to 
avoid further atrocities against American civilians. … In my judgment, this new 
paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limits on questioning enemy prisoners.
Finding that Geneva did not protect any captured detainee, the memo noted, “[s]ubstantially 
reduces the threat of  domestic prosecution under the War Crimes Act.” 11 
The CIA: High-Level Authorization                             
of Brutal Techniques
The policy statement regarding “humane treatment” and “the principles of  Geneva” in 
President Bush’s February 7 order applied only to the military, not the CIA. This distinction 
was not accidental. Taft’s notes summarizing discussions leading up to that decision state that 
“CIA lawyers believe,” to the extent that Geneva protections are applied as a policy matter, “it is 
desirable to circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA.” 12 
In December 2001, the CIA had asked psychologist James Mitchell to review the “Manchester 
Manual,” an Al Qaeda manual seized in the United Kingdom that advised operatives on 
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resisting interrogations. Mitchell was a retired psychologist from the military’s Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, and Escape program (SERE), which trains U.S. troops to resist interrogation if  
captured by enemy forces that do not follow the Geneva Conventions. The training is based, 
in part, on treatment of  American POWs during the Vietnam and Korean Wars. The SERE 
program is administered through the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) of  the Department 
of  Defense (DOD). Mitchell contacted another SERE psychologist, Bruce Jessen, and the two 
drafted a proposal to use those techniques against captured members of  Al Qaeda.13 
On March 28, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was captured in a gunfight in Faisalabad, Pakistan. He was 
believed at the time to be the highest level Al Qaeda suspect in U.S. custody. He was transported 
to a secret CIA site, most likely in Thailand. There, FBI interrogators Ali Soufan and Stephen 
Gaudin began interviewing Abu Zubaydah while doctors worked to stabilize his condition. Soon 
after, according to Soufan, a CIA team including contractor James Mitchell began directing the 
interrogation, and using “enhanced” techniques such as nudity and sleep deprivation. When 
Soufan argued that his questioning had gained valuable intelligence and expressed skepticism 
about the new techniques, Mitchell reportedly replied, “This is science.” 14
Not long after that, Soufan saw a “confinement box” that “looked like a coffin,” in which 
Mitchell was seeking authorization to place Abu Zubaydah.15 He concluded that “the 
interrogation was stepping over the line from borderline torture. Way over the line.” Soufan left 
the interrogation, with the approval of  his FBI superiors, Assistant Director Pat D’Amuro and 
FBI Director Robert Mueller.16
CIA officials, particularly former counterterrorism center director Jose Rodriguez, have disputed 
Soufan’s account. Most of  the disputes concern whether the FBI agents using traditional 
interrogation techniques or CIA interrogators using “enhanced” methods had more success 
in obtaining intelligence from Abu Zubaydah — an issue discussed elsewhere. Rodriguez also 
asserted that Soufan17 overestimated the contract psychologist’s role, and “seemed to blame 
our contractor for everything,” even threatening the contractor with violence at one point. 
Rodriguez wrote that “[a]t the time the contractor was just an advisor. He was not in charge 
of  the interrogation.” Rodriguez, however, does not dispute that the contract psychologist was 
advising FBI agents as well as CIA interrogators from the beginning, and Soufan does not 
dispute that Mitchell had CIA headquarters’ authorization for his actions.18 
According to Rodriguez, after Soufan and the FBI left, he met with the contract psychologist 
and CIA personnel involved in the interrogation and asked the psychologist how long it would 
take for more aggressive techniques to be effective:
“Thirty days” was his estimate. I thought about it overnight and the next 
morning asked the contractor if  he would be willing to take charge of  creating 
and implementing such a program. He said he would be willing to take the 
assignment but could not do it himself. … I agreed that the contractor should 
bring in someone from the outside to help him work with Agency officers in 
crafting a program we hoped would save lives.19
The program had approval from the highest levels of  the U.S. government, as Bush wrote in 
his memoirs:
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CIA experts drew up a list of  interrogation techniques that differed from 
those Zubaydah had successfully resisted. George [Tenet] assured me all 
interrogations would be performed by experienced intelligence professionals 
who had undergone extensive training. Medical personnel would be on-site to 
guarantee that the detainee was not physically or mentally harmed.
At my direction, Department of  Justice and CIA lawyers conducted a careful 
legal review. They concluded that the enhanced interrogation program complied 
with the Constitution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture.
I took a look at the list of  techniques. There were two that I felt went too far, 
even if  they were legal. I directed the CIA not to use them. Another technique 
was waterboarding, a process of  simulated drowning. No doubt the procedure 
was tough, but medical experts assured the CIA that it did no lasting harm.20
It is unclear what techniques Bush determined went too far. The ones that the OLC deemed 
legal included not only waterboarding, but: (1) sleep deprivation for up to 11 consecutive days; 
(2) “cramped confinement” in small, darkened boxes; (3) the placement of  an insect inside 
a confinement box, which the suspect could be told was a stinging insect but was in fact “a 
harmless insect such as a caterpillar”; (4) “wall standing” and other stress positions; (5) physical 
techniques including grabbing a suspect’s collar, grabbing his face, slapping him, and slamming 
him into a specially constructed “flexible wall.” 21
Years later, after he was transferred to Guantánamo Bay, Abu Zubaydah described the 
“confinement box” to the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC):
Then the real torturing started. Two black boxes were brought into the room 
outside my cell. One was tall, slightly higher than me, and narrow. Measuring 
perhaps in area 1 m x 0.75 m and 2 m in height. The other was shorter, 
perhaps only 1 m in height. … After the beating I was then placed in the small 
box. They placed a cloth or cover over the box to cut out all light and restrict 
my air supply. As it was not high enough even to sit upright, I had to crouch 
down. It was very difficult because of  my wounds. The stress on my legs held 
in this position meant my wounds both in the leg and stomach became very 
painful. I think this occurred about 3 months after my last operation. It was 
always cold in the room, but when the cover was placed over the box it made 
it hot and sweaty inside. The wound on my leg began to open and started to 
bleed. I don’t know how long I remained in the small box, I think I may have 
slept or maybe fainted. 
I was then dragged from the small box, unable to walk properly and put on 
what looked like a hospital bed, and strapped down very tightly with belts. A 
black cloth was then placed over my face and the interrogators used a mineral 
water bottle to pour water on the cloth so that I could not breathe. After a 
few minutes the cloth was removed and the bed was rotated into an upright 
position. The pressure of  the straps on my wounds was very painful. I vomited. 
The bed was then again lowered to a horizontal position and the same torture 
carried out again with the black cloth over my face and water poured on from a 
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bottle. On this occasion my head was in a more backward, downwards position 
and the water was poured on for a longer time. I struggled against the straps, 
trying to breathe, but it was hopeless. I thought I was going to die. I lost control 
of  my urine. Since then I still lose control of  my urine when under stress.22
None of  the other 13 high-value CIA detainees the ICRC interviewed at Guantánamo alleged 
placement in the “confinement box.” Two others were subjected to waterboarding, which the 
ICRC termed “suffocation by water.”
More common techniques were “prolonged stress standing,” in which detainees were shackled 
upright, and sleep deprivation for extended periods. According to the ICRC,
Ten of  the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to prolonged stress 
standing positions, during which their wrists were shackled to a bar or hook 
in the ceiling above the head for periods ranging from two or three days 
continuously, and for up to two or three months intermittently. All those 
detainees who reported being held in this position were allegedly kept naked 
throughout the use of  this form of  ill-treatment. …
While being held in this position some of  the detainees were allowed to defecate 
in a bucket. A guard would come to release their hands from the bar or hook 
in the ceiling so that they could sit on the bucket. None of  them, however, were 
allowed to clean themselves afterwards. Others were made to wear a garment 
that resembled a diaper. … Many of  the detainees who alleged that they had 
undergone this form of  ill-treatment commented that their legs and ankles 
swelled as a result of  the continual forced standing with their hands shackled 
above their head. They also noted that while being held in this position they 
were checked frequently by US health personnel. …
Although this position prevented most detainees from sleeping, three of  the 
detainees stated that they did fall asleep once or more while shackled in this 
position. These include Mr. Khaled Shaikh Mohammed and Mr. Bin Attash; 
the third did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities. When 
they did fall asleep held in this position, the whole weight of  their bodies was 
effectively suspended from the shackled wrists, transmitting the strain through 
the arms to the shoulders. … 
Eleven of  the fourteen alleged that they were deprived of  sleep during the 
initial interrogation phase from seven days continuously to intermittent sleep 
deprivation that continued up to two or three months after arrest.23
It is not clear how many other detainees were subjected to these techniques by the CIA. 
Administration officials, in defending the program, have argued that it was carefully limited in 
scope. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden testified at a congressional hearing on February 
5, 2008, that “[i]n the life of  the CIA detention program, we have held fewer than 100 people. 
And actually, fewer than one-third of  those people have had any techniques used against them, 
enhanced techniques.” 24 Acting OLC director Steven Bradbury gave similar estimates in a May 
30, 2005, legal memorandum, stating that the CIA had taken custody of  94 detainees and had 
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employed “enhanced” interrogation techniques on 28 of  them.25 But these appear to exclude all 
prisoners interrogated by the CIA in Iraq, and may also exclude those held at CIA-run facilities 
in Afghanistan. 
There were at least three such prisons in Afghanistan: a section of  Bagram Air Base; a prison 
northeast of  Kabul, known as the “Salt Pit”; and another location closer to the center of  Kabul. 
Of  these, the Salt Pit is likely the best known, as the site of  both a death in custody and the 
erroneous detention of  an innocent German citizen, Khaled El-Masri.
The prisoner who died was a suspected militant named Gul Rahman. Rahman was captured in 
Pakistan on October 29, 2002, and taken to the Salt Pit. He died less than a month later. The 
Associated Press (AP), which first publicly identified Rahman by name, has reported that after 
he threatened guards and threw a latrine bucket at them, his hands were shackled over his head 
and he was soaked with water. The morning of  his death, the temperature was 36 degrees, and 
Rahman was in his cell naked from the waist down. CIA physicians concluded that he died of  
hypothermia. It is not known what happened to his body.26 
During the Bush administration, the Department of  Justice (DOJ) reviewed the case, but 
declined to bring charges against either “Matt,” the top CIA officer at the prison, or “Paul,” 
the Afghanistan Station Chief. (AP has identified both by their first names.) The CIA held an 
internal review board, which found that Matt had not intentionally killed Rahman, and that he 
had made requests for guidance about detainee treatment that his superiors had disregarded. 
They did not recommend disciplinary action against Paul or any higher officials. Eventually, 
Dusty Foggo, the third-highest ranking official at the agency, decided that Matt should not be 
disciplined either. According to AP, both continue to work for the CIA, and Paul had been 
promoted to head of  the Near East division.27 
Several dozen detainees have given accounts of  abuse at CIA prisons in Afghanistan, at least 
some of  which come with some form of  credible corroboration.28 Many of  these refer to a 
site near Kabul, which they call either the “Dark Prison,” or the “Prison of  Darkness,” where 
they were kept shackled to the wall in complete darkness for weeks at a time, deprived of  
adequate food, and subjected to constant loud music to deprive them of  sleep. Federal courts 
have examined these allegations in several Guantánamo detainees’ habeas cases, and, in varying 
degrees, have treated them as credible. 
In Anam v. Obama, for example, a district court judge evaluated Yemeni detainee Musa’ab Omar Al 
Madhwani’s allegations of  being mistreated for 30 days in the “dark prison” in Afghanistan, including 
being suspended in his cell by his left hand. To this day he suffers pain in his 
left arm. Petitioner also alleges guards blasted his cell with music twenty-four 
hours a day. The sole respite from the deafening noise was the screams of  
other prisoners.29
The court notes that “[t]he Government made no attempt to refute the Petitioner’s description 
of  his confinement conditions” in Afghanistan. Rather, medical records showed that when 
he was transferred to Guantánamo he weighed 104 pounds; was suffering from severe post-
traumatic stress disorder; and his low blood pressure indicated “severe dehydration that would 
normally require hospitalization in the United States.” 30 Several other prisoners captured in the 
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same raid as Madhwani have made similar allegations about their treatment in the Dark Prison 
in their habeas cases, combatant status review tribunals, or both. 
In Ali Ahmed v. Obama,31 the court found that the government could not rely on statements from a 
witness who “spent time at Bagram and the Dark Prison, and alleges that he has been tortured. …
The Government has presented no evidence to dispute the allegations of  torture at Bagram or the 
Dark Prison.” In Mohammed v. Obama, the court found that statements from Binyam Mohammed 
to interrogators were tainted based on Mohammed’s detailed allegations of  abuse in Morocco 
and the Dark Prison. Again, the government did not deny Mohammed’s allegations that he was 
subject to near-continual darkness; deprived of  sleep; and shackled in painful positions, including 
“once for eight days on end in a position that prevented him from standing or sitting.” 32
 Detainees held at other CIA prisons in Afghanistan allege similarly brutal conditions. The 
German citizen Khaled El-Masri and the Algerian Laid Saidi, two detainees apparently held 
because of  mistaken identity, have given reporters detailed accounts of  their abusive treatment 
in the Salt Pit.33 
In an interview with Task Force staff, Libyan former detainee Khalid al-Sharif  said that he was 
tortured by U.S. interrogators at a prison in Kabul, including being suffocated by water:
Al-Sharif: …And then the interrogator starts pouring the water on your face and 
your face is, of  course, covered — there’s a cover on your face. 
Q: Covered like with a cloth? 
Al-Sharif: It’s that bag that they put on the detainees. 
Q: A hood? 
[clarification by translator] The whole face. 
Q: What is it made of, is it cloth? 
Al-Sharif: Yes, it’s cloth. You can’t see from it but you can breathe and water 
could obviously come in.
Q: There’s a bag on your face and the water is poured on it?
Al-Sharif: Yes. So with the constant pouring of  water on your face you start 
suffocating. 
Q: Did you think you were going to drown?
Al-Sharif: Of  course, because you start moving your face to the right and left and 
looking to breath and you completely smothered by the water pouring on you. 
Q: How long did this go on?
Al-Sharif: Depends on the interrogation. 
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Q: How many times did it happen? They were asking questions at the same time?
Al-Sharif: While pouring the water they are asking questions.
Q: How many times?
Al-Sharif: I don’t remember. It was several times. 34
Another Libyan detainee, Mohammed Shoroeiya, has described being waterboarded by the 
CIA in Afghanistan to Human Rights Watch.35 According to Human Rights Watch, Sharif, 
Shoroeiya and three other Libyan detainees described other abuses in CIA facilities, including 
being chained to walls naked — sometimes while diapered — in pitch dark, 
windowless cells, for weeks or months at a time; being restrained in painful 
stress positions for long periods of  time, being forced into cramped spaces; 
being beaten and slammed into walls.36 
Sharif  and Shoroeiya are not among the three detainees whose waterboarding the United States 
has publicly acknowledged. 
Mohamed Farag Bashmilah, a Yemeni citizen, has described and drawn diagrams of  a facility 
in Afghanistan where he was held for months. In sworn court documents, Bashmilah alleges 
treatment that includes being shackled to the wall, deprived of  sleep, and made to wear a soiled 
diaper for weeks at a time. 37 His attorneys believe this occurred in Bagram. 
The allegations of  abuses in CIA custody at Bagram are consistent with press reports from 
late 2002 and 2003. In December 2002, The Washington Post described the CIA holding and 
interrogating high-value detainees in a makeshift prison made out of  metal shipping containers 
and razor wire at Bagram. The Post alleged based on accounts from witnesses that “captives are 
often “softened up” by MPs and U.S. Army Special Forces troops who beat them up and confine 
them in tiny rooms … blindfolded and thrown into walls, bound in painful positions, subjected 
to loud noises and deprived of  sleep.” One intelligence official told the Post, “If  you don’t 
violate someone’s human rights some of  the time, you probably aren’t doing your job.” 38 A few 
months later, The New York Times described the detention and interrogation of  Omar al-Faruq at 
the CIA facility in Bagram after his capture in Indonesia in June 2002. Officials told the Times 
it was “likely” that Faruq was kept naked with his hands and feet bound; deprived of  food, 
sleep and light; and subjected to prolonged isolation and extreme temperatures. One Western 
intelligence official said Faruq’s interrogation was “not quite torture, but about as close as you 
can get.” 39 Faruq later escaped from Bagram in 2005, and was killed in Iraq in 2006. 
The Military: The Old Rules Gone and No Clear 
Replacement
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of  U.S. coalition troops in Iraq from 
2003 to 2004, later wrote in his memoirs of  the decision not to apply Geneva in Afghanistan:
In essence, the administration had eliminated the entire doctrinal, training, 
and procedural foundations that existed for the conduct of  interrogations. It 
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was now left to individual interrogators to make the crucial decisions of  what 
techniques could be utilized. …
Having eliminated the Conventions, it was the responsibility of  the Department 
of  Defense and the U.S. Army (as the executive agent) to publish new standards 
to steer our soldiers away from techniques that could be deemed torture. The 
fact that this was not done constitutes gross negligence and dereliction of  duty.40
In an interview with Task Force staff, Rear Admiral James McPherson, the top Navy JAG from 
2004 to 2006 offered a cogent explanation of  why a directive to treat detainees in a “manner 
consistent with the principles of  Geneva” was not an adequate substitute. Military personnel, 
McPherson said, are accustomed to being told rules in simple and explicit terms. “You can’t tell 
a soldier or sailor or airman what the policy is,” he said. “You have to tell them what they can 
do and what they can’t do.” Rules of  engagement for battlefield troops can be reduced to 3 x 
5 cards that can be understood at the platoon level. “The problem with the abuses [involving 
interrogation and detention] was that there was no 3 x 5 card,” he said. “No ‘do’s” and 
‘don’ts’.” 41 
An example McPherson gave involved Navy pilots who are given explicit rules on when they 
may engage in firing on an enemy. These rules, McPherson said, are in the form of  a simple 
checklist that each combat pilot carries on his kneeboard. If  an adversary “paints” the pilot’s 
plane with radar, the instructions are to veer away. If  it happens a second time, the pilot must 
again veer away. The third time, the aircraft is “painted” with hostile radar, the pilot is supposed 
to return fire. A pilot may be disciplined for not following those rules, McPherson said, although 
the pilot is allowed to argue mitigating circumstances for any deviation. But the rules are clean 
and straightforward and discourage any improvisation or freelancing.42
Guantánamo
Some commanders, understanding soldiers’ need for clear rules, simply ordered them to comply 
with Geneva, with the exception of  some of  the heightened protections that prisoners of  war 
receive. This happened during the early days of  Guantánamo Bay. General Michael Lehnert, 
the first commander of  the prison, and Manuel Supervielle, the lead JAG at SOUTHCOM, 
had made repeated requests up the chain of  command to authorize ICRC presence in Cuba. 
With a request still pending, and the first transports of  prisoners set to leave Afghanistan, 
Supervielle simply called Geneva and invited the Red Cross himself. DOD General Counsel 
William J. Haynes later made clear that he disagreed with this decision, but Supervielle’s 
chain of  command decided it was too late to un-invite the ICRC. Supervielle also thoroughly 
analyzed each article of  the Third Geneva Convention, and recommended that U.S. troops 
comply fully with most of  them.43 
Conditions of  confinement at Camp X-Ray were austere at best; Colonel Terry Carrico, the 
head of  the military police at the camp, acknowledged to Task Force staff  that the original 
wire-mesh cells were “essentially dog pens.” But Carrico stated that he told the troops under his 
command to treat the detainees as prisoners of  war, and MPs observed interrogations to ensure 
that there was no abuse.44
In February 2002, the Department of  Defense set up a new task force, JTF-170, to run military 
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interrogations at Guantánamo. Its first commander was Major General Michael Dunlavey. 
Donald Rumsfeld had personally selected Dunlavey for the job, and told Dunlavey to report 
directly to him each week about the interrogations of  detainees Rumsfeld had described as 
“among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of  the earth.” 45 Dunlavey 
later told Philippe Sands, “No one ever said to me ‘the gloves are off.’ But I didn’t need to talk 
about the Geneva Conventions, it was clear that they didn’t apply.” 46 
Dunlavey’s subordinates included Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer, JTF-170’s head of  
intelligence; David Becker, the head of  Guantánamo’s Interrogation and Control Element 
(ICE), and Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, his staff  judge advocate. 
During the summer of  2002, a military psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychiatric technician 
were deployed to Guantánamo Bay, and told that they had been assigned to a Behavioral 
Science Consultation Team (BSCT or, colloquially, “biscuit team”) in support of  interrogations. 
In September, the three BSCT members and four interrogators received training in SERE 
techniques at Fort Bragg, N.C. On October 2, 2002, the BSCT team signed a memo requesting 
authorization to use additional interrogation techniques. “Category II techniques” included 
stress positions; the use of  isolation for up to 30 days (with the possibility of  consecutive 30-day 
periods if  authorized by the chain of  command); deprivation of  food for 12 hours; handcuffing; 
hooding; and consecutive 20-hour interrogations once a week. “Category III” techniques 
included daily 20-hour interrogations; isolation without access to medical professionals or the 
ICRC; removal of  clothing; exposure to cold or cold water; and “the use of  scenarios designed 
to convince the detainee he might experience a painful or fatal outcome.” 47 While these and 
even harsher techniques had been authorized for use against high-value detainees in CIA 
custody, this would apply to a far larger population in military custody at Guantánamo. At its 
peak in 2003, the prison in Cuba held 680 inmates.
On October 11, 2002, General Dunlavey submitted a request to SOUTHCOM’s commanding 
general, James Hill, for authorization to use Category I, II and III techniques. In addition to 
the Category III techniques listed in the BSCT memo, there was an addition, which had been 
discussed at the October 2 meeting with the CIA: “use of  a wet towel and dripping water 
to induce the misperception of  suffocation.” 48 The list of  techniques stated, however, that 
Category III techniques were only intended for use against “exceptionally resistant detainees 
… less than 3%” of  the detainee population at Guantánamo,” 49 which at that time numbered 
close to 600.50
Dunlavey’s request was accompanied by a legal memorandum by Beaver, who wrote that 
neither the Geneva Conventions nor the dictates of  the Army’s interrogation Field Manual 34-
52 were binding at Guantánamo. She wrote that the “enhanced” techniques would not violate 
the Torture Statute 
because there is a legitimate governmental objective in obtaining the 
information necessary … for the protection of  the national security of  the 
United States, its citizens, and allies. Furthermore, these methods would not be 
used for the “very malicious and sadistic purpose of  causing harm.” 51
Beaver acknowledged that the techniques might “technically” violate several articles of  the 
Uniform Code of  Military Justice. She nevertheless recommended that they be approved, and 
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suggested that “it would be advisable to have permission or immunity in advance … for military 
members utilizing these methods.” 52 
Beaver’s analysis has been widely criticized, and she herself  has stated that she did not have 
adequate time to research it:
I wanted to get something in writing. That was my game plan. I had four days. 
Dunlavey gave me just four days. But I was in Guantánamo, there wasn’t access 
to much material, books and things.53
On October 25, Hill forwarded Dunlavey’s request to the General Richard Myers, chairman of  
the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, who sent it to the individual services for comment. JAGs from all four 
services recommended against approval of  the techniques without more careful review. The 
Air Force, Army and Marine Corps JAGs warned that several techniques could subject service 
members to prosecution under the Torture Statute or the UCMJ. The Guantánamo Criminal 
Investigative Task Force (CITF), which carried out interrogations and conducted investigations 
of  potential war crimes by detainees, had similar concerns.54 
Captain Jane Dalton, the legal counsel to the Joint Chiefs, began her own review, finding 
Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s analysis “woefully inadequate.” 55 General Myers, however, 
instructed her to stop the review, telling Dalton that Haynes was concerned about too many 
people seeing the paper trail.56 On November 27, Haynes recommended to Rumsfeld that he 
approve all of  the Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique (noninjurious 
physical contact). Rumsfeld gave his sign-off  on December 2, adding the following handwritten 
note: “However, I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” 57
Haynes’ recommendation contained no legal analysis. Beaver later told Senate investigators 
that she was “shocked” that her opinion, which she expected the chain of  command to review 
thoroughly and independently, “would become the final word on interrogation policies and 
practices within the Department of  Defense.” 58
Before Rumsfeld approved them for more general use at Guantánamo, the techniques were 
being implemented against detainee number 63, Mohammed al Qahtani. Al Qahtani was 
suspected of  being the intended 20th hijacker in the September 11 attacks. In October, 
he was interrogated with military dogs present, deprived of  sleep, and placed in stress 
positions, all while in isolation.59 When this failed to yield intelligence, JTF-170 halted 
the interrogation and began developing a new “Special Interrogation Plan.” Al Qahtani 
remained in isolation, however, and, according to an FBI agent, by the end of  November 
he was “evidencing behavior consistent with extreme psychological trauma (talking to non-
existent people, reportedly hearing voices, crouching in a corner of  the cell covered with a 
sheet for hours on end).” 60 
A publicly released interrogation log, dated from November 23, 2002, to January 11, 2003, shows 
that his treatment only became harsher.61 Al Qahtani was interrogated for approximately 20 hours 
a day for seven weeks; given strip searches, including in the presence of  female interrogators; 
forced to wear women’s underwear; forcibly injected with large quantities of  IV fluid and forced 
to urinate on himself; led around on a leash; made to bark like a dog; and subjected to cold 
temperatures. Not surprisingly, his condition deteriorated further. On December 7, 2002, al 
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Qahtani’s heartbeat slowed to 35 beats per minute, and he had to be taken to the hospital for a 
CT scan of  his brain and ultrasound of  a swollen leg to check for blood clots.62 
Al Qahtani’s interrogation plan was approved by and implemented under the supervision 
of  Major General Geoffrey Miller, who replaced Dunlavey as the commanding general in 
Guantánamo in November 2002.63 
The Schmidt-Furlow Report, the official DOD investigation into allegations of  abuse at 
Guantánamo, found that “every technique employed against [al Qahtani] was legally 
permissible under the existing guidance,” but “the creative, aggressive, and persistent 
interrogation of  [al Qahtani] resulted in the cumulative effect being degrading and abusive.” It 
criticized Miller for failing to adequately supervise al Qahtani’s interrogators, which “allowed 
subordinates to make creative decisions.” The investigation nevertheless concluded that al 
Qahtani’s interrogation “did not rise to the level of  inhumane treatment.” 64
Others have strongly disagreed. Susan Crawford, the convening authority of  the Guantánamo 
military commissions during the latter part of  the Bush administration, told The Washington Post in 
January 2009 that “[w]e tortured Qahtani. … His treatment met the legal definition of  torture.” 65 
There were also contemporaneous objections to the coercive techniques from FBI agents and 
agents of  the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). In December 2002, David Brant, 
the head of  NCIS, told Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora that NCIS agents stationed in 
Guantánamo had witnessed detainees being abused.66 On December 18, Mora and Brant met 
with NCIS chief  psychologist Dr. Michael Gelles, who told them that guards and interrogators 
had started using “abusive techniques” including “physical contact, degrading treatment 
(including dressing detainees in female underwear, among other techniques), the use of  
“stress” positions, and coercive psychological procedures.” 67 Gelles said that he believed these 
techniques were unlawful in themselves, and would also open the door to worse abuses. As 
recounted by Mora in a statement to the Navy’s inspector general,
[Gelles] believed that commanders took no account of  the dangerous 
phenomenon of  “force drift.” Any force utilized to extract information would 
continue to escalate, he said. If  a person being forced to stand for hours 
decided to lie down, it probably would take force to get him to stand up again 
and stay standing. … [T]he level of  force applied against an uncooperative 
witness tends to escalate such that, if  left unchecked, force levels, to include 
torture, could be reached.68
After Mora reviewed the request for coercive techniques at Guantánamo, Beaver’s legal analysis, and 
Rumsfeld’s authorization, he met with DOD General Counsel Haynes and told him that “some of  
the authorized techniques could rise to the level of  torture.” When Haynes disagreed, Mora:
urged him to think about the techniques more closely. What did “deprivation of  
light and auditory stimuli” mean? Could a detainee be locked in a completely 
dark cell? And for how long? A month? Longer? What precisely did the 
authority to exploit phobias permit? Could a detainee be held in a coffin? 
Could phobias be applied until madness set in? Not only could individual 
techniques applied singly constitute torture, I said, but also the application 
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of  combinations of  them must surely be recognized as potentially capable of  
reaching the level of  torture.69
On January 15, 2003, Mora presented Haynes with a draft memorandum advising that most 
Category II techniques and all Category III techniques were unlawful “in that they constituted, 
at a minimum, cruel and unusual treatment and, at worst, torture,” and told him he would sign 
it unless Rumsfeld’s December 2 authorization was suspended. That day, Rumsfeld rescinded 
the authorization for Category II and III techniques, and directed Haynes to set up a “Detainee 
Interrogation Working Group” to evaluate the law and policy for DOD interrogations.70 
The group consisted of  JAGs as well as civilian attorneys at the Pentagon. Mary Walker, the 
Air Force general counsel, Mora’s counterpart for the Air Force, had volunteered to lead the 
Working Group, which would ultimately produce a report with its findings. Rumsfeld wanted 
the work to be done quickly — the group had a tight deadline. 
Jack Rives, the Deputy Air Force JAG and a member of  the Working Group, told Task 
Force staff  that its meetings were contentious. Mary Walker, the lawyer in the DOD general 
counsel’s office who headed the group, was an adamant supporter of  the harsh detention and 
interrogation regimes. She believed that Mora and the service JAG lawyers were overstepping 
their bounds in pressing their objections. They were, she said, bound to obey the directives of  
the general counsel and accept fully the opinions of  the OLC. “Haynes was frustrated that he 
couldn’t make it just go away,” Rives said. 
Rather than the JAGs, Haynes relied on advice from John Yoo, the deputy at the Office of  Legal 
Counsel who had drafted the August 2002 “torture memos” for the CIA. Over the objections 
of  the service JAGs and the legal counsel to the Joints Chiefs of  Staff, Haynes directed that the 
Working Group would be bound by Yoo’s analysis of  the laws governing interrogation. Yoo’s 
final memo, signed on March 14, 2003, adopted many of  the same conclusions as the August 
2002 memos. It also concluded that federal criminal statutes prohibiting torture, assault, and 
maiming could not constitutionally apply to the Armed Forces in wartime, because “it is for the 
president alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy.” 71 
The Working Group report was finalized and issued on April 4, 2003. In addition to the 
Army Field Manual techniques, it recommended the approval of  hooding; isolation; “sleep 
adjustment”; 20-hour interrogations; sleep deprivation “not to exceed four days in succession”; 
prolonged standing (not to exceed four hours); “mild physical contact”; “dietary manipulation”; 
“environmental manipulation,” (which could include raising or lowering the cell temperature); 
“false flag” (convincing a detainee that individuals from another country were interrogating 
him); the threat of  transfer “to a third country … [that would] subject him to torture or death”; 
forcibly shaving detainees’ hair and beards; forcing detainees to exercise; slapping the detainee 
on the face or stomach (“limited to two slaps per application, no more than two applications per 
interrogation”); nudity; and “increasing anxiety by use of  aversions,” such as the presence of  a 
dog.72 The final report was not sent to the lawyers who had objected to the techniques, nor did 
they even know it had been completed.73 
On April 16, 2003, Rumsfeld authorized a list of  techniques that included dietary manipulation, 
environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, and isolation — although the last 
was authorized only if  the SOUTHCOM commander were to “specifically determine that 
military necessity requires its use and notify me in advance.” 74 Other additional techniques 
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were available if  the commander sent a written request. Rumsfeld’s memorandum concludes 
by stating that “[n]othing in this memorandum in any way restricts your existing authority 
to maintain good order and discipline among detainees” 75 — most likely a reference to the 
practices of  Guantánamo’s Extreme Reaction Force, which forcibly removed detainees from 
cells for disciplinary action and was repeatedly accused of  using excessive force. 
In July 2003, Miller submitted a request for approval for a “Special Interrogation Plan” for 
Mohamedou Ould Slahi, which was approved by Rumsfeld on August 13. The plan included 
moving Slahi on a boat to make him believe he had been taken away from Guantánamo; the 
presence of  military working dogs; shackling Slahi to the floor and leaving him there for hours 
at a time; prolonged standing; limiting sleep to four hours every 16 hours; and isolation in an 
interrogation room designed to reduce “outside stimuli” such as light. These techniques were 
designed to show Slahi that “the rules have changed and nobody knows he is there.” 76 
Interrogators apparently began implementing the plan before securing formal approval. On 
August 2, an interrogator told Slahi he would “very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His 
very existence will become erased. … [N]o one will know what happened to him and eventually, 
no one will care.” Slahi was also shown a letter falsely stating that his mother had been detained, 
and that if  she did not cooperate with interrogators she might be transferred to Guantánamo.77 
On August 7, Slahi told his interrogator that he would cooperate fully.78 Nonetheless, interrogators 
continued to carry out the interrogation plan through September and October. The Senate 
Armed Services Committee uncovered documents suggesting that interrogators eventually 
became concerned about Slahi’s mental state. On October 17, an interrogator emailed a BSCT 
psychologist that Slahi “told me he is ‘hearing voices’ now. … He is worried as he knows this 
is not normal. … [I]s this something that happens to people who have little external stimulus 
such as daylight, human interaction etc???? Seems a little creepy.” 79 A Guantánamo prosecutor, 
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Couch, eventually refused to prosecute Slahi because he concluded that 
his statements to interrogators were tainted by torture and coercion.80 
Two other “Special Interrogation Plans” for Guantánamo detainees are referenced in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee’s Investigation, but virtually all details about them are 
redacted and it is unclear if  they were implemented.81 
The use of  harsh tactics was not restricted to the “Special Interrogation Plans,” however. 
Detainees’ allegations of  brutal treatment have been corroborated by the FBI and the ICRC’s 
continued objections to the treatment of  detainees at Guantánamo. An FBI agent sent the 
following email to a superior on August 2, 2004, describing an incident she had witnessed earlier:
On a couple of  occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained 
hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food or water. Most 
times they had urinated or defecated on themselves and had been left there for 
18, 24 hours or more. On one occasion, the air conditioning had been turned 
down so far and the temperature was so cold in the room that the barefooted 
detainee was shaking with cold. When I asked the (military police) what was 
going on I was told that interrogators from the day prior had ordered this 
treatment and the detainee was not to be moved.82 
385
Appendix 2 - Memo in Support of Finding #2
The Constitution Project
A second FBI agent reported a detainee being short-shackled for 12 hours after an 
interrogation. The Schmidt-Furlow Report said it could not corroborate these allegations. This 
conclusion, however, may have overlooked an interview included in the annexes to the report, in 
which an operations offer stated 
The detainee might be left in the booth for an extended period of  time after 
interrogations awaiting MPs. The short chain was done as a control measure. 
The chain was close to the floor. The interrogator would ask the MPs to put the 
detainee in that position.83
The interviewee did not specify how long the “extended” period was. 
After a June 2004 visit to the camp, the Red Cross charged in a confidential report obtained by 
The New York Times that detainees in Guantánamo were being subjected to a systematic effort to 
break them, through 
humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, use of  forced 
positions. … The construction of  such a system, whose stated purpose is the 
production of  intelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional 
system of  cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of  torture.
The ICRC had criticized interrogation methods before, but said that had grown “more 
repressive and refined” over time.84
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, there was less legal guidance, and less high-level involvement. But it was 
there that replacement of  the Geneva Conventions’ detailed requirements with an ill-defined 
“humane treatment” standard proved most destructive. By the time that Michael Gelles and 
Alberto Mora warned the Pentagon about “force drift” in December 2002, it had already lead 
to pervasive abuse and two deaths in custody. 
In December 2002, two Afghans, named Dilawar and Habibullah, were beaten to death at 
Bagram Air Base, the United States’ largest detention facility in Afghanistan. In each case, the 
beating was delivered as the men were cuffed with their hands high so they could not sleep. In 
each case, there is evidence that they were being “sleep adjusted” at the request of  interrogators, 
and that the soldiers who suspended them from the ceiling believed they were using an 
authorized technique. 
The autopsy showed that the men had been beaten on their legs, and the investigation 
uncovered that they had been kneed by the MPs repeatedly. In Habibullah’s case, the beating 
dislodged a blood clot that may have formed partially as a result of  his being forced to stand 
for an extended period.85 Angela Birt, who investigated the case for the Army’s Criminal 
Investigative Division (CID), stated in an interview with Task Force staff, 
they chained them in a standing position. And doing that you can cause 
deep vein thrombosis, just like you can get on an aircraft, and that was one 
contributing things that killed one of  the detainees. One of  them had very 
serious thrombosis in his lower legs.86 
386
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
According to the coroners who examined Dilawar’s body, the beatings had “pulpified” his legs, 
which would likely have needed to be amputated had he survived. Dilawar had actually been 
approved for release at the time of  his death.87 By the time of  his final interrogation, his legs 
had been kicked repeatedly as he hung from the doorway, and he could barely walk. He was 
delirious, and believed his wife had died and that her ghost had come to the interrogation cell.88 
Joshua Claus was one of  the interrogators, and he was convicted for his conduct, which included 
grabbing Dilawar by the collar and yanking his head straight, forcing him to drink water, and 
ramming his hood down on his head. In an interview with Task Force staff, Claus asserted that 
his commanding officer, Captain Carolyn Wood, had repeatedly asked for guidance about how to 
treat detainees and received no answers:
We had no lines. And we asked thousands of  times. Where are our lines? Define 
it! Captain Wood would ask that once a week. Ok, what’s our rules? Where are 
our boundaries. You are saying these don’t matter but what are the new ones?…
I remember Captain Wood and Sgt. Loring in our meetings saying: OK, we have 
no guidelines but we are going to try to get some for you. And she’d go to those 
meetings. That’s why JAG would come through. We would randomly see her 
wandering through with eagles, stars, and in suits and ties. And you are like, who 
are you people? Please give us something we could use.
So I don’t understand why people kept bitching at us saying we are evil. 89
The initial investigation of  the deaths was abortive. The MPs convinced the first set of  criminal 
investigators that the blows they’d dealt to the legs of  Dilawar and Habibullah were completely 
authorized and routine. Angela Birt was at the Criminal Investigative Division and told Task Force 
staff  she was shocked that the investigators didn’t pursue it at first. 
I’ll be really candid. [The investigators] drank the Kool-Aid. They wrote reports 
saying these were authorized use of  force and that these were accidental deaths. 
… They really believed it was authorized, and I could never understand where 
they got that from. …
To me it was a great big billboard: “Murder, Murder, Murder!” And it was on the 
death certificate: Homicide. And I didn’t understand how we got from there to 
“Oh, it was just an accident.” You don’t accidentally hang someone from a ceiling 
and beat them to death.90
Eventually a serious investigation into the deaths led to 27 people being charged for abusing 
Dilawar, Habibullah, and other Bagram prisoners. But the longest sentence was for Claus, who 
received a total of  five months after pleading guilty. Private William Brand, the MP who allegedly 
caused Dilawar’s death by kneeing him repeatedly in the thigh, was reduced in rank.91 
The sentences were so low in part because of  testimony from multiple witnesses corroborating 
the defendants’ claims that there were no clear rules on how soldiers could treat “persons under 
control” in Afghanistan, and many of  the abusive techniques were common knowledge. Sergeant 
Betty Jones, a soldier who often passed through the prison but was not assigned as a guard or 
interrogator, said in a sworn statement to military investigators that:
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when they would first bring the PUC’s [persons under control] in, the detainees 
were thrown on the floor with their feet and hands bound and hoods and they 
would let the dogs with muzzles walk on the detainees with the dogs growling in 
their ear. It was a big joke.92
Asked who, besides those implicated in the deaths, was aware of  the use of  sleep deprivation, 
standing restraints, and “peroneal strikes,” Jones replied:
Everybody. People would come to the prison all the time. Everyone at Bagram 
wanted to see the prison. Everyone that is anyone went through the facility at one 
time or another.93 
Jones said that she had directly witnessed prisoners with their arms handcuffed over their heads 
for “hours and hours,” but had only heard from another soldier about detainees being beaten. She 
reported this before the deaths, but her commander “told me to stay out of  the prison because it 
was none of  my business.” 94 
Another Sergeant, Marianne Plummer, testified that 
When they first came in, it was a form of  punishment, but it was also used to 
keep them awake, make sure they stood up, and MI [Military Intelligence]
directed that we’d have them stand and be chained.95
Plummer said it was “standard procedure” to imprison detainees in the isolation cells when they 
first came to the facility, and chain them to the ceiling:
[T]he chaining was over the head with arms outstretched some. The chaining 
could have had the hands above the head. It was two positions. It was whoever 
chained them up who made the decision how the hands would be placed.96
Major Jeff  Bovarnick, the staff  judge advocate stationed there, told military investigators that sleep 
deprivation, enforced by shackling detainees in a standing position, was authorized at Bagram: 
[P]eople were consistently shackled to the airlock, even during the ICRC visits. 
No effort was made to hide it. They were restrained with their hands cuffed 
together and the cuffs were affixed to the airlock at about waist level.97
Asked what the legal justification was for this, Bovarnick replied that Army Regulation 190-8, which 
contains detailed prohibitions against mistreatment of  detainees, did not apply because of  the 
decision that the detainees were unprotected under the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC argued 
that violated the administration’s stated policy of  humane treatment, particularly an incident where 
a prisoner “was kept chained to the ceiling for over a day.” Bovarnick said that the military police 
captain, Christopher Beiring, denied the allegation about chaining to the ceiling, and he did not 
believe chaining the hands at waist level or eye level was “inhumane.” He stated that Colonel David 
Hayden, the leading staff  judge advocate in Afghanistan, agreed with this conclusion.98 
Hayden, in a video obtained by documentary filmmaker Alex Gibney, says the following about the 
prisoners’ deaths:
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This is not a hotel. This is not a place for them to get fat, lazy and happy. … 
There was an approved technique for the MPs when somebody was a difficult 
prisoner that you could hit them on the legs. It was supposedly considered not 
a lethal blow. Over two days, everybody’s hitting you in the legs, it can cause 
some severe problems.99 
In 2004, military investigators asked Hayden if  the findings of  Dilawar’s and Habibullah’s 
autopsies showed that “excessive force” was used. Hayden replied that based on what the first 
CID agents told him, 
I can’t say that. If  you wanted to call anything excessive it would have been the 
repeated blows over time. However, at the time, it was reasonable to conclude 
… that repetitive administration of  legitimate force resulted in all the injuries 
we saw.100
A January 24, 2003 memo from Lieutenant Robert Cotell, the deputy staff  judge advocate 
for Afghanistan to the DOD Working Group describes techniques that had previously been 
used in Afghanistan, including: (1) sleep “adjustment,” defined as “four hours of  sleep every 
24 hours, not necessarily consecutive”; (2) up to 96 hours of  isolation; (3) the use of  “safety 
positions”; (4) hooding during interrogation; (5) removal of  light and sound; (6) use of  an 
individual’s fears; (7) the use of  female interrogators to create “discomfort”; and (8) mild 
physical contact.101 
It is not clear exactly where the use of  shackling to the ceiling to enforce sleep deprivation 
originated. Birt believed that the MPs in the 377th were simply “lazy” and wanted to avoid 
having to check to make sure the detainees were awake. But Marianne Plummer testified 
that military intelligence directed the MPs to do it. The technique is also strikingly similar to 
descriptions of  prisoners being shackled in standing positions for extended periods at CIA 
facilities in Afghanistan, one of  which was located at Bagram Air Base. The court-martial 
documents demonstrate that there was some contact between the CIA and the interrogators 
from the 519th. One interrogator, Jennifer Higginbotham, testified that interrogators from 
the military and “Other Governmental Agencies” would attend daily briefings together, and 
sometimes discussed specific interrogation techniques.102
Iraq
In Iraq, unlike Afghanistan and Guantánamo, the Geneva Conventions were acknowledged 
to provide some protections. On May 7, 2004, shortly after photographs of  guards abusing 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib became public, Rumsfeld testified to Congress that soldiers’ 
“instructions are to, in the case of  Iraq, adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva 
Conventions apply to all of  the individuals there in one way or another.” 103
This was not a complete picture, however. First, many prisoners in Iraq were interrogated by the 
CIA or by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) troops, who did not answer to the same 
chain of  command as the regular military and did not consider themselves bound by Geneva. 
Second, even among the regular military, there was widespread and pervasive confusion as to 
whether the Geneva Conventions applied and what protections they provided.
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Special Forces and “Other Government Agencies”
Many high-value detainees in Iraq were interrogated by a JSOC task force, which over time was 
known as Task Force 20, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26, and Task Force 145. The task force 
was originally based at a facility outside the Baghdad International Airport, known as “Camp 
Nama.” It was not under the authority of  General Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander of  
U.S. troops in Iraq; Sanchez later said he did not even know what techniques the task force was 
authorized to use. An interrogator based at Camp Nama in the first half  of  2004 described to 
Human Rights Watch his unusual chain of  command:
I didn’t have any contact with my normal uniformed battalion. [Task Force 
121/6-26] was my new chain of  command for several months. …  There was 
no rank as far as team member or interrogative analyst and so forth. Everybody 
was in civilian clothes. There was no rank.104
The interrogator said there was a colonel who was “actually in charge of  this,” but 
We called the colonel by his first name, called the sergeant major by his first 
name. …I couldn’t tell you the sergeant major’s last name if  I tried. Same with 
the colonel. A lot of  my fellow interrogators, I didn’t know their last names 
either. … [W]hen you asked someone their name they don’t offer up the last 
name. … [M]ore often than not, when they gave you their name it probably 
wasn’t their real name anyway.
In addition to Special Forces personnel, the interrogator said, he worked with the CIA, who 
were stationed at another building nearby. Because of  the level of  secrecy, “[w]e knew that we 
were only a couple steps removed from the Pentagon, but it was a little unclear, especially to the 
interrogators who weren’t really part of  that task force.” 105 
According to the DOD inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the task 
force’s written standard operating procedures (SOPs) authorized sleep deprivation, loud music, stress 
positions, “light control,” and the use of  military dogs. Although not in the written SOPs, nudity was 
also commonly used, with the knowledge of  the task force’s commander and legal advisor.106
In the summer of  2003, Brigadier General Lyle Koenig, then the head of  the task force, asked 
Colonel Randy Moulton, the commander of  the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), for 
help with interrogation. Moulton had been corresponding with Bruce Jessen and others about 
the possibility of  using SERE techniques against detainees since February of  2002.107
JPRA sent a team of  three people led by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kleinman, its senior 
intelligence officer. On September 6, Kleinman “walked into an interrogation room all painted 
black.” A detainee was kneeling on the floor, and a Special Forces interrogator was asking him 
questions, and slapping his face with every response. Kleinman stopped the interrogation and 
told the interrogator it was a violation of  the Geneva Conventions. Kleinman later stopped 
interrogators from implementing a plan that called for sleep deprivation and holding a detainee 
in stress positions for hours at a time, and informed Moulton and the task force commander of  
what he had done. 108 
But Moulton, after consulting with task force commander, told Kleinman that the JPRA team 
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was authorized to use the full range of  SERE techniques on prisoners, including “walling, sleep 
deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach 
slaps, and finger pokes to the chest, space/time disorientation, [and] white noise.)” 109 
Kleinman spoke repeatedly to the special operations task force commander and legal advisor, 
and got the impression they agreed with his concerns and his decision to refuse to participate 
in abuse, but “it seemed to fall into a void. … [T]here were never any orders issued.” 110 After 
one Army Ranger sharpened a knife near his face, and warned him not to sleep too soundly, 
Kleinman wondered if  his life was in danger.111 
Shortly before Kleinman’s team visited Iraq, the task force legal advisor expressed similar 
concerns to Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver. As summarized by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee’s Report:
According to LTC Beaver the SMU TF legal advisor raised concerns with 
her about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during 
interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. He told her 
he was “risking his life” by talking to her about these issues.112
Many other sources have made similar allegations about the task force’s overt noncompliance 
with the Geneva Conventions, and hostility to those who reported violations. Retired Colonel 
Stuart Herrington learned of  similar allegations in December 2003, when he visited U.S. 
interrogation facilities in Iraq at the request of  General Barbara Fast. Herrington provided 
(TCP) Task Force staff  with a copy of  his report, which states that his team learned from an 
officer at the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) detention and interrogation facility (JIDC) at Baghdad 
airport that
prisoners arriving at his facility who had been captured by Task Force 121 showed 
signs of  having been mistreated (beaten) by their captors. … Detainees captured 
by TF 121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note 
that “detainee shows signs of  having been beaten.”… I asked the officer if  he had 
reported this problem. He replied that “Everyone knows about it.” 113 
Herrington said he had heard similar allegations from a former ISG JIDC employee before 
traveling to Iraq. The same employee told investigators in August 2004 that “by mid-June 2003, 
a pattern of  reports of  abuse of  prisoners” by the task force “was coming to me” from the 
interrogators at Camp Cropper.114 The ISG employee had relayed these reports to his superiors, 
but nothing came of  them. According to Herrington, his source eventually “gave up and asked 
to leave. Asked to depart theater. He didn’t want to have anything do with it.” 115
Herrington’s report also describes discussions with “an interagency representative,” most likely 
from the CIA, who told him that the agency had been directed not to have contact with Task 
Force 121’s interrogation facility.116 This is consistent with a later New York Times report that the 
CIA had barred its personnel from Camp Nama in August 2003. 117 Herrington concluded,  
“[I]t seems clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of  detainees.” 118
In March or April 2004, the CJTF-7 legal advisor’s office wrote to Herrington that they had 
investigated his sources’ allegations and found no evidence of  mistreatment. Herrington said 
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he expressed “blunt dismay” and incredulity at this conclusion, and said his source “could be 
excused for thinking this is a cover-up.” 119  
The Camp Nama interrogator who spoke to Human Rights Watch, meanwhile, had witnessed 
several weeks of  abuses. He and several colleagues had gone to the colonel in charge of  the 
facility, and told him they were “uneasy” with the detainees’ treatment:
And within a couple hours a team of  two JAG officers, JAG lawyers, came and 
gave us a couple hours slide show on why this is necessary, why this is legal, 
they’re enemy combatants, they’re not POWs, and so we can do all this stuff  to 
them and so forth. … And then they went on to the actual treatment itself  … 
that’s not inhumane because they’re able to rebound from it. And they claim no 
lasting mental effects or physical marks or anything, or permanent damage of  
any kind, so it’s not inhumane.120
The interrogator said that neither the ICRC nor the Army’s Criminal Investigative Division 
had access to Camp Nama. Theoretically, he could have gone to his normal unit’s chain of  
command and reported to CID, but he had been told on his first day at the camp that he was 
not allowed to disclose anything that happened at the Special Forces facility to his normal 
command.121 According to Angela Birt, if  he had reported to Army CID there was little they 
could have done:
[A]ny investigations that came out of  [JSOC facilities] were referred to a 
couple of  agents embedded with the folks at Fort Bragg. And they operate and 
work directly for them. And as soon as we saw something visible to us that 
belonged to them we had to hand it over. You don’t see it again. We’d hear 
about it from other detainees but as soon as we referred something it went into 
a black hole and we never saw it again.122 
But the reports of  abuse kept coming. According to The New York Times, an FBI agent on June 
25, 2004, emailed his superiors and alleged that a detainee captured by Task Force 6-26 alleged 
torture, and had suspicious burn marks on his body.123 The same day, Vice Admiral Lowell 
Jacoby wrote to Undersecretary of  Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, alleging that 
two Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel had observed prisoners arriving at a detention 
facility “with burn marks on their backs. Some have bruises, and some have complained of  
kidney pain.” A DIA interrogator had also witnessed “TF 6-26 officers punch a prisoner in 
the face to the point the individual needed medical attention.” When DIA personnel objected, 
task force members confiscated their keys, confiscated their photographs of  detainees’ injuries, 
forbade them from leaving the compound, and threatened them.124
The next day, Cambone wrote a handwritten note on Jacoby’s report to his deputy, Lieutenant 
General William G. Boykin, ordering him to “[g]et to the bottom of  this immediately. This is not 
acceptable.” 125 The results of  Boykin’s review have never been made public, but a 2006 inspector 
general’s report (OIG report) suggests that DOD leadership ultimately sided with the Special 
Forces task force. The OIG report states that “the disagreements between the DIA and special 
mission units were not reconciled to the benefit of  all those conducting interrogation operations in 
Iraq.” Instead, the DOD seems to have concluded that the problem was “disaffected interrogators 
from DIA who were not prepared for the demanding and exacting pace of  operations.” 126
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The Special Mission Unit task forces and the CIA did not confine their activities to Camp 
Nama. They also operated at different locations around Iraq, and are connected to several 
detainees’ deaths in detention, including Dilar Dababa, Manadel al-Jamadi, Abed Hamed 
Mowhoush, and Abdul Jameel. 
Manadel al-Jamadi is sometimes called the “Ice Man,” because there are notorious 
photographs of  Abu Ghraib guards Sabrina Harman and Charles Graner posing with his ice-
packed corpse. On November 4, 2003, he was arrested by a team of  Navy SEALs and CIA 
agents. Al-Jamadi struggled violently; even after he was subdued he was reportedly struck and 
“body slammed into the back of  a Humvee.” He was interrogated in a CIA facility, and then 
driven to Abu Ghraib.127 
Several of  the military police present when al-Jamadi was arrived have spoken to government 
investigators and journalists about what happened next. One MP, Jason Kenner, told military 
investigators that al-Jamadi was naked from the waist down when he arrived at the prison, with 
a bag over his head. Two CIA personnel (whom guards referred to as “OGA,” an abbreviation 
for “Other Government Agency”), an interrogator and a translator, asked Kenner and another 
MP to take him to tier one. Kenner said they placed al-Jamadi in an orange jumpsuit and steel 
handcuffs, which was “common procedure” for CIA prisoners, and
walked the prisoner to the shower room on Tier 1B. … The OGA personnel 
followed behind us. The interrogator told us that he did not want the prisoner 
to sit down and wanted him shackled to the wall. I got some leg irons and 
shackled the prisoner to the wall by attaching one end of  the leg irons to the 
bars on the window and the other end to the prisoner’s handcuffs.128
The window was five feet off  the ground. According to Kenner and another MP, Dennis 
Stevanus, there was enough slack that al-Jamadi could stand with his legs supporting his weight, 
but not if  he slumped forward or kneeled. The MPs exited the shower room, leaving al-Jamadi 
with CIA interrogator Mark Swanner and a contract interrogator.129 
According to a National Public Radio (NPR) report, the CIA personnel involved told 
investigators that al-Jamadi had been talking “about the city of  Mosul and hating Americans, 
when all of  a sudden he dropped, falling to at least one knee. … [T]hey immediately called for 
a medic.” 130 
The MPs contradicted this. Walter Diaz stated that Swanner had called the MPs in, and asked them 
to re-shackle al-Jamadi’s hands higher on the window frame, even though his arms were already
almost literally coming out of  his sockets. I mean, that’s how bad he was 
hanging. The OGA guy, he was kind of  calm. He was sitting down the whole 
time. He was, like, “Yeah, you know, he just don’t want to cooperate. I think 
you should lift him a little higher.” 131 
Diaz asked for help from two other MPs, Stevanus and Jeffrey Frost, to lift al-Jamadi up and 
re-fasten the handcuffs. Frost said that Swanner assured them the detainee was just “playing 
possum,” 132 but when they released him,
[h]e didn’t stand up. His arms just kept on bending at this awkward — not 
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awkward position, but it was — you know, I was almost waiting for a bone to 
break or something and just thinking, you know, this guy — he’s really good at 
playing ’possum.133
The MPs removed al-Jamadi’s hood, and realized that he was dead. When they lowered him 
to the floor, according to Frost, “blood came gushing out of  his nose and mouth, as if  a faucet 
had been turned on.” 134 The military autopsy classified the death as a homicide, caused by 
“compromised respiration” and “blunt force injuries” to the head and torso, including several 
broken ribs. Other pathologists who reviewed the autopsy report believed that what was fatal 
was the combination of  the broken ribs and al-Jamadi’s position. Dr. Michael Baden, the chief  
forensic examiner for the New York State police, told Jane Mayer, “You don’t die from broken 
ribs. But if  he had been hung up in this way and had broken ribs, that’s different. … [A]sphyxia 
is what he died from — as in a crucifixion.” 135 
Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, a Navy SEAL from the unit that captured al-Jamadi was court-
martialed, but acquitted based on evidence that he did not cause al-Jamadi’s death. No CIA officer 
was ever charged. According to AP, a grand jury was convened, and focused not on Swanner 
but on the role of  a former CIA officer named Steve Stormoen, who ran the agency’s “detainee 
exploitation cell” at Abu Ghraib. The AP reported that Stormoen had processed al-Jamadi into 
Abu Ghraib, but was not present in the room where he died, and that he had been reprimanded 
after an internal CIA probe for permitting agents to “ghost” prisoners, i.e., detain them without 
registering them or acknowledging their identity, without headquarters authorization. The grand 
jury also reportedly heard testimony about a CIA employee nicknamed “Chili,” who was at Abu 
Ghraib the day al-Jamadi died and still works for the agency.136 
But the grand jury did not lead to any indictments, and it is unclear whether the Department 
of  Justice ever proposed any indictments. On August 30, 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder 
released a statement that no charges would be brought because “the admissible evidence would 
not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 137 The DOJ 
declined to elaborate further, or respond to questions about the investigation.
Charles Graner, the soldier who received the longest prison sentence for abusing prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib, spoke to Army investigators about “Chili” in April 2005. Graner said that Chili 
had said he was an FBI contract worker, but “lo and behold he ends up being the interrogator 
over the analyst that the fellow in the shower dies with.” 138 He also described another incident 
where Chili and his colleagues were interviewing a detainee in the back stairwell, and “drug him 
back unconscious to his cell.” 139 
The MPs’ handwritten log books corroborate Graner’s allegations about CIA involvement in 
interrogation, though they use euphemisms. The entry that, according to Graner, corresponded 
to the detainee being carried unconscious from the stairwell reads simply: “OGA in cell 13 was 
taken away will be taken off  of  the count at this time.” 140 The only record of  al-Jamadi’s death 
is an entry stating: “Shift change Normal relief  1 OGA in IB shower not to be used until OGA 
is moved out.” 141
One entry from November 11, 2003 is more explicit, stating:
The 4 new OGA’s are in 2, 4, 6, and 8 they are to have no contact with each 
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other or anyone else — they are not to sleep or sit down until authorized by OGA 
personnel also we were informed that all four are neither hungry nor thirsty.142
Walter Diaz also reported that the CIA routinely interrogated “ghost prisoners” at Abu Ghraib. 
According to Diaz, the agency “would bring in people all the time to interview them. We had 
one wing, Tier One Alpha, reserved for the O.G.A. They’d have maybe twenty people there at 
a time.” Diaz said, “We, as soldiers, didn’t get involved. We’d lock the door for them and leave. 
We didn’t know what they were doing,” but “we heard a lot of  screaming.” 143 
Major General Antonio Taguba and Major General George Fay confirmed that MPs held 
“ghost detainees” for the CIA. Taguba reported that one MP unit had helped hide detainees 
from a visiting Red Cross survey team.144 Fay found that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan 
“became fascinated with the ‘Other Government Agencies,’ a term used mostly to mean 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),” and “allowed OGA to do interrogations without the 
presence of  Army personnel.” 145
In addition to the criminal investigation, the CIA’s Office of  the Inspector General (OIG) 
investigated al-Jamadi’s killing before the case was referred to DOJ. But the OIG report itself  
remains classified, and courts have ruled that the CIA is not required to disclose it under the 
Freedom of  Information Act. 
The Army CID file on al-Jamadi’s death does provide some clues as to the CIA OIG’s 
conclusions. According to the CID file, OIG personnel “advised their investigation had revealed 
that the CIA personnel involved in the interrogation of  [al-Jamadi] had not been entirely 
truthful in their accounts of  the incident, but declined to provide specifics.” 146 One individual 
whom the CIA OIG interviewed “had admitted removing the sand bag that was used to hood 
[al-Jamadi],” and his explanation for its removal was “not believable.” 147 The individual in 
question claimed that he had taken the bag to keep it secure in the event of  an investigation, 
and had given it to a security officer, but “further information had not corroborated this 
statement.” 148 The hood was never recovered.
On November 10, less than one week after Manadel al-Jamadi’s death, former General Abed 
Hamed Mowhoush turned himself  in to U.S. troops at Forward Operating Base Tiger near 
the border with Syria. On November 21, he was moved to a temporary detention facility in an 
old train station, known as the “Blacksmith Hotel.” Chief  Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, a 
former SERE trainer, took charge of  Mowhoush’s interrogation. 
On November 24, according to classified documents obtained by The Washington Post, 
Mowhoush was interrogated by a CIA operative referred to as “OGA Brian” and a team of  
Iraqi paramilitaries working for the CIA, known as “the Scorpions.” The Iraqis “were hitting 
the detainee with fists, a club, and a length of  rubber hose.” 149 The documents state that this 
was not uncommon treatment for uncooperative detainees at the Blacksmith Hotel.150 
At Welshofer’s court-martial, the CIA’s role in Mowhoush’s interrogation was discussed only 
obliquely. One witness who testified at the court-martial did so anonymously and behind a tarp, 
to conceal his identity from the public and press.151 At one point a defense attorney asked the 
witness if  he had reported something “to the CIA,” but then stopped himself  and apologized to 
the judge for the reference to the agency.152
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Several witnesses did testify about the November 24 interrogation. Specialist Jerry Loper, also 
testifying under a grant of  immunity, said that he had escorted Mowhoush to the interrogation 
room and waited outside. While waiting, “I heard loud thuds and screams. It sounded like he 
was being beaten.” When Mowhoush was brought out half  an hour to an hour afterwards, “[h]is 
hands were severely swollen, and he couldn’t walk. His breathing was labored. … It took five of  us 
to get him back.”153 Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams gave a very similar account to Loper’s.154
Todd Sonnek, a chief  warrant officer with the Army Special Forces unit Operational 
Detachment Alpha, testified that Welshofer had brought in Special Forces troops, civilians, 
and Iraqis to interview Mowhoush with a “fear-up” technique, and supplied the Iraqis with 
the questions to ask. Sonnek testified that “from start to finish, this was Chief  Welshofer’s 
interrogation,” though he acknowledged that Welshofer was not actually the one asking the 
questions and did not have “supervisory or operational control over the Iraqis.” Sonnek claimed 
that Mowhoush had tried to “strike out” and needed to be subdued, and denied that Mowhoush 
was unable to walk unassisted afterwards.155 
Testifying in his own defense, Welshofer acknowledged that he was present for the November 24 
incident but denied he was in control of  it:
5 minutes into his interrogation, when he continued to deny, deny, deny, I 
noticed other people in the hallway. … I passed control of  the interrogation over 
to these individuals in the hallway. It is not correct that I was in control of  the 
interrogation and that the others were just assisting me. I did not feel I had any 
command control over those people. … When the general left the room, it was 
under his own power. I saw what look like a straight piece of  radiator hose, a 
little bit softer material but of  the same diameter, as well as a piece of  something 
like insulation that might go around a door, only it was thicker and hollow on the 
inside with a camouflage net pole down in one end of  it. These devices were used 
to beat the general. There were also some kicks, some slaps.156 
 CIA Director George Tenet refers in his memoirs to “the Agency-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary 
group known as ‘the Scorpions,’ ” 157 but details of  their involvement with Mowhoush’s death 
have not been declassified. The CIA inspector general’s office prepared a report on Mowhoush’s 
death, but that also remains classified. 
 “OGA” and the Scorpions do not appear to have directly caused Mowhoush’s death. According 
to court-martial testimony, on November 26, Mowhoush was having obvious breathing 
difficulties at the beginning of  an interrogation, but Welshofer nonetheless put him into a 
sleeping bag, and wrapped it in a cord to hold it in place. (Welshofer said that Mowhoush 
did not appear to require medical assistance, and he concluded he was using a “resistance 
technique” of  “acting excessively fatigued.”) Welshofer asked Mowhoush questions while sitting 
on his chest, and sometimes obstructing his nose or mouth.158 Mowhoush died soon after of  
“asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression,” according to the autopsy report.159 
Welshofer was convicted of  negligent homicide, but was sentenced to only two months of  
confinement to barracks. This was in part because of  evidence that his commanding officers 
knew of  the sleeping bag technique and allowed him to use it on a number of  detainees. They 
also condoned a similar technique that involved placing detainees in wall lockers.160 
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Welshofer and his unit continued to use “close confinement” after Mowhoush’s death. Major 
Christopher Layton testified that while investigating the homicide in mid-January 2004, he had 
traveled to Forward Operating Base Rifles near Al Asad, where Welshofer’s unit was based. 
He saw a sleeping bag and wall lockers in an interrogation room there.161 Another witness, 
Gerald Pratt, said that after Mowhoush’s death, CID took the original sleeping bag, but “Chief  
Welshofer procured another one. A detainee came in with a sleeping bag, and Chief  got it.” 162 
Welshofer has denied that his actions caused Mowhoush’s death. In a 2009 interview with 
CBS, he said he only did what was necessary: “I helped save soldiers lives. I’m 100 percent 
convinced of  that.” 163
Welshofer’s unit, the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, operated out of  Forward Operating 
Base Rifles in Al Asad. Another detainee, 47-year-old Abdul Jameel, died there on January 9, 
2004. According to Jameel’s autopsy, his death was a homicide, caused by 
blunt force injuries and asphyxia. … According to the investigative report 
provided by U.S. Army CID, the decedent was shackled to the top of  a 
doorframe with a gag in his mouth at the time he lost consciousness and 
became pulseless.
The severe blunt force injuries, the hanging position, and the obstruction of  the 
oral cavity with a gag contributed to this individual’s death.164 
Another document summarizing the autopsy report describes the circumstances of  death as: 
“Q by OGA, gagged in standing restraint.” 165 In addition to being gagged and shackled, the 
detainee had suffered “the fracturing of  most of  his ribs and multiple fractures of  some of  his 
ribs,” and a fractured hyoid bone.166
CID investigators concluded that a series of  incidents had contributed to Jameel’s death. Jameel 
was captured by Operational Detachment Alpha 525 (ODA 525) of  the 5th Special Forces 
Group on January 4, 2004. CID found that one soldier had kicked Jameel in the chest several 
times after he was already restrained in zip-ties. 
On January 6, 2004, guards and other detainees saw masked interrogators take Jameel out for 
interrogation. He returned with severe bruises on his abdomen, and told other detainees and guards 
that he had been beaten.167 One detainee said Jameel had difficulty breathing. Three soldiers in 
ODA 525 and one interpreter claimed that Jameel had attacked them, attempted to grab one of  
their weapons during interrogation, and they had been forced to strike him repeatedly for one to two 
minutes in order to subdue him because “[h]e was strong and fought back,” demonstrating “extreme 
resistance.” 168 CID investigators noted this conflicted with other descriptions of  Jameel as appearing 
to be frail and in poor health.169 The summary of  Jameel’s interrogation on January 6 did not 
mention any struggle, and CID concluded that the interrogators’ account of  the incident could not 
credibly account for the extent of  Jameel’s injuries.170 
At approximately 2 am on January 9, Jameel allegedly tried to escape from the isolation/sleep 
deprivation area. After he was re-captured, a soldier in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Unit used an 
MP baton to force Jameel to a standing position, by placing the baton under Jameel’s chin and 
lifting. CID investigators concluded that this had broken Jameel’s hyoid bone, an injury that 
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directly contributed to his death. CID also found that several soldiers had conspired to give a 
false account of  the details of  Jameel’s attempted escape.171 
Finally, shortly after 7 am on January 9, Jameel was “repeatedly ordered … to stand as part 
of  a mass punishment” of  detainees for talking.172 Jameel did not obey. According to military 
doctors, based on the number and manner of  Jameel’s broken ribs and other injuries, he “would 
have been in great pain and would have had great difficulty breathing and would not have been 
able to walk.” 173 Soldiers handcuffed him to the door frame of  his cell in a standing position, 
and forced a gag into his mouth after he “refused to stop making noises.” 174 Five minutes later, 
he was dead.175 
No one was ever prosecuted for Jameel’s death, despite criminal investigators’ recommendation 
of  charges against 11 soldiers. According to an Army document,
The command, with the assistance of  advice of  command legal counsel, 
determined that the detainee died as a result of  lawful applications of  force in 
response to repeated aggression and misconduct by the detainee.176 
The use of  stress positions and “close confinement” by Special Forces and the CIA continued 
into mid-2004, and possibly beyond. An investigation into Special Forces task forces’ treatment 
of  detainees by General Richard Formica documented one incident in April or May 2004, in 
which detainees were held for periods between two and seven days in “small cells measuring 20 
inches (wide) x 4 feet (high) x 4 feet (deep),” which did not provide enough room “to lie down or 
stand up. They were removed from the cells periodically for latrine breaks, to be washed, and for 
interrogations,” and were “not kept in the cells for 72 continuous hours.” The same detainees 
were sometimes kept naked, “blindfolded, sometimes with duct tape,” and loud music was played 
to prevent them from communicating with each other and for “sleep management.” 177 
Formica recommended against disciplining soldiers for these incidents. He acknowledged that 
the tiny cells were “inappropriate for long-term detention,” but said they were not used for 
this purpose:
Rather, special forces secured combative, resistant detainees in these cells for 
short periods of  time in order to elicit tactical intelligence. … It is reasonable to 
conclude that this would be acceptable for short periods of  time. … [T]wo days 
would be reasonable; five to seven days would not.178
The conclusion that 24–48 hours in these conditions would be acceptable far exceeds the 
duration of  “cramped confinement” authorized by the OLC for Abu Zubaydah. The August 
2002 OLC techniques memo stated that confinement in the smaller box, in which the subject 
could not stand up, would be limited to two hours at a time.179
Formica also accepted the explanation that detainees were blindfolded with duct tape “for 
purposes of  force protection and to prevent escape,” and found that this was not inhumane. 
In part, this was because an interrogation policy for special forces troops in disseminated in 
February 2004 permitted interrogation techniques that had been rescinded for ordinary troops, 
including sleep deprivation, stress positions, and environmental manipulation.180 
Formica stated that this had been corrected in May 2004. However, in interviews conducted by 
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attorneys in July 2007, two former detainees gave detailed descriptions of  being imprisoned in 
tiny cells that detainees called “black coffins” in January 2006.181 They were arrested together 
and interrogated about the kidnapping of  the Christian Science Monitor reporter Jill Carroll, and 
then taken to a prison near Baghdad airport.182 There, they alleged, they were held in small 
wooden cells, painted black, at most one meter wide and one meter high. One detainee stated 
that he was held there for over a week, and the other for 16 days.183 Both said that they were 
continuously handcuffed and hooded, and allowed out of  the cells only to use the toilet. One 
of  the detainees said that he fainted twice inside his box, and taken out and given an IV nearby, 
but afterwards he was returned to the cell: “[e]verything was just the same.” 184 These accounts, 
while detailed and consistent with each other, could not be independently corroborated. 
Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7)
As to the issue of  whether abuses in Iraq fit into those committed by sadistic and unsupervised 
individuals or abuses authorized at high levels of  command, John Sifton of  Human Rights 
Watch stated that detainee abuse in Iraq was 
very widespread, but that doesn’t mean it’s all the same. There’s been 
spontaneous abuse at the troops’ level; there’s been more authorized abuse; 
there’s been overlap — a sort of  combination of  authorized and unauthorized. 
And you have abuse that passed around like a virus; abuse that started because 
one unit was approved to use it, and then another unit which wasn’t started 
copying them.185
During the summer of  2003, 10 or 12 members of  the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 
the same unit implicated in Dilawar’s and Habibullah’s deaths, traveled to Abu Ghraib to set up 
interrogation operations there. Captain Carolyn Wood became the officer-in-charge. On July 
26, 2003, Wood sent a proposed interrogation policy that included sleep management, “comfort 
positions,” the presence of  military dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation and light control.186 
Wood did not hear back from her command about the proposal, and resubmitted it on August 
27, 2003. This time, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib, and told her that “they did 
not see anything wrong with it,” and would approve it and forward it to higher-ranking officers 
for review.187 
In early September, Major General Miller visited Iraq to advise personnel there about 
improving interrogations. Several soldiers who met with him recalled him saying that they were 
treating detainees too leniently. For example, Major General Keith Dayton, also of  the Iraq 
Survey Group, remembered Miller telling him that ISG “not getting much out of  these people” 
because “you haven’t broken [the detainees] psychologically.” 188 
On September 14, CJTF-7 issued its first theater-wide interrogation policy, signed by General 
Sanchez. The policy stated that the Geneva Conventions applied, but nonetheless authorized 
sleep “adjustment,” stress positions, the presence of  military dogs, yelling, loud music, light 
control, environmental manipulation, and isolation. The policy went into effect immediately. 
According to Sanchez’s autobiography, his legal advisor, Colonel Marc Warren, told him there 
was “unanimous agreement” among legal experts in Iraq that “every one of  these is authorized 
by the Geneva Conventions.” 189 
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At a hearing on May 19, 2004, Sen. Jack Reed of  Rhode Island asked Warren how he 
could have concluded that those techniques complied with Article 31 of  the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which states that “physical or moral coercion shall not be exercised against 
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.” Warren 
stated that they were permitted “when applied to security internees, in this case who are 
unlawful combatants,” and who “would have been permissibly under active interrogation.”190
A December 24, 2003, letter from the military to the Red Cross explains this interpretation in 
more detail. Warren apparently relied on Article 5 of  the Fourth Geneva Convention, which 
states that if  a party to a conflict
is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of  or 
engaged in activities hostile to the security of  the State, such individual person 
shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present 
Convention as would, if  exercised in the favour of  such individual person, be 
prejudicial to the security of  such State. … [S]uch persons shall nevertheless be 
treated with humanity.
The letter cites this provision to argue that security detainees are not eligible for full protection 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and “in the context of  ongoing strategic interrogation … 
we consider their detention to be humane.” 191 This interpretation replaces the Fourth Geneva 
Convention’s protections with the same vague requirement of  “humane treatment” that applied 
in Guantánamo and Afghanistan. 
At Central Command, Major Carrie Ricci disagreed with Warren’s interpretation. She stated 
that many of  the techniques in the September 14 policy violated the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions, and should not be authorized.192 On October 12, 2003, Sanchez released a new 
directive, which listed only techniques included in Field Manual, and stated that requests for 
unlisted techniques had to be submitted to him in writing.193 
Many have argued that Sanchez’s second memo demonstrates that any subsequent abuses in 
Iraq were a function of  undisciplined, sadistic soldiers, not policy. This is particularly true of  
the notorious Abu Ghraib photographs, which have been denounced by even the most ardent 
defenders of  “enhanced interrogations.” Vice President Cheney described them as “deeply 
disturbing. The behavior recorded in them was cruel and disgraceful and certainly not reflective 
of  U.S. policy.” 194 John Yoo denies any connection between the OLC memos he wrote and 
“what happened at Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib featured terrible examples of  physical and sexual 
abuse, imposed not in any interrogation context, but as sadistic entertainment when higher 
officers were not present.” 195
Some photographs do fit Yoo’s description, and it was these incidents on which the court-
martial convictions of  Charles Graner, Ivan Frederick, Lynndie England, and the other night-
shift MPs rested. Captain Christopher Graveline, the lead Army prosecutor on the cases, later 
stated that his team had avoided “charging MPs if  there was even a hint of  MI involvement 
that may have led to confusion about how detainees should be treated.” 196 Instead, Graveline 
focused on a few incidents where the detainees involved were never interrogated by MI — a fact 
that he believed put “a stake in the heart” of  the defendants’ claim that they were just following 
orders from interrogators.197 
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But many of  the Abu Ghraib photographs depict abuses that began before Graner’s unit 
arrived at the prison, and were widely condoned if  not actually authorized. Brent Pack, the CID 
agent who examined the Abu Ghraib photographs, later told journalists that he asked of  each 
photo, “[D]oes this one actually constitute a crime or is it standard operating procedure?” Pack 
regarded nudity and stress positions as “standard operating procedures.” 198 
Damien Corsetti, an MP from the 519th Military Intelligence Brigade, has stated that his unit 
“set the same policies in Abu as we set at Bagram. The same exact rules.” 199 A September 16, 
2003, entry from the logbooks kept by the 72nd MP Company corroborates this, stating that a 
detainee “was stripped down per MI and he is [naked] and standing tall in his cell.” 200
The Red Cross came to a similar conclusion based on visits to Abu Ghraib in mid-October 
2003, where they “witnessed the practice of  keeping persons deprived of  their liberty completely 
naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness, allegedly for several consecutive 
days.” 201 When they demanded an explanation, “[t]he military intelligence officer in charge of  
the interrogation explained that this practice was ‘part of  the process.’ ” The ICRC also witnessed 
sleep deprivation, threats, and detainees being “handcuffed either dressed or naked to the bed bars 
or the cell door.” Its medical officer observed both physical and psychological symptoms resulting 
from this treatment, including bruising and cuts around the wrist, “incoherent speech, acute 
anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior, and suicidal tendencies.” 202
Lewis Welshofer’s court-martial demonstrates that the belief  that the “gloves were off ” extended 
to the Blacksmith Hotel, FOB Rifles in Al Asad, and FOB Tiger in Al Qaim.203 Other soldiers 
have testified to widespread abuse at a facility in Mosul, known informally as “The Disco,” 204 
and FOB Mercury, in Falluja.205 
The most troubling report may be the description from a unit stationed at Forward Operating 
Base Lion, near Balad, where six soldiers told reporter Joshua Phillips that they had routinely 
tortured detainees.206 Two soldiers from that unit, Adam Grey and Jonathan Millantz, died in 
possible suicides, and in Millantz’s case, it seems clear that his death was linked to remorse over his 
actions. Millantz was serving as a medic with his unit, and told Phillips in an initial interview that 
My position pretty much was to take vital signs of  prisoners while they were 
getting, for a lack of  better words, questioned or interrogated. And I saw some 
stuff  that really turns my stomach that I’m really not going to disclose.207
Millantz later disclosed more details; he said, for example, that one of  the techniques they used 
was stimulated drowning. He also said that he had tried to report the abuse but,
When I said that these conditions were inhumane for the detainees and, um … 
All my opinions were shut — shut down, basically. And I just, I was just told to, 
you know, mind my own business and do my job, and “don’t make a fuss, don’t 
make a scene.”…
It was beat into our brains the entire time we were there: “This is a company 
level operation. Do not talk about it. Do not tell anybody about this.” 208
Of  course, this is very far from typical of  units serving in Iraq, most of  whom treated prisoners 
honorably and in accordance with the law. But it does illustrate the danger of  relaxing the long-
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standing prohibitions against mistreating detainees whom soldiers may hold responsible for their 
friends’ deaths. 
A Pentagon survey of  1,700 U.S. troops serving in Iraq in 2007 found that approximately 10 
percent acknowledged gratuitously mistreating civilians or damaging their property. Less than 
half  would report a fellow soldier for immoral actions, and more than a third believed that 
torture should be allowed to save the lives of  another soldier.209 Soon after that survey was 
released, General Charles Krulak and General Joseph Hoar, retired commanders of  the Marine 
Corps and U.S. Central Command, wrote:
As has happened with every other nation that has tried to engage in a little 
bit of  torture — only for the toughest cases, only when nothing else works — 
the abuse spread like wildfire, and every captured prisoner became the key 
to defusing a potential ticking time bomb. Our soldiers in Iraq confront real 
“ticking time bomb” situations every day, in the form of  improvised explosive 
devices, and any degree of  “flexibility” about torture at the top drops down the 
chain of  command like a stone — the rare exception fast becoming the rule.210 
402




1 Guantánamo Remarks Cost Policy Chief  His Job, CNN (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cnn.
com/2007/US/02/02/gitmo.resignation (“When corporate CEOs see that those firms are representing 
the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those CEOs are going to make those law firms 
choose between representing terrorists or representing reputable firms.”). 
2  Task Force staff  interview with Moazzam Begg, Omar Deghayes, Bisher al-Rawi (Apr. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter Begg, Deghayes, al-Rawi Interview]. 
3  Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Military Eroding Trust of  Detainees, Lawyers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2005), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/world/americas/08iht-gitmo.html (“Another lawyer, Marc 
Falkoff  of  New York, whose firm represents several Yemenis at the naval base in Cuba, said some of  
his clients had told him that a person who said he was a lawyer and had civilian clothes had conferred 
several times with some detainees. That person, Falkoff  said his clients had told him, later appeared 
at the detention center in uniform, leading the inmates to distrust anyone claiming to be a lawyer and 
acting in their interest.”). See also Neil A. Lewis, Detainee’s Lawyer Says Captors Foment Mistrust, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/international/07hamdan.html (“The 
Guantánamo authorities violated a court order by moving a prisoner from the general population there 
and placing him in close contact with a hard-core operative for Al Qaeda known for urging detainees to 
refuse to cooperate with their lawyers, according to papers filed with the United States District Court here 
by Lt. Cmdr. Charles D. Swift.”). 
4  Lewis, U.S. Military Eroding Trust, supra note 3.
5  Begg, Deghayes, al-Rawi Interview, supra note 2.
6  Task Force staff  interview with Clive Stafford Smith (Apr. 16, 2012); William Glaberson, Many 
Detainees at Guantánamo Rebuff  Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/05/05/us/05gitmo.html (“ ‘Some people don’t have full trust in attorneys,’ Mr. Khussrof  
said, according to Mr. Remes’s notes. ‘They think you work for government.’ ”). 
7  Begg, Deghayes, al-Rawi Interview, supra note 2. 
8  Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of  Harsh Tactics is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2004), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/politics/17gitmo.html (“They were also occasionally given 
milkshakes and hamburgers from the McDonald’s on the base”). 
9  Neil A. Lewis, Report Discredits F.B.I. Claims of  Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/politics/14gitmo.html
10  Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Inquiry into the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody 
19 (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Levin Report], available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf. See also Jane Mayer, Thoughts 
on the Levin Report, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
newsdesk/2009/04/levin-torture-interrogation-senate-report.html
11  Levin Report, supra note 10, at 19. 
12 See Michael Elliott, Welcome to Camp X-Ray, TIME (Jan. 20, 2002), available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,195299,00.html; Sgt. Jim Greenhill, Outdated Images of  Detention Center, 
Mission Frustrate Guantánamo Troopers, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Dec. 1, 2006), available at http://www.
defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2272
13  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Terry Carrico (Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Carrico 
404
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Interview]. All the detainees had been transferred to Camp Delta by April 29, 2002. 
14  Greg Miller, Many Held at Guantánamo Not Likely Terrorists, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2002), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/22/nation/na-gitmo22
15 Id. 
16 Id. See also Ted Conover, In the Land of  Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2003), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/06/29/magazine/29GUANTANAMO.html
17  Mike Allen, Lawmaker Tours Become Part of  Guantánamo Life, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2005), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/05/AR2005080501568.html; 
Lewis, supra note 8; Josh White, U.N. Inspectors Are Invited to Guantánamo Bay, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2005), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/28/AR2005102802043.
html
18  Vikram Dodd, American Military Bans BBC Crew from Guantánamo Bay for Talking to Inmates, GUARDIAN 
(UK) (June 21, 2003), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2003/jun/21/cuba.usnews; Ben 
Wedeman, CNN Tours Gitmo Prison Camp, CNN (Jul. 7, 2005), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/
US/07/06/gitmo.tour/index.html
19  Conover, supra note 16. 
20  U.S. Army Sgt. Sara Wood, GITMO Photos, DOD Website (Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.
defense.gov/home/features/gitmo/facilities.html 
21  Greenhill, supra note 12. 
22  Kathleen T. Rhem, Guantánamo Detainees Receiving “First-Rate” Medical Care, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. 
(Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25852
23  Task Force staff  interview with Albert Shimkus (July 26, 2012) [hereinafter Shimkus Interview].
24 Id.
25 Id.
26  The next most impressive element of  the public relations tour was a talk visitors had with the 
camp’s Muslim chaplain, Capt. James Yee, a Chinese-American graduate of  West Point and a convert to 
Islam. Capt. Yee proudly explained how he played the Muslim call to prayer over the camp’s loudspeaker 
system several times a day as required. He also told visitors how he insured that the food was halal, 
religiously appropriate for consumption by Muslims. He was later arrested on suspicion of  espionage 
by base commanders and held in harsh conditions for several months. He eventually underwent a 
preliminary court-martial. He was acquitted of  anything connected to espionage — it became evident 
that investigators had a hair-trigger on their suspicions and misfired completely. Some other Muslims 
in the military were also wrongly suspected of  nefarious activities on behalf  of  Al Qaeda. In Capt. 
Yee’s case, he was discovered in the course of  the investigation to have had an extramarital affair at 
Guantánamo for which he was also charged. He was humiliated publicly when military prosecutors, 
finding their espionage case empty, enthusiastically presented details of  Capt. Yee’s relationship with a 
female Navy reservist from California, as well as his internet pornography habits. It led to the end of  his 
military career. See Tim Golden, Loyalties and Suspicions: The Muslim Servicemen; How Dubious Evidence Spurred 
Relentless Guantánamo Spy Hunt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2004), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9A04EEDC1230F93AA25751C1A9629C8B63




28 See Faculty Profile, Albert J. Shimkus, U.S. Naval War College, http://www.usnwc.edu/
Academics/Faculty/Albert-Shimkus.aspx
29  Shimkus Interview, supra note 23.
30 Id.
31  Begg, Deghayes, al-Rawi Interview, supra note 2. 




36  Mark Denbeaux, Drug Abuse, An Exploration of  the Government’s Use of  Mefloquine at Guantánamo, Seton 
Hall Univ. Sch. of  Law, Ctr. for Pol’y & Res., Paper, No. 2010-33 (2011), available at http://law.shu.edu/
ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/upload/drug-abuse-exploration-government-use-
mefloquine-gunatanamo.pdf; Jason Leopold & Jeffrey Kaye, Ex-Guantánamo Official Was Told Not to Discuss 
Policy Surrounding Antimalarial Drug Used on Detainees, Truthout (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://truth-out.
org/news/item/254:exGuantánamo-official-was-told-not-to-discuss-policy-surrounding-antimalarial-
drug-used-on-detainees; Carol Rosenberg, U.S., Cuba Talk About Malaria, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 22, 2002), 
available at http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y02/feb02/22e3.htm 
37  Shimkus Interview, supra note 23.
38  Rosenberg, supra note 36.
39  Leo Shane III, Experts: DOD Malaria Policy for Detainees is Malpractice, STARS & STRIPES, Jan. 
23, 2011, available at http://www.stripes.com/experts-dod-malaria-drug-policy-for-detainees-is-
malpractice-1.132623
40 Bush Delivers Ultimatum, CNN (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/
world/ret.afghan.bush_1_senior-taliban-official-terrorist-ringleader-osama-bin-mullah-mohammed-omar 
41 See David Firestone, A Nation Challenged: The Reaction; Sunday of  Muted Cheers and Renewed Fears, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/08/us/a-nation-challenged-the-
reaction-sunday-of-muted-cheers-and-renewed-fears.html; Patrick Wintour, Kamal Ahmed, Ed Vulliamy 
& Ian Traynor, It’s Time for War, Bush and Blair Tell Taliban, GUARDIAN (UK) (Oct. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/politics.september11
42 See ANGELO RASANAYAGAM, AFGHANISTAN: A MODERN HISTORY (2007); AMIN SAIKAL, A.G. RAVAN 
FARHADI & KIRILL NOURZHANOV, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL (2006); 
United Nations, Afghanistan & the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/
un-afghan-history.shtml
43 Celebrations, Confusion as Kandahar Falls, CNN (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.
com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/07/ret.kandahar.surrender; Taliban Surrender in Kandahar, 
GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/07/afghanistan1
44 A Nation Challenged; Air Campaign So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/10/13/us/a-nation-challenged-air-campaign-so-far.html; Dexter Filkins, A Nation Challenged; 
The Prisoners; Taliban Arab, Like Many, Longs for Home but Faces a Doubtful Fate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2001), 
406
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/02/world/nation-challenged-prisoners-taliban-arab-like-
many-longs-for-home-but-faces.html; Carlotta Gall, A Nation Challenged: Mazar-i-Sharif; U.S. Bomb Wounds 
G.I.’s as Battle Rages at Fort, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/27/ 
world/a-nation-challenged-mazar-i-sharif-us-bomb-wounds-gi-s-as-battle-rages-at-fort.html; Michael R. 
Gordon, A Nation Challenged: Military; Tora Bora Attack Advances Slowly in Tough Fighting, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/world/a-nation-challenged-military-tora-bora-
attack-advances-slowly-in-tough-fighting.html
45  Task Force staff  interview with anonymous source.
46  Chief  Warrant Officer 3 Sharon Curcio, Generational Differences in Waging Jihad, MIL. REV. 84 (2005) 
(“The recruiters used visual displays of  persecuted Muslims, and routinely exposed recruits to films that 
featured suffering women and children in refugee camps in Chechnya or Palestine.”).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 85. 
50 Id. at 85–86. 
51 Id. at 86 (“But why did the older men not expect retaliation after the 9/11 attack? Because there 
had been no significant retaliation after the terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers housing complex in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole in Port Aden, Yemen. It was reasonable to assume the United 
States would, once again, do little. Al-Qaeda also did not want to alert the young recruits that a larger, 
more dangerous game might have just begun.”). 
52 Id. at 87 (“Arab recruits were told to exit Afghanistan as soon as possible because a price was on 
their heads. Many recruits sought cover in the Tora Bora Mountains but were caught in the bombing and 
suffered shrapnel wounds or lost limbs after stepping on landmines. … Quite a few hired Afghan guides 
to get them out of  the mountains and spent many days on foot trying to get to the border. … Some 
recalled being rounded up and betrayed by Pakistanis who sold them to the Northern Alliance.”). 
53  Neil A. Lewis, Fate of  Prisoners from Afghan War Remains Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/24/international/worldspecial/24GITM.ht
54 Id. 
55 ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES 33–34 (2007); see also The Guantánamo Docket—Tariq 
Mahmoud Ahmed al Sawah, N.Y. TIMES, at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/535-tariq-
mahmoud-ahmed-al-sawah/documents/4 (last visited June 13, 2012) (“Massoud and Dostum were 
our enemies before. They are fighting Muslims. There are no rules in the United States to prevent it if  
you want to fight for religion. There are no rules to direct me not to defend people. … If  Massoud and 
Dostum are American allies, they were not an alliance before September 11th, were they? I think they 
were not American allies.”).
56  Celestine Bohlen, A Nation Challenged—An Overview: Dec. 6, 2011; Fall of  Kandahar, Debating a Surrender 
and Firefighters’ Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/
world/nation-challenged-overview-dec-6-2001-fall-kandahar-debating-surrender.html; see also THE 
GUANTÁNAMO FILES, supra note 55. 
57  Mil. Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of  Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 




58  Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of  2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html; see also The 
Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo
59  Some of  the detainees, in a case that has puzzled observers, included former prisoners of  the 
Taliban. The Taliban had considered them spies, but the arrival of  Western forces was no help to 
them, as they were not freed, but were then taken in as U.S. detainees, held in Kandahar, and later 
Guantánamo. They were Jamal al-Harith, Abdul Rahim Al Ginco, Airat Vakhitov, Saddiq Ahmad 
Turkistani, and Abdul Hakim Bukhary. Their journey from Taliban prisoners to U.S. detention in 
Afghanistan to Guantánamo was obviously one of  the most ironic and incomprehensible. See THE 
GUANTÁNAMO FILES, supra note 55, at 114; Tim Golden, Expecting U.S. Help, Sent to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/us/15gitmo.html
60  Cullen Murphy, Todd S. Purdum, David Rose & Phillippe Sands, Guantánamo: An Oral History, 
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 11, 2012) (“Maybe they had been picked up on the battlefield, and maybe they 
were involved in low-level insurgency. That would’ve been the worst of  it with a large portion of  these 
characters. The majority of  the ones that I saw-really, we just didn’t have anything on them.”), available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/01/guantanamo-bay-oral-history-201201 
61 CHRIS MACKEY AND GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS 174 (2004) [hereinafter THE 
INTERROGATORS]. 
62  Mark Denbeaux, Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of  517 Detainees through Analysis of  Department 
of  Defense Data, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of  Law Report (2006). 
63 Id. at 12 (“The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its 
coalition partners. 1. The detainee fled, along with others, when the United States forces bombed their 
camp. 2. The detainee was captured in Pakistan, along with other Uighur fighters.”). 
64 Id. at 14.
65 THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES, supra note 55, at 34; The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 58. 
66 THE INTERROGATORS, supra note 61, at 221.
67 Id. at 217. 
68  Task Force staff  interview with Richard Shiffrin (Mar. 9, 2012).
69 Id. 
70  Eyewitness observation by Neil A. Lewis, Task Force staff  Director.
71  Task Force staff  interview with Pierre-Richard Prosper (Apr. 10, 2012).
72 Final Report of  the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations 80 (Aug. 2004) (“Schlesinger 
Report”), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf
73  Tony Perry, Marine Officer Who Set Up Guantánamo Prison Expresses Dismay at What It Has Become, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/25/world/fg-marine-gitmo25
74 KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTÁNAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 55–59, 62–63 
(2009).
75 Id. at 57.
408
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
76  Task force staff  interview with William H. Taft IV (Sept. 27, 2011).
77  Carrico Interview, supra note 13.
78  Press Briefing, DOD Secretary Rumsfeld & Gen. Myers (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.
defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031
79  Carrico Interview, supra note 13. 
80 Id. 
81  Aram Roston, Terry Carrico, Ex-Guantánamo Prison Commander, Says Facility Should Close, DAILY 
BEAST (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/06/terry-carrico-ex-
guantanamo-prison-commander-says-facility-should-close.html
82 Id. 
83  Carrico Interview, supra note 13. 
84  Gerry G. Gilmore, Rumsfeld Visits, Thanks U.S. Troops at Camp X-Ray in Cuba, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. 
(Jan. 27, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43817
85 PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 51 
(2008).
86  Levin Report, supra note 10, at 38-39, 43-47, 51-53. 
87 Guantánamo Bay 10-Year Anniversary: Timeline, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9006682/Guantanamo-Bay-10-year-
anniversary-timeline.html; Eli Clifton, By the Numbers: 10 Years At Guantánamo Bay, Think Progress (Jan. 11, 
2012), available at http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/01/11/402586/ten-years-at-Guantánamo-
bay-by-the-numbers
88 Levin Report, Supra note 10, at 61–62, 65.
89 Id. at 62.
90  Julian Borger, “Soft” Guantánamo Chief  Ousted, GUARDIAN (UK) (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/16/usa.afghanistan 
91  Diane Beaver, Memorandum for Commander, JTF GTMO, Legal Review of  Aggressive Interrogation 
Techniques (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf
92 KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 
229–36 (2005).
93 SANDS, supra note 85, at 77.
94  Levin Report, supra note 10, at 66-70.
95 Id. at 70. Beaver has stated that she asked requested Dalton’s assistance for her own review, but did 
not receive any. SANDS, supra note 85, at 77.




97 GREENBERG & DRATEL, supra note 92, at 237.
98  Levin Report, supra note 10, at 96.
99 Id. at 60. 
100  Letter from T.J. Harrington, FBI Dep. Ass’t Dir., Counterterrorism Div., to Maj. Gen. Donald 
J. Ryder, Army Criminal Investigation Command, Re: Suspected Mistreatment of  Detainees (July 14, 
2004), available at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/resources/fbi-documents/FBI87_001914%20to%20
001916_DOJFBI001914.pdf
101 DOD, Interrogation Log, Detainee 063 (23 Nov. 2002 to 11 Jan. 2003) [hereinafter Detainee 063 
Interrogation Log], available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf
102 Id. at 27.
103  Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, Assessment of  DOD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in 
Iraq (2003) [“Miller Report”], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Taguba%20
Annex%2020.pdf
104 Id. 
105  Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of  the 800th Military Police Brigade 9, 18 (May 
2004) [“Taguba Report”] at 20, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html
106  Dexter Filkins, General Says Less Coercion of  Captives Yields Better Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2004), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/international/middleeast/07detain.html; Dexter 
Filkins, The Struggle for Iraq: The Warden; General Will Trim Inmate Numbers at Iraq Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 
5, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/05/world/the-struggle-for-iraq-the-warden-
general-will-trim-inmate-numbers-at-iraq-prison.html
107  Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt & Brig. Gen. John Furlow, Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation 
into FBI Allegations of  Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 1, 20 (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf
108 Id. 
109  Bob Woodward, Guantánamo Detainee Was Tortured, Says Official Overseeing Military Trials, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/
AR2009011303372.html
110  Task Force staff  interview with Sherif  El-Mashad (Aug. 13, 2012) (“As Muslims we don’t like 
to take off  our clothes in front of  men or women. They make you do it knowing the sensitivity of  the 
issue.”). 
111  Task Force staff  interview with Sami al-Hajj (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter al-Hajj Interview]. 
112 Id. (“Every 30 minutes, they come and say for you to move, move. They do this for 2 days, 
continuously.”). 
113 Id. 
114  Task Force staff  interview with Sean Baker (Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Baker Interview]. 
115  Amended Complaint, Baker v. United States, No. 05-221 (E.D. Ky. May 31, 2005); Decl. of  
410
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Anthony Adolph, Baker v. United States, No. 05-221 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005).
116  Baker Interview, supra note 114. 
117  Task Force staff  interview with Alberto Mora (Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Mora Interview].
118  Bill Dedman, Gitmo Interrogations Spark Battle Over Tactics, MSNBC (Oct. 23, 2006) available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15361458/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/gitmo-interrogations-spark-battle-over-
tactics
119  Detainee 063 Interrogation Log, supra note 101.
120  Mora Interview, supra note 117.
121 Id.
122  Memorandum from Alberto Mora (Navy Gen. Counsel) for Navy Inspector Gen., Statement for the 
Record: Office of  General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues 2-4 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.
aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf  








131 KURT EICHENWALD, 500 DAYS: SECRETS AND LIES IN THE TERROR WARS 446 (2012).
132  Mora Interview, supra note 117.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.; See also EICHENWALD, supra note 131, at 453.
136 EICHENWALD, supra note 131, at 455.








141  Philippe Sands, The Green Light, VANITY FAIR (May 2008) available at http://www.vanityfair.com/
politics/features/2008/05/guantanamo200805
142  Rives Interview, supra note 137.
143 Id.
144 See Memoranda from JAGs (Feb.-March 2003), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/20030205.pdf
145 Id.





151  DOD Working Group Report, Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of  Legal, 
Historical, Policy, and Operation Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003) available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/20030404.pdf
152 Id.
153  Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Counter-Resistance 
Techniques in the War on Terrorism, (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nation/documents/041603rumsfeld.pdf
154 Id.
155  Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of  Detainees was Thwarted, 
NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/27/060227fa_
fact 
156 Id.
157  Mora Interview, supra note 117.
158  542 U.S. 466 (2004)
159  Mark Denbeaux and Joshua Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings, Seton Hall School of  Law Report 
(2006); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783–85 (2008) 
160  Emergency Motion for Immediate Conditional Release, Al Ginco v. Gates, No. 07-1090 (D.C. 
Cir. Oct.31, 2007), available at http://or.fd.org/GTMO/DTA_docs/Petitioner’s%20Emergency%20
Motion%20(10.31.07).pdf
161 MARK DENBEAUX, JONATHAN HAFETZ, AND GRACE A. BROWN, EDS., THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: 
INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 151–54 (2009).
412
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
162  Dan Eggen & Josh White, Inmates Alleged Koran Abuse, WASH. POST (May 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/25/AR2005052501395.html
163  Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedures, JTF-GTMO 6-4 (Mar. 2003). 
164  Interview with Sami al-Hajj, supra note 111. 
165 Id. 




169 Guantánamo: An Oral History, supra note 60. 
170  Golden, supra note 166. 
171  Scott Horton, The Guantánamo “Suicides”: A Camp Delta Sergeant Blows the Whistle, HARPER’S (Mar. 
2010), available at http://harpers.org/archive/2010/03/the-guantanamo-suicides
172  James Risen & Tim Golden, 3 Prisoners Commit Suicide at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/11/us/11gitmo.html
173  Josh White, Guards’ Lapses Cited in Detainee Suicides, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2008), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/22/AR2008082203083.html
174  Task Force staff  visit to Guantánamo Bay (Feb. 14, 2012). Rear Adm. David Woods handed over 
command on June 25, 2012 to Rear Adm. John W. Smith Jr.
175  Task Force staff  visit to Guantánamo Bay, supra note 174; Carol Rosenberg, A Prison Camps Primer, 
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/12/22/2558413/web-
extra-a-prison-camps-primer.html
176  Rosenberg, Prison Camps Primer, supra note 175. 




179  Rosenberg, Prison Camps Primer, supra note 175. 
180  Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo’s Once-Hated Camp 6 Now Prisoners’ Lockup of  Choice, MCCLATCHY 
NEWS SERVICE (DEC. 2, 2010), Available at http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/12/at_
guantanamo_once-hated_camp.html
181  TASK FORCE STAFF VISIT TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY, supra note 174; Rosenberg, Guantánamo’s Once-Hated 
Camp, supra note 180. 





184 ZACHARY KATZNELSON, THE ULTIMATE INJUSTICE AT GUANTÁNAMO: THE DEATH OF ADNAN LATIF, ACLU 
(Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/ultimate-injustice-guantanamo-
death-adnan-latif; Carol Rosenberg, NCIS Still Investigating Yemeni Prisoner’s Guantánamo Death, Miami Herald 
(Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/12/18/3148083/yemenis-death-in-
Guantánamo-still.html
185  Katznelson, supra note 184. Editorial, Death at Guantánamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2012), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/opinion/sunday/death-at-guantanamo-bay.html
186  Task Force staff  visit to Guantánamo Bay, supra note 174.
187  ICRC Hits Back at U.S. Accusations, Swiss Broad. Corp. (swissinfo.ch) (June 17, 2005), available at 
http://m.swissinfo.ch/eng/archive/ICRC_hits_back_at_US_accusations.html?cid=4569206 
188  William Glaberson, Red Cross Monitors Barred From Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2007), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/washington/16gitmo.html
189 Id. 
190 ICRC Highlights Guantánamo Torture, Al-Jazeera (AFP) (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.
aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849143717784684.html
191  Stephanie Nebehay, Guantánamo Conditions Improve Under Scrutiny, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2009), available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/11/us-aid-cross-guantanamo-idUSTRE57A45Z20090811
192  Simon Schorno, Ten Years of  ICRC Action at Guantánamo, Intercross (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://
intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/field-ten-years-icrc-action-guantanamo 
193  Task Force staff  visit to Guantánamo Bay, supra note 174. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Guantánamo: An Oral History, supra note 60 [Quote from Torin Nelson: “I realized that a large 
majority of  the population just had no business being at Guantánamo”; Quote from Lawrence Wilkerson: 
“That first big tranche of  prisoners was basically not captured by U.S. personnel. It was the Northern 
Alliance, the warlords associated therewith, and the Paks and others who gave us that first huge tranche, 
based on bonuses we paid them or based on their own sweep down from the border into Kabul. So in 
most cases we’ve initially accepted someone else’s word for their guilt.”]
197  Shanita Simmons, Manchester Manual: The Code of  Conduct for Terrorism, Joint Task Force Guantánamo 
(Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/storyarchive/2007/August/081407-2-
manmanual.html
198 Id. 
199  Benjamin Wittes, A New Battle Over GTMO Attorney Access, Lawfare (July 11, 2012), available at http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/7995
200  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf
414
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
201  Wittes, supra note 199; MOU Governing Continued Contact Between Counsel/Translator and 
Detainee Following Termination of  Habeas Case, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/Post-Habeas-MOU.pdf
202  Respondents’ Combined Opposition to Motions by Detainees Al-Mudafari, Al-Mithali, Ghanem, 
Al-Baideny, Esmail, and Uthman for Continued Counsel Access Pursuant to the Protective Order, In re 
Guantánamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/doj.gtmo_.mou_.pdf
203 Id.; Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval 
Base at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Cuba, No. 08-442 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_08-mc-00442/pdf/
USCOURTS-dcd-1_08-mc-00442-7.pdf
204 Memorandum Opinion, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 
12-398 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
Counsel-Access-Decision-Amended1.pdf
205  Josh Gerstein, Obama Appeals to Set Rules for Guantánamo Lawyers, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/11/obama-appeals-to-set-rules-for-guantanamo-
lawyers-148240.html
206  Ryan Cooper, The End of  Habeas Corpus? WASH. MONTHLY (June 11, 2012), available at http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2012_06/is_habeas_corpus_dead037877.php
207 Guantánamo: An Oral History, supra note 60. 
208  Danica Coto, U.S. Releases List of  Guantánamo Detainees Cleared for Transfer, THE STAR (Canada) 
(Sept. 21, 2012), available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/09/21/us_releases_list_of_
guantanamo_detainees_cleared_for_transfer.html
209 Id. Benjamin Wittes, David Remes on a Human Rights Agenda for the Obama Second Term, Lawfare (Nov. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/david-remes-on-a-human-rights-agenda-for-the-
obama-second-term
210 The Abu Ghraib Pictures, NEW YORKER (May 3, 2005), available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2004/05/03/slideshow_040503; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER (May 
10, 2004), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact. The first report 
on the abuses at Abu Ghraib was televised by 60 Minutes II on April 27, 2004. Abuse of  Iraqi POWs by GIs 
Probes, CBS News (Apr. 27, 2004). 
211  David S. Cloud, Red Cross Cited Detainee Abuse Over a Year Ago, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2004). 
212  Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html
213 History of  the ICRC: Founding and Early Years, ICRC, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-
are/history/founding/index.jsp
214 Yemen: ICRC Visits Detained Soldiers in Abyan, ICRC (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/yemen-news-2012-03-19.htm





216  Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, supra note 212; Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite 
Detention in Guantánamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/10/
us/red-cross-criticizes-indefinite-detention-in-Guantanamo-bay.html
217 The ICRC’s Work at Guantánamo Bay, ICRC (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/misc/678fk8.htm 
218 See Guantánamo Bay: Overview of  the ICRC’s Work for Internees, ICRC (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5qrc5v.htm; DOD, JTF-170, Memorandum of  Record: ICRC 
Meeting with MD Miller on 09 Oct 03 (Oct. 10, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nation/documents/GitmoMemo10-09-03.pdf
219  Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, supra note 212. 
220  Scott Higham, A Look Behind the “Wire” at Guantánamo, WASH. POST (June 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37364-2004Jun12.html. See also ICRC Meeting with 
MD Miller, supra note 218.
221  Eyewitness observation by Neil A. Lewis, Task Force staff  director.
222  Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention, supra note 216. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225  Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Found Abuses at Abu Ghraib Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/11/politics/11RIGH.html
226  Cloud, supra note 211.
227 Id. 




232  Summary, June 04 ICRC Medical Visit to Guantánamo (June 2004) [on file with The Constitution 
Project]; Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, supra note 212.
233 Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, supra note 212.
234 Id.
235  Summary, June 04 ICRC Medical Visit, supra note 232.
236 Id. 
237  Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, supra note 212. 
238  Task Force staff  interview with Christophe Girod (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Girod Interview]. 
416
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
239 Id. 
240  Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross President Plans Visit to Washington on Question of  Detainees’ Treatment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/01/politics/01gitmo.html; Red 
Cross to Renew Guantánamo Call, BBC News (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/3400461.stm
241  Summary, June 04 ICRC Medical Visit, supra note 232.










1  Seymour Hersh, King’s Ransom: Exposing a Right Royal Mess, NEW YORKER (Oct. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1
2  Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Kuehn, Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of  Success in 
Afghanistan, NYU Ctr. for Int’l Cooperation (Feb. 2011), available at http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/
files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf  (“The Taliban and al-Qaeda remain distinct groups with different goals, 
ideologies, and sources of  recruits; there was considerable friction between them before September 11, 
2001, and today that friction persists.”); See also Nigel Inkster, The al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus, Council on 
Foreign Rel. (Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/al-qaeda-taliban-nexus/p20838 
(“The Afghan Taliban were never that much in sympathy with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Arabs, and if  
you look at what happened in Afghanistan pre-9/11, you realize that the relationship was never very 
comfortable.”); see also ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES 2 (2007). 
3 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 2; See also George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the 
Determination of  Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 898 n.11 (2002) (“I know of  no evidence 
suggesting that Qaeda personnel were incorporated in Taliban military units as part of  the Taliban 
armed forces.”).
4 Id. See also U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Report of  the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Linkages 
Between Al-Qaida and the Taliban, Doc. No. S/2011/790 (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20
s%202011%20790.pdf  (“[T]he Taliban has not embraced the international agenda that defines Al-
Qaeda. Al-Qaida has been, and remains, useful to the Taliban for what it can provide in technical and 
tactical terms, but the Taliban does not see it as a political ally.”)
5  Brian Whitaker, Taliban Agreed to Bin Laden Handover in 1998, GUARDIAN (UK) (Nov. 4, 2001), available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/05/afghanistan.terrorism3
6 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 1.
7 HUM. RTS. WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS (2012) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH], available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/09/06/delivered-enemy-hands-0
8 ALEX STRICK VAN LINSCHOTEN & FELIX KUEH, AN ENEMY WE CREATED: THE MYTH OF THE 
TALIBAN–AL QAEDA MERGER IN AFGHANISTAN 234 (2012) (“Even the Mullah Mohammed Omar did 
not believe that the United States would launch a full-scale attack”); id. at 237 (“The lack of  Taliban 
preparation was undoubtedly an important reason why a defeat of  their government and military forces 
was so swiftly accomplished.”).
9 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 16; see also Nabi Abdullaev, From Russia to Guantánamo, Via Afghanistan, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_
id=8881
10 Id.









17  Celestine Bohlen, A Nation Challenged — An Overview: Dec. 6, 2011; Fall of  Kandahar, Debating 
a Surrender and Firefighters’ Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/12/07/world/nation-challenged-overview-dec-6-2001-fall-kandahar-debating-surrender.html
18  Rory McCarthy, Dawn Raids Stoke Fires of  Resentment, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/08/afghanistan.rorymccarthy
19  Website of  Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, chief  of  staff  for Commander in Chief, http://
generaldostum.com
20 MAYER supra note 11, at 76.
21 Id. at 77.
22 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 10.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 11.
25  Luke Harding, Taliban Who Escaped the Fort of  Death, OBSERVER (UK) (Dec. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/02/afghanistan.lukeharding
26  Combatant Status Rev. Tribunal, Summarized Detainee Statement for ISN #201, Encl. 3, at 1, 
available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/get/2041/66698/02880text.txt
27  Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER (Mar. 10, 2003), available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2003/03/10/030310fa_fact2 (noting 86 survivors of  Qala-i-Jangi).
28  Jim Sciutto & Don Dahler, Hundreds of  Taliban Surrender at Kunduz, ABC News (Nov. 24, 2001), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80387 (“Northern Alliance officials say more 
than 1,100 of  perhaps 13,000 Afghan and foreign soldiers believed to be defending the last Taliban 
stronghold in northern Afghanistan either surrendered or switched sides today”).
29  Paul Salopek, Shipping Containers Adorn the Countryside, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://
articles.sun-sentinel.com/2002-01-01/news/0112310549_1_afghanistan-malik-pahlawan-containers 
(“Container death” has been a common form of  execution in Afghanistan at least since 1997. That year, 
a ruthless Uzbek general named Malik Pahlawan is alleged to have suffocated at least 1,250 captured 
Taliban soldiers inside containers. The Taliban repaid the favor by killing hundreds of  Pahlawan’s 
Hazara allies in a similarly horrible manner a year later”); WORTHINGTON, supra note 2.
30  542 U.S. 466 (2004)
31 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 22.
32  Physicians for Hum. Rts., Preliminary Assessment of  Alleged Mass Gravesites in the Area of  Mazar-i-Sharif, 
Afghanistan (Amended Report, Dec. 12, 2008), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_other/
afghanistan-mass-grave/prelim-assess-afghanistan2002-amend2008.pdf








37 Obama Orders Review of  Alleged Slayings of  Taliban in Bush Era, CNN (July 13, 2009), available at http://
edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/12/obama.afghan.killings
38 See David Firestone, A Nation Challenged: The Reaction; Sunday of  Muted Cheers and Renewed Fears, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/08/us/a-nation-challenged-the-
reaction-sunday-of-muted-cheers-and-renewed-fears.html; Patrick Wintour, Kamal Ahmed, Ed Vulliamy 
& Ian Traynor, It’s Time for War, Bush and Blair Tell Taliban, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/politics.september11
39  Mil. Order of  November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of  Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2001-11-16/pdf/01-28904.pdf
40 CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS 113 (2004).
41 Id.
42 KAREN GREENBERG & JOSHUA DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 80 (2005).
43  Mike Chinoy, Marines Setting up Detention Center, CNN (Dec. 15, 2001), available at http://edition.cnn.
com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/15/ret.chinoy.otsc/index.html
44 MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 40, at 235.
45 GEN. (RET.) STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, MY SHARE OF THE TASK: A MEMOIR 123 (2013). 
46  CTR. FOR LAW & MIL. OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOL. 




49  Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Inquiry into the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody (Nov. 
20, 2008), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20
Final_April%2022%202009.pdf  [hereinafter Levin Report].
50 Id. at 166.
51  Albert T. Church III, Executive Summary of  Review of  DOD Interrogation Operations 10 (2004) 
[hereinafter Church Report Summ.], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.
pdf
52  Task Force staff  interview with Joshua Claus (July 13, 2011) [hereinafter Claus Interview]. 
53  John Goetz & Holger Stark, New Testimony May Back Kurnaz Torture Claims, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 
3, 2007), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-soldiers-under-fire-new-
testimony-may-back-kurnaz-torture-claims-a-503589.html
420
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
54 MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 40, at 7.
55  Task Force staff  interview with Sami al-Hajj (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter al-Hajj Interview].
56  Nicholas D. Kristof, When We Torture, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/02/14/opinion/14kristof.html
57 DAVID HICKS, GUANTÁNAMO: MY JOURNEY 206 (2011).
58 Id. at 209.
59  Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Report of  Inspection, CFC-A Detainee Operations 6 (June 26, 2004) 
[hereinafter Jacoby Report], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Jacoby%20
Report.pdf
60  Paul Wolfowitz, DOD Memo, Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and 
Exams for Detainees Under DOD Control 2 (Jan. 12, 2005).
61 Id.
62  Claus Interview, supra note 52.
63  Former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan, wrote in his 2011 book, Black Banners, that he believed Begg 
was guilty of  helping to raise funds for the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. Of  Begg, Soufan 
wrote “British Pakistani extremist who operated al-Ansar, a bookstore in Birmingham, and helped raise 
funds for the Khaldan training camp. He escaped from England to Afghanistan when British authorities 
tried to arrest him.”
64  Ewan MacAskill, US U-Turn Over Ex-Guantanamo Inmate, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-us-guantanamo-moazzam-begg
65  Interview with Moazzam Begg, PBS: NOW (July 28, 2006) [hereinafter NOW Interview], available 
at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/230.html
66 Id.





71  NOW Interview, supra note 65.
72  Petition for Writ of  Habeas Corpus, at 4–5, Begg v. Bush, Civ. No. 04-1137 (D.D.C. July 2, 2004), 
available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/558-moazzam-begg/documents/4
73 Id.






77  Mark Denbeaux, Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of  517 Detainees Through Analysis of  
Department of  Defense Data, Seton Hall Sch. of  Law Report (2006).
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 12 (“The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its 
coalition partners. 1. The detainee fled, along with others, when the United States forces bombed their 
camp. 2. The detainee was captured in Pakistan, along with other Uigher fighters.”). 
80 Id. at 14.
81 WORTHINGTON, supra note 2, at 34. 
82 MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 40, at 221.
83  Cullen Murphy, Todd S. Purdum, David Rose & Philippe Sands, Guantánamo: An Oral History, 
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Guantánamo: An Oral History], available at http://www.vanityfair.
com/politics/2012/01/guantanamo-bay-oral-history-201201 (“Maybe they had been picked up on the 
battlefield, and maybe they were involved in low-level insurgency. That would’ve been the worst of  it 
with a large portion of  these characters. The majority of  the ones that I saw — really, we just didn’t have 
anything on them.”). 
84 MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 40, at 220.
85 Id. at 221.
86  Claus Interview, supra note 52. 
87  Sharon Curcio, Generational Differences in Waging Jihad, MIL. REV. 84, 85 (2005). 
88 Guantánamo: An Oral History, supra note 83. 
89 ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF, MY LIFE WITH THE TALIBAN 182 (2010).
90  David Rohde, Afghans Freed from Guantánamo Speak of  Heat and Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2002), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/29/world/threats-responses-detainees-afghans-freed-
guantanamo-speak-heat-isolation.html
91 See Tim Golden, Expecting U.S. Help, Sent to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2006), available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0C10F63A540C768DDDA90994DE404482
92  Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantánamo Docket — Ali Shah Mousavi, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://
projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/1154-ali-shah-mousavi/documents/11
93  Nancy Youssef, Where’s Pentagon “Terrorism Suspect”? Talking to Karzai, MCCLATCHY (July 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/07/71434/wheres-pentagon-terrorism-suspect.html
94  Summary of  Open Source Materials in the case of  Noor Uthman Muhammed before the Office 
of  Military Commissions (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter Noor Uthman Muhammed Fact Summary].
95  Claus Interview, supra note 52.
96  Al-Hajj Interview, supra note 55.
422
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
97  NOW Interview, supra note 65.
98  Autopsy Report: Mullah Habibullah, Bagram Collection Point, Afghanistan (Homicide) (0134-
02-CID369-23533) (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/autopsy-
report-mullah-habibullah-bagram-collection-point-afghanistan-homicide-0134-02
99  Claus Interview, supra note 52.
100  Al Qaeda Manual (as located by Manchester Police), available at http://www.justice.gov/
ag/manualpart1_1.pdf; Benjamin Wiser, A Nation Challenged: The Jihad, Captured Terrorist Manual 
Suggests Hijackers Did a Lot by the Book, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/10/28/world/nation-challenged-jihad-captured-terrorist-manual-suggests-hijackers-did-lot.
html
101  Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects of  Harsh Tactics in 9/11’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/us/12psychs.html (“At the C.I.A. in December 2001, Dr. 
Mitchell’s theories were attracting high-level attention. Agency officials asked him to review a Qaeda 
manual, seized in England, that coached terrorist operatives to resist interrogations. He contacted Dr. 
Jessen, and the two men wrote the first proposal to turn the enemy’s brutal techniques — slaps, stress 
positions, sleep deprivation, wall-slamming and waterboarding — into an American interrogation 
program.”). 
102  Tim Golden, Years After 2 Afghans Died, Abuse Case Falters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/national/13bagram.html
103  Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of  2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html
104 Id.
105  Military Justice Field Report (from ACLU FOIA Litigation) (June 2004), available at http://www.
thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD049084.pdf
106  Sworn Statement of  Jeff  Allan Bovarnick 49 (May 26, 2008) , available at http://detaineetaskforce.
org
107  Tim Golden, Case Dropped Against U.S. Officer in Beating Deaths of  Afghan Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 
2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/international/asia/08bagram.html
108  Golden (May 20, 2005), supra note 103.
109  Claus Interview, supra note 52.
110  Sworn Statement of  Jennifer Higgenbotham 19 (Aug. 1, 2004) , available at                                 
http://detaineetaskforce.org
111  Sworn Statement, Selena Marie Salcedo 55 (Sept. 15, 2005) http://detaineetaskforce.org
112  CIA, Office of  Inspector Gen. Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 30 
(May 7, 2004), available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/IG_Report.pdf





115  Golden (Feb. 13, 2006), supra note 102.
116  Tim Golden, In Final Trial, G.I. Is Acquitted of  Abusing Jailed Afghans, N.Y TIMES (June 2, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/02/world/asia/02bagram.html
117 Id.
118 See Noor Uthman Muhammed Fact Summary, supra note 94.
119 Id.
120  Sworn Statement of  Col. Theodore Charles Nicholas III, at 8 (June 11, 2004).
121  Claus Interview, supra note 52.
122  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington (June 20, 1012).
123 MAYER, supra note 11, at 144.
124 Id. at 146.
125  Task Force staff  interview with John C. Rizzo (Aug. 2, 2012).
126 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 36.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 32.
129  Church Report Summ., supra note 51, at 18.
130  Jane Mayer, Who Killed Gul Rahman? NEW YORKER (Mar 31, 2010), available at http://www.
newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2010/03/who-killed-gul-rahman.html
131  United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1551 (2010).
132  Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, Passaro, 04-CR-211 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2007).
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 4.
136  DOJ Press Release, Statement of  Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of  Investigation into the Interrogation 
of  Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-1067.
html
137  Jacoby Report, supra note 59, at 3.
138 Id. at 4.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 15.
424
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
141 Id. at Encl. P, at p. 78.
142 Id.
143  Church Report Summ., supra note 51, at 13.
144 Id. at 10. 
145 Id. at 15.
146 Id. at 11.
147 Id. at 16.
148  Exec. Order No. 13,493, Review of  Detention Policy Options, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009).
149  Task Force staff  interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Doug Stone (June 21, 2012).
150 See Tim Golden, Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/world/asia/07bagram.html
151  Task Force staff  interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Doug Stone (Aug. 2, 2011) (hereinafter Stone 
Interview, Aug. 2, 2011).
152  Daphne Eviatar, U.S. General: Most Bagram Detainees Should Be Released, WASH. INDEPENDENT (Aug. 
20, 2009), available at http://washingtonindependent.com/55715/u-s-general-admits-most-bagram-
detainees-should-be-released
153  Jeff  A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, 2010 ARMY 
LAWYER 9, 25 (2010) (“The detainees regularly play soccer in a large recreation yard which has basketball 
hoops at either end. There is a large vocational training area, and the officer-in-charge of  rehabilitation 
programs is implementing practical programs such as tailoring, baking, farming, and artistry that will 
benefit the detainees upon release.”); see also Tom Jones, CJIATF 435 Bringing Power to ANA Life Support Area, 
Local Villages, U.S. Cent. Command (Aug. 13, 2011), available at http://www.centcom.mil/news/cjiatf-
435-bringing-power-to-ana-life-support-area-local-villages (To prepare for a transition of  control from the 
ISAF and U.S. forces to the Afghan authorities of  the Parwan Detention Facility, Task Force-435 began 
working on connecting the facility, and thereby surrounding villages, to the national power grid. The 
project would provide opportunities for employment for local workers and Afghan contractors as well as 
guaranteeing a reliable power source for villagers in the area.). 
154  Justin Elliott, The Gitmo No One Talks About, SALON (June 4, 2011), available at http://www.salon.
com/2011/06/04/bagram_obama_gitmo
155  Open Soc’y Founds., Remaking Bagram: The Creation of  an Afghan Internment Regime and the Divide over 
U.S. Internment Power 5 (September 6, 2012) [hereinafter Open Soc’y Founds.], available at http://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/BagramReportEnglish.pdf
156  Golden (Jan. 7. 2008), supra note 150.
157 HUM. RTS. WATCH, TROOPS IN CONTACT: AIRSTRIKES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS IN AFGHANISTAN 
(2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0908webwcover_0.pdf; 
U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Detention_en.pdf; Nader Nadery & 





158 Afghan Views Worsen as Setbacks Counter U.S. Progress in Helmand (ABC News / BBC / ARD / Wash. 
Post Poll) (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ACSOR_
Afghanistan_WhereThingsStand2010.pdf; see also Luke N. Condra, et al., The Effect of  Civilian Casualties 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, Working Paper 21-22 (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/
papers/CFIS_CIVCAS_OCT2010.pdf  (a study analyzing the short term and long term rise in insurgent 
attacks on U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq found a significant link with civilian casualties).
159  Sabrina Tavernise & Sangar Rahimi, Attack in Afghan Capital Illustrates Taliban’s Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Oct. 28, 2009) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/asia/29afghan.html
160  Stone Interview, Aug. 2, 2011, supra note 151. 
161  ISAF, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment 2-16 (Aug. 30, 2009) [hereinafter McChrystal Assessment], 
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_
Redacted_092109.pdf, at § 2-16, p. 24.
162 Id. at F-1, p. 50.
163 Id. at F-4, p. 54.
164 MCCHRYSTAL, supra note 45, at 178.
165 Id. at 199.
166  Ron Synovitz, New U.S. Plan Reportedly to Let Afghan Prisoners Challenge Incarceration, Radio Free Europe 
(Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/New_US_Plan_Reportedly_To_Let_Afghan_
Prisoners_Challenge_Incarceration/1822216.html
167  Bovarnick, supra note 153. 
168 Id.
169 Id. at 18. 
170 Id., at 19. 
171 Id. at 19–20 (“The panel of  three officers also had the responsibility of  dividing the detainees into 
separate categories: High Level Enemy Combatant (HLEC); Low Level Enemy Combatant (LLEC); and 
Threat only. Those who were to be released were categorized as No Longer Enemy Combatant (NLEC). 
As the UECRB worked its way through the [sic] hundred detainees in the BTIF, the files of  all detainees 
assessed as LLECs were transferred to the DAB. The DAB, comprised of  military intelligence analysts 
and military criminal investigators, assessed the detainee files for potential transfer to Afghan authorities 
for prosecution. To support the Rule of  Law mission, the DAB would only recommend transfer of  cases 
for prosecution if  there was solid evidence. Those detainees not recommended for transfer remained 
interned until their next review in six months.”). 
172  As of  2010. Bovarnick, supra note 153, at 22. The U.N. Sec. Council Res. 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 
1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1817, 1890, 1917, 1943, & 2011. 
173  Hum. Rts. First, Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic Priorities 2–3 
(2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Fixing-Bagram-110409.
pdf  (“On the other hand, similarities between the DRBs and the discredited Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CSRTs) in Guantánamo are cause for concern. Specific problems with the CSRTs that may 
also arise in the DRBs involve enforcement of  detainees’ entitlement to exculpatory information and 
their ability to review and challenge the evidence against them and produce their own evidence, including 
426
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
witnesses, all in the absence of  entitlement to legal representation or independent review of  their 
detention.”). 
174  Bovarnick, supra note 153, at 22–24. 
175 Id. 
176 See Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/asia/16bagram.html
177  Bovarnick, supra note 153, at 23 (“Since March 2010, the inclusion of  Afghan witness testimony 
has had a noticeable impact on the DRB process, not only in terms of  logistics, but also in the frequency 
of  releases for detainees supported by witness testimony.”).
178  Hum. Rts. First, Detained and Denied in Afghanistan 2 (May 2011) [hereinafter Detained and Denied], 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Detained-Denied-in-Afghanistan.
pdf  (“Former detainees we interviewed repeatedly emphasized that they believed they were wrongly 
imprisoned based on false information provided to U.S. forces by personal, family or tribal enemies, a 
view that they took back to their villages after their eventual release. Afghan lawyers and human rights 
workers confirmed that this is a big problem in Afghanistan, as have recent news reports.”). 
179 Id. at 3. 
180  Bovarnick, supra note 153, at 35 (“During roughly the same period — 6 March to 18 June 
2010 — a total of  581 DRBs were conducted. In the 404 cases where no witnesses appeared, the 
board recommended continued interment in 55% of  the cases. In the 177 cases, which involved either 
live or telephonic witnesses, the continued interment rates were considerably lower: 43% and 48% 
respectively.”). 
181 Id. (“In large part, that is because the detainees are not represented by legal counsel in these 
proceedings, known as Detainee Review Boards. The detainees’ ‘personal representatives’ are uniformed 
U.S. soldiers with no legal background or training in the culture or language of  the detainees they 
represent. Moreover, with only 15 such representatives assigned to Bagram at the time of  this report, each 
representative is responsible for the defense of  more than 100 detainees.”). 
182 Id. (“Moreover, while most forensic evidence, which is more likely to be reliable, is not classified, 
evidence provided by informants, which is far more difficult to verify, is classified. These informants are 
never tested. It is also impossible to know if  the classified evidence includes statements elicited from the 
detainee or from witnesses by coercion, torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, despite the 
military’s rule excluding tortured evidence. Such evidentiary rules can only be enforced if  the evidence 
can be tested in a truly adversarial system.”); Hum. Rts. First, Undue Process: An Examination of  Detention and 
Trials of  Bagram Detainees in April 2009 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/HRF-Undue-Process-Afghanistan-web.pdf
183 Detained and Denied, supra note 178, at 4. 
184  Larisa Epatko, Detention Centers in Iraq Move from “Chaos” to Reform, PBS NewsHour (June 20, 
2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/jan-june08/
detainees_06-20.html; Gerry J. Gilmore, Iraq Detention Centers Give Glimpse Into al-Qaida, General Says, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERV. (June 9, 2008); Scott Horton, Inside a Secret DOD Prison in Afghanistan, HARPER’S (Oct. 
19, 2010), available at http://harpers.org/blog/2010/10/inside-a-secret-dod-prison-in-afghanistan; 
Joshua Partlow, U.S. Gives Tour of  New Afghan Detention Center, WASH. POST, (Nov. 16, 2009), available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-16/world/36829899_1_detention-center-detainees-





Schmitt, Afghan Prison Poses Problem in Overhaul of  Detainee Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/washington/27bagram.html; W. Thomas Smith Jr., The New 
Counterinsurgency Front: A Conversation with Sen. Lindsay Graham, NAT. REV. (Sept. 4, 2007), available at http://
www.nationalreview.com/articles/222008/new-counterinsurgency-front/w-thomas-smith-jr; Doug 
Stanton, Postcard from Parwan, TIME (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,2008892,00.html
185  Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, Speech at U.S. Institute of  Peace (June 11, 2008), available at http://
www.usip.org/events/major-general-douglas-stone-mnf-i-deputy-commanding-general-detainee-
operations; DOD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Doug Stone (June 9, 2008); Rubin, supra note 176.
186  Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Seeks to Overhaul Prisons in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/world/asia/20detain.html 
187  Andrew Woods, “Good Muslim, Good Citizen” And Other Lesson Plans from Iraq Prisons, SLATE (Jan. 23, 
2009) available at http://www.slate.com/articles/life/faithbased/2008/07/good_muslim_good_citizen.
html (“Prisons are where so many Islamist identities are born, nurtured, and plugged into violent 
networks. It was in Cairo’s prisons that Sayyid Qutb crafted an intellectual framework for modern 
Islamist terrorism, and Ayman al-Zawahiri underwent the transformation that would lead him to launch 
al-Qaida. … And now, along comes a Marine reservist from California, hard as hell, McKinsey-savvy, 
who claims he can turn detention facilities into a strategic asset.”). 
188  Maria Yager, Empowered Detainees to Leave Detention Facility in Parwan with New Knowledge, U.S. Cent. 
Command (Feb. 6, 2011), available at http://www.centcom.mil/news/empowered-detainees-to-leave-
detention-facility-in-parwan-with-new-knowledge
189 Id. 
190  Afghanistan Indep. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Press Release, Situation of  Economic and Social Rights 
in Afghanistan (Dec. 10, 2011), available at http://www.aihrc.org.af/en/press-release/514/situation-of-
economic-and-social-rights.html 
191  DOD Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 61 (Nov. 2010), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf  
192  DOD Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 81 (Apr. 2012), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf
193  Julian E. Barnes & Adam Entous, U.S. Looks to Set Size of  Afghan Presence After 2014, WALL STREET J. 
(Nov. 26, 2012).
194  McChrystal Assessment, supra note 161, at § 2-7, p. 15. 
195  GAO Report (GAO-05-575), Afghanistan Security, (June 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d05575.pdf




198 Id.; see also Charlie Savage & Graham Bowley, U.S. to Retain Role as a Jailer in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/asia/us-will-hold-part-of-
afghan-prison-after-handover.html
428
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
199 Id.
200  Open Soc’y Founds., supra note 155, at 3. 
201 Id. at 4.
202 See Matthew Rosenberg, Deal Close on Night Raids, U.S. and Afghan Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/world/asia/deal-to-continue-afghanistan-
night-raids-is-near.html; Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Transfers Control of  Night Raids to Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
8, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/world/asia/deal-reached-on-controversial-
afghan-night-raids.html
203  Task Force staff  interviews (Nov. 2012).
204  Afghanistan Indep. Hum. Rts. Comm’n + Open Society Founds. Torture, Transfers, and Denial of  




206  Brad Adams, Rewarding Afghanistan’s Torturers?, CNN (Sept. 10, 2012) available at http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/10/rewarding-afghanistans-torturers
207  Alissa J. Rubin, After a Reassessment, NATO Resumes Sending Detainees to Afghanistan Jails, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/nato-resumes-transferring-
detainees-to-afghan-prisons.html
208  U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: One 
Year On at 2 (Jan. 20, 2013), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5
b37o%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US
209 Id.
210  Open Soc’y Founds., supra note 155, at 4.
211  Savage & Bowley, supra note 198.
212 Id.
213  House Armed Servs. Comm. Press Release, Chairman Buck McKeon and Chairman Lamar 
Smith Comment On Iraq’s Decision to Release Ali Mussa Daqduq (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://
armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2012/8/chairman-buck-mckeon-and-chairman-lamar-smith-
comment-on-iraq-s-decision-to-release-ali-mussa-daqduq
214  Task Force staff  interview with Senator Lindsey Graham (June 12, 2012).
215  Rod Norland, Karzai Orders Afghan Forces to Take Control of  American-Built Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 






1 DOD Office of  Inspector Gen., Review of  DOD-Directed Investigations of  Detainee Abuse 81 (Aug. 2006) 
(Report No. 06-INTEL-10) [hereinafter DOD IG Report], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/abuse.pdf
2  Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Inquiry into the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody 
19 (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Levin Report], available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf
3 Id. at 163.
4 Id. at 162.
5 Id. at 163.
6 Id. 
7  DOJ Office of  Inspector Gen., A Review of  the FBI’s Involvement In and Observations of  Detainee 
Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq 241–42 (May 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/s0805/final.pdf
8  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., CID Report of  Investigation No. 0176-2004-CID259-80265 
at 11–14 [hereinafter Al-Ani CID file], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/
DOD054697.pdf
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id. at 3, 28–29.
11 Id. at 73.
12  U.S. Army Inspector Gen., Interview of  Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington at 5 (Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Herrington Army OIG interview], available at http://detaineetaskforce.org
13  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 160-61; DOD IG Report, supra note 1, at 26.
14  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 161.
15  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Authorization of  Survival Evasion 
Resistance and Escape (SERE) Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq at 25 (Testimony of  Col. Randy Moulton) 
(Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Moulton Testimony], available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
Transcripts/2008/09%20September/A%20Full%20Committee/08-69%20-%209-25-08.pdf
16  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 160. Koenig’s name is redacted from the report but he was later 
identified in congressional testimony by Col. Randy Moulton, supra note 15.
17  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 160.
18 Id.
19  Moulton Testimony, supra note 15, at 21. 
20  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 170-71.
430
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
21  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Steven Kleinman (June 19, 2012) [hereinafter Kleinman 
Interview].
22  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 176.
23 Id.; Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Authorization of  Survival Evasion 
Resistance and Escape (SERE) Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq at 13 (Testimony of  Col. Steven Kleinman) 
(Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Kleinman Testimony], available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
Transcripts/2008/09%20September/A%20Full%20Committee/08-69%20-%209-25-08.pdf
24  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 176–78. Russell later told Senate Armed Service Committee staff  
that Kleinman should have intervened through the interrogator’s chain of  command. Id.
25  Kleinman Testimony, supra at note 23, at 14.
26  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 179. 
27  Kleinman Testimony, supra note 23, at 19.
28 Id.
29  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 181–82.
30 Id. at 182.
31  Kleinman Interview, supra note 21. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. Levin Report, supra note 2, at 186.
34  Kleinman Interview, supra note 21.
35  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 193-94.
36  Kleinman Interview, supra note 21.
37  Terrence Russell Trip Report (Sept. 30, 2003), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/404703-jpra-10-11.html
38  Stuart Herrington, Report of  CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Herrington 
Report] [on file with The Constitution Project].
39 Id.
40  Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In Secret Unit’s ‘Black Room,’ a Grim Portrait of  U.S. Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/
middleeast/19abuse.html/
41 Id.; Herrington Report, supra note 38.
42  Herrington Army OIG interview, supra note 12, at 9–10.
43 HUM. RTS. WATCH, “NO BLOOD, NO FOUL”: SOLDIERS’ ACCOUNTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE IN IRAQ 11 




44 Id. at 14.
45 Id. at 7–8.
46 Id. at 13.
47 Id. at 16–17.
48  Task Force staff  interview with Angela Birt (July 20, 2011).
49 Emails between Gary Bald, Valerie Caproni, Edward Lueckenhoff  and Others, Report of  Possible 
Detainee Abuse at Temporary Holding Facility, (THF) 6-26 Outstation (June–July 2004), available at http://www.
thetorturedatabase.org/document/emails-between-gary-bald-valerie-caproni-edward-lueckenhoff-and-
others-re-report-possible
50 Memorandum from Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby (Dir., DIA) to Stephen Cambone (Undersecretary 
of  Defense for Intelligence), Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6 Personnel (June 25, 2004), available at http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/DOD%202596-0297.pdf
51  Memorandum from Stephen Cambone (Undersecretary of  Defense for Intelligence) to Lt. 
Gen. William Boykin (June 26, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2006/03/19/
international/19abuse_CA0ready.html
52  Schmitt & Marshall, supra note 40.
53  DOD IG Report, supra note 1, at 16. 
54  Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/24/040524fa_fact
55 Id.
56 Pentagon: Hersh Report “Journalist Malpractice,” CNN (May 17, 2004), available at http://articles.
cnn.com/2004-05-17/world/iraq.abuse.main_1_cia-program-intelligence-official-abu-ghraib?_
s=PM:WORLD
57 ANTHONY SHAFFER, OPERATION DARK HEART (2010) (unredacted version), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/news/2010/09/dark-contrast.pdf. The reference to “Copper Green” has been removed 
from most copies of  the book. The Army initially approved Shaffer’s book for publication with minor 
redactions. After the first printing, however, the DIA and NSA read the book, and decided that much 
more of  the book needed to be deleted or redacted. The Department of  Defense purchased and 
destroyed the first printing of  approximately 10,000 copies, but was not able to destroy advance review 
copies that were already circulating.
58 MARC AMBINDER & D.B. GRADY, THE COMMAND: DEEP INSIDE THE PRESIDENT’S SECRET ARMY 
(2012). 
59  Al-Ani CID file, supra note 8, at 99.
60  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., CID Report of  Investigation No. 0213-2004-CID259-80520 at 
79, available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD044418.pdf
61  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., CID Report of  Investigation No. 031-03-CID899-63493 at 78 
[hereinafter Dababa CID file], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/cid-report-
death-0031-03-cid899-63493/
432
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
62 Id. at 296. See also id. at 44, 539. 
63 Id. at 213; Office of  the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Autopsy Examination Report, Autopsy No. 
ME03-273 (May 11, 2004) [hereinafter Autopsy, Dababa], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.
org/document/autopsy-report-45-year-old-iraqi-male-iraq-homicide-death-certificate-included
64  Dababa CID file, supra note 61, at 338.
65  Autopsy, Dababa, supra note 63.
66  Dababa CID file, supra note 61, at 18–19, 30, 126
67 Id. at 15–16, 149, 156
68 Id. at 16–19, 26–30, 53, 55, 132
69 Id. at 275.
70 Id. at 248.
71  John McChesney, Documents Shed Light on Abu Ghraib Death, NPR (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4979183; Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/11/14/051114fa_fact
72  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., File No. 0237-03-CID259-61219 at 47–48 [hereinafter 
Jamadi CID file], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOACID009482.
pdf; Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 71.
73 Id.
74  McChesney, supra note 71.
75 Id.
76  Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 71.
77  McChesney, supra note 71.
78  Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 71.
79 Id.
80  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Steve Stormoen, Former CIA Official, Under Scrutiny in Abu 
Ghraib Prisoner Death, HUFFINGTON POST (AP) (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/07/13/steve-stormoen-former-cia-officer-abu-ghraib-death-_n_896810.html
81  DOJ Press Release, Statement of  Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of  Investigation into the Interrogation of  
Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-1067.html
82  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., Interview of  Charles Graner, at 247 [on file with The 
Constitution Project].
83 Id. at 273–74.




Investigative Div., CID Interview of  Charles Graner, supra note 82, at 272–73.
85  Abu Ghraib MP logbook, supra note 84, at 16.
86 Id. at 24.
87  Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 71.
88  Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of  the 800th Military Police Brigade 27 (May 2004) 
[hereinafter Taguba Report], available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf
89  Maj. Gen. George Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of  the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and the 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade 44–45 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Fay Report], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf
90  Jamadi CID file, supra note 72, at 96.
91 Id. 
92 Id.
93  Josh White, Documents Tell of  Brutal Improvisation by GIs, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201941.html
94 Id.
95  Jon Sarche & Dan Elliott, CIA Role Remains a Mystery at Army Court Martial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 
22, 2006), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0122-08.htm; Court-Martial Record, 
United States v. Welshofer, 118–21 (Testimony of  unidentified witness).
96  Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 95.
97 Id. at 134–36 (Testimony of  Jerry Loper).
98 Id. at 53–54 (Testimony of  Jefferson Williams).
99 Id. at 101–02 (Testimony of  Todd Sonnek).
100 Id. at 177 (Testimony of  Lewis Welshofer).
101 GEORGE TENET & BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 388 (2007).
102 See generally Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 95.
103  Office of  the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report No. ME03-571 (Dec. 18, 2003) [Abed 
Hamid Mowhoush Autopsy] available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/autopsy-report-
56-year-old-iraqi-male-al-qaim-iraq-homicide-death-certificate-included/
104  Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 95, at 52–54, 64–66, 69–74, 104–05.
105  Record of  Article 32 Investigation, United States v. Williams, Sommer, and Loper at 51–52, available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/84994/02795_041202_001.pdf/
106  Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 95, at 93.
434
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
107 Death of  a General, CBS News (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18560_162-1476781.html 
108  Office of  the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report No. ME04-14 (Apr. 30, 2004) [Abdul 
Jameel autopsy], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/autopsy-report-47-year-old-
male-al-asad-iraq-homicide-0009-04-cid679-83486-death/
109  Detainee Autopsy Summary (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/
get/2041/78954/02668_040923_002.pdf. “OGA,” an abbreviation for “Other Government Agency,” 
usually refers to the CIA. In this case, though, the CID investigation into Abdul Jameel’s death shows that 
he was interrogated by Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 525, of  the 5th Special Forces Groups, 
and “OGA” may be a mistaken transcription of  “ODA”. However, there is a press report of  possible CIA 
involvement in Jameel’s death, and several pages of  the CID file are absent as they are “civilian agency 
records.” U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., File No. 009-04-CID679-83486 at 392 [hereinafter 
Jameel CID file], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/cid-report-death-009-04-
cid679-83486
110  The hyoid bone is located in the neck, and is frequently fractured in homicides caused by 
strangulation.
111  Jameel CID file, supra note 109, at 119.
112 Id. at 59, 67.
113 Id. at 99 (medical examiners stated that detainee had an unhealthy heart); 101 (witness believed 
detainee to be “at least seventy years old and emotionally unsound”); 123 (description of  detainee as an 
“old man”); 301 (detainee told medical screeners that he was diabetic and had high blood pressure).
114 Id. at 202, 358
115 Id.
116 Id. at 5, 9.
117 Id. at 326.
118 Id. at 9.
119 Id. at 95.
120  U.S. Army CID Press Release, Army Criminal Investigators Outline 27 Confirmed or Suspected Detainee 
Homicides for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom (Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://www.cid.
army.mil/Documents/OIF-OEF%20Homicides.pdf
121  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., File No. 0537-04-CID034-72601 at 52 [hereinafter Jan 4, 
2004 death CID file], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/cid-report-death-0537-
04-cid034-72601.







126 Id. at 52.
127 Id. at 65, 88.
128  Task Force staff  interview with John Rizzo (Aug. 2, 2012).
129 Id.
130  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, At CIA, Grave Mistakes, Then Promotions, ASSOCIATED PRESS (FEB. 
9, 2011); available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/9/ap-cia-grave-mistakes-then-
promotions; Goldman & Apuzzo, Steve Stormoen, supra note 80.
131  GEN. (RET.) STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, MY SHARE OF THE TASK 199–200 (2013).
132 Id. at 227.
133 Id.
134 DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN 
SECURITY STATE 248 (2011),
135  Rod Hafemeister, Spec-Ops General Said to Be Retiring in Secrecy, AIR FORCE TIMES (Jan. 26, 2004), 
available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-AIRPAPER-2559575.php
136 MCCHRYSTAL, supra note 131, at 228.
137 MARK URBAN, TASK FORCE BLACK 87 (2011).
138 MCCHRYSTAL, supra note 131, at 229.
139 Id. 
140 URBAN, supra note 137, at 87.
141 Id. at 87. 
142 Id. at 187.
143 MCCHRYSTAL, supra note 131, at 229.
144  Richard Formica, Article 15-6 Investigation of  CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations 46–48 
(Nov. 2004) [“Formica Report”], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/
dod054971.pdf
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 48–49, 72–73.
147  Interviews with detainees (conducted by Katherine Hawkins et al. in Istanbul, Turkey, July 2007) 




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
150 Id.
151 MCCHRYSTAL, supra note 131, at 230.
152 Id. at 231.
153 Id.




157 MARC AMBINDER & D.B. GRADY, THE COMMAND: DEEP INSIDE THE PRESIDENT’S SECRET ARMY (2012)
158  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Testimony of  Donald Rumsfeld (May 7, 2004).
159 RICARDO S. SANCHEZ WITH DONALD T. PHILLIPS, WISER IN BATTLE: A SOLDIER’S STORY 220 (2008).
160  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 166–67.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 169–70.
163 Id. at 191–97.
164 SANCHEZ, supra note 159, at 266.
165  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Testimony of  Col. Marc Warren (May 19, 2004). 
166  Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Disputed Protected Status of  Prisoners Held in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (May 
23, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/reach-war-prisoners-us-military-
disputed-protected-status-prisoners-held-iraq.html?ref=janiskarpinski/
167  Levin Report, supra note 2, at 203–04.
168 Id. at 204–05.
169 CHRISTOPHER GRAVELINE & MICHAEL CLEMENS, THE SECRETS OF ABU GHRAIB REVEALED: AMERICAN 
SOLDIERS ON TRIAL 283 (2010). 
170 Id. at 121–22.
171  Fay Report, supra note 89, at 71.
172  Taguba Report, supra note 88, at 18.
173  Task Force staff  interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Antonio Taguba (Apr. 26, 2012).
174  Taguba has said to New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh that he believed his military career hit a 
dead end as a result of  his report. See Seymour Hersh, The General’s Report, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2007), 




this to Task Force staff, and recounted that that shortly before his retirement a higher ranking general, 
someone he described as an old friend, had called him and told him, “you know you’re blacklisted.”
175 PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (2008).
176  The interview appears in TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE (2007).
177  Fay Report, supra note 89, at 89.
178 Id. at 88.
179 Id. at 90.
180  Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross, Report of  the ICRC on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of  Prisoners of  War 





184  Letter reprinted in GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 175, at 110–11.
185  Interview with Sabrina Harman (conducted by Katherine Hawkins et al. in Washington, D.C. in 
2007) [notes on file with The Constitution Project]. 
186 Id. 
187  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division, Interview of  Charles Graner, supra note 82, at 223.
188 Id.
189  Statement of  Amjad Ismail Waleed (Jan. 21, 2004), redacted copy available at http://media.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/10.pdf
190  Taguba Report, supra note 88, at 18; Fay Report, supra note 89, at 74-75. Waleed is referred to as 
“Detainee-07” in the Fay Report.
191  Translated deposition testimony of  Amjad Ismail Waleed, United States v. Harman (Feb. 2005) [on file 
with The Constitution Project]. 
192  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., Interview of  Charles Graner, supra note 82, at 166–67.
193  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., Interview of  Ivan Frederick at 44–45, 49–50, 84–85 [on file 
with The Constitution Project]. 
194  Court-Martial Record, United States v. Smith, at 469–70 (Testimony of  Ivan Frederick).
195 United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
196  Interview of  Ivan Frederick, supra note 193, at 101.
197  Richard A. Serrano, Two Army Dog Handlers Charged in Abuse Scandal, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2005), 
438
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/03/nation/na-dogs3
198  Mark Benjamin & Michael Scherer, Big Steve and Abu Ghraib, SALON (Mar. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.salon.com/2006/03/31/big_steve/
199 J. PHILLIP LONDON, OUR GOOD NAME: A COMPANY’S FIGHT TO DEFEND ITS HONOR AND GET THE 
TRUTH TOLD ABOUT ABU GHRAIB 396 (2008). 
200  Taguba Report, supra note 88, at 48; Fay Report, supra note 89, at 86–87, 89, 91, 134. Stefanowicz 
is referred to as “Civilian-21” in the Fay Report. 
201  Fay Report, supra note 89, at 4–5.
202  Statement of  Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee No. 150542 (Jan. 17, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/150542-1.pdf
203  Statement of  Ameen Sa’eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee No. 151362 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/151362.pdf
204  Statement of  Thaar Salman Dawood, Detainee No. 150427 (Jan. 17, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/150427.pdf
205  Statement of  Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee No. 7787 (Jan. 17, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/7787.pdf
206  Statement of  Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee No. 152259 (Jan. 17, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/152529.pdf
207  Statement of  Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee No. 151108 (Jan. 18, 2004), available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/151108.pdf
208  Task force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington (June 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
Herrington Interview]. 
209  Herrington Report, supra note 38.
210  Herrington Interview, supra note 208.
211  Joshua E.S. Phillips & Michael Montgomery, What Killed Sergeant Gray?, Am. RadioWorks (Jan. 
2010), available at http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/vets/transcriptb.html. 
212 TONY LAGOURANIS & ALLEN MIKAELIAN, FEAR UP HARSH 79–80 (2007).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 80.
215 JOSHUA E.S. PHILLIPS, NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE 95 (2010).
216  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Div., CID Report of  Investigation No. 0046-04-CID389-80649-5H9B 
[hereinafter Mohammed CID file] at 10, 39, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/
pdf/DOD050584.pdf
217  Office of  the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Autopsy No. ME04-309 (June 23, 2004) [hereinafter 






219  Memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] Commander, Naval Special Warfare Task Group, 
Preliminary Inquiry into Death of  [redacted] (Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/
files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD056947.pdf
220  Josh White, 3 More Navy SEALS Face Abuse Charges, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48674-2004Sep24.html
221  No Blood, No Foul, supra note 43, at 45. 
222  PHILLIPS, supra note 215, at 95–96.
223 Former U.S. Army Interrogator Describes the Harsh Techniques He Used in Iraq, Detainee Abuse by Marines 
and Navy Seals and Why “Torture is the Worst Possible Thing We Could Do,” Democracy Now! (Nov. 15, 2005), 
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/11/15/former_u_s_army_interrogator_describes
224 NO BLOOD, NO FOUL, supra note 43; John Richardson, Acts of  Conscience, ESQUIRE (Sept, 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0806TERROR_102
225 NO BLOOD, NO FOUL, supra note 43.
226 Id.
227 Id. 
228 HUM. RTS. WATCH, LEADERSHIP FAILURE: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF TORTURE OF IRAQI DETAINEES 
BY THE U.S. ARMY’S 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION 1-17 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2005/us0905/us0905.pdf
229 Id. at 11.
230 Id. at 16
231 Id. 
232 Letter from Capt. Ian Fishback to Sen. John McCain (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/27/AR2005092701527.html 
233  LEADERSHIP FAILURE, supra note 228, at 17–18.
234  PHILLIPS, supra note 215.
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 101.
237 Id. at 106.
238 DOUGLAS A. PRYER, THE FIGHT FOR THE HIGH GROUND: THE U. S. ARMY AND INTERROGATION 
DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I, MAY 2003–APRIL 2004(2009).
239  Albert T. Church III, Review of  Dep’t of  Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogations (Mar. 
440
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
2005) 292–93, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file625_26068.pdf
240 Id. 





245  Ctr. for Hum. Rts. & Global Justice, Hum. Rts. Watch, and Hum. Rts. First, By the Numbers: Findings 
of  the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdf/06425-etn-by-the-numbers.pdf
246 Id.




250  Thom Shanker, With Troop Rise, Iraqi Detainees Soar in Number, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/25/world/middleeast/25detain.html?_r=0
251  Task Force staff  interview with Lt. Gen. Jack Gardner (July 26, 2011) 
252 Id. 
253  Brandenburg Interview, supra note 247.
254  Task Force staff  interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Douglas Stone (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Stone 
Interview].
255 Id.
256 E.g., Autopsy Report of  Mohammed M. Kadr (May 24, 2005) (Army MEDCOM 349–59); 
Autopsy Report of  Amer Mussa/Muhammed (Aug. 15, 2006) (Army MEDCOM 502–08); Autopsy 
Report of  Rasoul Jabal Daraj (Oct. 4, 2006) (Army MEDCOM 595–602); Autopsy Report of  Hamed 
Ali Mohamed (June 29, 2006) (Army MEDCOM 641–55); Autopsy Report of  Marwan Taha Ahmad 
(Jan. 23, 2008) (Army MEDCOM 722–31); Autopsy Report of  Layith Husayn Khalaf  Al Fahadawi 
(Nov. 29, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 732–42); Autopsy Report of  Mohammed Khudayer Abdulla (Nov. 
29, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 768–76); Autopsy Report of  Muhammad Qusay Khalid (Oct. 30, 2007) 
(Army MEDCOM 813–21), Autopsy Report of  Hader Ali Hussein (Sept. 4, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 
822–31); Autopsy Report of  Mohammed Hashim Abdul Rahim (July 30, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 
833–44); Autopsy Report of  Mohammed Anwar Abdulkarim (May 23, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 895–
903); Autopsy Report of  Umar Sa’ad Nassir Jabrin (May 11, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 914–23); Autopsy 
Report of  Khayri Naim Muhammad (July 6, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 924–32); Autopsy Report of  
Husayn Uwayyid Kazim (Aug. 25, 2008) (Army MEDCOM 980–87); Autopsy Report of  Husayn Kazim 




257  Kim Gamel, US Military: Inmates in Iraq Imposed Islamic Justice, USA TODAY (AP) (July 26, 2008), 
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-07-26-1981329628_x.htm
258  Stone Interview, supra note 254.
259  Gamel, supra note 257.
260  Autopsy Report of  Mohammed Ajimi al-Isawi (Sept. 4, 2007) (Army MEDCOM 785–93).
261  Stone Interview, supra note 254.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264  Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Military reforms its prisons in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2008), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/world/africa/01iht-detain.4.13375130.html?pagewanted=all
265 Iraq in Transition, PBS NewsHour (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/jan-june08/detainees_06-20.html; Elizabeth Detwiler, Iraq: 
Positive Change in the Detention System, U.S. Inst. of  Peace (July 2008), available at http://www.usip.org/
files/resources/USIP_0708.PDF; Vasilios Tasikas, The Battlefield Inside the Wire: Detention Operations under 
Major General Douglas Stone, MIL. REV. (Sept.–Oct. 2009), available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/
MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091031_art011.pdf
266 Id.
267  Stone Interview, supra note 254.
268  There was one exception: Ali Omar Ibrahim al-Mohemmed Amin, a journalist who was arrested 
multiple times. He acknowledged that he had fought against Americans and fought for the insurgency. He 
did not know if  he had ever injured or killed anybody, and the leader of  his group told him he was not 
a competent soldier, but “[o]nce I burned a Bradley vehicle,” he said. He said he had been honest with 
interrogators about his involvement in the insurgency. Task Force staff  interview with Ali Omar Ibrahim 
al-Mohammed al-Amin (Aug. 25, 2012).
269  Task Force staff  interview with Nuri Nejem Abdullah (Aug. 27, 2012).
270 Id.
271 Id. 
272  Task force staff  interviews with Saad Rahim Abdelalratha (Sept. 1, 2012); Mohammed Abdlwarida 
(Aug. 25, 2012); Nuri Nejem Abdullah (Aug. 27, 2012); Tay Rahm Addularida (Aug. 27, 2012); Tamer 
Abdullah Abass al-Ameri (Aug. 28, 2012); Ali Omar Ibrahim al-Mohammed al-Amin (Aug. 25, 2012); 
Saddam Rahm (Aug. 28, 2012). There are troubling reports made by some Iraqis in interviews with 
Task Force staff  that U.S. forces who came to their homes to make arrests also pilfered valuables. The 
accounts of  Iraqi detainees as to what they claim was taken are specific and explicit, although there is 
no feasible way to properly evaluate what are only uncorroborated allegations. Of  the more than two 
dozen Iraqis interviewed about their detention experiences, about a third reported that during the raids 
that led to their arrests, some soldiers took cash or gold, which Iraqis typically keep in their homes. One 
man said that at the time of  his arrest, soldiers took cash, gold and a locked safe. He said he saw the safe 
later at the detention center to which he had been taken and that it had been broken open. He said that 
all the money and gold that had been in the safe was returned to him later but not the money and gold 
taken during the raid. Lt. Col. Todd Breasseale, a Defense Department spokesman said in response to a 
442
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
request for comment that, “Allegations of  this sort became a kind of  cottage industry for a minority of  
those affected and are not only absolutely baseless but simply do not withstand meaningful, intellectual 
rigor.’’ The Task Force emphasizes that it takes no position on the veracity of  these uncorroborated 
allegations. Nonetheless, the Task Force thought it appropriate to note the existence of  these reports for 
several reasons. They would be criminal violations of  the Uniform Code of  Military Justice and cannot 
be dismissed as implausible on their face. And, to whatever extent any of  the accounts might be true, it 
would signify a lack of  proper supervision and a failure of  command discipline, which comports with 
documented and lamentable failures in the military command structure that the Task Force believes 
contributed to many of  the verifiable incidents of  physical abuse and torture that occurred.
273  Task force staff  interview with Saddam Rahm (Aug. 28, 2012). 





1 MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’ WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
CONFLICT IN THE GULF (1995).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3 Id. amend. XIV. 
4 Id. amend. VIII.
5  Rochin v. Calif., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See also Michael John Garcia, Interrogation of  Detainees: 
Overview of  the McCain Amendment, CRS Report RS22312 (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.au.af.mil/
au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs22312.pdf
6  The Geneva Conventions were ratified by the United States in 1955. The four Conventions 
include: First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (first adopted 1864, last revision in 1949) [hereinafter GCI]; Second Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  
Armed Forces at Sea (first adopted in 1949, successor of  the 1907 Hague Convention X) [hereinafter 
GCII]; Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War (first adopted in 1929, 
last revision 1949) [hereinafter GCIII]; Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian 
Persons in Time of  War (first adopted in 1949) [hereinafter GCIV]. The two Conventions applicable to 
detainees are the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. 
7  The law of  war is referred to as “international humanitarian law” (IHL) and the law of  armed 
conflict (LOAC). Those terms are used interchangeably in this report. 
8 See ICRC, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_reaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf
9  The Geneva Conventions were adopted on August 12, 1949, and ratified by the United States in 
February 1955. 
10  Jennifer Elsea, Lawfulness of  Interrogation Techniques under the Geneva Conventions, CRS Report RL32567, 
18 (Sept. 8, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32567.pdf  (citing the ICRC Commentary 
to the Geneva Conventions III, at 140). 
11  ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of  12 Aug. 1949, Vol IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of  Civilian Persons in the Time of  War 51 (Jean de Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter Commentary to GCIV]. 
12 See supra note 6. 
13  ICRC, U.S. Ratification Statement and Reservations (Feb. 8, 1955), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.
nsf/NORM/D6B53F5B5D14F35AC1256402003F9920 
14  Senate Foreign Rel. Comm. (84th Cong.) Hearing on Geneva Conventions for the Protection of  War Victims 
3–4 (1955) (statement of  Robert Murphy). See also Josef  Kunz, The Chaotic Status of  the Law of  War and 
the Urgent Necessity for their Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 57–60 (1951) (stating that the U.S. “actively 
supported” the initiative of  the International Red Cross in revising the Geneva Conventions following 
WWII). 
15  At a speech commemorating the Geneva Conventions’ 60th anniversary at the Library of  
Congress, Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., noted: “We embrace the Geneva Conventions 
because it is the right thing to do. … We embrace them because hard experiences have taught us that 
444
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
we are safer and stronger when we do. The United States will support and advance international 
humanitarian law, both as a matter of  national policy and as a basic precept for the entire international 
community.” Kimberly Rieken, Honoring the Geneva Conventions (Jan.–Feb. 2010), available at http://www.loc.
gov/loc/lcib/10012/conference.html
16 See Army Reg. 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of  War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other 
Detainees § 1-5(a)(2) (1997); Dep’t of  the Army, Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of  Land Warfare, ch. 
3, § I, ¶ 71 (1956) (adopting art. 5 verbatim). 
17  James F. Gebhardt, The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience, MIL. REV. 44, 
50 (Jan.–Feb. 2005) (quoting U.S. Army Field Manual, 1976 ed.).
18 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996). 
19  GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV art. 3.
20 Id. 
21 Id. art. 3(1). 
22 Id. art. 3(1)(a)–(d). 
23 Id. art. 3(1).
24  GCIII.
25  GCIV. 
26  Commentary to GCIII art. 3 ¶ 1(1)(A).
27 Id. 
28  GCIII art. 2. 
29 Id. art. 3 (Note that no statuses apply here in the only provision addressing noninternational armed 
conflict). 
30  GCIV.
31  GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV art. 3.
32  Customary international law (CIL), which emerges from a general and consistent practice of  states 
followed out of  a sense of  legal obligation, is binding on all states irrespective of  implementing domestic 
legislation or treaty ratification. CIL is considered binding international law within the United States. See 
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9, 1949); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900) (holding that “International Law is part of  our law.”).
33  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (quoting the ICRC’s own interpretation of  
Common Art. 3); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 523 (June 27). 
The same conclusion was reached by the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
for Rwanda. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 98 (Oct. 2, 
1995); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-




34  GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV art. 3(1)(a)–(d) (emphasis added). Common Article 3 also prohibits 
hostage taking and requires care for the wounded and sick. These provisions are not quoted since they 
have lesser application to detainees. 
35 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
65-74 (August 10, 1995) (finding that Common Art. 3 applied to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
whether or not that conflict was characterized as international or internal in scope. And, stating that 
Common Art. 3 sets forth “the most fundamental requirements of  the law of  war”); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14 (June 27) (stating that “[t]here is 
no doubt that, in the event of  international armed conflicts, [the provisions of  Article 3] constitute a 
minimum yardstick. … Because the minimum rules applicable to international and non-international 
conflicts are identical, there is no need to address the question whether [the actions alleged to be in 
violation of  Common Art. 3] must be looked at in the context of  the rules which operate for one or for 
the other category of  conflict.”). 
36 Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
37 GCIII arts. 17, 87, 130 (designating torture as a “grave breach” of  the Geneva Conventions); 
GCIV arts. 32, 147 (same as Article 130 from GCIII); U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
CAT], art. 4, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A; 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A).
38 See, e.g., CAT, supra note 37, art. 7; GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV art. 3(1)(c); 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(b). 
39  In subsequent laws these concepts are generally stated together as a ban on “Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading treatment.” For purposes of  brevity this report will shorthand this as “CID.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2441(d)(1)(B); CAT, supra note 37, art. 16. 
40  CAT, supra note 37, arts. 5, 7. 
41  GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV art. 3(1)(d). 
42 ICRC, 1 CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 355 (2005). 
43 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–33 (stating that the definition of  “regularly constituted” is specific to the 
U.S., and in the U.S., courts-martial, not military commissions, are the “regularly constituted” courts. 
As such, the latter can be used only if  there is a practical need for their deviation from that which is 
“regularly constituted.” In Hamdan, the Supreme Court in 2006 held that the government failed to show 
such a practical need.).
44  GCIII art. 3. 
45 Id. art. 4. 
46 Id. art. 5.
47 Id. arts. 2–78. 
48 Id. art. 4. 
49 Id. art. 4(A)(1). 
50 Id. art. 4(A)(2)(a)–(d). 
446
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
51 Id. art. 5. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. art. 13.
54 Id. art. 17. 
55 Id., e.g., arts. 21–32, 34–38, 82–107. 
56  Civilians are defined, in Art. 50(1) Additional Protocol I of  1977, as individuals not belonging to 
one of  the categories of  persons referred to in Art. 4(A)(1),(2),(3), and (6) of  GCIII as well as in Art. 43 of  
the Protocol. See Protocol I (1977): Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of  Aug. 12, 1949, relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.
nsf/full/470
57 Commentary to GCIV, supra note 11, art. 42 ¶ 1 (stating that “[t]he Convention stresses the 
exceptional character of  measures of  internment and assigned residence by making their application 
subject to strict conditions,” and that such measures are “exceptional” in character). 
58  GCIV art. 5. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61  Id. art. 78; see also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention 
in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of  Violence, 87 INT’L REV. OF RED CROSS 375, 381 (2005), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0892.pdf
62  GCIV art. 78. 
63 Id.
64 Id. art. 147. 
65 Id. art. 132. 
66 Id. art. 27. 
67 Id. art. 43. 
68  CAT, supra note 37. The Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 10, 
1984, and took force on June 26, 1987. DOS, Initial Report of  the United States of  America to the U.N. Committee 
Against Torture (Oct. 15, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.
pdf  [hereinafter U.S. Initial Report]). CAT was ratified by the U.S. Senate on Oct. 20, 1994, and took 
effect as U.S. law on Nov. 20, 1994. Id. The U.S. Senate ratified CAT subject to a list of  reservations, 
understandings, and declarations that limited the Convention.
69  The codified prohibition against torture goes back at least to the American Civil War, when it 
was absolutely banned in the 1863 Lieber Code. See Gen. Orders No. 100, § I, art. 16 (Apr. 24, 1863), 
reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48 (1983).




71 Id. arts. 17–22. To date, the United States has presented two periodic reports to the Committee 
Against Torture. 
72 Id. art. 2.
73 Id. arts. 3, 15. 
74 Id. arts. 4–14.
75 U.S. Initial Report, supra note 68.
76 Id. DOS observed that the U.S. took note of  torture elsewhere, stating that “[t]he U.S. government 
pursues allegations of  torture by other governments as an integral part of  its overall human rights policy.” 
Id. 
77  Ronald Reagan, Message to Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman 
Treatment or Punishment (May 20, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35858 
78 Id. 
79  According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, which governs the interpretation 
and binding force of  treaties, a reservation is “a unilateral statement … whereby [a State] purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of  certain provisions of  the treaty in their application to that State.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, art. 1(d), May 23, 1969, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. By contrast, understandings are statements 
interpreting the treaty language, and declarations are statements of  purpose or position regarding the 
subject matter of  the treaty. While reservations modify a state’s obligations under a treaty, understandings 
and declarations do not. See also U.S. Senate, Treaties, available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm 
80  The text of  the provision defining torture is:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of  
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of  any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of  or with the consent or acquiescence of  a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
CAT, supra note 37, art. 1(1). 
81  There were further understandings and declarations made with regard to Art. 1, but here we 
address only those that pertain to detainee treatment. 
82  136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990) (U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and 
Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html [hereinafter U.S. 
Reservations].
83  Senate Foreign Rel. Comm., Report on Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 9 (1990). 
84  U.S. Reservations, supra note 82. 
448
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
85 Id. 
86  CAT, supra note 37, art. 16(1). 
87  U.S. Reservations, supra note 82.
88 U.S. Initial Report, supra note 68. 
89  CAT, supra note 37, art. 16. 
90  CAT, General Comment No. 2, (Jan. 24, 2008) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,
CAT,GENERAL,,47ac78ce2,0.html. Although General Comments by U.N. treaty bodies are not legally 
binding, they provide authoritative guidance regarding the object and purpose of  the treaty. 
91  CAT, supra note 37, art. 2(1). Here as in other instances, U.S. law involved the interplay of  
international and domestic law. The Senate consented to ratification of  CAT after a domestic torture 
statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A) had been adopted, as required to fulfill this requirement to enact 
domestic legislation.
92 Id. art. 2(4). 
93 Id. arts. 2(2), 2(3). 
94  U.S. Reservations, supra note 82.
95  CAT, supra note 37, art. 10.
96 Id. 
97 Id. art. 12.
98 Id. art. 16(2). 
99  CAT, supra note 37, art. 15 (emphasis added).
100 Id. 
101  18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340A. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104  Michael John Garcia, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation 
Techniques, CRS Report RL32438 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32438.
pdf
105  18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b). 
106  CAT, supra note 37, art. 7. 
107  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A.






111 Id. Under the Conventions, “grave breaches” in international conflicts are willful killing, torture 
or inhuman treatment, biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health, compelling a prisoner of  war to serve in the forces of  a hostile power, or willfully depriving a 
prisoner of  war of  the rights of  fair and regular trial. GCIII art. 129. 
112 Id.; Michael John Garcia, The War Crimes Act: Current Issues 1, CRS Report RL33662 (Jan. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf
113  Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
114 Id.(Art. 3 establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of  person.” Art. 
9 holds that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Art. 10 establishes the right 
to “a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal … to any criminal charges against 
him,” and Art. 11(1) confirms the “right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in 
a public trial in which he has had all the guarantees for his defence.”) 
115  UDHR, supra note 113, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71. Torture and CID are banned under Art. 7 of  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and arbitrary detention, under Art. 9. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
116 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Declarations and Reservations (Apr. 26, 
2011), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en
117 See Senate Foreign Rel. Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 
23, at 1(1992). 
118  David P. Stewart, The Significance of  the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1183, 1187–88 (1993). The ICCPR is similar in some respects to the U.S. Bill of  Rights, as it recognizes 
freedom of  thought, conscience, and religion (Art. 18(1)); freedom of  opinion and expression (Art. 19(1)–
(2)); freedom of  association (Art. 22); the right of  peaceful assembly (Art. 21); the right to vote (Art. 25(b)); 
equal protection of  the law (Art. 14(1)); the right to liberty (Art. 9(1)); the right to a fair trial, including the 
presumption of  innocence (Art. 14(1)–(2)). 
119  Proclamation No. 7463, Declaration of  National Emergency by Reason of  Certain Terrorist Attacks, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20010914.pdf
120  Authorization for Use of  Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 
2001).
121 Id.





The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
126 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25; see also Principles to Guide the Office of  Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter 
OLC Guide], available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs_OLC%20principles_white%20
paper.pdf
127 OLC Guide, supra note 126
128  FY 2013 Budget Request for the Office of  Legal Counsel (OLC), available at http://www.justice.
gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-olc-bud-summary.pdf
129 Id.
130  Senate Judiciary Comm. (107th Cong.), Hearing on the Nomination of  Jay S. Bybee to be Assistant Attorney 
General (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg80915/html/CHRG-
107shrg80915.htm
131  147 Cong. Rec. S10905 (Oct. 23, 2001) (Confirmation of  Jay S. Bybee of  Nevada to be Assistant 
Attorney General), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-10-23/pdf/CREC-2001-10-
23-pt1-PgS10905-5.pdf
132 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 20 (2006); see also House Judiciary Comm., Testimony of  Judge 
Jay S. Bybee 18 (May 26, 2010) [hereinafter Bybee Testimony], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/pdf/BTranscript.pdf
133 See, e.g., John Yoo, U.N. Wars U.S. Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355 (Fall 2000); John Yoo, Clio at War: The 
Misuse of  History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (Fall 1999); John Yoo, Globalism and the 
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self  Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (Dec. 1999); 
John Yoo, The Continuation of  Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of  War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. 
REV. 167 (Mar. 1996).
134  Yoo, U.N. Wars, supra note 133, at 364.
135 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 66 (2008).
136  DOJ Office of  Prof ’l Resp. Report, Investigation into the Office of  Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning 
Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of  “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 
39 (July 29, 2009) [hereinafter OPR Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.
137  Jon Ward, Cheney Defends War on Terror’s Morality, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/18/cheney-defends-morality-of-war-on-terror/print
138  Transcript of  Interview with Vice President Dick Cheney, ABC’s This Week at 9 (Feb. 14, 
2010), available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-vice-president-dick-cheney/
story?id=9818034&page=9
139  Robert Parry, Bush/Cheney Pulled Torture Strings, Consortium for Indep. Journalism (Mar. 4, 2010), 
available at http://consortiumnews.com/2010/030410.html
140  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 51.
141  House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Const., Civ. Rts., & Civ. Liberties (110th Cong.), 
Testimony of  David Addington 38, 42 (June 26, 2008) [hereinafter Addington Testimony], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/43152.PDF




Att’y Gen., DOJ), Constitutionality of  Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Change the “Purpose” Standard 
for Searches (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/bush-administration-terrorism-
memos#p=1
143 Id. at 12.
144  Memorandum from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) & Robert J. Delahunty (Special 
Counsel) to Alberto R. Gonzales (Counsel to the President) & William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, 
DOD), Authority for Use of  Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Oct. 2001 





148 Id. In citing a number of  Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that First Amendment 
liberties could be curtailed (including Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), which had 
recognized the government’s ability to resist divulging information on the movement of  troops) the 
memo, at page 24, posited “The current campaign against terrorism may require even broader exercises 
of  federal power domestically.”
149  Memorandum from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to the Deputy Counsel to the 
President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations 






155  Memorandum from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) & Robert J. Delahunty (Special 
Counsel) to John Bellinger III (Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to NSC), 
Authority of  the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of  the ABM Treaty (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://
documents.nytimes.com/bush-administration-terrorism-memos#p=51
156 Id.
157  James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of  the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations 
(Aug. 2004) [“Schlesinger Report”] 80, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/
d20040824finalreport.pdf
158  Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to the Counsel for the 








162 Id. at 8. 
163  Mil. Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of  Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20011113.pdf
164  ACLU, Index of  Bush-Era OLC Memoranda Relating to Interrogation, Detention, Rendition and/or Surveillance 
3 [hereinafter ACLU Index], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/olcmemos_chart.pdf
165  Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) & John C. Yoo (Deputy 
Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, DOD), Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over 




168 But see Latif  v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). Critics 
of  the Supreme Court argue the Supreme Court has failed to back up its decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008), and has allowed the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to effectively void 
Boumediene. See Libby Lewis, Lawyer for Gitmo Detainees: “Less Hope Now Than Ever” CNN (June 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/24/justice/guantanamo-lawyer-supreme-court
169  ACLU Index, supra note 164.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172  The first time at least that is publicly known.
173 KAREN GREENBERG & JOSHUA DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 38 (2005) [hereinafter TORTURE 
PAPERS].
174  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto Gonzales (Counsel to 
the President) & William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, DOD), Application of  Treaties and Laws to Al 




177  This reasoning is similar to the OLC’s earlier reasoning and advice that the President had the 
plenary authority to suspend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
178  Jan. 22 Bybee memo, supra note 174.
179  Memorandum from William H. Taft IV (Legal Adviser, DOS) to John C. Yoo (Deputy 
















191 TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 173, at 118.
192 Id. at 80.
193 Id. at 118.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 119.
196 Id. at 120.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 122.
199 Id. at 123.





204  Taft presumably wrote the memo after he had learned of  Attorney General Ashcroft’s February 1 
letter.
205 TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 173, at 129.
206 Id. at 134.
454
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
207 Id.
208 Id. at 135.
209 Id. at 134.
210  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto R. Gonzales (Counsel to the 
President), Status of  Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of  the Third Geneva Convention of  1949 (Feb. 7, 2002), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/pub-artc4potusdetermination.pdf
211 TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 173, at 144.
212  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, 
DOD), Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of  Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan 
(Feb. 26, 2002) available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020226.pdf
213 Id.
214  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 6.
215 Id. at 7.
216  Memorandum from Patrick Philbin (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Daniel J. Bryant 
(Ass’t Att’y Gen., DOJ Office of  Legis. Affairs), Swift Justice Authorization Act (Apr. 8, 2002) 
[hereinafter Philbin Swift Justice Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
memojusticeauthorizationact0482002.pdf
217 Id. at 2.
218 See Oct. 2001 Military Authority Memo, supra note 144.
219  Philbin Swift Justice Memo, supra note 216, at 20.
220  Editorial Staff, Leading Case: 3. Personal Jurisdiction — Habeas Venue, 118 HARV. L. REV. 416 (2004).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 417.
223 Id.
224  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Ashcroft (Att’y Gen., DOJ), 
Determination of  Enemy Belligerency and Military Detention (June 8, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Padilla Memo], 
available at http://documents.nytimes.com/bush-administration-terrorism-memos#p=126
225  Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
226  Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
227  Bybee Padilla Memo, supra note 224, at 6.
228 Id. at 9.
229  Memorandum from John C. Yoo ( Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Daniel J. Bryant (Ass’t Att’y 




States Citizens (June 27, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo Padilla Memo], available at http://documents.nytimes.com/
bush-administration-terrorism-memos#p=135
230  Yoo Padilla Memo, supra note 229.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 136.
233 Id. at 137.
234 Id. at 141.
235 Id. at 138.
236 Id. at 143.
237  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, 
DOD), Re: The President’s Power as Commander in Chief  to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of  
Foreign Nations (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/bush-administration-terrorism-
memos#p=72
238 Id. at 72.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 95.
242  Jason Leopold & Jeffrey Kaye, Guidebook to False Confessions: Key Document John Yoo Used to Draft Torture 
Memo Released, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://truth-out.org/news/item/8278-exclusive-
guidebook-to-false-confessions-key-document-john-yoo-used-to-draft-torture-memo-released
243  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington (June 20, 2012); OPR Report, supra 
note 136, at 30. But see ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION, FROM THE 
COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
244  Leopold & Kaye, supra note 242.
245 Id.
246  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Supporting Documentation for Committee Report on its Inquiry 
Into the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.levin.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2008/SASC.documents.092508.pdf
247  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 35.
248  DOD, Pre-Academic Laboratory Operating Instructions, available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/
operation_and_plans/Detainee/PREAL%20Operating%20Instructions.pdf
249  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 38.
250 Bybee Testimony, supra note 132, at 14.
456
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
251  Letter from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, 









259  Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Aff., Testimony of  Michael Chertoff (Feb. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/2005/02/02/nomination-hearing
260  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 8.
261  Fax to John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) from unknown (July 24, 2002) [hereinafter 





265 See Parry, supra note 139.
266  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 43.
267 Id.; but see id. at 63, where Patrick Philbin expressed his view about how time pressure had existed 
and had played a role in OLC’s process.
268  Bybee Testimony, supra note 132, at 150.
269  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 43.
270 Id. at 46.
271 Id.
272  Bybee Testimony, supra note 132, at 125.
273  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto Gonzales (Counsel to the 
President), Standards for Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 – 2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020801-1.pdf







278 Id. at 51.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281  Addington Testimony, supra note 141, at 38.
282  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 53.
283  Letter from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto Gonzales (Counsel to the 




287 Id. at 5.
288  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Interrogation of  Al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods 
Memo], available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70967/00355_020801_004display.pdf
289  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 53.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 54.
292  Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods Memo, supra note 288.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 See Yoo Psychological Assessment Fax, supra note 261, as the source of  OLC’s discussion here of  
Zubaydah’s psychological assessment.
296  Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods Memo, supra note 288.
297  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 101.
298 Id. at 104.
299  Memorandum from John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to William J. Haynes II (Gen. 
Counsel, DOD), Re: Military Interrogation of  Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 
2003), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20030314.pdf
458
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
300 Id.
301  CIA, Office of  Inspector Gen., Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 
101 (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter IG Report], available at http://documents.nytimes.com/c-i-a-reports-
on-interrogation-methods; but see Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to George 
Tenet (Director, CIA) (June 18, 2004) (in which Goldsmith relayed DOJ’s concern that the CIA IG report 
“contains some ambiguous statements concerning the Attorney General’s remarks … that mistakenly 
characterize the extent of  advice provided by the Department.”), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc36.pdf
302  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 27.
303 Id. at 36.
304 Id. at 110.; see also Parry, supra note 139.
305 Id.
306  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 110.
307 Id.; see also Bybee Testimony, supra note 132, at 29.
308  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 27.
309  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 12.
310  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 111.
311 JACK GOLDSMITH III, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 151 (2007).
312 Id. at 154.
313 Id. at 155.
314  Fax from Scott Muller (Office of  Gen. Counsel, CIA) to Jack Goldsmith III (Ass’t Att’y 














323  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 13.
324  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 113.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 13.
328 Id.
329  Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, III (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto Gonzales (Counsel 
to the President), “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Mar. 18, 2004), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/gc4mar18.pdf
330 Id. at 3.
331 Id. at 23.
332 GOLDSMITH, supra note 311, at 41.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 173, at 366.
336 Id. at 367.
337 Id. at 368.
338 Id. at 380.
339  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 14.
340 Id.
341  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 113.
342  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 14.
343  IG Report, supra note 301; see also Bybee Testimony, supra note 132, at 115, in which Bybee 
suggested the CIA had exceeded or deviated from the legal counsel provided by OLC in its application of  
certain interrogation methods.
344  IG Report, supra note 301, at 102.
345 Id. at 101.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348  Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John L. Helgerson, Inspector 
460
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Gen., CIA) (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc26.pdf
349  Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Scott Muller (Gen. Counsel, 
CIA) (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc28.pdf





355  Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of  Torture, WASH. POST (June 8, 
2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html
356  Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture “May Be Justified,” WASH. POST (June 13, 2004), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html
357  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 121.
358 GOLDSMITH, supra note 311, at 159.
359 Id. at 160.
360  Memorandum from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Deputy Attorney General, 
DOJ, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Torture 
Statute Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm
361 Id.
362  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
363  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 17.
364  Letter from John D. Ashcroft (Att’y Gen., DOJ) to John E. McLaughlin (Acting Dir., CIA) (July 22, 
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc64.pdf
365  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 124.
366 Id. at 28.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369  Letter from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Scott W. Muller (Gen. 







372  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 18.
373  Fax to Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) from unknown Associate Gen. Counsel, CIA 
(Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc72.pdf
374  Letter from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Acting Gen. 
Counsel, CIA) (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc74.pdf
375 See ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 19–22 (Memos dated Aug. 19, Aug. 25, Oct. 12, and Oct. 22, 
2004).
376  Letter from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Acting Gen. 
Counsel, CIA) (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc85.pdf
377  Letter from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Acting Gen. 
Counsel, CIA) (Sept. 6, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc88.pdf
378 Id.
379  Letter from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Acting Gen. 
Counsel, CIA) (Sept. 20, 2004) available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc79.pdf
380  Memorandum from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Att’y Gen. & Deputy Att’y 




383 Id. (emphasis added).
384  Jan Crawford Greenburg & Ariane de Vogue, Bush Administration Blocked Waterboarding Critic, 
ABC World News with Diane Sawyer (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WN/DOJ/
story?id=3814076
385  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 117.
386  Levin Torture Statute Memo, supra note 360, at 2.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 4.
390 Id. at 8.
391 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
462
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
392 See Greenburg & de Vogue, supra note 384.
393 GOLDSMITH, supra note 311, at 165.
394  ACLU Index, supra note 164, at 23.
395 Id. at 24.
396  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 131.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 See Parry, supra note 139.
400  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 131.
401 Id.





407 Id. at 132.
408 Id. at 142.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 144.
411 Id. at 145.
412 Id.
413  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be 
Used in the Interrogation of  a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005 [No. 13]), available at http://media.
luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf
414 Id. at 1.
415 Id. at 4.





418 Id. at 28.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 30.
421  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be 
Used in the Interrogation of  a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005 [No. 12]) available at http://media.
luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury_20pg.pdf.
422 Id. at 10.
423 Id. at 11.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 16.
426 Id.
427  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  United States Obligations Under Article 16 of  the Convention Against 
Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of  High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005), 
available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf
428 Id. at 1.
429 Id.
430 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
431  Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Cts., Testimony of  Philip Zelikow 
10 (May 13, 2009) [hereinafter Zelikow Testimony], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_
hr/051309zelikow.pdf
432  The McCain Amendment would be signed into law in December 2005. 
433  Zelikow Testimony, supra note 431.
434  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Origins of  Aggressive Interrogation 
Techniques (statement of  Sen. Lindsey Graham) (June 17, 2008), available at http://www.armed-services.
senate.gov/Transcripts/2008/06%20June/A%20Full%20Committee/08-52%20-%206-17-08%20-%20
am.pdf
435  Task Force staff  interview with Senator Lindsey Graham (June 13, 2012).
436  Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, McCain Rebukes Giuliani on Waterboarding Remark, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/us/politics/26giuliani.html
437  Zelikow Testimony, supra note 431, at 11.
438 Id. at 12.
439  Spencer Ackerman, CIA Committed “War Crimes,” Bush Official Says, WIRED MAGAZINE (Apr. 4, 2012) 
464
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
[hereinafter Ackerman], available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/secret-torture-memo
440 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
441  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 153.
442  Zelikow Testimony, supra note 431, at 13.
443  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 154.
444 Id.
445 Id. at 157.
446 Id.
447  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common 
Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of  High 
Value al Qaeda Detainees (July 20, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/
olc/2007%20OLC%20opinion%20on%20Interrogation%20Techniques.pdf
448 Id.
449 Id. at 2.
450 Id.
451 Id. at 4.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 10.
454  Letters from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior Deputy 
Gen. Counsel, CIA) (Aug. 23, Nov. 6, and Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/082409/olc/08232007%20Letter%20from%20OLC%20to%20CIA.pdf  (Aug. 23); http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olc/11062007%20Letter%20from%20OLC%20to%20CIA.
pdf  (Nov. 6); and http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olc/110707%20Letter%20from%20
OLC%20to%20CIA.pdf  (Nov. 7)
455  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
456  Memorandum for the files, from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC), Re; October 
23, 2001 OLC Opinion Addressing the Domestic Use of  Military Force to Conduct Terrorist Activities (Oct. 6, 2008), 
available at http://documents.nytimes.com/bush-administration-terrorism-memos#p=148
457 Id.
458 Id. at 151.
459 Id.
460  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 27.




462 Id. at 11.
463 Id.
464 Id. at 160.
465 Id.
466  Memorandum from David Margolis (Associate Att’y Gen., DOJ) to Att’y Gen. and Deputy Att’y 
Gen., DOJ, Memorandum of  Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of  Professional Misconduct in the Office 
of  Professional Responsibility’s Report of  Investigation into the Office of  Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues 
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of  “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (Jan. 5, 
2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20100220JUSTICE/20100220J
USTICE-DAGMargolisMemo.pdf
467 Id. at 2.
468 See, e.g., Task Force staff  interview with Alberto Mora (Apr. 24, 2012); Ackerman, supra note 439.
469 MAYER, supra note 135, at 8.
470  343 U.S. 579 (1952)
471  U.S. v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984).
472  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001)
473  OPR Report, supra note 136, at 2.
474 Id. at 3.
475  Scott Shane & David Johnston, U.S. Lawyers Agreed on Legality of  Brutal Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/politics/07lawyers.html
476  David Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
455, 462 (2010).
477 Id. at 457.
478 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
479 Id. at 143.
480  GCIV art. 5.
481 Id.
482 Id.




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
486 Id.
487 MAYER, supra note 135, at 84.





1  Task Force staff  interview with David Crane (Sept. 23, 2011). We know that the practice dates as 
far back as 1886, when the Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), ruled that U.S. courts 
had jurisdiction to prosecute individuals abducted from other countries, and this principle was affirmed in 
the 1992 case of  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
2  David B. Ottaway & Don Oberdorfer, Administration Alters Assassination Ban, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 
1989). 
3  Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 21, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pdd39.htm
4  House Foreign Aff. Comm., Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Hum. Rts., & Oversight, and Subcomm. 
on Europe (110th Cong.), Joint Hearing, Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on 
Transatlantic Relations (Testimony of  Michael Scheuer) (Apr. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Scheuer Testimony], 
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/transcript012911.pdf
5 Id.
6  DOS Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — Egypt (1995).
7  Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER (Feb. 8, 2005). 
8 HUM. RTS. WATCH, BLACK HOLE 6 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/11757/section/6
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA RENDITION AND TORTURE PROGRAM 
126 (2007).
12 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 113 (2008). 
13 Id. 
14  Matthew Cole & Sarah O. Wali, New Egyptian VP Ran Mubarak’s Security Team, Oversaw Torture, 
ABC News (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/egypt-crisis-omar-suleiman-cia-
rendition/story?id=12812445; Griff  Witte, Egyptian Soldiers Show Solidarity with Protesters, Activist ElBaradei 
Joins Demonstration, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/01/29/AR2011012903283.html?sid=ST2011012806535. 
15  Scheuer Testimony, supra note 4. See also Jason Ryan, CIA Nominee Leon Panetta Says No Prosecutions 
for Waterboarding, ABC News (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/
story?id=6813553
16  Mayer, supra note 7. 
17  Scheuer Testimony, supra note 4. 
18  Task Force staff  interview with Paul Pillar (Dec. 16, 2011).
19  Task Force staff  interview with Ali Soufan (July 5, 2012) [hereinafter Soufan Interview]. 
468
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
20 RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 144–45 (2004).
21  Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., Written Statement for the Record of  the 
Director of  Central Intelligence (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/
hearing8/tenet_statement.pdf; see also Transcript: Wednesday’s 9/11 Commission Hearings, WASH. POST (Mar, 
24, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20349-2004Mar24.html.
22 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT ch. 10 
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm
23  Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of  a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476_pf.html
24 Id.
25  For example, Binyam Mohammed, who was arrested in Pakistan, rendered to Morocco, then 
transferred to the “dark prison” reserved for CIA prisoners near Kabul, and finally Bagram and 
Guantánamo Bay in 2004. Mohammed was released from Guantánamo without charge in 2009. ROGER 
GOUGH, STUART MCCRACKEN & ANDREW TYRIE, ACCOUNT RENDERED: EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS AND 
BRITAIN’S ROLE 35 (2011).
26  Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/politics/06intel.html
27  Task Force staff  interview with Tyler Drumheller (June 13, 2012) [hereinafter Drumheller 
Interview]. 
28  European Parliament, Report on the Alleged Use of  European Countries by the C.I.A. for the Transportation 
and Illegal Detention of  Prisoners, A6-0020/2007 (2007) [hereinafter European Parliament Report], available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-
2007-0020+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
29  David Johnston & Mark Mazzetti, A Window into C.I.A.’s Embrace of  Secret Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/world/13foggo.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
30  Michael V. Hayden, Remarks by CIA Director at the Council on Foreign Relations (Sept. 7, 2007), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2007/general-haydens-remarks-
at-the-council-on-foreign-relations.html
31 Id. See also Amnesty International, Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and “Disappearance” (2006), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/051/2006; Peter Finn & Julie Tate, NY 
Billing Dispute Reveals Details of  Secret CIA Rendition Flights, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ny-billing-dispute-reveals-details-of-secret-cia-
rendition-flights/2011/08/30/gIQAbggXsJ_story.html
32  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A Rizzo 
(Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  U.S. Obligations Under Article 16 of  CAT to Certain 
Techniques that May Be Used in Interrogation of  High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Memo], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/
olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf
33  Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Disappearing Act: Rendition by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES 





34 Id. See also Jehl & Johnston, supra note 26; House Foreign Aff. Comm., Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., 
Hum. Rts., & Oversight, and Subcomm. on Europe (110th Cong.), Joint Hearing, Diplomatic Assurances and 
Rendition to Torture: The Perspective of  the State Department’s Legal Adviser 110-192 (2008) [hereinafter Diplomatic 
Assurances], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/rendition.pdf
35  Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; “Stress and Duress” Tactics 
Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2002), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html
36  DeNeen L. Brown & Dana Priest, Deported Terror Suspect Details Torture in Syria; Canadian’s Case Called 
Typical of  CIA, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2003).
37  Human Rights Council, Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the 
Context of  Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. Report], 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf. See 
also LARRY SIEMS, THE TORTURE REPORT (2012); John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Britain to Compensate Former 
Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/
world/europe/ 
17britain.html?_r=1&hp; Charlie Savage, Court Dismisses A Case Asserting Torture by CIA, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
8, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/us/09secrets.html?pagewanted=all
38  Drumheller Interview, supra note 27. 
39  Steven Loeb, Karl Rove Denies Egypt Ever Tortured Any Prisoners Sent There By The Bush Admin., BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-11/entertainment/ 
30036924_1_secret-police-bill-o-reilly-mubarak
40  DOS Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — Egypt (2002), available at http://www.state.
gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18274.htm
41  Cole & Wali, supra note 14. DOS Cable, 06-Cairo-2933, “Scenesetter for Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick’s Visit to Egypt,” (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0605/S00012.
htm. 
42  Cole & Wali, supra note 14. 
43 Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 34, at 6 (Rep. Pitts quoting Baer interview).
44  Soufan Interview, supra note 19.




48  ICRC, Report on the Treatment of  Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody (2004) [hereinafter 
ICRC HVD Report], at 6–7, available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream 
/2041/71001/03083_070214_001display.pdf
49  ICRC HVD Report, supra note 48, at 78. 
50 CIA “Black Sites” Denied Suspects’ Rights, CBS News (AP) (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.
cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6749455.html
470






55  Jehl & Johnston, supra note 26. 
56 HUM. RTS. WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS (2012) , available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2012/09/05/delivered-enemy-hands
57 Id. 
58 MAYER, supra note 12, at 110. 
59 Maher Arar: Statement, CBC News (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/
arar/arar_statement.html
60 Id.
61  Complaint, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-249 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004). 
62 Id.
63 Maher Arar: Statement, supra note 59.
64 Id.
65 U.S. Expands ‘Axis of  Evil’, BBC News (May 6 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/1971852.stm. Libya was similarly named as a member of  the “Axis of  Evil” in Bolton’s speech, despite 
the U.S.’s close collaboration with Libya on the renditions of  Abdel Hakim Belhadj, Sami Al Saadi, and 
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. John R. Bolton, Remarks at the Heritage Found. (May 6, 2002), available at http://
www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/V24-4%20PDF%20Files%20By%20Author/Bolton,%20John%20R.,%20
Axis%20of%20Evil.pdf
66 Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 34. 
67  House Foreign Aff. Comm., Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Hum. Rts., & Oversight, and Subcomm. 
on Europe (110th Cong.), Joint Hearing; DHS Inspector General Report OIG-08-18, The Removal of  a 
Canadian Citizen to Syria, Vol. 4, 74 (June 5, 2008). 
68  Stephen Grey, Frontline World: Extraordinary Rendition, PBS (Oct. 21, 2007), available at http://www.
stephengrey.com/2007/10
69  Drumheller Interview, supra note 27.
70  Nahal Zamani, Rendition to Continue Under Obama’s Watch, ACLU (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://
www.aclu.org/2009/08/27/rendition-program-to-continue-under-obamas-watch (highlighting the fact 
that DOS has sought to replace the system of  diplomatic assurances with a “monitoring mechanism” to 





72  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rts., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-
20, 6 I.L.M. 368, at art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”). 
73  ICRC, Enforced Disappearance: A Violation of  Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (June 27, 2006), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/human-rights-council-
statement-270606.htm; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  
War art. 49, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/380-600056; 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/365?opendocument 
74  Int’l Convention for the Protection of  All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, A/RES/61/177; 
14 I.H.R.R. 582, art. 5 (2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/
ConventionCED.aspx 
75  See Aoife Duffy, Expulsion To Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
373 (2008).
76  U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 
1990), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html
77  Scheuer Testimony, supra note 4 (during the hearing, it was stated that “these renditions not only 
appear to violate our obligations under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other international 
treaties, but they have undermined our very commitment to fundamental American values.”). 
78 Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 34; Task Force staff  interview with Harold Koh, Legal Advisor to 
Secretary of  State (Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Koh Interview]. 
79 Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 34 (Bellinger’s statement). There has been debate on this point. 
Former Congressman Bill Delahunt argued against Bellinger in a 2008 hearing that the 1998 Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (codifying CAT Art. 3) is “a law that is passed by the United 
States Congress [and] must be complied with by the executive.” Id. at 9. See also COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. 
RTS. INST., PROMISES TO KEEP: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE IN US TERRORISM TRANSFERS 
(2010), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/Promises%20
to%20Keep.pdf
80  Task Force staff  interview with Juan Mendez (Sept. 21, 2011). See also Michael John Garcia, 
Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture 16, CRS Report RL32890 16 (Sept. 8, 2009), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf  (“the express language of  CAT-implementing 
legislation, the United States cannot ‘expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of  any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger 
of  being subjected to torture, regardless of  whether the person is physically present in the United States.’ It may be 
argued that this express statutory language prohibits renditions from outside the United States.”). 
81  European Parliament Report, supra note 28; Council of  Europe, Comm. On Legal 
Affairs & H.R., Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers Involving Council of  Europe 
Member States (2006) [hereinafter Council of  Europe Report], available at http://assembly.coe.int/
committeedocs/2006/20060606_ejdoc162006partii-final.pdf; U.N. Report, supra note 37. 
82 See Application, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), available at http://www.soros.org/
sites/default/files/echr-al-nashiri-application-20110506.pdf; Appeal Prosecution Office in Warsaw V’th 
Department for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption, Abu Zubaydah, AP V Ds. 37/09 (2010) 
[hereinafter Abu Zubaydah Application], available at http://www.interights.org/userfiles/Documents/20
101216AbuZubaydahApplicationforVictimStatusinPolishArticle231Investigation EnglishTranslation.pdf; 
Application, El-Masri v. Macedonia, Eur. Cr. H.R. (2009), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/
files/Application-Public-Version-20090921.pdf
472
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
83  Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC to William H. Taft IV et al., 
Draft memo to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Permissibility of  Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from 
Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith], available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.pdf; Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take 
Detainees out of  Iraq, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A57363-2004Oct23.html
84  Priest, supra note 83. 
85  “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 28 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/gc4mar18.pdf.
86  Kevin Jon Heller, British Court of  Appeal Implicitly Repudiates Goldsmith Memo, Opinion Juris (Dec. 
19, 2011), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/19/british-court-implicitly-repudiates-goldsmith-
memo; Eric L. Lewis, Britain Shouldn’t Aid a Lawless America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/opinion/prisoners-are-not-pawns.html; Priest, supra note 83. 
87 Egypt “Has Proof ” US Questioned Suspects in Romania, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Nov. 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.flickr.com/photos/majikthise/474580686/sizes/o/; Scott Horton, Swiss Intelligence Confirms 
CIA Blacksites in Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bulgaria, HARPER’S (Apr. 28, 2007). See 
also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Doc. No. 200706444 (June 22, 2009), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/134973.pdf
88  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War art. 49, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/380-600056
89  Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, supra note 83.
90  As many as 39 countries have been implicated, including: Albania (Mayer, supra note 7; Disappearing 
Act, supra note 33; Austria (European Parliament Report, supra note 28); Belgium (European Parliament 
Report, supra note 28); Bosnia-Herzegovina (Amnesty Int’l, Open Secret: Mounting Evidence of  Europe’s 
Complicity in Rendition and Secret Detention (2010) [hereinafter Open Secret], available at http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/EUR01/023/2010/en/3a3fdac5-08da-4dfc-9f94-afa8b83c6848/eur010232010en.
pdf; U.N. Report, supra note 37; Canada (Report of  the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Commission of  
Inquiry into the Actions of  Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006) [hereinafter Report of  
the Events Relating to Maher Arar], available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf; 
Abushka Asthana, Domestic Detainee From 9/11 Released, WASH. POST (July 21, 2006), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/20/AR2006072002007.html); Denmark 
(Danish Government Avoids Parliamentary Inquiry on CIA Flights (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://
www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08COPENHAGEN50&q=rendition; Danish FM Moeller Asks 
for Help on Overflights and Interrogation Issues (June 10, 2008), available at http://www.cablegatesearch.
net/cable.58php?id=08COPENHAGEN332&q=rendition; Egypt (Jane Perlez & Raymond Bonner, An 
Ex-Detainee of  the U.S. Describes a 6-Year Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/06/world/asia/06iqbal.html?pagewanted=all; Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect 
Alleges Torture, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2005); Finland (Charge’s Meeting With Finish Prime Minister (Dec. 
8, 2005), available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05HELSINKI1267&q=rendition; 
Finland U.N. Rapporteur Welcomes the Secretary’s Remarks on Rendition (Dec. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05HELSINKI1290&q=rendition); The Gambia (The 
Guantánamo Docket: Jamil El Banna, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/
detainees/905-jamil-el-banna; Extraordinary Rendition: Extended Interviews Bisher al-Rawi, PBS Frontline 
(Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/interviews/bisher.
html); Germany ((June 7, 2007), Council of  Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed, Human Rights Watch 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/06/07/council-europe-secret-cia-prisons-confirmed; 
European Parliament Report, supra note 28); Indonesia (Dana Priest, Foreign Network at Front of  CIA’s 




article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702070_3.html; Disappearing Act, supra note 33;) Italy (CIA Agents Guilty 
of  Italy Kidnap, BBC (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8343123.stm; Jennifer K. 
Elsea & Julie Kim, Undisclosed U.S. Detention Sites Overseas: Background and Legal Issues, CRS Report (Jan. 
23, 2007); Sweden (Double Jeopardy, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Double Jeopardy], 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/04/07/double-jeopardy; Sweden: The New Post “CIA 
Planes” Reality — Politicizing A Deportation Flight Clearance (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.
cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06STOCKHOLM527&q=rendition); and United Kingdom (David 
Rose, MI6 and CIA ‘Sent Student to Morocco to be Tortured, GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Rose], 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/dec/11/politics.alqaida; All Parliamentary Group on 
Extraordinary Rendition, http://www.extraordinaryrendition.org)
91 See, e.g., Open Secret, supra note 90; Reprieve Report, Scottish Involvement in Extraordinary Rendition 
(Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.reprieve.org.uk/2009_11_09scottishrendition; European 
Parliament Report, supra note 28; Tony Bunyan, Europe and Extraordinary Rendition, Statewatch (2006), 
available at http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/90bunyan.pdf; Neil Mackay, The 
New Boom Industry, The HERALD (Scotland) (Dec. 4, 2005), available at http://www.heraldscotland.com/
sport/spl/aberdeen/the-new-boom-industry-torture-with-cia-extraordinary-rendition-flights-stopping-
off-at-european-airports-and-british-intelligence-agencies-relying-on-information-extracted-by-cruel-
methods-western-governments-have-embraced-torture-with-terrifying-eas-1.35494; Rose, supra note 
90; Amnesty Int’l, USA: Urgent Need for Transparency on Bagram Detentions (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/031/2009/en/fc855c8c-2291-4e73-bd98-324907c17fa9/
amr510312009en.html
92 See, e.g., Report of  the Events Relating to Maher Arar, supra note 90; Council of  Europe, Comm. on 
Legal Affairs & H.R., Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of  Detainees Involving Council of  Europe 
Member States: Second Report (2007) [hereinafter CoE Second Report], available at http://assembly.coe.
int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11555&Language=EN; Anushka Asthana, Domestic Detainee 
from 9/11 Released, WASH. POST (July 21, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/07/20/AR2006072002007.html
93 See, e.g., Scheuer Testimony, supra note 4; Peter Bergen, I Was Kidnapped by the CIA, MOTHER 
JONES (2008), available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/exclusive-i-was-kidnapped-
cia; John Crewdson, CIA Chiefs Reportedly Split Over Cleric Plot: Agency Schisms Come to Light in Italy 
Probe, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-
0701080198jan08,0,5630268.story; Elsea & Kim, supra note 90; Council of  Europe: Secret CIA Prisons 
Confirmed, supra note 90 . 
94  See, e.g., Council of  Europe Report, supra note 81; CoE Second Report, supra note 92; Council 
of  Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed, supra note 90; John Goetz & Holger Stark, CIA Had Secret Plan to 
Kidnap German-Syrian Suspect in Hamburg, DER SPIEGEL (Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,671198,00.html
95 See, e.g., Double Jeopardy, supra note 90; The Swedish Government’s Handling of  Matters Relating 
to Expulsion to Egypt, Government Scrutiny Report (2005), available at http://www.riksdagen.
se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Granskning-av-regeringens-hand_
GT01KU2/; Sweden Refuses Residence Permit of  Agiza and Alzery, LE MONDE (Dec. 9, 2009) [hereinafter 
Sweden Refuses Residence Permit], available at http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.
cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=1108546&clef=ARC-TRK-D_01
96 ACCOUNT RENDERED, supra note 25; Complaint, Arar, supra note 61; Application, El-Masri, supra 
note 82; Sweden Refuses Residence Permit, supra note 95; European Parliament Report, supra note 28.
97  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, 
(Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-
torture-20120205.pdf. 
474
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
98   Report of  the Events Relating to Maher Arar, supra note 90, at 201. 
99 Id.
100 Harper Apologizes for Canada’s Role in Arar’s ‘Terrible Ordeal,’ Canwest News Serv. (Jan. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=54e0c760-750d-4b18-9f6d-
15501296a7b2&k=69081
101  James Orr, Jack Straw Sued over Illegal Rendition of  Abdel Hakim, Belhadj TELEGRAPH (UK) (Apr. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9210758/
Jack-Straw-sued-over-illegal-rendition-of-Abdel-Hakim-Belhadj.html. See also Rod Nordland, Files 
Note Close CIA Ties to Qaddafi Spy Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/09/03/world/africa/03libya.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&ref=europe; Richard Norton-
Taylor, Libyan Rebel Leader Sues Britain Over Rendition Ordeal, GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/19/libyan-rebel-abdel-hakim-belhadj
102  Duncan Gardham & Gordon Rayner, MI5 ‘Knew Guantánamo Detainee Binyam Mohamed Was Being 
Tortured’, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
terrorism-in-the-uk/7204741/MI5-knew-Guantanamo-detainee-Binyam-Mohamed-was-being-tortured.
html. 
103  Andy Worthington, Seven Years of  Torture: Binyam Mohamed Tells His Story (Aug. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/03/08/seven-years-of-torture-binyam-mohamed-tells-his-
story/ 
104  In re Mohamed, R v. Sec’y of  Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA Civ 65, [2011] 
QB 218 at ¶ 61, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/65.html
105 Id.; Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, Top Judge: Binyam Mohamed Case Shows MI5 to Be Devious, 
Dishonest and Complicit in Torture, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/feb/10/binyam-mohamed-torture-mi5
106 Id.
107  In re Mohamed, R. v. Sec’y of  Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 104, at ¶ 61. 
108 “One of  Them Made Cuts in My Penis. I Was in Agony,” GUARDIAN (UK) (Aug. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/aug/02/terrorism.humanrights1
109 Id. 
110 MI5 Telegrams ‘Fed Interrogation’, BBC News (Mar. 7, 2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/7930708.stm
111  “One of  Them Made Cuts in My Penis. I Was in Agony.” supra note 108. 
112  In re Mohamed, R. v. Sec’y of  Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 104, at ¶ 61. 
113 Id. 
114  Richard Norton-Taylor, Peter Walker & Robert Booth, Binyam Mohamed Returns to Britain after 
Guantánamo Ordeal, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/
feb/23/binyam-mohamed-guantanamo-plane-lands 




116  Ian Cobain, Macedonia on Trial for Human Rights Abuses in US Post-9/11 Rendition Case, GUARDIAN (UK) 
(May 16, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/16/macedonia-trial-human-
rights-abuses-911
117  Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of  a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476_pf.html 
118  Declaration of  Manfred Gnjidic, El-Masri v. Tenet, Civ. No. 1:05cv1417-TSE-TRJ, (E.D. Va. Apr. 
6, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/gnjidic_decl_exh.pdf
119  Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (109th Cong. 2d Sess.), Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq’s 




122  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Lawrence Wilkerson (Oct. 28, 2011). 
123 DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS, supra note 56, at n. 391. 
124  Michael Isikoff, Death in a Libyan Jail Cell, NEWSWEEK (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.
thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/05/15/death-in-a-libyan-jail-cell.html
125  Peter Finn, Detainee Who Gave False Iraq Data Dies in Prison in Libya, WASH. POST (May 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/11/AR2009051103412.
html




130  John Hooper, Italian Court Finds CIA Agents Guilty of  Kidnapping Terrorism Suspect, GUARDIAN (UK) (Nov. 
4, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/04/cia-guilty-rendition-abu-omar
131  Frances D’Emilio & Colleen Barry, Italy Court Upholds American Convictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 
19, 2012), available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/italys-high-court-upholds-american-convictions
132 MAYER, THE DARK SIDE, supra note 12, at 119.
133 The Broken Promise , Swedish TV4 Kalla Fakta Program (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.
org/legacy/english/docs/2004/05/17/sweden8620.htm
134  Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, U.N. Comm. Against 
Torture (May 20, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42ce734a2.html; Alzery v. 
Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, U.N. H.R.C. (Nov. 10, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/47975afa21.html
135  Johan Nylander, CIA Rendition Flights Stopped by Swedish Military, SWEDISH WIRE (Dec. 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.swedishwire.com/component/content/article/2-politics/7497-cia-rendition-
476
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
flights-stopped-by-swedish-military; Sweden to Pay Damages to Egyptian Handed Over to CIA, Monsters & 
Critics (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/news/article_1431943.
php/Sweden_to_pay_damages_to_Egyptian_handed_over_to_CIA
136  DOS, Remarks [of  Condoleezza Rice] Upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec. 5, 2005), available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm. Bush acknowledged that certain terrorists 
were being held outside the United States, although he did not divulge the location of  these detention 
centers or details of  the prisoners’ confinement. Bush Admits to CIA Secret Prisons, BBC News (Sept. 7, 
2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm; R. Jeffrey Smith & Michael 
Fletcher, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried: He Confirms Existence of  CIA Prisons, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2006), 
at A01. 
137  Council of  Europe Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 22.
138 Id.  




143  Task Force staff  interview with Jozef  Pinior (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Pinior Interview].
144 Id. 
145  U.N. Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 22. 
146 Id. ¶¶ 107–159. 
147 Court Case Reveals Details of  Secret Flights, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-09-01/Court-case-reveals-details-of-secret-
flights/50218452/1 
148  Peter Finn & Julie Tate, N.Y. Billing Dispute Reveals Details of  Secret CIA Rendition Flight, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 30, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ny-billing-dispute-
reveals-details-of-secret-cia-rendition-flights/2011/08/30/gIQAbggXsJ_story.html; Ben Quinn & Ian 
Cobain, Mundane Bills Bring CIA’s Rendition Network into Sharper Focus, GUARDIAN (UK) (Aug. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/cia-rendition-flights-cost; Legal Dispute 
Reveals Details of  Secret CIA Rendition Program, NAT’L J. (Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Legal Dispute], available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/legal-dispute-reveals-details-of-secret-cia-rendition-
program-20110901
149  Quinn & Cobain, supra note 148 (quoting William Ryan, representing Richmor). 
150 Legal Dispute, supra note 148. Richmor Aviation v. Sportsflight Air, Inc., 82 A.D.3d 1423 (N.Y.A.D. 3 
Dept. 2011).
151 Richmor Aviation transcript at 113, available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/
documents/2011/06/13/court-verbatim-rendition.pdf





153  European Parliament, Press Release, US Secret Prisons in Europe: A “Law of  Silence” Among 
Governments (Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/
content/20120326IPR41840/html/US-secret-prisons-in-Europe-a-law-of-silence-among-governments
154  European Parliament, Report on Alleged Transportation and Illegal Detention of  Prisoners in European 
Countries by the CIA: Follow-Up of  the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report, A7-0266/2012 
(Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter European Parliament Follow-Up Report 2012], available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-
0266+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
155 Bush Admits CIA “Black Sites”, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/0,1518,435736,00.html
156  Ken Dilanian, Terrorism Suspect Secretly Held for Two Months, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2011), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/06/nation/la-na-somali-detainee-20110706
157  Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_4.html
158  Shawn W. Crispin, US and Thailand: Allies in Torture, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JA25Ae01.html; Adam Goldman, CIA Officer Implicated in Abuse 
Case Back at Work, NBC News (AP) (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39043456/
ns/us_news-security; Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror 
Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_4.html.
159  Priest, supra note 157. 
160  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Inside Romania’s Secret CIA Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/inside-romanias-secret-cia-
prison-6273973.html; Lithuania Hosted Secret CIA Prisons, BBC News (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426028.stm. The Lithuanian facility may have been equipped as early as mid-
2004. 
161  Horton, supra note 87. 
162  Drumheller Interview, supra note 27. 
163  U.N. Report, supra note 37.
164  Stephen Grey, CIA Rendition: The Smoking Gun Cable, ABC News (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/11/cia-rendition-t; Extraordinary Rendition, Frontline, http://www.
pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/map/ 
165 GREY, supra note 11; Extraordinary Rendition, supra note 164; Grey, supra note 164. 
166  Grey, supra note 164. 
167 Extraordinary Rendition, supra note 164; Grey, supra note 164. 
168 Profile: Omar al-Farouq, BBC News (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/5379604.stm
169  U.N. Report, supra note 37 (quoting Bisher Al-Rawi).
478
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
170 Id. See also Extraordinary Rendition, supra note 164; Statement from Binyam Mohamed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/europe/23iht-23statement.20376235.
html
171 Human Rights Watch, U.S. Operated Secret Dark Prison in Kabul (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://
www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2005/12/19/afghan12319.htm
172 Id. 
173 DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS, supra note 56. 
174 Id.
175 Id. at n. 134. 
176 Id. 
177 Id.
178 U.S. Operated Secret Dark Prison in Kabul, supra note 171; U.N. Report, supra note 37; DELIVERED INTO 
ENEMY HANDS, supra note 56. 
179 DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS, supra note 56. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at n. 134.
183 Id.
184 U.S. Operated Secret Dark Prison in Kabul, supra note 171; Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, 
Algerian Tells of  Dark Term in US Hands, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html
185 See, e.g., Classified Response to the DOJ Office of  Professional Responsibility Classified Report 
Dated July 29, 2009, Submitted on Behalf  of  Judge Jay S. Bybee, at n. 28 (official confirmation 
of  the Salt Pit’s existence) (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
BybeeResponse090729.pdf  
186  Adam Goldman & Kathy Gannon, Salt Pit Death: Gul Rahman, CIA Prisoner, Died of  Hypothermia 
in Secret Afghanistan Prison, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/03/28/salt-pit-death-gul-rahman_n_516559.html; Scott Horton, Inside the Salt Pit, HARPER’S 
(Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/03/hbc-90006791; Dana Priest, CIA 
Avoids Scrutiny of  Detainee Treatment, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A2576-2005Mar2.html. 
187  Goldman & Gannon, supra note186. 
188 Id.
189  El-Masri v. Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/




190  Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations (Jan. 22, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Ensuring_Lawful_Interrogations 
191  Anthony R. Jones & George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of  the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade 9 (July 31, 2005) [hereinafter Fay Report], available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf
192  Sworn Statement, Camp Victory, Iraq (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
projects/foiasearch/pdf/DOD000370.pdf  (Sworn statements as annex to the Fay Report); Josh White, 
Army, CIA Agreed on “Ghost” Prisoners, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A25239-2005Mar10.html. See also Fay Report, supra note 191; Antonio M. Taguba, 
Article 15-6 Investigation of  the 800th Military Police Brigade 9, 18 (May 2004) [Taguba Report] at 20, available 
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html; James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of  
the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (2004) (Schlesinger Report) (citing the problem of  
“ghost” detainees), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf
193  White, supra note 192. 





198  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, CIA Officer Examined in Army Iraq Prison Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 13, 2011), available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/07/cia-officer-investigation-army-
prison-iraq-071311/
199  Mayer, supra note 194. 
200  Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 198. 
201  Matt Cantor, Grand Jury Probes CIA in Abu Ghraib’s “Iceman” Killing, Newser (June 13, 2011), available 
at http://www.newser.com/story/120903/federal-grand-jury-eyes-cia-agent-mark-swanner-in-iceman-
death-at-abu-ghraib.html; Debra Cassens Weiss, Deaths of  2 CIA Detainees Probed; Freezing Temperatures and 
Blunt Force May be Cause, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
doj_launches_full_probe_into_deaths_of_two_detainees_in_cia_custody
202  DOJ, Statement of  the Attorney General Regarding Investigation into the Interrogation of  Certain 
Detainees (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/June/11-ag-861.html; 
Edmund H. Mahony, Justice Department to Investigate Deaths of  2 Terror Suspects in U.S. Custody, HARTFORD 
COURANT (June 30, 2011), available at http://articles.courant.com/2011-06-30/news/hc-durham-terror-
interrogrations-070120110630_1_cia-interrogation-techniques-criminal-investigation-secret-cia-prison 
203  Cantor, supra note 201; Justice Dept. Prepares to Close Probes of  2 Detainees, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-02/justice-cia-detainee-
deaths/52941734/1




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
205  Jayshree Bajoria & Carin Zissis, The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand, Council on Foreign Rel. 
(Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/thailand/muslim-insurgency-southern-thailand/p12531. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. See also S Thailand Protest Turns Violent, BBC News (Oct. 25, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3951387.stm; Thai Protesters Die in Custody, BBC News (Oct. 26, 2004), available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3954587.stm; 78 Killed Following Riot in Southern Thailand, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6334068/ns/world_
news/t/killed-following-riot-southern-thailand/#.T_MdMhdDzTo 
208  Bajoria & Zissis, supra note 205. 
209  Shane, supra note 204. 
210  CoE Second Report, supra note 92, at n.27. 
211  CIA, Office of  Inspector Gen., Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (May 
7, 2004) [hereinafter CIA IG Report], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/IG_Report.pdf
212 ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS 375 (2011). 
213  CoE Second Report, supra note 92, at ¶ 70. 
214 Disbelief  at Thai Terror Centre Denial, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 5, 2005), available at http://
www.smh.com.au/news/World/Disbelief-at-Thai-terror-centre-denial/2005/11/05/1130823430288.
html
215 SOUFAN, supra note 212, at 383. GEORGE TENET & BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: 
MY YEARS AT THE CIA (2007). 
216  Anonymous source.
217  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Jose Rodriguez, Ex-CIA Officer, Defends Destroying Waterboarding 
Videos in “Hard Measures” Book, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/04/24/jose-rodriguez-cia-hard-measures-book_n_1450416.html 
218  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, ¶¶ 74, 91(unclassified version released 24 Aug. 2009); U.N. Report, 
supra note 37; Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 217.
219  Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 217; JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ & BILL HARLOW, HARD MEASURES: HOW 
AGGRESSIVE CIA ACTIONS AFTER 9/11 SAVED AMERICAN LIVES 190, 193 (2012) [hereinafter RODRIGUEZ].
220  Cobain, supra note 116.
221  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, ¶ 77; U.N. Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 108.
222  ACLU, Torture Tapes (timeline), available at http://www.aclu.org/timelines/torture-tapes; Dan Eggen 
& Walter Pincus, FBI, CIA Debate Significance of  Terror Suspect, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702151_pf.html; 
List of  Top Secret documents, ACLU v. Dep’t of  Def., 04-cv-4151 (May 18, 2009), available at http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/torturefoia_list_20090518.pdf





224  U.N. Report, supra note 37; Johnston & Mazzetti, supra note 29. 
225 Thailand: Hambali Interrogated at Secret Location — 2003-08-16, Voice of  Am. (Oct. 29, 2009), available 
at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2003-08-16-34-Thailand-67472182.html
226 Hambali: Guantánamo Bay Detainee File on Hambali, US9ID-010019DP, Passed to the Telegraph by 
Wikileaks, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-
files/guantanamo-bay-wikileaks-files/8477093/Guantanamo-Bay-detainee-file-on-Hambali-US9ID-
010019DP.html; The Guantánamo Docket: Zubair (Mohd Farik Bin Amin), N.Y. TIMES, available at http://
projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10021-zubair-mohd-farik-bin-amin-; The Guantánamo 
Docket: Lillie (Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep), N.Y. TIMES, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/
detainees/10022-lillie-mohammed-nazir-bin-lep-
227  Office of  the Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, Detainee Biographies, available at http://www.defense.gov/
pdf/detaineebiographies1.pdf  
228 MAYER, supra note 12, at 225. 
229  Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 217.
230  Peter Taylor, “Vomiting and Screaming” in Destroyed Waterboarding Tapes, BBC News (May 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17990955
231 SOUFAN, supra note 212, at 381–85 (detailing the dramatic transfer of  Abu Zubaydah to a Thai 
hospital by CIA officials dressed as soldiers). See also Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., 
OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA), Interrogation of  Al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002), available 
at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf
232  U.N. Report, supra note 37, at 108.
233 Zubaydah’s Torture, Detention Subject of  Senate Intelligence Inquiry, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 17, 2010) (quoting 
intelligence officials with direct knowledge of  Abu Zubaydah’s treatment), available at http://archive.
truthout.org/zubaydahs-torture-detention-subject-senate-intelligence-inquiry58666
234  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, at 36. See also Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Principal 
Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A Rizzo (Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  U.S. 
Obligations Under Article 16 of  CAT to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in Interrogation of  High Value Al Qaeda 
Detainees (May 30, 2005) (notes that Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded, by the CIA’s own admission, while 
already compliant with interrogators), available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_
bradbury.pdf. Former CIA official Jose Rodriguez has described the process of  waterboarding as counting 
the number of  times water was poured onto the cloth over the detainee’s nose and mouth. RODRIGUEZ, 
supra note 219, at 70. 
235 SOUFAN, supra note 212, at 380–81. 
236  Soufan Interview, supra note 19.
237 SOUFAN, supra note 212, at 393-410. 
238 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 219, at 190, 193; Mark Mazzetti, US Says CIA Destroyed 92 Tapes 
of  Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/
washington/03web-intel.html. Soufan Interview, supra note 19. Soufan claims that this justification was 
false, since the interrogators on the video who used the “enhanced” techniques wore masks. 
239 Id. See also Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2007), 
482
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07intel.html
240  Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_2.html; 
241  Goldman, supra note 158.
242 Wojciech Czuchnowski & Adam Krzykowski, The Secret of  the CIA Villa in Stare Kiejkuty, Panorama 
TVP 2, Mar. 27, 2012; U.N. Report, supra note 37; European Parliament Report, supra note 28; CoE 
Second Report, supra note 92. 
243  CoE Second Report, supra note 92.
244 Id. at ¶ 125.
245 Id. at ¶ 124 (quoting a long-serving CIA official).
246  Task Force staff  interview with Anonymous Polish Source (Nov. 16, 2011).
247  Pinior Interview, supra note 143. See also Edyta em a & Mariusz Kowalewski, Polski wywiad w s
u bie CIA, RZECZPOSPOLITA, Apr. 15, 2009; Adam Krzykowski & Mariusz Kowalewski, Politycy przecz , 
RZECZPOSPOLITA (Apr. 15, 2009); U.N. Report, supra note 37. 
248  U.N. Report, supra note 37. 
249  Pinior Interview, supra note 143. 




252  CoE Second Report, supra note 92, at ¶ 168 (emphasis of  CoE).
253 Id. at ¶127; Secret Jails: Terror Suspect’s Odyssey through CIA’s ‘Black Sites’, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available 
at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/binalshibh; A. Bodnar & D. Pudzianowska, Alleged 
Existence of  Secret CIA Facilities on Polish Territory — In Search of  Truth and Accountability, EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITIONS & THE PROTECTION OF HUM. RTS. 82 (M. Nowak & R. Schmidt eds., 2010).
254  Open Soc’y J. Initiative, Explanation of  Rendition Flight Records Released by Polish Air Navigation Services 




257  European Parliament, Working Document No. 8 on the Companies Linked to the CIA, Aircraft Used by the CIA 
and the European Countries in which CIA Aircraft Have Made Stopovers (Doc. DT/641333EN) (Nov. 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/working-doc-no-8-nov-06.pdf; Stephen Grey & 
Renwick McLean, Spain Looks Into C.I.A.’s Handling of  Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/international/europe/14spain.html




259  Eric Umansky, Did CIA Rendition Flights Rely on Bogus State Dept. Letter?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.propublica.org/article/did-cia-rendition-flights-rely-on-forged-state-dept.-letter; 




262 MAYER, supra note 12, at 276. 
263  ICRC HVD Report supra note 48, at 35. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 36. 
266  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, at 91. See also ICRC HVD Report, supra note 48, at 35–37. 
267  ICRC HVD Report, supra note 48, at 36. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 37. See also Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html 
270  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, at ¶ 92. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 94. 
273  Goldman, supra note 158. When contacted by the Task Force, the former CIA official said to have 
been in charge of  the Polish prison refused to comment. 
274  ICRC HVD Report, supra note 48, at 17. See also Adam Goldman & Monika Scislowska, Poles 
Urged to Probe CIA “Black Site,” CBS News (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/09/21/world/main6887750.shtml
275  CIA IG Report, supra note 211, at ¶ 97. 
276  Abu Zubaydah Application, supra note 82, at ¶ 29 (2010); Yemeni Claims He Was Held at CIA 
Prison in Poland, THE NEWS POLAND (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/
Artykul/90331,Yemeni-claims-he-was-held-at-CIA-prison-in-Poland
277  Task Force staff  interview with Anonymous Source (Nov. 16, 2011). 
278  Open Soc’y Foundations, Al-Nashiri v. Poland: Poland Complicit in Rendition, Detention, and Torture at CIA 
Black-Site Prison, available at http://www.soros.org/litigation/al-nashiri-v-poland
279  Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, Interights (2011), http://www.interights.org/abu-zubaydah/index.html
280  Letter from Stefan Meller (Poland Minister of  Foreign Aff.) to Terry Davies (Secretary Gen. of  
Council of  Eur.) (Feb. 17, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/com/files/events/2006-cia/Poland.
pdf
484
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
281 Polish CIA Prison: US and Poland Had Been Trying to “Put Story to Rest”, WL Central (Sept. 2, 2011), 
available at http://wlcentral.org/node/2214
282 Former PM and President “Told about CIA Black site in Poland,” NEWS POLAND (May 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/99002,Former-PM-and-president-told-about-CIA-black-site-in-
Poland
283 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 
585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Colum Lynch, U.N. Human 
Rights Chief  Criticizes Handling of  Detainees, WASH. POST (June 24, 2009) (noting Obama’s “decision to 
limit investigation into past abuses.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/06/24/AR2009062401172.html?wprss=rss_nation
284  Polish Letter, Pani Danut Przywara Prezes Zarzadu Helsinskiej Fundacji Praw Czlowieka & Pan 
dr Adam Bodnar Sekretarz Zarzadu Helsinskiej Fundacji Praw Czlowieka (Dec. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.hfhr.org.pl/cia/images/stories/Odpowiedz_Prokuratura_15_12_2010.pdf. 
285  Ann Riley, Poland Prosecutors Grant Terror Suspect Victim Status, JURIST (Oct. 27, 2010), available at 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/10/poland-prosecutors-grant-terror-suspect-victim-status.php
286 Id. 
287  Task Force staff  interview with Prosecutors Waldemar Tyl, Dariusz Korneluk, & Szymon Liszewski 
(Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Tyl, Korneluk, Liszewski Interview]. 
288 Pytania prokuratorow, GAZETA (May 30, 2011), available at http://wyborcza.
pl/1,75402,9689932,Pytania_prokuratorow,ga.html (Translations provided by the Open Soc’y J. 
Initiative). 
289  Task Force staff  interviews with four anonymous sources (Nov. 15 & 24, 2011). 
290 Id. See also Bodnar & Pudzianowska, supra note 253. 
291  Tyl, Korneluk, Liszewski Interview, supra note 287. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. See also Scott Horton, Justice Department Refuses Cooperation With Polish Prosecutors Investigating Torture 
at CIA Black Site, HARPER’S (Dec. 30, 2010), available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/12/hbc-
90007880
294 Id. 
295  Adam Krakow, Sprawa tajnych wiezien CIA teraz w Krakowie, TVP (Feb. 11, 2012), available at http://
tvp.info/informacje/polska/sprawa-tajnych-wiezien-cia-teraz-w-krakowie/6498938; Task Force 
correspondence with Waldemar Tyl (Feb. 15, 2012). 
296  Joanna Berendt & Nicholas Kulish, Polish Ex-Official Charged with Aiding C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/europe/polish-ex-official-charged-with-
aiding-cia.html. 






298 Wiezienie CIA. Kto poprowadzi teraz sledztwo?, GAZETA (Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://wyborcza.
pl/1,75478,11426413,Wiezienie_CIA__Kto_poprowadzi_teraz_sledztwo_.html
299  Monika Scislowska, PM: Poland Is “Victim” of  US Leaks on CIA Prison, SALON (Mar. 29, 2012), available 
at http://www.salon.com/2012/03/29/pm_poland_is_victim_of_us_leaks_on_cia_prison/; Marcin 
Goettig, Polish Prosecutors to Drop Charges in CIA Inquiry: Report, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/19/us-poland-cia-siematkowski-idUSBRE91I10F20130219
300  Human Rights Watch, Statement on U.S. Secret Detention Facilities in Europe (Nov. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch-statement-us-secret-detention-facilities-
europe
301  U.N. Report, supra note 37. 
302  John Crewdson, Elusive Jet May Hold Clue to Secret Prisons – Mystery Gulfstream Landed in Romania, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-09-13/news/0609130176_1_
european-parliament-secret-prisons-combatants; Finn & Tate, supra note 148. 
303  Letter from Piotr Patla (Border Guard Major) to Danuta Przywara (Chair of  the Board 
Helsinki Found. for Hum. Rts. (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.hfhr.org.pl/cia/images/stories/
Letter_23_07_2010.pdf; Helsinki Found. for Hum. Rts., Arrivals and Departures of  CIA Aircraft on Polish 
Territory, 2002–2005, available at http://www.hfhr.org.pl/cia/images/stories/Data_flights_eng.pdf
304  Urban Olivia, AI Report Points Finger at Romania for Human Rights Violation, NINE O’CLOCK (Romania) 
(May 27, 2010), available at http://www.nineoclock.ro/ai-report-points-finger-at-romania-for-human-
rights-violation/
305  Cristian Gaginsky, Letter to the Editor; Romania and C.I.A. Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Aug, 22, 2009), 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E2DC113DF931A1575BC0A96F9C
8B63
306  CoE Second Report, supra note 92, at ¶ 155.
307 Id.
308 Id. ¶ 228. 
309 Id. ¶¶ 211-12. 
310 Id. ¶¶ 212-13. 
311 Id. ¶ 134; U.N. Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 112. 
312  Les Egyptiens ont des sources confirmant la presence de prisons secretes americaines (Nov. 15, 
2005), http://www.flickr.com/photos/majikthise/474580686/sizes/o/; Horton, supra note 79. See also 
Archie M. Bolster, DOS (June 22, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/134973.pdf; 
Council of  Europe Report, supra note 81, at 22425. 
313  Johnston & Mazzetti, supra note 29 (Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to a fraud charge involving a 
contractor that equipped the C.I.A. jails, and spent three years in jail).
314 Id.
315  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, AP Exclusive: Inside Romania’s Secret CIA Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/8/ap-exclusive-inside-
486







320 Romania Denies Reports It Provided CIA with Secret Prison, Monsters & Critic (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/news/article_1679643.php/Romania-denies-reports-it-
provided-CIA-with-secret-prison; CIA “Secret Prison” Found in Romania — Media Reports, BBC News (Dec. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16093106
321  Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 198. 
322  Crofton Black, Court Case Aims to Dispel Shadows Around Romania’s CIA Black Site, Reprieve (Aug. 22, 
2012), available at http://www.reprieve.org.uk/blog/2012_08_22_Romania_CIA_ECHR/
323 Id.
324  Memorandum from Thomas Hammarberg (Council of  Eur. Comm’r for Hum. Rts.) to Laura 
Codruta Kovesi (Prosecutor Gen. of  Romania), Advancing Accountability in Respect of  the CIA Black Site in 
Romania (Mar. 30, 2012), available at https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.
instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2203768&SecMode=1&DocId=1964684&Usage=2
325 Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
326 Id. ¶¶10–12.
327 Id. ¶ 33. 
328 Id. ¶ 4. 
329  Al Nashiri v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 33234/12 (Aug. 2, 2012), at http://www.soros.org/
sites/default/files/echr-nashiri-romania-20120802.pdf; CSC Flights: Romania 2004–5, Reprieve (July 4, 
2012), available at http://reprieve.org.uk/articles/CSCRomania/
330  Matthew Cole, Officials: Lithuania Hosted Secret CIA Prison to Get “Our Ear,” ABC News (Aug. 20, 
2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=8373807
331 Id. 
332  Parliament Votes to Investigate Alleged CIA Prison in Lithuania (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://
www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09VILNIUS592
333  Lithuanian President Grybauskaite’s First Six Months (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.
cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10VILNIUS4&q=grybauskaite
334 Id. 
335  Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence , Findings of  the Parliamentary Investigation 
Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of  Persons Detained by the [CIA] in the Territory of  the Republic 





336 Id. at 6. 
337  Task Force staff  interview with Egle Digryte (Jan. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Digryte Interview].
338 Id. See also Seimas Report, supra note 335, at 6. 
339 Id. at 5. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342  Cole, supra note 330 (quoting a former CIA official).




346  Task Force staff  interview with Arvydas Anusauskas (Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Anusauskas 
Interview]. 
347  Lithuania’s President Reignites Alleged CIA Prison Story in the Press (Oct. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09VILNIUS549 
348  Cole, supra note 330.
349  NATO, Press Release, NATO Welcomes Seven New Members (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.nato.int/
docu/update/2004/04-april/e0402a.htm
350  Seimas Report, supra note 335, at 6–7. 
351 Id. at 6. 
352 Id. 
353  Egle Digryte, Parlamentaru tyrimas atskleide ne visas CZV kalejimo paslaptis, DELFI (Dec. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/parlamentaru-tyrimas-atskleide-ne-visas-czv-kalejimo-
paslaptis.d?id=27125571
354 Id. Matthew Cole & Brian Ross, CIA Secret “Torture Prison” Found at Fancy Horseback Riding Academy, 
ABC News (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cia-secret-prison-found/
story?id=9115978; Craig Whitlock, Lithuania Investigates Possible CIA ‘Black Site’, WASH. POST (Nov. 
19, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/18/
AR2009111803994.html
355  D.C. Dep’t of  Consumer & Reg. Aff., Certificate of  Organization for Elite LLC (July 9, 2003). 
356 Id. 
357  Digryte Interview, supra note 337. 
488
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
358  Id.
359  Cole & Ross, supra note 354. 
360  Seimas Report, supra note 335, at 7. 
361 Id. at 7. 
362 Id. at 8. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 9. 
365  Anusauskas Interview, supra note 346. These details were confirmed by Jonas Markevicius. 
Markevicius Interview, supra note 343. 
366  Anusauskas Interview, supra note 346. 
367 Id. 
368 Ambassador to Georgia Fired by Lithuanian President over CIA Prison Scandal, ALFA (Lithuania) (Dec. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10304745/?Ambassador.to.Georgia.fired.by.Lithuanian.
President.over.CIA.prison.scandal..update.=2009-12-15_23-11
369 Lithuania’s FM Resigns after CIA Dispute, World Bulletin (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.
worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=52980 
370  Task Force staff  interview with Vygaudas Usackas (Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Usackas Interview]. 
See also Lithuania’s FM Resigns after CIA Dispute, supra note 369. 
371  Usackas Interview, supra note 370. 
372  Amnesty Int’l, Lithuania: Unlock the Truth in Lithuania: Investigate Secret Prisons Now (Sept. 29, 2011), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR53/002/2011/en
373  Task Force staff  interview with Darius Raulušaitis & Irmantas Mikelionis (Jan. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Raulušaitis & Mikelionis Interview]
374  Council of  Europe, Press Release, Council of  Europe Anti-Torture Committee Visits Lithuania (June 23, 
2010), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ltu/2010-06-23-eng.htm (the CPT is the only 
organization outside of  Lithuania to have been granted site visits to both of  the alleged detention sites. 
The Task Force requested similar access, but received no response from the Lithuanian government). 
375 Id. at ¶68. 
376 Justice Minister: Lithuania Has Done Everything It Can During CIA Prison Investigation, 15 Min. (Lithuania) 
(Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.15min.lt/en/article/in-lithuania/justice-minister-lithuania-has-
done-everything-it-can-during-cia-prison-investigation-525-214099
377  Amnesty Int’l, Unlock the Truth in Lithuania: Investigate Secret Prisons Now (2011), available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR53/002/2011/en/dd6dc600-25ea-4299-8aec-1d3d16639d4c/
eur530022011en.pdf




379  Cole, supra note, 330. See also CSC’s Covert Flights Through Lithuania, Reprieve (Sept. 7, 2012), http://
reprieve.org.uk/articles/csclithuania
380  Raulušaitis & Mikelionis Interview, supra note 373.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383  European Parliament Follow-Up Report 2012, supra note 154, at ¶ 14. 
384 Id. 
385 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, Interights, available at http://www.interights.org/abu-zubaydah-v-
lithuania/index.html
386  Mark Mazzetti, 9/11 Suspect Was Detained and Taped in Morocco, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/world/18tapes.html; U.N. Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 151.








393 Abou Elkassim Britel: At Home at Last!, Giustizia per Kassim (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.
giustiziaperkassim.net/?page_id=105
394  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (2010) (en banc). 
395  Mark Mazzetti, 9/11 Suspect Was Detained and Taped in Morocco, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/world/18tapes.html. 
396 Id. 




400  Org. for Security & Cooperation in Eur., Kosovo: Review of  the Criminal Justice System (March 2002 – 
April 2003) (2003) [hereinafter OSCE Report], available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/12555.
401 Id. at 33.
490
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
402 Id. at 34 (citing Section 4 (b) of  KFOR Directive 42). 
403 “Everyone Knew What Was Going on in Bondsteel”, supra note 397.
404  Lawrence Marzouk, Wikileaks: NATO Blocked Kosovo Secret Prison Probe, Balkan Insight (Dec. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nato-hampered-kosovo-secret-prison-probe
405 Id. 
406  Council of  Europe Report, supra note 81.
407 Id.
408 DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS, supra note 56, at fn. 134. 
409  U.N. Report, supra note 37, at 47, 80; Secret Prisons, Reprieve (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://
reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/secretprisonbriefings
410  Sudarsan Raghavan & Julie Tate, African Commission Asked to Take Case Challenging CIA Rendition 
Program, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/28/AR2011022803848.html
411  U.N. Report, supra note 37, at 81.
412  Raghavan & Tate, supra note 410.
413  U.N. Report, supra note 37, at 80 (citing High Court of  Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, criminal 
application No. 23 of  2004, Abdullah Saleh Mohsen al-Asad v. Director of  Immigration Services, ex parte 
Mohamed Abdullah Salehe Mohsen Al-Asaad counter affidavit, 30 June 2004).
414 Id.; African Commission Urged to Take on Groundbreaking Extraordinary Rendition Case, Interights (Feb. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.chrgj.org/press/docs/100228renditionrelease.pdf
415  Raghavan & Tate, supra note 410.
416  Brief  for Defendant at 302, 305, 316, Richmor Aviation v. SportsFlight Air, Inc. Ben Quinn & 
Ian Cobain, Mundane Bills Bring CIA’s Rendition Network into Sharper Focus, GUARDIAN (UK) (Aug. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/cia-rendition-flights-cost
417  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Statement of  Gen. John P. Abizaid, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Central 
Command, on the 2005 Posture of  the U.S. Central Command (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/
dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-01Abizaid.doc
418  Craig Whitlock, Renditions Continue Under Obama, Despite Due Process Concerns, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 




















433  Clara Gutteridge, How the U.S. Rendered, Tortured and Discarded One Innocent Man, NATION (July 27, 
2012), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/168621/how-us-rendered-tortured-and-discarded-
one-innocent-man
434 Id. 
435 ACLU, El-Masri v. Tenet (June 1, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/el-masri-v-tenet; 
En Banc Rehearing Transcript, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4216-cv (2d Cir. 2008), available at http://www.
ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c05cd9a7-02c0-4d4e-b8ef-92b467c6a843/1/doc/06-4216-
cv_opn2.pdf. See also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), available at http://scholar.google.com/
scholar_case?case= 13093177374759375473&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr; Margaret L. 
Satterthwaite, The Story of  El-Masri v. Tenet: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the “War on Terror (N.Y.U. 
Sch. of  Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 08-64, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1311622
436  Amy Goodman & Juan Gonzalez, Democratic Rep. Jerrold Nadler on Maher Arar, Rendition, Voting 
Rights Chair John Tanner, and Seeking Justice for the Jena 6, Democracy Now! (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.
democracynow.org/2007/10/24/democratic_rep_jerrold_nadler_on_maher
437  ACLU, Mohamed et al. v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/mohamed-et-al-v-jeppesen-dataplan-inc
438  Jane Mayer, The C.I.A.’s Travel Agent, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer
439  ACLU Press Release, Appeals Court Decision Denies Extraordinary Rendition Victims Their Day in Court 
(Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/appeals-court-decision-denies-
extraordinary-rendition-victims-their-day-court
440  ACLU Press Release, International Tribunal Takes Up Case of  Innocent Victim of  CIA Extraordinary 
Rendition Program (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_national-security/
international-tribunal-takes-case-innocent-victim-cia-extraordinary-r
441  ACLU Press Release, Italian Court Finds Americans Guilty in CIA Rendition Case (Nov. 4, 2009), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_national-security/italian-court-finds-americans-guilty-cia-
492
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
rendition-case
442  Scott Shane, Woman in Rendition Case Sues for Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2009), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/us/14diplo.html; John Hooper, Italian Court Finds CIA Agents Guilty 
of  Kidnapping Terrorism Suspect, GUARDIAN (UK) (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/nov/04/cia-guilty-rendition-abu-omar
443 Hooper, supra note 442. 
444 Id. 
445  Michael Isikoff, To Pay Abu Omar, CIA’s Man in Milan Loses Villa, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/declassified/2009/11/07/to-pay-abu-omar-cia-s-man-
in-milan-loses-villa.html; Colleen Barry, Milan Court Convicts 3 Americans in CIA Kidnapping, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (AP) (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2013/02/01/
milan-court-convicts-3-americans-in-cia-kidnapping; Sara Rossi, Italian Ex-Spy Chief  Gets Ten Years in 
CIA Case, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-italy-
rendition-verdict-idUSBRE91B0OS20130212
446 Application to European Court of  Human Rights in Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, Interights, available at 
http://www.interights.org/document/181/index.html; http:Application to European Court of  Human 
Rights in al-Nashiri v. Poland, available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/echr-al-nashiri-
application-20110506.pdf; Application to European Court of  Human Rights in al-Nashiri v. Romania; http://www.
soros.org/sites/default/files/echr-nashiri-romania-20120802.pdf. 
447  El-Masri v. Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, No. 39630/09 (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/CASE_OF_EL-MASRI_v__THE_FORMER_
YUGOSLAV_REPUBLIC_OF_MACEDONIA.pdf
448  Richard Norton-Taylor, CIA ‘Tortured and Sodomized’ Terror Suspect, Human Rights Court Rules, 
GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/dec/13/cia-tortured-
sodomised-terror-suspect




452  James Blitz & Hannah Kuchler, Straw Faces Lawsuit on Libya Rendition Claims, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d63d0fa-892e-11e1-85af-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1usaKHQVG
453  Dominic Casciani, UK Pays £2.2m to Settle Libyan Rendition Claim, BBC News (Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20715507
454 Id.; Lana Lam, Rendition Case Libyan Sami al-Saadi Still Plans to Sue Hong Kong Government, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 16, 2012), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
article/1106511/rendition-case-libyan-sami-al-saadi-still-plans-sue-hong-kong
455 ACCOUNT RENDERED, supra note 25, at 11. 
456  Owen Bowcott, Ian Cobain & Richard Norton-Taylor, Gibson Inquiry into MI5 and MI6 Torture 





457  House of  Commons Foreign Aff. Comm., Human Rights Annual Report (2007), available at http://
www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/uk-hr-fac-cia.pdf. 
458  Mohammed al-Asad v. Republic of  Djibouti, Complaint, Afr. Comm’n H.R. & Peoples’ R. (Dec. 
10, 2009), available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Al-Asad_Complaint.-2009.pdf
459  Raghavan & Tate, supra note 410.
460  Matthias Gebauer & John Goetz, The CIA’s El-Masri Abduction: Cables Show Germany Caved to Pressure 
From Washington, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,733860,00.html; Scott Horton, The El-Masri Cable, HARPER’S (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/11/hbc-90007831
461  Gebauer & Goetz, supra note 460. 
462 Id.
463 Id. 
464 Observatory on “Rendition”: The Use of  European Counties by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of  
Prisoners, STATEWATCH, available at http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html
465  Gebauer & Goetz, supra note 460. 
466  Stephen Grey & Renwick McLean, Spain Examines CIA “Rendition” Flights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/world/europe/14iht-spain.html; Open Soc’y J. 
Initiative, Fact Sheet: CIA Rendition Investigations (2012), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
sites/default/files/factsheet-rendition-20121012_0.pdf
467  Manuel Altozano, El fiscal solicita el arresto de 13 espaias de EE UU que tripularon los vulos de 
la CIA, EL PAIS (Spain) (May 12, 2010), available at http://elpais.com/diario/2010/05/12/
espana/1273615212_850215.html; Ximena Marinero, Spain Prosecutor Requests Arrest Warrants for CIA 
Rendition Agents, JURIST (May 13, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/05/spain-
prosecutor-requests-arrest-warrants-for-cia-rendition-agents.php
468  Amy Goodman & Juan Gonzalez, WikiLeaks Cables Reveal U.S. Tried to Thwart Spanish Probes of  
Gitmo Torture and CIA Rendition, Democracy Now! (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.democracynow.
org/2010/12/1/wikileaks_cables_reveal_us_tried_to
469  Giles Tremlett, Wikileaks: US Pressured Spain over CIA Rendition and Guantánamo Torture, GUARDIAN 
(UK) (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-us-spain-
guantanamo-rendition
470 Id.
471  Mark Tran, Miliband Admits US Rendition Flights Stopped on UK Soil, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 21, 2008), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/21/ciarendition.usa
472 Id. 




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
474  Richard Norton-Taylor & Julian Borger, Embarrassed Miliband Admits Two US Rendition Flights Refueled 




477  DOS, Unclassified Emails to Richard B LeBaron (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/132711.pdf
478 Id.
479  Bin Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-1347(GK), slip op. (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/12170928jECF.pdf
480 Id. at 64. 
481 Id. at 68, 70. 
482 Binyam Mohamed Torture Appeal Lost by UK Government, BBC News (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507852.stm
483  Letter from John B. Bellinger III (DOS Legal Adviser) to Daniel Bethlehem (Legal Adviser, U.K. 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://www.extraordinaryrendition.
org/document-library/finish/5-foreign-office/23-john-bellinger-letter-re-binyam-mohamed/0.html; 
David Rose, You Be the Judge, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/
features/2009/02/miliband-torture200902
484  In re Mohamed, Rv. Sec’y of  Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 104, at ¶ 23. 
485  Letter from Jonathan Sumption Q.C. Re: R (Binyam Mohammed) v. Sec’y of  State for Foreign 
& Commonwealth Affairs (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/26659700/Letter-
from-Jonathan-Sumption-Q-C-Re-R-Binyam-Mohammed-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Foreign-and-
Commonwealth-Affairs; In re Mohamed, R. v. Sec’y of  Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 
104; Gordon Rayner & Duncan Gardham, Binyam Mohamed: Release of  Secrets Will Harm Relations with 
Britain, Warns US, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/7211021/Binyam-Mohamed-release-of-secrets-will-harm-relations-with-
Britain-warns-US.html
486  Rayner & Gardham, supra note 485. 
487  Johan Nylander, supra note 135; Sweden: The New Post “CIA Planes” Reality — Politicizing a 




490  Louise Nordstrom, Egyptian Deported by CIA Gets Residency in Sweden, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 4, 2012), 
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egyptian-deported-cia-gets-residency-sweden
491  Irish Hum. Rts. Comm’n, “Extraordinary Rendition”: A Review of  Ireland’s Human Rights Obligations 




492  Irish Establish Cabinet Committee to Review Renditions Allegations and Other Human Rights 
Concerns (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.shannonwatch.org/cables/08dublin602
493 Id. 
494  Jennifer Hough, Special Cabinet Committee on Rendition ‘Failed to Deliver’, IRISH EXAMINER (Nov. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/special-cabinet-committee-on-rendition-failed-
to-deliver-137176.html 
495  Emerging Constraints on U.S. Military Transits at Shannon, available at http://www.shannonwatch.
org/cables/06dublin1020
496 Id. 
497  Leslie Schulman, Switzerland Probing Unlawful US Use of  Swiss Airspace for Renditions, JURIST (Feb. 14, 
2007), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/02/switzerland-probing-unlawful-us-use-of.php 
498  Swiss Cabinet Authorizes a Criminal Investigation on “Rendition Overflight” Ends 
Investigation of  “Agent Tom” (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.
php?id=07BERN151&q=italy%20rendition
499 Swiss Behave! Suspend CIA Rendition Probe, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.
energy-net.org/NUZ/HRIGHTS/INT/08123367.TXT
500 Id. 
501 Ministry Hones in on Alleged CIA Rendition Flight, YLE (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://yle.fi/uutiset/
ministry_homes_in_on_alleged_cia_rendition_flight/2985932; Amnesty Int’l, Finland Must Further 
Investigate USA Rendition Flights (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/finland-must-
further-investigate-usa-rendition-flights-2011-11-01
502  Finland: Status of  Extradition and MLAT Agreements (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.
cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07HELSINKI885&q=finland%20rendition
503  DOJ Press Release, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the 
President (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html
504  David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, But With More Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html 
505  Report of  the Events Relating to Maher Arar, supra note 90, at 185.
506 Id. at 185-90.
507  Koh Interview, supra note 78. 
496
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES
1  Captain Shimkus’s current views, as expressed in an interview with Task Force staff, are discussed 
in Chapter 1.
2  Malcolm Nance, Waterboarding Is Not Simulated Drowning — It Is Drowning, SALON (Nov. 9, 2007), 
available at http://www.salon.com/2007/11/09/nance 
3  Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Hearings on the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody (S. 
Hrg. 110-720) (June 17 & Sept. 25, 2008) at 48, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/
treatment.pdf
4  DOD, Pre-Academic Laboratory (PREAL) Operating Instruction 4, 16 (May 7, 2002), available at http://
www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/PREAL%20Operating%20Instructions.pdf
5 E.g., Martin E.P. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock, 74 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 1 (1967); Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E. Seligman & John D. Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in 
Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978).
6 Learned Helplessness in Humans, supra note 5, at 59.
7 Id.
8 M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 132 (2011).
9  Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects of  Harsh Tactic’s in 9/11’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/us/12psychs.html; Katherine Eban, Rorshach and Awe, VANITY 
FAIR (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/07/torture200707; 
Joby Warrick & Peter Finn, Interviews Offer Look at Roles of  CIA Contractors During Interrogation, WASH. POST 
(July 19, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/18/
AR2009071802065.html?hpid=topnews; Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Inquiry into the 
Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody 6–7 (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Levin Report], available at http://
www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.
pdf  (Jessen did not retire from the DOD until July 2002, after which he and Mitchell formed a company 
called Mitchell Jessen & Associates). 
10 BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 136–37.
11  Shane, supra note 9; Mark Benjamin, “War on Terror” Psychologist Gets Giant No-Bid Contract, SALON 
(Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://www.salon.com/2010/10/14/army_contract_seligman
12  Shane, supra note 9; Eban, supra note 9; Warrick & Finn, supra note 9; Levin Report, supra note 9, 
at 6–7; CIA, Office of  Inspector Gen., Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 13 
(May 7, 2004) [hereinafter CIA OIG Report], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/IG_Report.
pdf  
13  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Steven Kleinman (June 19, 2012). 
14 Id.
15  Fax from CIA to Dan Levin (DOJ, OLC), Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of  Interrogation 
Techniques (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter CIA Background Paper on Combined Techniques].






17  Massimo Calabresi, Ex-CIA Counterterror Chief: “Enhanced Interrogation” Led U.S. to bin Laden, TIME 
(May 4, 2011), available at http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/04/did-torture-get-the-us-osama-bin-
laden; Hard Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post-9/11 Tactics, 60 Minutes (Apr. 29, 2012), available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57423533/hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-11-tactics/
18 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ISTANBUL PROTOCOL: MANUAL ON THE EFFECTIVE 
INVESTIGATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, at 45, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.04.XIV.3 
(2004),available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf
19 ALI SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS 393–95 (2011) (Soufan refers to the CIA contract psychologist as 
“Boris” but multiple, credible press accounts have confirmed that it is Mitchell, e.g. Warrick & Finn, supra 
note 9). 
20 SOUFAN, BLACK BANNERS, supra note 20; BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 137; Eban, supra note 9; PETER 
BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR 112 (2011); Shane, supra note 9.
21  Michael Isikoff, We Could Have Done This the Right Way, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/24/we-could-have-done-this-the-right-way.html; 
Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Cts., Testimony of  Ali Soufan (May 13, 
2009), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f73
5da14945e6&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da14945e6-1-2
22 SOUFAN, BLACK BANNERS, supra note 19, at 422–23 (FBI agent Steve Gaudin remained slightly 
longer, but his superiors eventually ordered him not to return); DOJ, Office of  Inspector Gen., A Review of  
the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of  Detainee Interrogations in Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0910.pdf
23  Rodriguez does not identify Soufan by name in his book, but comparing his description to other 
sources makes clear that Soufan is the FBI agent in question. 
24 JOSE RODRIGUEZ, HARD MEASURES 77–78 (2012). 
25 Id. at 70.
26 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 169 (2010). 
27  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Interrogation of  Al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods 
Memo], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf
28 Id.
29  Shane, supra note 9; Levin Report, supra note 9, at 23–24.
30  Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods Memo, supra note 27.
31  Fax from [Redacted] to John Yoo (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC), Draft Psychological Assessment of  Zain al-




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
33 Id.
34 SOUFAN, BLACK BANNERS, supra note 19, at 427–28.
35  Respondent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and Petitioner’s 
Motion for Sanctions, Husayn v. Gates, No. 08-1360 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009). 
36 See Memorandum in Support of  Motion for Order Requiring the Gov’t to Return the Original 
Unredacted Copies of  Petitioner’s Diaries and Other Writings, Husayn v. Gates, No. 08-1360 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 14, 2009).
37  CIA OIG Report, supra note 12, at 21–22.
38 Id.
39  Task Force staff  interview with John Rizzo (Aug. 2, 2012).
40  Email from Kirk Hubbard, Aug. 19, 2012. (on file with the Constitution Project)
41  Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods Memo, supra note 27, at 11.
42  CIA OIG Report, supra note 12, at 36. Jose Rodriguez has alleged in his memoirs that the OIG 
Report is inaccurate and biased. In particular, Rodriguez states that the report’s finding that Abu 
Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times is a 
“canard”: “[i]t is a measure of  the care and precision with which we conducted the program that Agency 
officers recorded every drip of  water that was used … the ‘183 times’ that we get credited/blamed 
for waterboarding KSM in fact involved only 183 splashes of  water (applications).” RODRIGUEZ, supra 
note 24, at 52. In fact, the OIG report makes clear that the 83 and 183 figures refer to the number of  
“waterboard applications,” which it defines as “each discrete instance in which water was applied.” CIA 
OIG Report, supra note 12, at 36. 
43  CIA OIG Report, supra note 12, at 37. 
44 Levin Report, supra note 9, at xxvi.
45  DOJ Office of  Prof ’l Resp. Report, Investigation into the Office of  Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning 
Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of  “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 
235–36 (July 29, 2009) [hereinafter OPR Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf  
46  CIA OIG Report, supra note 12, at 21–22, 36–37, 90; OPR Report, supra note 45, at 83, 85.
47  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Officials: CIA Gave Waterboarders $5M Legal Shield, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 17, 2010).
48  ACLU v. DOD, Vaughn Indices, available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/
torturefoia_vaughn1_20090501.pdf
49  Email from Hubbard, supra note 40.
50 Id.
51  Warrick & Finn, supra note 9.




53  ICRC, Report on the Treatment of  Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 28–31 (2007), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/71001/03083_070214_001display.pdf  [hereinafter ICRC 
HVD Report].
54  Transcript of  Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing for Abu Zubaydah (Mar. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/csrt_abuzubaydah.pdf
55  Application, Zubaydah v. Republic of  Lithuania, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶153 (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.interights.org/document/181/index.html
56  Jane Mayer, The Secret History, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/06/22/090622fa_fact_mayer
57  George J. Tenet, Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees (Jan. 28, 2003), Appendix D to 
CIA OIG Report, supra note 12 [hereinafter CIA Guidelines on Conditions of  Confinement]; George J. Tenet, 
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the [Redacted] (Jan. 28, 2003), Appendix E to CIA OIG 
Report, supra note 12 [hereinafter CIA Guidelines on Interrogations].
58 CIA Guidelines on Conditions of  Confinement, supra note 57, at 2.
59 CIA Guidelines on Interrogations, supra note 57, at 1–3.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2.
62  CIA Off. of  Med. Servs., Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation, 
and Detention (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004], available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/
doc/bitstream/2041/72435/02793_041200display.pdf; CIA Off. of  Med. Servs., Guidelines on Medical 
and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation, and Detention (May 17, 2004) [hereinafter OMS 
Guidelines May 2004], available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/103009/cia-olc/2.pdf; 
CIA Off. of  Med. Servs., Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, 
Interrogation, and Detention (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter OMS Guidelines Sept. 2003], available at http://
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/cia_oig_report.pdf  (Appendix F)
63  OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004, supra note 62, at 8. 
64  OMS Guidelines Sept. 2003, supra note 62, at 1.
65 Id. at 2. 
66  OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004, supra note 62, at 10. 
67  OMS Guidelines Sept. 2003, supra note 62, at 4. 
68  OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004, supra note 62, at 12–13. 
69  OMS Guidelines Sept. 2003, supra note 62, at 5–6. 
70 Id. at 7. 
71  OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004, supra note 62, at 14. 
72  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used 
500
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
in the Interrogation of  a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005) [hereinafter Bradbury May 10 Memo], 
available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 14. 
75  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A. Rizzo 
(Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  U.S. Obligations Under Article 16 of  CAT to Certain 
Techniques that May Be Used in Interrogation of  High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
Bradbury May 30 Memo], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20120403/docs/
Bradbury%20memo.pdf
76  OMS Guidelines May 2004, supra note 62, at 7, 23. 
77  Bradbury May 30 Memo, supra note 75, at 13. 
78 Id. 
79  OMS Guidelines Dec. 2004, supra note 62, at 17–18. 
80 Id. at 19. 
81  Bradbury May 10 Memo, supra note 72, at 14–15. 
82 Id. at 7. 
83 Id. at n. 31. 
84 Id. at 47. 
85  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used 
in the Interrogation of  a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee 62 (May 10, 2005 [No. 12]) [hereinafter CIA Combined 
Use Memo], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury_20pg.pdf  
86  Bradbury May 30 Memo, supra note 75. 
87  In the case of  waterboarding, they were largely moot except insofar as they accurately described 
past practices, as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was reportedly the last detainee subjected to that technique.
88  OPR Report, supra note 45, at 243. 
89 ICRC HVD REPORT, supra note 53, at 22.
90 Id. at 11, 22. 
91 Id. at 10. 
92 Id. at 11–12, 15, 31–33.
93 Id. at 21–23, 33. See also Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, Algerian Tells of  Dark Term in 





94 ICRC HVD REPORT, supra note 53, at 13, 28–30.
95 Id. at 23.
96 Id. at 21.
97 Id. at 14–17.
98  Most of  the former CIA detainees declined to attend their CSRTs. 
99  Transcript of  Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (2007), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/csrt_alnashiri.pdf
100  Transcript of  Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for Majid Khan (2007), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/csrt_majidkhan.pdf
101  A partial exception to this is Ahmed Ghailani, who was tried and convicted in federal court 
for his role in the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. A psychologist hired by the 
defense asserted that Ghailani had suffered from PTSD as a result of  his treatment in CIA custody, 
but his symptoms had “partially remitted.” A psychiatrist appointed by the court described Ghailani 
as becoming tearful and unable to speak about certain incidents in captivity (the details of  which were 
redacted) and had “some anxiety-related symptoms that could be consistent with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder,” but concluded that overall, “I do not feel that Mr. Ghailani meets the criteria for a current 
diagnosis” of  PTSD. The court accepted the psychiatrist’s conclusion. See Order, United States v. 
Ghailani, Crim. No. 98-1023 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2010), available at http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/
decisions/070210kaplan.pdf; Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation by Gregory B. Saathoff, M.D. (redacted 
version), United States v. Ghailani, Crim. No. 98-1023 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2010). 
102  James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen are known to have a formed a company called Mitchell, Jessen 
and Associates that contracted with the CIA and had 120 employees in 2007. Their contracts were not 
fully terminated until 2009. It is unclear precisely what role their employees had in the interrogation 
program, however. Eban, supra note 9. 
103  The studies on the medical and psychological impacts of  these techniques is summarized 
in PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. & HUM. RTS. FIRST, LEAVE NO MARKS: ENHANCED INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES AND THE RISK OF CRIMINALITY (2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/07801-etn-leave-no-marks.pdf; K. Alexa Koenig, Eric Stover & Laurel E. Fletcher, 
The Cumulative Effect: A Medico-Legal Approach to United States Torture Law and Policy, 6 ESSEX H.R. REV. 145 
(2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/KoenigStoverFletcher.pdf
104  Albert D. Biderman, Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of  War, 33 
BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 616, 620 (1957), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/
national/20080702_1957.pdf
105 Id. 
106 HAROLD WOLFF & LAWRENCE HINKLE, COMMUNIST CONTROL TECHNIQUES 26 (1956), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/19560400.pdf
107 Id. at 36. 
108 Id. at 37. 
109 Levin Report, supra note 9, at 38–39. Major Leso’s name is redacted from the Levin report 
but he has been identified as the psychologist on the initial JTF-170 BSCT team. Sheri Fink, Tortured 
502
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Profession: Psychologists Warned of  Abusive Interrogations, Then Helped Craft Them, PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.propublica.org/article/tortured-profession-psychologists-warned-of-abusive-
interrogations-505
110  Fink, supra note 109. 
111 PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 125 
(2008). 
112  Task Force staff  interview with Dr. Michael Gelles (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Gelles Interview]; 
see also SANDS, supra note 111. 
113  Gelles Interview, supra note 112; SANDS, supra note 111. 
114  Gelles Interview, supra note 112. 
115 Levin Report, supra note 9, at 39.
116  Memorandum from Brig. Gen. R.A. Huck to U.S. Southern Command (Aug. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Huck%208-2-02.pdf
117  Gelles Interview, supra note 112. 
118  DOD Memorandum, BSCT Standard Operating Procedures (Nov. 11, 2002), available at http://
humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-
standard-operating-procedures/bsct_sop_2002.pdf
119  Levin Report, supra note 9, at 43–48.
120 Id. at 47.
121  Fink, supra note 109. 
122  Levin Report, supra note 9, at 38–39, 43–47, 51–53.
123 Id. at 51–52.
124 Id. at 52.
125 Id. at 50. 
126 BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 154. 
127  Levin Report, supra note 9, at 215.
128 Id. at 60. 
129  Letter from T.J. Harrington (Deputy Ass’t Dir., Counterterrorism, FBI) to Maj. Gen. Donald J. 
Ryder (Army Criminal Investigation Command), Suspected Mistreatment of  Detainees (July 14, 2004), available 
at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/resources/fbi-documents/FBI87_001914%20to%20001916_
DOJFBI001914.pdf





131 Id. at 27.
132 Id. at 35.
133 Id. at 34, 37, 41.
134 Id. at 6, 9–11, 14, 18, 22, 24–25, 27–28, 30, 33, 35, 41, 45, 47, 58
135 Id. at 3, 6, 8, 9, 24, 29–31, 33, 37, 41, 46, 47, 53–55, 57, 64–65, 69, 76, 83.
136 Id. at 29, 31.
137 Id. at 1, 12, 20, 31, 59.




141  Memorandum from Alberto Mora (Navy Gen. Counsel) for Navy Inspector Gen., Statement for the 
Record: Office of  General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.
org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf
142 LARRY C. JAMES, FIXING HELL 28–29 (2008).
143 Id. at 30.
144 Id. at 57.
145  This phrasing seems to leave open the policy that abusive techniques might be approved for 
detainees not assessed to be too ill or fragile to bear them.
146 JAMES, supra note 142, at 59, 181. 
147  Gelles Interview, supra note 112.
148  Levin Report, supra note 9, 137–38.
149  Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt & Brig. Gen. John Furlow, Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation 
into FBI Allegations of  Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 24–25 (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf  [“Schmidt-Furlow Report”]
150  Levin Report, supra note 9, 140–41.
151 Id. at 140–41.
152 Id. at 141; Jess Bravin, The Conscience of  the Colonel, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 31, 2007).
153  David J.R. Frakt, Mohammad Jawad and the Military Commissions of  Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L. J. 1367, 
1402 (2011).
154 E.g., Justine Sharrock, First, Do Harm, MOTHER JONES (July–Aug. 2009), available at http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/first-do-harm
504
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
155  DOD Inspector Gen., Investigation of  Allegations of  the Use of  Mind-Altering Drugs to Facilitate 
Interrogations of  Detainees (Sept. 23, 2009).
156  Summary, June 04 ICRC Medical Visit to Guantánamo (June 2004) [on file with The Constitution 
Project].
157 Id.
158  Task Force staff  interview with Dr. Steven Sharfstein (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Sharfstein 
Interview].
159 JAMES, supra note 142, at 70. See also id. at 242 (asserting that “there were no psychologists at Abu 
Ghraib during the abuses.”).
160  Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, Assessment of  DOD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention 
Operations in Iraq 5 (2003) [“Miller Report”], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
OathBetrayed/Taguba%20Annex%2020.pdf
161 BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 119–22. See also JIDC organizational chart (Jan. 23, 2004) (available at 
http://detaineetaskforce.org.
162 BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 120.
163  Testimony of  Col. Thomas Pappas to Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba (Feb. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/a46.pdf
164  Terrence Russell, Trip Report, at 2–7 (Sept. 1–24, 2003), available at https://www.documentcloud.
org/documents/404703-jpra-10-11.html
165  U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command, Memorandum re: CID Report of  Investigation-Final 
Referred-0117-04-CID259-80188-5C1Q2/5Y2E (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/released/030705/9117_9134.pdf
166  Albert T. Church III, Review of  Department of  Defense Detention Operations and Detainee 
Interrogation Techniques 355 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
church_353365_20080430.pdf. This may have been a matter of  lax administration more than an attempt 
to allow interrogators to exploit medical files. With one exception, the clinicians interviewed for the Church 
Report denied interrogators ever making use of  medical information or attempting to influence treatment.
167 Id. at 354.
168  U.S. Army Surgeon Gen., Assessment of  Detainee Medical Operations for OEF, GTMO, and OIF 1-5, 17-1 
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Army%20Surgeon%20
General%20Report.pdf  (hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Report).
169 Id. at 1–5.
170 Id. at 14-1, 14-2.
171 Id. at 14-1.
172 Id. at 14-2.
173 E.g., JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 203–04 (2008) . It is unclear how many of  the personnel 





174  Surgeon Gen. Report, supra note 168, at 20–25. 
175 Id. at 16-2.
176 Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of  the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade 47, 78–80, 136 (2004) [“Fay Report”]. 
177 STEVEN H. MILES, OATH BETRAYED 119–26 (2006). 
178 Ex-Iraqi General Dies in U.S. Custody, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Nov. 23, 2003).
179  Office of  the Armed Forces Med. Examiner, Autopsy Examination Report, Autopsy No. ME03-571 (Dec. 
18, 2003) [hereinafter Mowhoush Autopsy], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/
autopsy-report-56-year-old-iraqi-male-al-qaim-iraq-homicide-death-certificate-included
180 MILES, supra note 177, at 89–90.
181 Id. at 84.
182  Vincent Iacopino and Stephen N. Xenakis, Neglect of  Medical Evidence of  Torture in Guantánamo Bay: A 
Case Series, PLOS MED. (April 26, 2011), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%253Adoi
%252F10.1371%252Fjournal.pmed.1001027
183  Susan Okie, Glimpses of  Guantánamo — Medical Ethics and the War on Terror, 353 NEW ENG J. MED. 
2529–34 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp058296
184  Supp. Declaration of  Julia Tarver, Esq., Joudi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-0301 (GK) (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 
2005); Declaration of  Thomas B. Wilner, Al Odah v. United States, Civ. No. 02-0828 (CKK) (D.D.C. 
Sept. 29, 2005); Declaration by Marc D. Falkoff  , Shalabi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-0520 (RMU) (D.D.C Mar. 
7, 2006); Declaration of  Richard G, Murphy, Jr., Al-Adahi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 
2006).
185  Task Force staff  interview with Sami al-Hajj (October 6, 2011).
186 Id.
187  Declaration of  John S. Edmondson, ¶ 14, Razak. v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-1601 (GK) (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 
2005).
188 Id. ¶ 15.
189  Supp. Declaration of  Stephen G. Hooker, ¶ 5, el-Adahi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-280 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Mar. 13, 2006 Hooker Declaration]. 
190 Id. ¶ 5.
191 Id. ¶ 8. 
192 Id. ¶ 8.
193 http://www.restraintchair.com
194  Report by Dr. Emily Keram at 10, Zuhair v. Obama, Civ. No, 08-864 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) 
506
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
[hereinafter Keram Evaluation of  Zuhair].
195  Mar. 13, 2006 Hooker Declaration, supra note 189, at ¶¶ 8, 11–12, 14.
196  Decl. of  Maj. Gen. Jay W. Hood ¶ 12, el-Adahi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-280 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2006).
197  Keram Evaluation of  Zuhair, supra note 194, at 3, 5, 12; Declaration of  Dr. Emily Keram ¶¶ 8, 10, 
14–16, Al-Oshan v. Obama, Civ. No. 05-520, (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2009 [hereinafter Keram Evaluation of  
Shalabi].
198  Keram Evaluation of  Zuhair, supra note 194, at 24–25, 27–28.
199  Keram Evaluation of  Shalabi, supra note 197, at ¶¶ 11–18.
200  This recommendation was followed in Zuhair’s case, until his release in 2009. Shalabi eventually 
began eating solid food again to avoid starvation after nasal inflammation and serious gastrointestinal 
problems made it impossible to absorb an adequate number of  calories through enteral feeding.
201  Keram Evaluation of  Zuhair, supra note 194, at 12–13.
202  Declaration of  Capt. Ronald Sollock ¶ 7g, Al-Adahi v. Bush, Civ. No. 05-280 (D.D.C. March 19, 
2007).
203  World Med. Association, Declaration of  Tokyo — Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and 
Imprisonment (May 2006), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c18
204  World Med. Association, Declaration of  Malta on Hunger Strikers (Oct. 2006), available at http://
www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/h31
205  Al Adahi v. Obama, 596 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Judge Kessler also held that she lacked 
jurisdiction over the force-feeding procedure.
206  Patrick Walsh, Review of  Department Compliance With President’s Executive Order on Detainee Conditions 
of  Confinement (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2009/02/23/17/
FINALReport1.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf  
207  Press Release, Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, Dr. Sami Al-Arian Suspends Hunger 
Strike (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.freesamialarian.com/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id= 586&Itemid=68; Samuel Spies, Family of  Fasting Inmate Asks for Hunger Strike to Stop, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://www.freesamialarian.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=592&Itemid=82
208 See DOJ, Federal Bureau of  Prisons, Program Statement No. P5562.05, at 7–8 (July 29 2005), available at 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5562_005.pdf; Leonard Rubenstein & George Annas, Medical Ethics 
at Guantánamo Bay Detention Center and in the US Military: A Time for Reform, 374 LANCET 353 (2009). 
209  28 C.F.R. § 552.20.
210 Id. 
211 Second Periodic Report of  the United States of  America to the Committee Against Torture (May 6, 2005), available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/us-statereport2005.html




10, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/10/abu-hamza-isolation-supermax-
prison; Dan Eggen, New Home is “Alcatraz of  the Rockies,” WASH. POST (May 5, 2006), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/04/AR2006050401902.html 
213 Supermax: A Clean Version of  Hell, CBS News (June 9, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.
com/2100-18560_162-3357727.html 
214  Task Force staff  interview with Laura Rovner (May 24, 2012).
215  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A. Rizzo (Acting Gen. 
Counsel, CIA) 13 (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-rizzo2006.pdf
216  Sondra S. Crosby, Caroline M. Apovian & Michael A Grodin, Hunger Strikes, Force-Feeding, and 
Physicians’ Responsibilities 563–66 (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.globallawyersandphysicians.org/
storage/JAMA%20Hunger%20Strikes.pdf; George J. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantánamo; Medical Ethics 
and Human Rights in a “Legal Black Hole.” 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377–82 (Sept. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMhle062316; Hernan Reyes, MD, Force-feeding and Coercion: 
No Physician Complicity, 9 VIRTUALMENTOR No. 10: 703–08 (Oct. 2007), available at http://virtualmentor.
ama-assn.org/2007/10/pfor1-0710.html
217 See Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA’s Code of  Medical Ethics (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page; World Med. Ass’n, WMA 
International Code of  Medical Ethics (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/
c8/
218 See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Ethical Principles of  Psychologists & Code of  Conduct (2010), available at 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx; Am. Academy of  Physicians Assistants, Guidelines for the 
Ethical Conduct for the Physician Assistant Profession (2008), available at http://www.aapa.org/uploadedFiles/
content/Common/Files/19-EthicalConduct.doc; Int’l Council of  Nurses, ICN Code of  Ethics for Nurses 
(2012), available at http://www.icn.ch/images/stories/documents/publications/free_publications/
Code%20of%20Ethics%202012%20for%20web.pdf
219  World Med. Association, Declaration of  Geneva (1948). 
220  World Med. Association, Declaration of  Tokyo (1975). 
221 Principles of  Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of  Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection 
of  Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 
37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r194.htm
222 Id.
223  Press Release, Against Torture: Joint Resolution of  the American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association (1985), available at http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/joint-resolution-
against-torture.pdf
224  DOD Instruction, Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations, No. 2310.08E (June 6, 2006), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231008p.pdf
225  M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1497–99 (Apr. 
7, 2005), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM200504073521423
226  Leonard Rubenstein, Christian Pross, Frank Davidoff  & Vincent Iacopino, Coercive US Interrogation 
Policies: A Challenge to Medical Ethics, 294 J. AM. MED ASS’N 1544–49 (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://
jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201572
508
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
227  A side by side comparison of  the language is contained in Table A of  Coercive US Interrogation 
Policies, supra note 226. 
228  DOD Instruction, supra note 224.
229 U.S. Army Behavioral Science Consultation to Detention Operations, Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefing, 
and Tactical Questioning 18 (2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/60959907/U-S-Army-
Behavioral-Science-Consultation-Team-Policy-2008
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 26.
232 Id. at 28–29.
233  Letter from Dr. C. Anderson Hedberg to Dr. William Winkenwerder (Nov. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.acponline.org/running_practice/ethics/issues/human_rights/winkenwerder.pdf
234  Am. College of  Physicians, Ethics Manual, Sixth Edition (2012), available at http://www.acponline.
org/running_practice/ethics/manual/manual6th.htm
235  Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Psychiatric Participation in Interrogation of  Detainees (Sept. 12, 
2008), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2008/sep/gatesletter.pdf
236  Sharfstein Interview, supra note 158.
237 See BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 169. See also Stephen H. Behnke & Gerald P. Koocher, Commentary on 
“Psychologists on the Use of  Torture and Interrogations,” 7 ANALYSIS SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 21 (2007).
238 BLOCHE, supra note 8, at 167–69. 
239  Sharfstein Interview, supra note 158.
240  Kevin B. O’Reilly, AMA Adopts Policy on Interrogations, Am. Med. News (July 3, 2006), available 
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/07/03/prse0703.htm; World Medical Association, 
Declaration of  Tokyo (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c18/
241  Am. Psychological Ass’n, Report of  the American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on 
Psychological Ethics and National Security 1 (2005), available at http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/pens.
pdf
242 Id. at 4. 
243 Id. 
244  Am. Psychological Ass’n Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security, 
2003 Members’ Biographical Statements, available at http://www.clarku.edu/peacepsychology/tfpens.
html; Email from Michael Gelles, Aug. 22, 2005, Email Messages from the Listserv of  the American 
Psychological Association’s Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and Nation Security 169 
[hereinafter PENS Emails], available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/pens_
listserv.pdf; Mark Benjamin, Psychological Warfare, SALON (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.salon.
com/2006/07/26/interrogation_3; Amy Goodman & Juan Gonzalez, Dissident Voices: Ex-Task Force 





245  Several are mentioned above: Michael Gelles, the NCIS psychologist who opposed abusive 
techniques at Guantánamo; Larry James, the former BSCT at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib; Morgan 
Banks, the chief  SERE and JSOC psychologist; and Scott Shumate, who reportedly left Abu Zubaydah’s 
interrogation because he objected to the techniques being used. Others were Robert Fein, a forensic 
psychologist who consulted for the Department of  Defense, and Bryce Lefever, a SERE psychologist who 
advised interrogators in Afghanistan in 2002–2003, and has since publicly defended James Mitchell and 
Bruce Jessen.
246  Goodman & Gonzalez, Dissident Voices, supra note 244. 
247  Jean Maria Arrigo, A Counterintelligence Perspective on APA PENS Task Force Process, Aug. 17, 2007, 
available at http://www.ethicalpsychology.org/materials/Arrigo--PENS%20Process%20APA07.pdf
248  Email from Jean Maria Arrigo, May 22, 2005, PENS Emails, supra note 244, at 43–44. 
249  Email from Col. Larry C. James, May 23, 2005, PENS Emails, supra note 244, at 47. 
250 Id.
251  Task Force staff  interview with Stephen Soldz (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Soldz Interview]. 
252  Am. Psychological Ass’n, Reaffirmation of  the American Psychological Association Position Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Its Application to Individuals Defined in the United 
States Code as “Enemy Combatants” (Aug. 19, 2007), available at http://www.apa.org/about/governance/
council/torture-amend.aspx
253  Am. Psychological Ass’n Press Release, 2008 APA Petition Resolution Ballot, available at http://www.
apa.org/news/press/statements/work-settings.aspx 
254  Soldz Interview, supra note 251.
255  Letter from Carol D. Goodheart, President of  the American Psychological Association, to the 
Texas State Board of  Examiners of  Psychologists (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.apa.org/news/
press/statements/texas-mitchell-letter.pdf
256  Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Letter Turns Up Heat on Psychologist, WASH. POST (July 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/10/AR2010071002896.html
257  Gelles Interview, supra note 112. 
258  Texas State Board of  Examiners of  Psychologists Complaint: Dr. James Elmer Mitchell, License 
No. 23564 (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/In_re_Gitmo_II/mitchell_
final_20100617.pdf
259  Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen N. Xenakis, Doctors Without Morals, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/opinion/01xenakis.html
260  Physicians for Hum. Rts., MA and NY Legislation to Sanction Health Professionals Who Torture, available at 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/torture/us-torture/ma-and-ny-anti-torture-legislation.html 
510
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES
1  Peter Baker, Banned Techniques Yielded “High Value Information,” Memo Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/us/politics/22blair.html
2  Jane Mayer, Counterfactual: A Curious History of  the CIA’s Secret Interrogation Program, NEW YORKER (Mar. 




5 PETER BERGEN, MANHUNT 102–03 (2012). 
6  Michael Mukasey, The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2011), available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859304576305023876506348.html 
7  Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Bin Laden Raid Revives Debate on Value of  Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
(May 3, 2011) [hereinafter Shane & Savage], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/us/
politics/04torture.html?_r=1
8 Id.
9  Michael Hayden, Birthers, Truthers and Interrogation Deniers, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303745304576359820767777538.html
10 Id.
11  Tim Ross & Conrad Quilty-Harper, Bin Laden’s Courier Trained 9/11 Hijack Team, TELEGRAPH 
(UK) (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8489866/
WikiLeaks-Bin-Ladens-courier-trained-911-hijack-team.html. See also Michael Isikoff, Bin Laden Death 
Rekindles “Enhanced” Interrogation Debate, NBC News (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/42863247/ns/world_news-death_of_bin_laden/#.UUs0ARfqlR0
12 Id. 
13 BERGEN, supra note 5.
14  Michael Isikoff, How Profile of  bin Laden Courier Led CIA to its Target, NBC News (May 4, 2011), 
available at http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/42906157/ns/today-today_news/t/how-profile-bin-laden-
courier-led-cia-its-target/
15  Press Release, Scheduled Remarks of  President George W. Bush on Medical Liability Reform (Jan. 
26, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040126-3.
html. See also Bret Baier & Ian McCaleb, Suspected Al Qaeda Operatives Nabbed in Iraq, Fox News (Jan. 24, 
2004), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,109338,00.html
16  Adam Goldmont, “Linchpin” in Hunt for Bin Laden Back with al-Qaida, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 15, 
2011), available at www.salon.com/2011/06/15/US_bin_laden_linchpin
17 JOSE RODRIGUEZ & BILL HARLOW, HARD MEASURES 126–27 (2012).
18  Mark Hosenball & Brian Grow, Bin Laden Informant’s Treatment Key to Torture Debate, REUTERS 






20 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 17, at 111.




25 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 17, at 125–28, 252.
26 Id. at 111.
27 Id. at 231.
28  Shane & Savage, supra note 7. 
29  Task Force staff  interview with Joe Navarro (Jan. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Navarro interview].
30  Joint Statement of  Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee, 




32  DOJ Office of  Prof ’l Resp. Report, Investigation into the Office of  Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning 
Issues Relating to CIA’s Use of  “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (Jul. 29, 2009) at 246, 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf  [hereinafter OPR 
Report].
33  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., DOJ OLC, to John A. Rizzo, 
Senior Dep. Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of  United States Obligations Under Article 16 of  the Convention 
Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of  High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 
2005) at 8, available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf
34 Id. at 10.
35  OPR Report, supra note 32, at 243.
36  Task Force staff  interview with John Rizzo (Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Rizzo Interview].
37 Id.
38  Task Force staff  interview with Ali Soufan (July 5, 2012) [hereinafter Soufan Interview]. 
39 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 17, at 102.
40 ALI SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS (2011).
512
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
41  Soufan Interview, supra note 38.
42 Id.
43 Id. 
44  Peter Taylor, “Vomiting and Screaming” in Destroyed Waterboarding Tapes, BBC News (May 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17990955
45  Rizzo Interview, supra note 36.
46  Tabassum Zakaria, Ex-CIA Official Says Tapes Destroyed to Prevent Al Qaeda Reprisals, REUTERS (Apr. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/01/us-usa-security-interrogation-
idUSBRE84003D20120501
47  Soufan Interview, supra note 38.
48  Email (Declassified) to Dusty Foggo, Exec. Dir., CIA, from unknown (Nov. 10, 2005), available at 
http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/torture-email-1.pdf
49  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., DOJ OLC, to John A. Rizzo, 
Senior Dep. Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of  the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common 
Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of  High Value 
al Qaeda Detainees (Jul. 20, 2007) at 32, available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/
olc/2007%20OLC%20opinion%20on%20Interrogation%20Techniques.pdf
50  A sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) is where highly classified information can be 
reviewed.
51  Soufan Interview, supra note 38.
52  Now known as the U.S. Bank Tower.
53  Marc Thiessen, Enhanced Interrogations Worked, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/20/AR2009042002818.html?sub=AR 
54  Deroy Murdock, Cracking KSM, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.nationalreview.
com/articles/227376/cracking-ksm/deroy-murdock 
55  Bush erroneously referred to the skyscraper as the “Liberty Tower.” See Press Release, Press 
Briefing on the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Townsend Speech], available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060209-4.html
56  President George W. Bush’s Speech to the National Guard Association of  the United States 
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/09/
AR2006020900892.html
57 Id.
58  Townsend Speech, supra note 55.






60 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS (2010) 170–71.
61 Malaysian Linked to 2002 Calif. Terror Plot, NBC News (AP) (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/11266564/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/malaysian-linked-calif-terror-plot/; 
See also Simon Elegant, The Terrorist Talks, TIME (Oct. 5, 2003), available at http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,493256,00.html
62 GEORGE TENET & BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 254 (2007). Other sources may 
have also contributed to Hambali, Bin Lep’s and Zubair’s arrest. 
63  CIA Report, Detainee Reporting Critical for the War Against al-Qa’ida (Jun. 3, 2005), available at http://
washingtonindependent.com/56310/obtained-the-cia-documents-dick-cheney-says-vindicate-torture. See 
also RODRIGUEZ & HARLOW, supra note 17, at 103; TENET, supra note 62, at 255.
64  CIA, Office of  Inspector Gen., Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 
(May 7, 2004) [hereinafter CIA IG Report], available at http://documents.nytimes.com/c-i-a-reports-on-
interrogation-methods
65 Id.
66  Soufan Interview, supra note 38.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., Eddie Chua, JI Preparing Malaysian Students for Militant Activities, THE STAR (Malaysia) 
(Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/2/2/nation/13280284& 
sec=nation; Two JI Members Detained Under ISA Released, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), (Nov. 10, 2007); 
Richard C. Paddock, Cleric’s Brother Goes on Trial in Indonesia Attack, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2004), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/22/world/fg-gungun22; Indonesian Student Deported from Pakistan 
Escapes Charge of  Terrorism, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Oct. 14, 2004). 
69 KEN CONBOY, THE SECOND FRONT: INSIDE ASIA’S MOST DANGEROUS TERRORIST NETWORK 209 
(2006).
70  Zubair told interrogators that he instructed Azahari to focus on a different target, and Khan’s 
indictment states that Azahari and his co-conspirators only settled on the Marriott as the target in mid-
July. 
71  Philippe Sands, The Green Light, VANITY FAIR (May 2008), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/
politics/features/2008/05/guantanamo200805 
72  Navarro Interview, supra note 29.
73  Statement of  Col. Steven Kleinman (Ret.) before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Sept. 25, 




76  M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 132 (2011).
77  Rizzo Interview, supra note 36.
514
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
78  Kleinman Statement, supra note 73.
79 BLOCHE, supra note 76, at 136–37. See also Gregg Bloche, Torture-lite: It’s Wrong, and It Might Work, 
WASH. POST (May 27, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/torture-lite-its-wrong-
and-it-might-work/2011/05/19/AGWIVzCH_story.html 
80  Task Force staff  interview with Dr. M. Gregg Bloche (Apr. 11, 2012). 
81  Task Force staff  interview with Dr. Stephen Xenakis (Jan. 16, 2013).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 17.
85  CIA IG Report, supra note 64.
86  Soufan noted that he does not believe that President Bush deliberately exaggerated Abu 
Zubaydah’s importance, saying of  Bush: “[H]e’s a good man, with a decent heart, he really cares about 
the security of  this country, however, he was ill-advised.” Soufan Interview, supra note 38. 
87  Transcript of  Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for Abu Zubaydah, ISN #10016 (Mar. 
27, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/transcript_isn10016.pdf
88 Id.
89  Remarks by President George W. Bush on Iraq at the Cincinnati Museum Center (Oct. 7, 2002), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html 
90 GARRETT GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR (2011). 
91  Secretary Powell’s former chief  of  staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, told Task Force staff  in an interview 
that neither he nor Powell, as they prepared for Powell’s U.N. presentation, were ever shown an internal 
Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum that cast doubt on al-Libi’s credibility. 
92  Report of  the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD 
Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments (Sept. 8, 2006) at 
80–82, available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf
93  Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.newyorker.
com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6
94  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington (Jun. 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
Herrington Interview].
95  Navarro Interview, supra note 29.
96  Kleinman Statement, supra note 73.
97  Soufan Interview, supra note 38.
98 Id.





101  Navarro Interview, supra note 29.
102  Press Release, Human Rights First, Top Interrogators Declare Torture Ineffective in Intelligence 
Gathering (Jun 24, 2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2008/06/24/top-interrogators-declare-
torture-ineffective-in-intelligence-gathering. Task Force member Brig. Gen. (Ret.) David Irvine was one of  
the 15 former government officials who signed the Human Rights First Statement.
103 Id.
104  Herrington Interview, supra note 94.
105  Kimberly Dozier, WH adviser: Interrogation Team Questions Shahzad, NBC News (May 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37225759
106 Id.
107  Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel, HCJ 5100/94 ( S. Ct. 1999) (Isr.), draft op. at 4, 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf
108 Id. at 36.
516
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES




4 “Arrest Threat” to Rumsfeld Trip, BBC News (Feb. 4, 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4236489.stm
5 Id.
6  Ulrike Demmer, Rumsfeld Lawsuit Embarrasses German Authorities, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/wanted-for-war-crimes-rumsfeld-lawsuit-
embarrasses-german-authorities-a-473987.html
7 Id.; French Prosecutors Throw Out Rumsfeld Torture Case, REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2007), available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/23/us-france-rights-rumsfeld-idUSL238169520071123
8 Rumsfeld Flees France, Fearing Arrest, ALTERNET (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.alternet.org/
story/66425/rumsfeld_flees_france%2C_fearing_arrest; Doreen Carvajal, Torture claim is filed against 
Rumsfeld in France; N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/world/
americas/26iht-rumsfeld.4.8070649.html?_r=0 
9  Center for Constitutional Rights, The Spanish Investigation into U.S. Torture, available at http://
ccrjustice.org/spain-us-torture-case
10 Id. 
11  Supreme Court of  Justice (Spain), Criminal Div., Ruling 1916/2012 (12/20/12), available at http://
www.ccrjustice.org/files/2012-12-20%20Spanish%20National%20Court%20Decision%20Final%20
English.pdf
12 George W. Bush: Human Rights Groups Seek Charges in Canada Against Former U.S. President, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/09/29/human-rights-groups-seek-
_n_987411.html; George W. Bush War Crime Prosecution Blocked in B.C., CBC News (Canada) (Oct. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2011/10/24/bc-bush-prosecution-
attempt-halted.html
13  Yvonne Ridley, Bush Convicted of  War Crimes in Absentia, FOREIGN POL’Y J. (May 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/05/12/bush-convicted-of-war-crimes-in-absentia
14 Id. 
15 Vatican Calls Prison Abuse a Bigger Blow to U.S. than Sept. 11, USA TODAY (May 12, 2004), available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-12-vatican-iraqi-abuse_x.htm
16  Richard Norton-Taylor, Top Judge: US and UK Acted as “Vigilantes” in Iraq Invasion, GUARDIAN (UK) 
(Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/18/iraq-us-foreign-policy






18  Application to Eur. Court of  Human Rights in Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, available at http://
www.interights.org/document/181/index.html; Application to the European Court of  Human Rights 
in El-Masri v. Macedonia, available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/Application-Public-
Version-20090921.pdf; Application to the Eur. Court of  Human Rights in al Nashiri v. Poland, available 
at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/echr-al-nashiri-application-20110506.pdf; Application to the 
Eur. Court of  Human Rights in al Nashiri v. Romania, available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/
files/echr-nashiri-romania-20120802.pdf; Complaint, Mohammed al-Asad v. Republic of  Djibouti 
(African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Al-Asad_Complaint.-2009.pdf  
19 Government to Compensate Ex-Guantánamo Bay Detainees, BBC News (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11762636
20  Dominic Casciani, UK Pays £2.2m to Settle Libyan Rendition Claim, BBC News (Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20715507
21 Id.
22  House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Human Rights Annual Report (2007), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/uk-hr-fac-cia.pdf; The All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Extraordinary Rendition: http://www.extraordinaryrendition.org 
23  Richard Norton-Taylor, Libyan Rebel Leader Sues Britain Over Rendition Ordeal, GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 
19, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/19/libyan-rebel-abdel-hakim-belhadj
24  Cullen Murphy, Todd S. Purdum, David Rose & Philippe Sands, Guantánamo: An Oral History, 
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/01/guantanamo-bay-
oral-history-201201
25 HUM. RTS. WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS: US-LED ABUSE AND RENDITION OF 
OPPONENTS TO GADDAFI’S LIBYA (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
libya0912webwcover_1.pdf
26  David Poort, Q&A: Top NTC Commander Abdel Hakim Belhadj, Al-Jazeera (Sept. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/09/2011920155237218813.html 
27  Task Force staff  interview with Abdel Hakim Belhadj (Sept. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Belhadj 
Interview].
28  Ian Cobain, Special report: Rendition Ordeal That Raises New Questions About Secret Trials, GUARDIAN 
(UK) (Apr. 8, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/08/special-report-britain-
rendition-libya







The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
35 Id.
36  Chris McGreal, Human Rights Watch Accuses US of  Covering Up Extent of  Waterboarding, GUARDIAN (UK) 
(Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/06/human-rights-watch-us-
waterboarding
37  Dominic Casciani, Former MI6 Officer Sir Mark Allen Sued Over Rendition, BBC News (Jan. 31, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16804656
38  Remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference at Tripoli, March 15, 2004 (quoted in 
Michelle Dunn, Libya: Security Is Not Enough, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace (2004), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB32DunneFinal.pdf)
39  Cobain, supra note 28.
40 Id.
41  Casciani, supra note 37; Belhadj Interview, supra note 27.




46 Id.; HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 25, at 105.
47  Al Saadi Interview, supra note 42.
48 Id. 
49 Id.
50  Dominic Casciani, UK Pays £2.2m to Settle Libyan Rendition Claim, BBC News (Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20715507
51  Task Force staff  interview with Khalid al-Sharif  (Sept. 2, 2012).
52  Johan Nylander, CIA Rendition Flights Stopped by Swedish Military, Swedish Wire (Dec. 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/7497-cia-rendition-flights-stopped-by-swedish-military; 
DOS Cable, 06-Dublin-1020, Emerging Constraints on U.S. Military Transits at Shannon (Sept. 5, 2006), available 
at http://www.shannonwatch.org/cables/06dublin1020; Ministry Homes in on Alleged CIA Rendition Flight, 
Yleisradio News (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://yle.fi/uutiset/ministry_homes_in_on_alleged_cia_
rendition_flight/2985932; Richard Norton-Taylor & Julian Borger, Embarrassed Miliband Admits Two US 
Rendition Flights Refueled on British Soil, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2008/feb/22/ciarendition.foreignpolicy1
53 JOSHUA E.S. PHILLIPS, NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE: AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND TORTURE 
(2010); U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody (Oct. 
2011), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/October10_%202011_
UNAMA_Detention_Full-Report_ENG.pdf; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says 26 Inmate 
Deaths May Be Homicide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/




Police Brigade (May 2004) [Taguba Report] at 20, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/
tagubarpt.html 
54  Mark A. Costanzo and Ellen Gerrity, The Effects and Effectiveness of  Using Torture as an Interrogation 
Device: Using Research to Inform the Policy Debate, 3 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 179, 202 (2009), available at 
http://www.cgu.edu/pdffiles/sbos/costanzo_effects_of_interrogation.pdf
55 6 U.S. Sailors Accused of  Detainee Abuse, CBS News (AP) (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.
cbsnews.com/2100-500257_162-4350439.html; Andrew Tilghman, Sailor Acquitted in Detainee Abuse 
Case, NAVY TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/03/navy_
campbucca_031209w
56  Task Force staff  interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Douglas Stone (Aug. 2, 2011). 
57  Jennifer S. Bryson, My Guantanamo Experience: Support Interrogation, Reject Torture, Pub. Discourse (Sept. 
9, 2011), available at http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/09/3934
58  Costanzo & Gerrity, supra note 54, at 194. 
59  Carol Rosenberg, Guantanamo Hearing: Ex-Interrogator Felt Sorry for Khadr, MIAMI HERALD (May 5, 
2010), available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/05/v-print/93575/ex-army-interrogator-
corsetti.html
60  Spencer Ackerman, ‘The Monster’ Testifies at Gitmo Hearing, WASH. INDEPENDENT (May 5, 2010), 
available at http://washingtonindependent.com/84034/the-monster-testifies-at-gitmo-hearing; Michelle 
Shepherd, Interrogator Nicknamed ‘The Monster’ Remembers Omar Khadr as a Child, STAR (Canada) (May 5, 
2010), available at http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/omarkhadr/article/804783--interrogator-
nicknamed-the-monster-remembers-omar-khadr-as-a-child; Reuel S. Amdur, Interrogator Appears on CBC, 
ARAB-AM. NEWS (Dec. 20, 2008), available at http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=
article&cat=Canada&article=1802&page_order=1&act=print; Rosenberg, supra note 59.







67  James Randerson, Guantanamo Guards Suffer Psychological Trauma, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/feb/25/guantanamo.guards 
68 Id. 
69  Laura Blumenfeld, The Tortured Lives of  Interrogators, WASH. POST (Jun. 4, 2007), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/03/AR2007060301121.html
70 TONY LAGOURANIS & ALLEN MIKAELIAN, FEAR UP HARSH: AN ARMY INTERROGATOR’S DARK JOURNEY
THROUGH IRAQ (2007) 92–101; Blumenfeld, supra note 69.
520
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
71 Id. at 235.
72 Id. at 236–37. 
73 Id. at 235.
74  Mark Shaffer, Flagstaff  GI Loved People, Languages, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 18, 2003), available at http://
www.azcentral.com/specials/special19/articles/0918iraqcasualty18.html?&wired
75  Greg Mitchell, U.S. Soldier Killed Herself  — After Refusing to Participate in Torture, HUFFINGTON 





79  Greg Mitchell, Part II: Soldier Who Killed Herself  — After Refusing to Participate in Torture, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 24, 2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-mitchell/patt-ii-soldier-who-
kille_b_191148.html
80  Mitchell, supra note 75. 
81 Id.
82  Mitchell, supra note 79. 
83  Gay Gardner, Portugal’s Bold Initiative Highlights U.S. Hypocrisy on Guantanamo, Amnesty Int’l “Human 
Rights Now” Blog (Dec. 15, 2008), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/europe/portugals-bold-initiative-
highlights-us-hypocrisy-on-guantanamo; Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Some Truths about Guantanamo Bay, WASH. 
NOTE (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://washingtonnote.com/some_truths_abo/ 
84  The Council of  Europe is a transnational organization with 47 member states that primarily 
develops legal guidelines for the enforcement and promotion of  the European Convention on Human 
Rights; see http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en
85  Council of  Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, Comm. on Legal Affairs & Hum. Rts., Alleged 
Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers Involving Council of  Europe Member States (Draft Report 
— Part II) 23 (June 7, 2006), available at http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2006/20060606_
ejdoc162006partii-final.pdf
86  DOJ, Federal Bureau of  Prisons Program Statement p5325.07, Release Preparation Program (Dec. 31, 




90  Andrew Livingstone, Omar Khadr’s Mother Maha Elsamnah Both “Happy and Sad” After Son Returns to 





canada-from-guantanamo-bay; Natalie O’Brien, Witnesses Back Hicks on Chemical Torture, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Sept. 16, 2012), available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/witnesses-back-hicks-on-chemical-
torture-20120915-25z05.html; Josh White & William Branigin, Former Bin Laden Driver Hamdan to Leave 
Guantanamo Bay for Yemen, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/24/AR2008112403159.html
91 LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, GUANTANAMO AND ITS AFTERMATH 63 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/Gtmo-Aftermath_2.pdf
92 REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR — EUROPEAN RESETTLEMENT OF MEN FROM GUANTANAMO BAY 
JANUARY 2009 – DECEMBER 2010 (2011); FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91.
93 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91, at 65.
94 Id. at 66.
95 Id. at 63.
96  Task Force staff  interviews with Moazzam Begg, Bisher al-Rawi, & Omar Deghayes (Apr. 17, 
2012) [hereinafter Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews].
97 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91, at 67.
98 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91, at 64. See also PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BROKEN LAWS, 
BROKEN LIVES: MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF TORTURE BY US PERSONNEL AND ITS IMPACT 92-93 (2008), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/BrokenLaws_14.pdf
99  Task Force staff  interview with Lal Gul (Nov. 13, 2012).
100  El-Britel was held concurrently with Binyam Mohammed [see Chapter 5], and the two have 
shared similar details about their treatment in Moroccan custody, at CIA behest, including “bottle 
torture,” which involves the insertion of  a broken bottle in the detainee’s anus, other sexual abuse, and 
severe beatings resulting in visible scars. First Amended Complaint, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW) (N. D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/
mohamed_v_jeppesen_1stamendedcomplaint.pdf
101  Letter from Khadija Anna L. Pighizzini to Johnston County Comm’rs (Sept. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncstoptorturenow.org/PDF_Archives/Letter2JohnstonCountyBoard_20110915.pdf





107  614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
108  Britel Interview, supra note 102.
109 MAMDOUH HABIB, MY STORY: THE STORY OF A TERRORIST WHO WASN’T 233–34, 237 (2008).
522
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
110 REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR, supra note 92.
111 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 98, at 93.
112  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
113  “Reprieve” Report, Sherif  El-Mashad, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/cases/sherifelmashad 
[hereinafter Reprieve—El-Mashad]; Task Force staff  interview with Sherif  El-Mashad (Aug. 13, 2012) 
[hereinafter El-Mashad Interview]. 
114  Reprieve—El-Mashad, supra note 113. 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91.
118 Id. at 64.
119  El-Mashad Interview, supra note 113.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122   “Reprieve” Report, Mohammed el Gharani, http://reprieve.org.uk/cases/mohammedelgharani/
history
123   El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Mike Melia, Ex-Gitmo Detainee 









131 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91, at 66.
132  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
133  Patrick Wintour, Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Be Paid Compensation by UK Government, GUARDIAN 





134  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137  European Union Justice & Home Affairs Council, Conclusions of  the Council and of  the Representatives of  
the Governments of  the Member States on the Closure of  the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre (June 4, 2009), available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/108299.pdf  
138  Center for Constitutional Rights, Maher Arar Testified Before Congressional Hearing on Rendition About 
U.S. Sending Him to Be Tortured in Syria (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-
releases/maher-arar-testified-congressional-hearing-rendition-about-u.s.-sending-him-; Amy Goodman 
& Juan Gonzalez, Democratic Rep. Jerrold Nadler on Maher Arar, Rendition, Voting Rights Chair John Tanner, 
and Seeking Justice for the Jena 6 (Democracy Now! broadcast, Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.
democracynow.org/2007/10/24/democratic_rep_jerrold_nadler_on_maher
139  Lisa Hajjar, Grave Injustice: Maher Arar and Unaccountable America, Middle E. Research & Info. Project 
(June 24, 2010), available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero062410
140  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
141  European Union Justice & Home Affairs Council, supra note 137.
142 REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR, supra note 92.
143  European Union Justice & Home Affairs Council, supra note 137. Most former detainees have been 
restricted in their movements outside of  the states that receive them. REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR, supra 
note 92, at 11. 
144 REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR, supra note 92, at 18.
145 Id. at 20.
146 Id. at 22. See also First Guantánamo Inmate Arrives in Switzerland, Swiss Broad. Corp. (swissinfo.ch) (Jan. 
26, 2010) available at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/international/First_Guantánamo_inmate_
arrives_in_Switzerland.html?cid=8166724
147 REPRIEVE, THE STORY SO FAR, supra note 92, at 41.
148  Christopher Boucek, Saud Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l 
Peace (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf  
149 Id. 
150  Bobby Ghosh, Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?, TIME (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,1874278,00.html
151  In 2008, former Guantanamo prisoner Said Al-Shihri fled Saudi Arabia after completing the 
rehabilitation program, and rejoined Al Qaeda in Yemen. He died in January 2013 after being wounded 
in a U.S. drone strike in 2012. Mark Mazzetti, No. 2 Leader of  Al Qaeda in Yemen is Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
24, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/middleeast/said-ali-al-shihri-qaeda-
leader-in-yemen-is-dead.html?_r=0
152 Ex-Bush Official: Many at Guantanamo Are Innocent, FOX NEWS (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.
524
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/19/ex-bush-official-guantanamo-bay-innocent; David Leigh, James Ball, 
Ian Cobain, & Jason Burke, Guantanamo Leaks Lift Lid on World’s Most Controversial Prison, GUARDIAN (UK) 
(April 24, 2011), available at http://readersupportednews.org/off-site-news-section/389-guantanamo-
bay/5737-guantanamo-files-massive-leak-reveals-innocent-detainees; Christopher Hope, Robert Winnett, 
Holly Watt & Heidi Blake, Wikileaks: Guantanamo Bay Terrorist Secrets Revealed, TELEGRAPH (UK) (April 
25, 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8471907/WikiLeaks-
Guantanamo-Bay-terrorist-secrets-revealed.html
153  Council of  Europe Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 85, at 16.
154  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
155 FLETCHER & STOVER, supra note 91, at 68.
156 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 98, at 90.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
160 Id.
161  Task Force staff  interview with Sami al-Hajj (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Al-Hajj Interview].
162 Id.
163  Vivienne Walt, Six Years Inside Gitmo: A Journalist’s Tale, TIME (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1844512,00.html
164  “Reprieve” Report, Adel Fattough Ali Al-Gazzar, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/cases/adelalgazzar 
[hereinafter Reprieve—Al-Gazzar]
165 Id.
166   Moazzam Begg, Moazzam Begg Interviews Former Guantanamo Prisoner, Adel el-Gazzar, in Slovakia, 






171  Reprieve—Al-Gazzar, supra note 164.
172  Moazzam Begg, supra note 166.





175  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
176  Devin Powell, The Lingering Effects of  Torture, ABC News (July 3, 2009), available at http://abcnews.
go.com/Technology/story?id=7986990&page=1
177 Id.
178 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BREAKING THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 
BY US FORCES 48 (2005), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/break-them-down.pdf
179  Theo van Boven, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment ¶45, submitted in accordance with Assembly Resolution 59/164, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/324 (2004) (quoting the first Special Rapporteur on Torture, Peter Kooijmans); PHYSICIANS FOR 
HUM. RTS., BREAKING THEM DOWN, supra note 178.
180 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BREAKING THEM DOWN, supra note 178, at 49.
181  Council of  Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 85. 
182  Begg, al-Rawi, Deghayes Interviews, supra note 96.
183 Id.
184 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BREAKING THEM DOWN, supra note 178, at 50.
185 Id. at 91–92 
186 Id. at 91.
187 Id. at 51.
188  ACLU, Biography of  Plaintiff  Abou Elkassim Britel (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/
national-security/biography-plaintiff-abou-elkassim-britel+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
189  Task Force staff  interview with Kassim el-Britel and Khadija Anna (Jul. 20, 2012).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192  Al-Hajj Interview, supra note 161.
193 Id.; Brian Stelter, From Guantanamo to Desk at Al Jazeera, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/world/middleeast/23jazeera.html
194   Devin Powell, supra note 176.
195 Id.
196 Id.




The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
199   Catherine Skroch, On the 10th Anniversary of  Guantanamo, Revisiting the Meaning of  Torture, PolicyMic 
(Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.policymic.com/articles/295/on-the-10th-anniversary-of-
guantanamo-revisiting-the-meaning-of-torture
200  Georg Mascolo & Holger Stark, The U.S. Stands Accused of  Kidnapping, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 14, 
2005), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/terror-and-diplomacy-the-us-stands-
accused-of-kidnapping-a-341636.html
201 Attorney for German in CIA Kidnapping Case Concedes Client Set Fire to Store, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (May 
18, 2007).
202  Tony Paterson, Rendition Victim Sent to Mental Institution after Arson Attack, INDEPENDENT (UK) (May 19, 
2007), available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/bbs/archives/003879.html
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 US Rendition Victim Gets Suspended Sentence, Expatica (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.expatica.
com/de/news/local_news/US-rendition-victim-gets-suspended-sentence.html




209 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BREAKING THEM DOWN, supra note 178, at 57.
210 Id. at 67; ICRC, Report on the Treatment of  Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 6–7 (Feb. 
2007), available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/71001/03083_070214_001display.pdf; 
Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html
211 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 98, at 89.
212 23 Detainees Attempted Suicide in Protest at Base, Military Says, N.Y. TIMES (AP) (Jan. 25, 2005), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/25/national/25gitmo.html?ex=1152676800&en=f645a0dc4588
a2ae&ei=5070; Kevin Gray & Jane Sutton, Afghan Prisoner at Guantanamo Dies in Apparent Suicide, REUTERS 
(May 18, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/19/us-usa-guantanamo-death-
idUSTRE74I04I20110519. There is some controversy over whether the deaths of  Salah Ahmed Al-
Salami, Mani Shaman al-Utaybi, Yasser Talal al-Zahrani, Abdul Rahman al-Amri, and Mohammed 
Ahmed Abdullah Saleh al Hanashi were suicides. See Jeffrey Kaye, Recently Released Autopsy Reports Heighten 
Guantanamo “Suicides” Mystery, Truthout (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://truth-out.org/news/item/6981-
recently-released-autopsy-reports-heighten-guantanamo-suicides-mystery; Scott Horton, The Guantanamo 
“Suicides”: A Camp Delta Sergeant Blows the Whistle, HARPERS (Jan. 18, 2010), available at http://www.harpers.
org/archive/2010/01/hbc-90006368
213 23 Detainees Attempted Suicide, supra note 212.
214 Yemeni Guantanamo Bay Detainee Found Dead in Cell, NAT’L YEMEN (Sept. 16, 2012), available at http://
nationalyemen.com/2012/09/16/yemeni-guantanamo-bay-detainee-found-dead-in-cell





216 Id.; Josh White, Guantanamo Desperation Seen in Suicide Attempts, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103101987_pf.html
217  Luis Martinez, Guantanamo Inmate Who Died Identified as Yemeni, ABC News (Sept. 11, 2012), available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/guantanamo-inmate-died-identified-yemeni/story?id=17212593
218  Baher Azmy, The Face of  Indefinite Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/09/14/opinion/life-and-death-at-guantanamo-bay.html; Murtaza Hussain, supra note 
215.
219  Latif  v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, (D.C. Cir. 2011), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/opinions.nsf/C891703993091388852579ED007142EF/$file/10-5319-1371305.pdf  ; Murtaza 
Hussain, supra note 215.




222  Andy Worthington, Another Desperate Letter from Guantánamo by Adnan Latif: “With All My Pains, I say 
Goodbye to You” (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011/02/20/another-desperate-
letter-from-guantanamo-by-adnan-latif-with-all-my-pains-i-say-goodbye-to-you
223  Asa Hutchinson, former DHS undersecretary for border and transportation security; David Irvine, 
Brig. Gen. (Ret.) and former Army Reserve Strategic Intelligence Officer.
224  No proven evidence of  terrorist activity was ever presented for Begg, al-Rawi, or Deghayes.
225  Task Force meeting (July 23, 2012). 
528
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CHAPTER 9 ENDNOTES
1  House Armed Servs. Comm., Print No. 112-4, Leaving Guantánamo: Policies, Pressures, and Detainees 
Returning to the Fight (Jan. 2012) at 19.
2 Id. at 10. See also The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo; Military Identifies Guantánamo Detainee Who Died, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/politics/detainee-who-died-at-guantanamo-had-release-
blocked-by-court.html 
3  George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all. See also Mark Denbeaux, The 
Meaning of  “Battlefield”: An Analysis of  the Government’s Representations of  “Battlefield” Capture and “Recidivism” of  
the Guantánamo Detainees, WASH. POST (2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/BattlefieldAnalysis121007.pdf
4  Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees Formerly Held at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-
publications/93-reports-publications-2012/712-summary-of-the-reengagement-of-detainees-formerly-
held-at-guantanamo-bay
5  Department of  Defense, Former Guantánamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight (July 12, 
2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070816051212/http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
d20070712formergtmo.pdf
6 See DOJ Letter Regarding Freedom of  Information Act Litigation — Roderick MacArthur Justice 
Center v. Defense Intelligence Agency, Civ. Action No. 09:02101 (CKK), (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2010) [hereafter 
FOIA Letter]. 
7  Task Force staff  correspondence with Gary Berntsen (Mar. 15, 2012). Gary Berntsen served in the 
CIA as part of  the Directorate and as a station chief  between 1982 and 2005. 
8  Benjamin Wittes, Andy Worthington on Guantánamo Recidivism, Lawfare (Mar. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/andy-worthington-on-Guantanamo-recidivism/
9 The Meaning of  “Battlefield,” supra note 3, at 2. 
10 Id. 
11 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE (2008); Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military 
Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/25/international/
worldspecial2/25gitmo.html?pagewanted=all&position= (“[He] was told after his arrival there in 
February 2002 that as many as half  of  the initial detainees were thought to be of  little or no intelligence 
value.”). See also Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Some Truths About Guantánamo Bay, WASH. NOTE (Mar. 17, 2009), 
available at http://washingtonnote.com/some_truths_abo/  (“[S]everal in the U.S. leadership became 
aware of  this lack of  proper vetting very early on and, thus, of  the reality that many of  the detainees 
were innocent of  any substantial wrongdoing, had little intelligence value, and should be immediately 
released.”). 
12 MAYER, supra note 11. 
13  Defense Intelligence Agency, Transnational: Guantánamo Bay Detainees Returning to Terrorism Update 





14  The following is the list of  the seven names provided in the 2006 DIA report: Mohammed Ismail, 
Said Mohammed Alim Shah (aka Abdullah Mahsud), Mohamed Yusif  Yaqub (aka Mullah Shazada), 
Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar, Mohammed Nayim Farouq, Ravil Shafeyavich Gumarov, and Timur Ravilich 
Ishmurat. Id.
15  Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report—Terrorism: Transnational: Former GTMO 
Detainee Terrorism Trends—Update (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/
TRANSNATIONAL%20FORMER%20GTMO%20DETAINEE%20TERRORISM%20TRENDS-
UPDATE_4.pdf
16  Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report—Terrorism: Transnational: Former GTMO 
Detainee Terrorism Trends—Update (May 12, 2008) available at http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/
TRANSNATIONAL%20FORMER%20GTMO%20DETAINEE%20TERRORISM%20TRENDS-
UPDA%20(1).pdf
17  Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report—Terrorism: Former Guantánamo Detainee Terrorism 
Trends (Jan. 7, 2009). 
18  Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report—Terrorism: Transnational: Former GTMO Detainee 
Terrorism Trends—Update (Apr. 8, 2009) (Note the report does not give the percentage of  re-engagement but 
states the confirmed and suspected numbers are out of  “over 530” released; relying on the January 2009 
number of  531 released detainees the percentages come out to 5 percent and 8.9 percent respectively). 
19 Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainee, supra note 4. 
20  Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20
and%20Pubs/March%202012%20Summary%20of%20Reengagement.pdf
21  Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo 





24 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Transnational: Guantánamo Bay Detainees, supra note 13. 
25 See Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainee, supra note 4. 
26 See FOIA Letter, supra note 6. 
27 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report—Terrorism, supra note 15. 
28 See Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees, supra note 20.
29 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Transnational: Guantánamo Bay Detainees, supra note 13, at 2. 
30 Id.
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 3. 
530
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
33 Id. at 2. 
34 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report — Terrorism, supra note 15, at 1. 
35 Id. at 2. 
36 See Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Analysis Report — Terrorism, supra note 16, at 2. 
37 Id. at 1. 
38 See Leaving Guantánamo, supra note 1. 
39 Id. at 7–9. 
40 Id. at 61 (“It is possible that the precise deadline for the apparent impending closure of  the facility 
and a mandate that transfers or releases were to be prioritized over other options, could have colored 
EOTF disposition considerations.”) 
41 Id. at 67 (“The majority is well aware that most of  the relevant material is classified and politically 
sensitive.”) 
42 Id.
43 Id. at 72. 
44 Id. at 72–73 (“In addition, only 66 persons have been transferred from GTMO by the current 
Administration, with only 2 confirmed as re-engagers, a figure of  about 3.3%.”).
45 See Peter Bergen, Katherine Tiedemann & Andrew Lebovich, How Many Gitmo Alumni Take Up 
Arms?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/11/
how_many_gitmo_alumni_take_up_arms; Peter Bergen, Katherine Tiedemann & Andrew Lebovich, 
Guantánamo: Who Really “Returned to the Battlefield?,” New Am. Found. (Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/110112_RecidivismAppendix2.pdf  
46  Mark P. Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux & R. David Gratz, Revisionist Recidivism: An Analysis of  the 
Government’s Representations of  Alleged “Recidivism” of  the Guantánamo Detainees, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of  Law, 
Ctr. for Policy & Research (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/
CSJ/upload/GTMO_Final_Final_Recidivist_6-5-09-3.pdf
47 Guantánamo: Who Really “Returned to the Battlefield?,” supra note 45, at 2–6. 
48 Revisionist Recidivism, supra note 46, at 4–5. 
49 Id. at 5 (while not reported as either killed or captured). 
50 Id. at 6 (the use of  names rather the more accurate Interment Serial Number (ISN) used to identify 
the individuals re-engaged in terrorism is one of  the reasons for such inaccuracies and led to Professor 
Denbeaux raising the question of  why ISN numbers are not used). See also The Meaning of  “Battlefield,” 
supra note 3, at 8. 
51  Mark Denbeaux, National Security Deserves Better: “Odd” Recidivism Numbers Under the Guantánamo Policy 






52 See Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees, supra note 20. 
53 The Meaning of  “Battlefield,” supra note 3, at 9–10 (presumably the claim by Professor Denbeaux of  
no actual military conduct on behalf  of  these individuals is based on based available public information 
and may be contradicted by classified intelligence). See also Denbeaux, National Security Deserves Better, supra 
note 51 (highlights the 2007 DOD press release that identified five Uighurs as examples of  recidivists; 
while these individuals had been transferred to Albania and held there at a refugee camp with not 
incident, one of  the Uighur men wrote an opinion piece for the New York Times on habeas corpus in the 
United States). 
54 See Guantánamo: Who Really “Returned to the Battlefield?,” supra note 45; see also Andy Worthington, 
Guantánamo and Recidivism: The Media’s Ongoing Failure to Question Official Statistics, PUB. RECORD (Mar. 15, 
2012), available at http://pubrecord.org/politics/10213/guantanamo-recidivism-medias (“Pentagon 
spokesman Lt. Col. Todd Breasseale … explained, ‘Someone on the “suspected” list could very possibly 
not be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security interests.’ ”). 
55  Pam Benson, More Former GITMO Detainees Back on the Battlefield, CNN (Mar. 6, 2012), available at 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/06/report-more-former-gitmo-detainees-back-on-the-battlefield
56  Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Inflating the Guantánamo Threat, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/opinion/29bergen.html?_r=1 (“[N]early half  of  
the men on the new list — 14 of  the 29 — are listed as being ‘suspected’ of  terrorist activities, which 
makes ‘recidivist’ a fairly vague definition. Next, the acts that at least nine of  the 29 are either known or 
suspected of  having been involved with were not directed at America or at our immediate allies in our 
current wars, the governments of  Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.”). 
57 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827–28 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game 
of  bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief  will make the war 
harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. … In the long term, then, the 
Court’s decision today accomplishes little, except perhaps to reduce the well-being of  enemy combatants 
that the Court ostensibly seeks to protect. In the short term, however, the decision is devastating. At least 
30 of  those prisoners hitherto released from Guantánamo Bay have returned to the battlefield.”).
58  Director of  National Intelligence, Summary of  the Reengagement of  Detainees, supra note 20. 
59  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (“Material support meant 
to ‘promot[e] peaceable, lawful conduct,’ Brief  for Plaintiffs 51, can further terrorism by foreign 
groups in multiple ways. ‘Material support’ is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up 
other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend 
legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups — legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to 
recruit members, and to raise funds — all of  which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”). 
60  When there are references to multiple DIA reports there is seldom if  ever additional information 
since last reported. The multiple reports are a summarization and restatement of  previously reported 
cases of  reengagement. 
61 National Security Deserves Better, supra note 51, at 15 (“In the July 2007 DoD news release, the five 
Uighurs relocated to Albania were listed as examples of  recidivists activity. … Since their release — 
following three years of  incarceration at GTMO — the five men have lived at the same refugee camp 
in Tirana, Albania.”) (The press release was removed by the DOD and is no longer available online, the 
copy is reproduced in the cited report). 
532
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CHAPTER 10 ENDNOTES
1  Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations (Jan. 22, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (2009). 
2  Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of  Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base 
and Closure of  Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (2009). 
3  Exec. Order No. 13,493, Review of  Detention Policy Options (Jan. 22, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (2009). 
4  Washington Post–ABC News Poll (Jan. 13–16, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/politics/documents/postpoll011709.html. Another survey released during approximately 
the same period showed a similar margin of  support for closing Guantánamo, but a far lower percentage 
of  the public rejecting torture in all circumstances. Pew Research Center for People & the Press, Obama 
Faces Familiar Divisions Over Anti-Terror Policies (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.people-press.
org/2009/02/18/obama-faces-familiar-divisions-over-anti-terror-policies/
5  Task Force staff  interview with Greg Craig (Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Craig Interview].
6 Id.
7 Id. 
8  Rep. Frank Wolf  & Rep. Chris Smith, China Trip Report (July 2008), available at http://wolf.house.
gov/uploads/China2008TripReport-Enews.pdf
9  Craig Interview, supra note 5. 
10  Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Guantánamo Bay: How the White House Lost the Fight to Close It, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/Guantanamo-bay-how-
thewhite-house-lost-the-fight-to-close-it/2011/04/14/AFtxR5XE_story.html . See also DANIEL KLAIDMAN, 
KILL OR CAPTURE 101–03 (2012). 
11 KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 102.
12 Id. at 105–06.
13 Id. at 106.
14  Craig Interview, supra note 5. 
15  155 CONG. REC. H5065–68 (daily ed. May 4, 2009) (statement of  Rep. Wolf), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-05-04/pdf/CREC-2009-05-04.pdf
16  Finn & Kornblut, supra note 10.
17  U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, S. Amend. 1133 to H.R. 2346, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 20, 2009), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&s
ession=1&vote=0016
18  Six others had been resettled in Albania under the Bush Administration. The remaining three 
detainees have rejected resettlement offers from Palau, El Salvador, and the Maldives. 
19  Carol Rosenberg, How Congress Helped Thwart Obama’s Plan to Close Guantanamo, MCCLATCHY (Jan. 





20  Task Force staff  interview with State Department officials (Feb. 6, 2012). [hereinafter Interview 
with DOS Officials]
21  White House Press Release, Statement of  President Barack Obama on Release of  OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-
on-Release-of-OLC-Memos
22 Id.
23  Letter from Sean H. Lane and Peter M. Skinner (DOJ) to Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein (Apr. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/letter_singh_20090423.pdf
24  Letter from Sean H. Lane and Peter M. Skinner (DOJ) to Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein (May 13, 
2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/torturephoto_reversal_letter_20090513.pdf
25 E.g., Gordon Lubold, Iraq General Swayed Obama on Detainee Photos, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 13, 
2009), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/0513/iraq-general-swayed-obama-on-
detainee-photos; Scott Wilson, Obama Reverses Pledge to Release Photos of  Detainee Abuse, WASH. POST (May 14, 
2009), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-14/politics/36781768_1_abuse-photos-
prisoner-abuse-court-ordered-release; KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 48.
26  White House Press Release, Statement by the President on the Situation in Sri Lanka and Detainee Photographs 
(May 13, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-situation-sri-
lanka-and-detainee-photographs 
27  ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d 59, 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008). 
28  DOD v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
29  White House Press Release, Statement of  President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obama-
military-commissions




33  DOJ, DOD, DOS, DHS, Off. of  Dir. of  Nat’l Intel. & Joint Chiefs of  Staff, Guantánamo Review Task 
Force, Final Report 24 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-
report.pdf
34  Interview with DOS Officials, supra note 20. 
35  Task Force staff  interview with government official.
36 See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
37 See, e.g., David W. Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of  the Military Commission 
Charges Against Omar Khadr, Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-37 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669946
38 KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 4–6.
534
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
39  Task Force staff  interview with Sen. Lindsey Graham (June 13, 2012).
40  Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/14terror.html
41 KLAIDMAN, supra note 10 at 79.
42  Memorandum for Court by Dr. Simon Perry on behalf  of  DOJ, The Level of  Danger Posed by 
Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, Crim. No. 20-20005 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2012), available at https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/291666-abdulmutallab-danger.html
43  White House Press Release, Remarks by the President on Security Reviews (Jan. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-security-reviews
44  White House Press Release, Statement by the President (Jan. 2, 2013), available at http://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/550698-2013ndaa-stm-rel-pdf.html
45 Guantánamo Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline
46  Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (111th Cong.), Nomination of  Leon Panetta to be Director, Central 
Intelligence Agency 13–14 (Feb. 5–6, 2009), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/111172.pdf
47  DOJ Press Release, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to 
President (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html
48 Id.
49 Id.
50  Interview with DOS Officials, supra note 20.
51 Id.
52  Jeremy Scahill, The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia, NATION (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.
thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia
53 Id.
54  Luis Martinez, CIA Assists Somali Terror Interrogations But Doesn’t Run Secret Prison in Somalia, ABC 
News (Jul. 13, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/07/cia-assists-somali-terror-
interrogations-bud-doesnt-run-secret-prison-in-somalia
55  Peter Finn & Kafia A. Hosh, “I Felt Like I Was Getting Kidnapped,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012107042.
html; Andrew Wander, US Accused Of  Yemen Proxy Detention, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2010/09/2010917195419241717.html; Nick Baumann, Locked 
Up Abroad- For the FBI, MOTHER JONES (Sept.–Oct. 2011), available at http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2011/08/proxy-detention-gulet-mohamed
56  Jeremy Scahill, Why Is President Obama Keeping A Journalist in Prison in Yemen? NATION (Mar. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/166757/why-president-obama-keeping-journalist-prison-
yemen; White House Press Release, Readout of  President’s Call with President Saleh of  Yemen (Feb. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/03/readout-presidents-call-president-
saleh-yemen; Jake Tapper, White House Stands by Obama Push for Yemeni Journalist to Remain Behind Bars, ABC 




by-obama-push-for-yemeni-journalist-to-remain-behind-bars; Iona Craig, U.S. Has “Direct Interest” in 
Shaye’s Case (Feb. 12, 2012), available at http://ionacraig.tumblr.com/post/17969745744/us-ambassador-
response-to-shaye-imprisonment
57  U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody  2 
(Oct. 2011), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/October10_%20
2011_UNAMA_Detention_Full-Report_ENG.pdf
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id. at 17–21.
60  Joshua Partlow & Julie Tate, U.S. Had Advance Warning of  Abuse at Afghan Prisons, Officials Say, WASH. 




63  DOS, 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm
64  Task Force staff  interview with former U.S. official. 
65  Testimony of  Richard Colvin to Canadian Parliament, House of  Commons, Special Committee 
on Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, 40th Parl. 2d Sess., Meeting No. 015 (Nov. 18, 2009) [hereinafter 
Colvin Testimony], available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4236
267&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#T1530
66  Hum. Rts. Inst., Colum. Law Sch., U.S. Monitoring of  Detainee Transfers in Afghanistan: International 
Standards and Lessons from UK & Canada (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/
Human_Rights_Institute/AfghanBriefingPaper%20FINAL.pdf
67  DOS Cable, 10-Kabul-688, Proposed Afghanistan Detainee Monitoring Strategy (Feb. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10KABUL688
68  Matthieu Aikins, How Long Can the US Ignore Systematic Torture in Afghanistan? ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 
2011), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/how-long-can-the-us-
ignore-systemic-torture-in-afghanistan/246548
69  Interview with former U.S. official, supra note 64. 
70 Id.
71 PM Shuts Down Parliament Until March, CBC News (Dec. 30, 2009), available at http://www.cbc.ca/
news/politics/story/2009/12/30/parliament-prorogation-harper.html; Daniel Leblanc, Harper to Shut 
Down Parliament, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada) (Dec. 30, 2009), available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/harper-to-shut-down-parliament/article4300862
72 Hum. Rts. Inst., supra note 66.
73 See, e.g., http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100843.pdf. U.S. courts are unlikely to 
rule on the legal merits of  this position, because every legal challenge alleging that U.S. military or CIA 
had violated the CAT has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds or to protect state secrets. 
536
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
74  Interview with former U.S. official, supra note 64.
75 U.S. Probes Afghan Abuse, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2011).
76  Interview with former U.S. official, supra note 64.
77 Id.
78  Afghanistan Indep. Hum. Rts. Comm’n. & Open Society Founds., Torture, Transfer, and Denial of  Due 
Process: The Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan 3, 49 (Mar. 17, 2012), available at http://www.
aihrc.org.af/media/files/AIHRC%20OSF%20Detentions%20Report%20English%20Final%2017-3-
2012.pdf
79 Id. at 46–48.
80 Id. at 48.
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 46–47. 
84 Id. at 47.
85  Interview with former U.S. official, supra note 64.
86 Id.
87 Id. 
88  Colvin Testimony, supra note 65. 
89  David Ariosto, Karzai’s Choice for Afghanistan Intelligence Chief  Suspected of  Torture, Trafficking, CNN 
(Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/04/world/asia/afghanistan-intelligence-chief/
index.html
90  Brad Adams, Rewarding Afghanistan’s Torturers? Hum. Rts. Watch (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/10/rewarding-afghanistan-s-torturers
91  Document available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/interactive/2012/nov/03/torture-email
92  Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, Torture Claims Halt MoD Transfers to Afghan Jails, GUARDIAN 
(UK) (No. 2, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/nov/02/torture-claims-mod-
afghan-jails; High Court Blocks UK Detainee Transfers in Afghanistan, BBC News (Nov. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20185001. 
93  U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of  Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: One 
Year On 10 (Jan. 2013), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5b37o
%3D&tabid=12323&language=en-US
94 Id.




96 Id. at 53.
97 Id. at 40–41.
98 Id. at 12.
99 Id. at 5.
100 Id. at 64.
101  Rod Norland & Thom Shanker, U.S. Military Stops Sending Detainees to Some Afghan Prisons on Rights 
Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/world/asia/us-
military-stops-sending-some-detainees-to-afghan-custody.html; UN Finds Torture Still Rampant in Afghan 
Prisons as Government Tries to Hide or Ignore Abuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 20, 2013).
102 UN Finds Torture Still Rampant in Afghan Prisons, supra note 101.
103  David Nakamura & Anne Gearan, Obama Criticized for Visiting Afghan Intelligence Chief  at U.S. 
Hospital, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-08/
politics/36233348_1_afghan-intelligence-karzai-asadullah-khalid
104  U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation 1–8 (1992), available at https://www.fas.org/
irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf
105  U.S. Army, Field Manual 2-22.3/34-52: Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Appendix M (2006) 
[hereinafter Appendix M], available at https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf
106 Id.
107 Id. 
108  Hum. Rts. First, The U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation: A Strong Document in Need of  Careful 
Revision, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Army_Field_Manual.
pdf
109  Appendix M, supra note 105.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112  DOD Directive 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning (Oct. 
11, 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/311509p.pdf
113  Task Force staff  interview with Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington (June 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
Herrington Interview].
114 Id.
115  Remarks by Col. (Ret.) Stuart Herrington, The Interrogation Perfect Storm, Ft. Leavenworth Ethics 
Symposium U.S. Army Command and General Staff  College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. (Nov. 17, 2009). 
116  Herrington Interview, supra note 113. 
117  Eric Schmitt, U.S. Shifts, Giving Names of  Detainees to the Red Cross, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2009).
538
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
118 Id.
119  Hillary Anderson, Red Cross Confirms “Second Jail” at Bagram, Afghanistan, BBC News (May 11, 2010), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8674179.stm
120  Joshua Partlow & Julie Tate, Two Afghans Allege Abuse at U.S. Site, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/27/AR2009112703438.
html
121  Alissa J. Rubin, Afghans Detail Detention at “Black Jail” on U.S. Base, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/world/asia/29bagram.html
122  Marc Ambinder, Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, ATLANTIC (May 14, 2010), available 
at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-at-
bagram/56678/
123  Jeremy Scahill, Obama’s Expanding Covert Wars, NATION (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.
thenation.com/blog/obamas-expanding-covert-wars; Spencer Ackerman, Special Operations Chiefs Quietly 
Sway Afghan Policy, WASH. INDEP. (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://washingtonindependent.com/67136/
special-operations-chiefs-quietly-sway-afghanistan-policy
124  Open Society Founds., Regional Policy Initiative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Confinement Conditions 
at a U.S. Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base (Oct. 14. 2010), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/confinement-conditions-20101014.pdf
125  Heidi Vogt, Afghans Allege Abuse at Secret U.S. Jail, AIR FORCE TIMES (AP) (Oct. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/10/ap-afghans-allege-abuse-at-secret-jail-101410




129  Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Nominations of  Gen. James D. Thurman, Vice Admiral William H. 
McRaven, and Lt. Gen. John R. Allen 36 (Jun, 28, 2011), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
Transcripts/2011/06%20June/11-59%20-%206-28-11.pdf
130  Ken Dilanian, Terrorism Suspect Secretly Held for Two Months, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2011), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/06/nation/la-na-somali-detainee-20110706. CIA personnel 
reportedly did not directly interrogate Warsame. Id. 
131  Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/world/africa/07detain.html
132 See generally United States v. Warsame, Crim. No. 11-559 (S.D.N.Y.).
133  Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Somali Terrorist Helps a U.S. Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2012), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/nyregion/ex-member-of-somali-terrorist-group-helps-a-us-
prosecution.html
134  DOJ Press Release, Statement on the Investigation into the Destruction of  Videotapes by CIA Personnel (Nov. 9, 




135  DOJ Press Release, Statement of  the Attorney General Regarding Investigation Into the Interrogation of  Certain 
Detainees (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/June/11-ag-861.html
136  DOJ Press Release, Statement of  Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of  Investigation Into the Interrogation 
of  Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-1067.
html
137  Chatham House, Enforcing the Absolute Prohibition Against Torture (Remarks by Juan Mendez) 5–6 (Sept. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/General/100912Mendez.
pdf
138  Specific examples of  this appear throughout this report, particularly in Chapter 2 (courts-
martial for the deaths of  detainees at Bagram Air Base resulted in maximum sentence of  five months 
imprisonment), Chapter 3 (court-martial for homicide resulted in sentence of  60 days confinement to 
barracks; four other suspicious deaths resulted in no charges; many acts of  mistreatment at Abu Ghraib 
never prosecuted), and Chapters 6 and 8 (no prosecutions for various acts of  torture in CIA rendition, 
detention and interrogation program).
139  Letter from Jacqueline Coleman Snead (DOJ Senior Counsel) to Alexander Abdo (ACLU) (Nov. 
14, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/cia_vaughn_index_11142011.pdf
140 Id.
141  ACLU v. CIA, Civ. No. 11-0933, slip op.(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/ddc_opinion_on_cross_motions_for_summary_judgment_09252012.pdf
142  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
143  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010).
144  Declaration of  Leon E. Panetta, ¶¶ 11–12, ACLU v. DOD, Civ. No. 04-4151 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 
2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/aclu-panetta.pdf
145  Task Force staff  interview with Joseph Margulies (Mar. 13, 2012).
146 Id. Margulies said that in general conditions of  confinement in Guantánamo had markedly 
improved since his early visits to the base: “Guantánamo’s an entirely different place from 2002, 2003, 
and 2004.” Even the high value detainees in Camp 7 were housed in conditions “vastly better than a 
maximum security unit” in the United States. Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149  Defense Motion to End Presumptive Classification, 28–31, United States v. Mohammed (Military 
Commission, Guantánamo Bay Apr. 17, 2012).
150  Government Supplemental Motion for Modified Order to Protect Against Disclosure of  
National Security Information, Attachment B at 5, United States v. Mohammed (Military Commission, 
Guantánamo Bay Sept. 25, 2012).
151  Motion of  the ACLU for Public Access to Proceedings and Records at 19, United States v. 
Mohammed (Military Commission, Guantánamo Bay May 2, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/aclu_motion_for_public_access_5_2_12.pdf
540
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
152  Transcript of  Hearing I at 806, United States v. Mohammed (Military Commission, Guantánamo 
Bay Oct. 17, 2012).
153 Id. at 799–801.
154 See, e.g., Laura Pitter, Sins of  Commission, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/10/abd_al_rahim_al_nashiri_Guantanamo_bay
155  Spencer Ackerman, 9-11 Defendants Seek to Preserve CIA Sites Where They Were Tortured, WIRED (Jan. 24, 
2013), available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/01/black-sites
156  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
157  18 U.S.C. § 2441.
158  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A. Rizzo, 
(Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of  the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 
3 of  the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of  High Value 
Detainees (July 20, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olc/2007%20
OLC%20opinion%20on%20Interrogation%20Techniques.pdf
159  Charlie Savage, Election to Decide Future Interrogation Methods in Terrorism Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/us/politics/election-will-decide-future-of-
interrogation-methods-for-terrorism-suspects.html; Romney Campaign Interrogation Policy Document 
(Sept. 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/28/us/politics/interrogate-
romney-campaign-memo.html?ref=politics&gwh=1AF3FD46D8A50951864F544E0221CDDF
160 See Chapter 2 (Afghanistan), Chapter 3 (Iraq).




164  Michael Hayden & Michael Mukasey, The President Ties His Own Hands on Terror, WALL STREET J. 
(Apr. 17, 2009).
165  Task Force staff  interview with John Rizzo (Aug. 2, 2012).
166 Id.
167  Herrington Interview, supra note 113.
168  Task Force staff  interview with Ali Soufan (July 5, 2012).





1 Abuse of  Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, 60 Minutes II (Apr. 28, 2004); James Risen, G.I.’s Are Accused 
of  Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/
politics/29ABUS.html; David Nather & John Cochran, Stunned By Abuses, Congress Must Now Be Involved, 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1061–62 (May, 8, 2004) McCain, Delay;  Joseph Anselmo, Congress Gropes for Next 
Move in Response to Abuse Scandal, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1157–60 (May 15, 2004) (Leahy, DoD). 
2  Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of  Terror Suspects, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 11, 2002); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse But Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/
AR2006060901356.html; DeNeen L. Brown & Dana Priest, Deported Terror Suspect Details Torture in Syria, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2003).
3  David Nather, Congress as Watchdog Asleep on the Job, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1190 (May 22, 2004); 
Joseph C. Anselmo & Martin Kady II, Duty and Honor’s Tightrope, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1196 (May 22, 
2004).
4  James Risen, David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Investigations, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/world/struggle-for-iraq-
detainees-harsh-cia-methods-cited-top-qaeda-interrogations.html; David Nather & John Cochran, Stunned 
By Abuses, Congress Must Now Be Involved, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1062 (May 8, 2004); Charles Babington & 
Helen Dewar, Lawmakers Demand Answers on Abuses in Military-Run Jails, WASH. POST (May 6, 2004); Joseph 
C. Anselmo, Congress Gropes for Next Move in Response to Abuse Sandal, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1160 (May 15, 
2004); Joseph C. Anselmo & Martin Kady II, Duty and Honor’s Tightrope, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1196 (May 
22, 2004). 
5  David Nather & John Cochran, Stunned By Abuses, Congress Must Now Be Involved, CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 1061 (May 8, 2004); 151 CONG. REC. S4061 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2005) (statement of  Jay Rockefeller), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-04-21/pdf/CREC-2005-04-21-pt1-PgS4052-2.
pdf; 151 CONG. REC. S4064–65 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2005) (statement of  Pat Roberts), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-04-21/pdf/CREC-2005-04-21-pt1-PgS4052-2.pdf
6  Anselmo & Kady II, supra note 4.
7 See CIA records (Member Briefings on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques), available at http://
www.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/EIT_Member_Briefings.pdf
8 JOSE RODRIGUEZ, HARD MEASURES 64 (2012).
9  Pelosi news conference (Apr. 23, 2009) (provided by Office of  House Democratic Leader, Oct. 26, 
2012). 
10  Greg Miller, Pelosi Says CIA Misled Congress About Waterboarding, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2009), available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/15/nation/na-pelosi-torture15
11  Porter J. Goss, Security Before Politics, WASH. POST (April 25, 2009), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/24/AR2009042403339.html
12 Id.; see also Ali Frick, Porter Goss Refuses to Say That CIA Told Him and Pelosi About Waterboarding 
in 2002 Briefing, THINK PROGRESS (May 21, 2009) available at http://thinkprogress.org/
politics/2009/05/21/41673/goss-wont-confirm-cia/ 
13 Florida’s Graham Backs Pelosi on CIA Briefings, NPR (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=104196363 
542
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
14 See, e.g. CIA Office of  the Inspector Gen., Memorandum for the Record, Document/File Review 
Related to CIA Notification Meetings with Nancy Pelosi About the Use of  Harsh Interrogation Techniques Against 
Detainees (July 27, 2009) (on file with Constitution Project)
15  150 CONG. REC. 11653 (daily ed. June 7, 2004). 
16 Legislative Summary: Wartime Prisoner Abuse, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2855 (Dec. 4, 2004); Letter from 
Daniel J. Dell’Orto (DOD Office of  Gen. Counsel) to Sen. Warner (June 15, 2004).
17  150 CONG. REC. 10049, 10163–64 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2004). 
18  150 CONG. REC. S10041 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004); Letter from Condoleezza Rice (Ass’t 
to President for Nat’l Security Aff.) & Joshua Bolten (Dir., OMB) to Rep. Peter Hoekstra & Sen. 
Susan Collins, 8–9 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
administration/whbriefing/whitehouse_memo_101804.pdf; Letter from Joseph Zogby to The 
Constitution Project (Nov. 6, 2012). 
19  Editorial, Torture Policy, WASH. POST (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A44849-2004Jun15.html; Task Force staff  interview with Jim Manley (Oct. 6, 2012); 
Task Force staff  email correspondence with Joseph Zogby (Oct. 11, 2012). 
20  Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House Fought New Curbs On Interrogations, Officials Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/13/politics/13intel.html; 
Dana Priest, Senate Urged to Probe CIA Practices, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2005), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8008-2005Apr21.html; 151 CONG. REC. S3976–80, 3988 (daily 
ed. Apr. 20, 2005); Eric Lichtblau, Congress Adopts Restriction on Treatment of  Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/11/politics/11torture.html
21  Task Force staff  email correspondence with Joseph Zogby (Aug. 22, 2012); Josh White & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, White House Aims to Block Legislation on Detainees, WASH. POST (July 23, 2005), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/22/AR2005072201727.html; Anne Plummer, 
Conflict Ahead on Defense Authorization, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2053 (July 25, 2005).
22  For a thorough discussion of  the amendment’s provisions, see Michael John Garcia, Interrogation of  
Detainees: Overview of  the McCain Amendment, CRS Report RS22312 (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs22312.pdf
23  Anne Plummer, Intraparty Imbroglio Stalls Defense Bill, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2116 (Aug. 1, 2005); 
Eric Schmitt, Senate Moves to Protect Military Prisoners Despite Veto Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/politics/06detain.html
24  Eric Schmitt, House Delays Vote on U.S. Treatment of  Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/04/politics/04detain.html
25  Eric Schmitt, House Backs McCain on Detainees, Defying Bush , N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/politics/15detain.html; House Vote 630, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 
3410 (Dec. 26, 2005).
26  Josh White, President Relents, Backs Torture Ban, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/15/AR2005121502241.html
27  126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
28  Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Blocks Guantánamo Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2006), available at 





29  John M. Donnelly, Detainee Treatment Fractures GOP, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2458–59 (Sept. 15, 2006).
30 E.g. Carle Hulse, News Analysis: An Unexpected Collision Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/15/us/politics/15assess.html 
31  Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by Bush; Constitutional 
Challenges Predicted, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092800824.html; Kate Zernike, Senate Approves Broad New 
Rules to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/
washington/29detain.html; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/13scotus.html; 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Jennifer K. Elsea, The Military Commissions Act of  2009: Overview 
and Legal Issues, CRS Report R41163 (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
R41163.pdf
32  Task Force staff  interview with Tom Daschle (Aug. 21, 2012).
33  Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Report Blames Rumsfeld for Detainee Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/washington/12detainee.html; Brian Knowlton, Report 
Gives New Detail on Approval of  Brutal Techniques, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/04/22/us/politics/22report.html; Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), Report on 
Inquiry into the Treatment of  Detainees in U.S. Custody 6–7 (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
congress/2009_rpt/detainees.pdf
34  Paul Kramer, The Water Cure, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/02/25/080225fa_fact_kramer
35  Richard E. Welch, Jr., American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response, 43(2) PAC. 
HIST. REV. 234 (May 1974).
36 Id. at 235.
37 Id. at 234.
38  Kramer, supra note 34.
39 RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., RESPONSE TO IMPERIALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINE-
AMERICAN WAR 1899–1902 137 (1979).
40  Kramer, supra note 34.
41 Cruelty Charge Denied: Secretary of  War Refutes Reports from the Philippines, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1902), 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=F10E16F93E5412738DDDA90A94D
A405B828CF1D3
42  Kramer, supra note 34; Told of  “Water Cure” Given to Filipinos: Witnesses Went Into Details Before Senate 
Committee on the Philippines, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1902), available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf ?res=F10912F9395412738DDDAC0994DC405B828CF1D3
43 Told of  “Water Cure,” supra note 42; Saw the “Water Cure” Given: Edward J. Davis, a Volunteer from 
Massachusetts, Testifies Before a Senate Committee, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1902), available at http://query.nytimes.
com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=F40F17F6395412738DDDA10994DC405B828CF1D3
544
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
44 The Water Cure Described: Discharged Soldier Tells Senate Committee How and Why the Torture Was Inflicted, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 1902), available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=9F07E3D6
1130E132A25757C0A9639C946397D6CF; The Philippine Inquiry: Soldiers Testify Regarding the Administration 
of  the Water Cure — Prisoners Were Treated Well, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 1902), available at http://query.nytimes.
com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=F20F16FF385412738DDDA00894DD405B828CF1D3; One “Water 
Cure” Victim: Witness Tells of  the Case Before Senate Committee, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1902), available at http://
query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=F30F11F73B591B728DDDA80994DD405B828CF
1D3; Making Filipinos Talk: Returning Soldier Says Rattans, Bastinados, and Lighted Matches Were Used on Insurgents, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1902), available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=FB0B14F
F3A5F12738DDDA00994DD405B828CF1D3; Tell of  “Water Cure” Cases: Witnesses Give Further Testimony 
Before the Senate Committee on the Philippines Regarding Filipinos’ Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 1902), available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf ?res=F40E17FB385412738DDDAA0994DE405B828
CF1D3
45  Welch, supra note 35. See also Kramer, supra note 34.
46  Task Force staff  email correspondence with Paul Kramer (Sept. 13, 2012).
47 WELCH, supra note 39, at 145.
48  Correspondence with Kramer, supra note 46. 
49  A concise summary and critique of  the proceedings can be found in Fred I. Borch III, The 
“Malmedy Massacre” Trial: The Military Government Proceedings and the Controversial Legal Aftermath, ARMY 
LAWYER (Jan. 2011). 
50 Id.; German Churches Enter Malmedy Case, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 8, 1949).
51 Plea for 12 of  Malmedy; Anti-War Group Cables Clay to Spare German Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 1949); 
William R. Conklin, Protests Increase on Malmedy Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 1949); War Crimes: Clemency, TIME 
(Jan. 17, 1949).
52  Borch, supra note 49, at 7; Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (81st Cong.), Report on Malmedy Massacre 
Investigation 1–2 (Oct. 13, 1949) [hereinafter Malmedy Massacre Investigation], available at http://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Malmedy_report.pdf
53  Malmedy Massacre Investigation, supra note 52, at 35.
54  U.S. Marine Corps, Oral History Transcript, Col. Justice M. Chambers 75–77 (1988).
55  Malmedy Massacre Investigation, supra note 52, at 7–23.
56  John Fisher, Senate Unit Clears Army in War Trial: Report Challenged by McCarthy, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 15, 
1949). 
57  Borch, supra note 49, at 8.
58  Task Force staff  email correspondence with Fred L. Borch III (Sept. 25, 2012). 
 APPENDIX 1 
                                                 
1
 Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 41 (2002) (“[T]he actions of individual human 
rights violators, such as murder, rape, assault, and torture, are prohibited by almost every 
domestic criminal justice system”); see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.11 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (listing various constitutional and penal prohibitions against torture from around the 
world). For a comprehensive database of global anti-torture legislation, see the Compilation of 





 See 1863 Lieber Code, Gen. Orders No. 100, § I, art. 16 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in RICHARD 
SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48 (1983). 
4
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004), quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 890 (2nd Cir. 1980). See also Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1222, n.11 (“torture is illegal under the law 
of virtually every country in the world”). 
5
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. 
6 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] at art. 2(2)–(3), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html (stating that “no exceptional circumstance 
for torture whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture). See also Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights [hereinafter Universal Declaration], G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at art. 
5 (1948) (prohibiting torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) 
[hereinafter ICCPR] at art. 7 (banning torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998); 
2187 UNTS 90 at arts. 7–8.  
7
 E.g. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII] at art. 3(1), art. 17, art. 87, art. 130 (prohibiting torture 
and defining it as a “grave breach”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Times of War, 12 Aug. 1959, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV] at 
art. 3(1), art. 32, art. 147 (same).  
8
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A; CAT, supra note 6, art. 2(2)–(3); GCIV, supra note 7, art. 3(1).  
9
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969) at art. 53 (defining a jus cogens norm as one “ accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.”). See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction 
for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 




 Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 28 
February 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html 
                                                                                                                                                  
11
 American Convention on Human Rights Art. 27(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 




 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 144 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
14
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994) at art. 3(f) (defining torture as a 
“crime against humanity”).  
15
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A [Torture Act]; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [Torture Victims Protection Act] 
[hereinafter TVPA]; 18 U.S.C. § 2441 [War Crimes Act] [hereinafter WCA]; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1807 [Military Commissions Act of 2009] [hereinafter MCA].  
16
 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1. CAT was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 
1984, and took force on June 26, 1987.
 
DOS, Initial Report of the United States of America to the 
U.N. Committee Against Torture (Oct. 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.pdf. CAT was ratified by the U.S. Senate 
on October 20, 1994, and took effect as U.S. law on November 20, 1994. Id. The U.S. Senate 
ratified CAT subject to a list of reservations, understandings, and declarations. U.S. Reservations, 
Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990) 
[hereinafter U.S. CAT Reservations], available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html 
17
 Id. art II(1)–(5). In international law, these are referred to as understandings, declarations and 
reservations; they alter the binding nature of an international treaty such that the country making 
such reservations is bound only to the extent of those reservations.  
18
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A.  
19
 Id. § 2340(1). 
20
 Id. § 2340(2).  
21
 Id. § 2340(1). 
22
 See discussion below which reviews the relevant cases.  
23
 E.g., Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1218. 
24
 MCA, 18 U.S.C. § 950t(11)(A) (2009). 
25
 WCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A).  
26
 TVPA, 28 U.S.C. § (3)(b)(1).  
27 MCA 18 U.S.C. § 950t(11)(A) (2009); WCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A); TVPA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ (3)(b)(1). It is not clear that this additional language narrows the definition of torture in 
practice. Two circuits have held that this language is meant merely “to illustrate the common 
motivations that cause individuals to engage in torture … [and to] ensure[ ] that, whatever its 
specific goal, torture can occur … only when the production of pain is purposive, not merely 
haphazard." United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 807 (11th Cir. 2010), citing Price v. Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
28
 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1.  
                                                                                                                                                  
29
 Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340(1). 
30
 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 125, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Villegas v. Mukasey, 
523 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2008); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 117 (2nd Cir. 2007); Cadet v. 
Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004); In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002). Contra 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Although the regulations require that 
severe pain or suffering be ‘intentionally inflicted,’ we do not interpret this as a ‘specific intent 
requirement.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). The Auguste court dismissed this as dicta. Auguste, 
395 F.3d at 148. 
31
 Pierre, 502 F.3d at 117. 
32
 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 146. 
33
 E.g., CAT, supra note 6, at art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 7; Universal Declaration, supra 
note 6, art. 5; GCIII, supra note 7, art. 3, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S 143 at art. 5(2), African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982) at art. 5. 
34
 MCA, 18 U.S.C. § 948r(a).  
35
 Detainee Treatment Act [DTA], 42 U.S.C. §1003(d). The definition is also tied to the “United 
States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New 
York, December 10, 1984.”  
36
 U.S. CAT Reservations, supra note 16. (“[T]he United States considers itself bound by the 
obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ 
only insofar as the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, 
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”) 
37
 18 U.S.C. § 2441(B). 
38
 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Alberto Gonzales (Counsel to the 
President), Standards for Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 2340 – 2340A at 2 (Aug. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf. 
39
 Id. at 46.  
40
 Id. at 23.  
41




 Scott Higham, Law Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2004), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41189-2004Aug4.html 
44
 Edward Alden, Dismay at Attempt to Find Legal Justification for Torture, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(June 10, 2004).  
45
 Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2004), at A14, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/25/world/the-reach-of-war-penal-law-legal-
scholars-criticize-memos-on-torture.html  
                                                                                                                                                  
46
 Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing Law: The Justice Department’s Legal Contortions on 
Interrogation, WASH. POST (June 20, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A54025-2004Jun19.html; R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, 
WASH. POST (July 4, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A26431-2004Jul3.html 
47DOJ Office of Prof’l Resp. Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda 
Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation 
Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 3 (June 29, 2009) [hereinafter OPR Report], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf; Mike Allen & Dana Priest, 
Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST (June 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26401-2004Jun8.html 
48
 Memorandum from Daniel B. Levin (Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to Att’y Gen. & Deputy Att’y Gen., 
DOJ, Status of Interrogation Advice 1 (Sept. 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc89.pdf 
49
 Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html. See 
OPR Report, supra note 47. 
50
 Memorandum from David Margolis (Associate Att’y Gen., DOJ) to Att’y Gen. and Deputy Att’y Gen., 
DOJ, Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional 
Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office 
of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s 




 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative 2 (Aug. 1, 2002)  [hereinafter Bybee Techniques 
Memo], available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf. 
52
 CIA Office of the Inspector Gen., Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and 
Interrogation Activities (Sept. 2001 – Oct. 2003) (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter CIA OIG Report], 
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/cia_oig_report.pdf  
53
 Bybee Techniques Memo, supra note 51, at 5.  
54
 See CIA, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, 
Interrogation and Detention (May 2004) [hereinafter OMS Guidelines May 2004], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/103009/cia-olc/2.pdf; Memorandum from Steven G. 
Bradbury (Principal Deputy Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the 
Interrogation of a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005 [No. 13]) [hereinafter Bradbury 
May 10 Memo Re: Individual Techniques], available at 
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf; Memorandum from Steven G. 
Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John A. Rizzo (Senior Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, CIA), Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be 
Used in the Interrogation of a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005 [No. 12]) 
[hereinafter Bradbury May 10 Memo Re: Combined Techniques], available at 
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury_20pg.pdf; Memorandum from  Steven 
                                                                                                                                                  
G. Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A Rizzo (Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Application of U.S. Obligations Under Article 16 of CAT to Certain Techniques that May 
Be Used in Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
Bradbury May 30 Memo], available at 
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf 
55
 Bradbury May 10 Memo Re: Individual Techniques, supra note 54 at 9–10. 
56
 Id. at 28. 
57
 Id. at 11.  
58
 Id.  
59
 Id. at 12.  
60
 Bradbury May 30 Memo, supra note 54, at 13.  
61
 OMS Guidelines May 2004, supra note 54, at 7, 23.  
62
 Bradbury May 30 Memo, supra note 54, at 13.  
63
 Id.  
64
 CIA, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, 
Interrogation, and Detention 17–18 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/72435/02793_041200display.pdf 
65
 Id. at 19.  
66
 Bradbury May 10 Memo Re: Individual Techniques, supra note 54, at 13–15.  
67
 Bradbury May 10 Memo Re: Individual Techniques, supra note 54, at 5.  
68
 Id. at n. 31.  
69
 Id. at 45.  
70
 Bradbury May 10 Memo Re: Combined Techniques, supra note 54.  
71
 Bradbury May 30 Memo, supra note 54.  
72
 Am. Med. Ass’n, Ethics Opinion 2.068 — Physician Participation in Interrogation (Nov. 
2006), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion2068.page 
73
 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement: Psychiatric Participation in Interrogation of 




 Am. Psychological Ass’n, Letter from Carol T. Goodheart to the Texas State Board of 
Examiners of Psychologists Re: Complaint Filed by Dr. Jim L.H. Cox Regarding Dr. James 
Elmer Mitchell (June 30, 2010) (APA Mitchell Letter), available at 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/texas-mitchell-letter.pdf 
75Am. Psychological Ass’n, Reaffirmation of the American Psychological Association 
Position Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and Its Application to Individuals Defined in the United States Code as 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Enemy Combatants” (Aug. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.apa.org/about/governance/council/torture-amend.aspx  
76
 See U.S. CAT Reservations, supra note 16 (“That the United States considers itself bound by 
the obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ 
only insofar as the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, 
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, And 
Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights I(3), 138 CONG. REC. 
S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992) (“That the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to 
the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States.”); see also Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. 
Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
77
 See Price, 294 F.3d at 93 (stating that the court needed to know the frequency, duration, and 
affected parts of plaintiff’s body in order to assess severity for the purposes of determining 
torture). 
78




 See Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp .2d. 1322, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (“Plaintiffs continue 
to suffer from their ordeals both physically and emotionally. … [A]ll have lasting physical scars 
and injuries, and continue to experience pain from injuries they have experienced as a result of 
torture,”); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d. 62, 65 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting the 
permanent physical scarring and hearing loss suffered by plaintiffs when finding that they were 
tortured). 
81
 Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. at 1336 (noting that plaintiff suffered “eight broken ribs … [and] a 
broken nose and finger”). 
82
 Id. (noting permanent damage to plaintiff’s kidneys); Cicippio, 18 F. Supp. 2d. at 65 (noting 
that plaintiff suffers from permanent hearing loss as a result of his treatment). 
83
 Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. at 1337 (noting that plaintiff has a permanent crescent scar on his 
forehead that was carved by the defendant). 
84
 United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 799 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting victim’s disfigured 
genitals). 
85
 Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. at 1359 (noting lasting mental effects such as “nightmares, difficulty 
sleeping, flashbacks, anxiety”).  
86
 Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
87
 Id.  
88
 Id. at 1318. 
89








 Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1213. 
93
 Belfast, 611 F.3d at 783–828. 
94
 Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 
95
 Kang v. Atty. Gen. of United States, 611 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2010). 
96
 Paul Kramer, The Water Cure, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/25/080225fa_fact_kramer.  
97 JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 1059 (1948) 
(“Among these tortures were the water treatment. … The victim was bound or otherwise secured 
in a prone position; and water was forced through his mouth and nostrils into his lungs and 
stomach until he lost consciousness. Pressure was then applied, sometimes by jumping upon his 
abdomen to force the water out. The usual practice was to revive the victim and successively 
repeat the process.”)  
98 Walter Pincus, Waterboarding Historically Controversial, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006100402005.html. Defenders of the legality of 
waterboarding have argued that the “water cure” practiced in many of these prior cases was 
distinct from the method that the CIA used, either because the “water cure” was accompanied by 
other forms of torture or used a higher volume of water. But the CIA also did not use 
waterboarding in isolation, and the precedents need not be factually identical in every respect to 
be relevant.  
99
 White v. State, 129 Miss. 182 (1922); see also Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116 (1926) (“There 
can be no kind of doubt that this confession [by water cure] was unlawfully secured”). 
100
 White, 129 Miss. at 187. 
101
 Id. at 187; 189. 
102
 Cavazos v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 564 (1942) (The court did not describe how the water cure 
was administered. In addition to the water cure, officers made defendant “stand for hours on tin 
cans with his feet bare and with his arms extended above his head” and “slapped and kicked” him 
and shocked him “with an iron rod charged with electricity.” Id. at 566.)  
103
 Id. at 567. An intermediate appellate court in Texas rejected an appeal of a conviction based a 
confession allegedly coerced using waterboarding in Morris v. State but the issue there was on the 
credibility of the allegations and not on the severity of the alleged behavior. 697 S.W.2d 687 
(Tex. App. 1985). 
104
 United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984). 
105




 Lee, 744 F.2d at 1126. The issue on appeal was whether the district court should have severed 
the appellant’s trial from the other defendants. 
                                                                                                                                                  
107
 Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. at 1463 (describing the practice as “where a 
cloth was placed over the detainee’s mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a 
drowning sensation”). 
108
 Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]ll of the abuses 
alleged … constituted either torture or prolonged arbitrary detention.”). 
109
 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21515, at *48, 58, 77 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (citing several international tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR, when considering the 
elements of genocide); Doe I v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing decisions by 
ICTY and ICTR regarding persecution and command responsibility in suit against Chinese 
officials by followers of Falun Gong and definition of genocide); Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 
1346 (stating that opinions by the ICTY and ICTR are “particularly relevant” to U.S. courts 
determining contemporary norms in CIL and noting that the U.S. has “explicitly endorsed” the 
approach of the ICTY Statute); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing case 
law from the ICTY and Supreme Court of Israel that crimes such as torture and genocide are 
subject to universal jurisdiction). 
110
 E.g. ICTY Statute at arts. 2(a)&5(f); ICTR Statute at arts. 3(f)&4(a); Rome Statute at arts. 
7(1)(f)&(2)(e), 8(2)(a)(ii)&(c)(i). 
111
 See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶289 (Feb. 28, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, ICTR-99-46-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 703 (Feb. 25, 2004). 
112
 Prosecutor v. Limaj, IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 237 (Nov. 2, 2001). 
113
 Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, ¶ 241 
(July 26, 2010). 
114
 Id. at ¶ 360. 
115
 Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1978) Series A, No. 25, at ¶¶ 96, 167. 
116
 Id. (stating that torture implies “a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very 
serious and cruel suffering.”).  
117 Hum. Rts. Watch, Getting Away with Torture 4 (July 2011) (stating that detainees in U.S. run 
facilities experienced exposure to loud noises, stress positions, and deprivation of food, water and 
sleep, among other interrogation techniques); Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th Cong.), 
Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody xxiii-xxiv, 54 (Nov. 20, 2008) (Levin 
Report), available at http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf. 
(describing the use of stress positions, sleep deprivation, loud noise, food deprivation among 
other interrogation techniques); DOD, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the 
Global War on Terrorism 64–65, 70 (2003) (approving and recommending the use of hooding, 
forced standing, and sleep deprivation for interrogations). 
118
 Aksoy v. Turkey, (Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts. 1996), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b67518.html 
119
 Id. at ¶¶ 14–15. 
120
 Id. at ¶ 64.  
                                                                                                                                                  
121
 El-Masri v. Macedonia, Judgment No. 39630/09 (Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts. Dec. 13, 2012) ¶¶ 
205–211, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/CASE_OF_EL-
MASRI_v__THE_FORMER_YUGOSLAV_REPUBLIC_OF_MACEDONIA.pdf 
122
 Id. at ¶¶ 24–30. 
123





 U.S. Army, Field Manual 2-22.3/34-52: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (2006), 




 CIA OIG Report, supra note 52, at 91. 
128
 DOS, Human Rights Reports (1999 – present), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
129
 Bob Woodward, Guantánamo Detainee was Tortured, Says Official Overseeing Military 
Trials, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html 
130
 Id.  
131
 Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora (Navy Gen. Counsel) for Navy Inspector Gen., , 
Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Techniques at 
7 (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70985/02368_040707_001display.pdf 
132




 Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Op-Ed., No Torture. No Exceptions., WASH. MONTHLY (2008), 
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.wilkerson.html 
134
 Shushannah Walshe, Former Powell Chief of Staff Col. Larry Wilkerson: Cheney “Fears 




 PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAW, BROKEN LIVES: MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF 
TORTURE BY US PERSONNEL AND ITS IMPACT viii (Preface by Antonio Taguba) (June 2008), 
available at http://brokenlives.info/?page_id=23 
136
 ICRC, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High-Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 5 (Feb. 
2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICRC Report], available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/71001/03083_070214_001display.pdf 
137
 ICRC, Report on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected 
Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment, and Interrogation 23 
(Feb. 2004) [hereinafter 2004 ICRC Report], available at http://cryptome.org/icrc-report.htm  
138
 Id.  
                                                                                                                                                  
139
 2007 ICRC Report, supra note 136.  
140
 2004 ICRC Report, supra note 137, at 3.  
141
 Id. at 23 (stating that “high value” detainees were kept in strict solitary confinement for 23 
hours a day in small concrete cells devoid of daylight, “an internment regime which does not 
comply with the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions”)  
142
 Id.  
143
 Id. at 8.  
144
 Id. at 3.  
145
 Id. at 4.  
146
 Id.  
147
 Id. at 10.  
148
 Id.  
149
 Id. at 8.  
150
 Id. at 12.  
151
 Id.  
152
 Id. at 10.  
153
 Id.  
154
 Id.  
155
 Id. at 11.  
156
 Id.  
157
 Id.  
158
 Id. at 15.  
159
 Id.  
160
 Id. at 16.  
161
 Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html 
162
 2007 ICRC Report, supra note 136, at 26. 
163
 Id. at 24.  
164
 Id. at 8.  
165
 Id. at 7.  
166
 Id. at 7.  
167
 Id.  
168
 Id. at 7–8.  
169
 Id. at 24.  
                                                                                                                                                  
170
 Id. at 16.  
171
 Id. at 8–19. The list of these “ill-treatment” techniques is listed on pp. 8–9.  
172
 Id. at 19.  
173
 Id. at 11–12.  
174
 E.g., id. at 9 (“each specific method was in fact applied in combination with other methods, 
either simultaneously, or in succession.”); id. at 35 (“The beatings were combined with the use of 
cold water…”); id. at 15 (“Sleep was deprived in various ways, and therefore overlaps with some 
of the other forms of ill-treatment described in this section, from the use of loud repetitive noise 
or music to long interrogation sessions to prolonged stress standing to spraying with cold 
water.”).  
175
 Id. at 14.  
176
 Id. at 19.  
177
 Id. at 26.  
178
 Id.  
179
 Id. at 5.  
180
 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
181
 Id. at 288. 
182
 Id. at 267.  
183
 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57–58, 61–64 (D.D.C. 2009). 
184
 Id. at 58. 
185
 Id. at 63. 
186
 Id. at 58.  
187
 Id. at 61.  
188
 Id.  
189
 Order (re: Mohammed Jawad) at 1, Saki Bacha v. Obama, Civ. No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. July 17, 
2009).  
190
 Order at 1, Saki Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009). 
191
 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2009).  
192
 Id. at 57.  
193
 The court states at 65 that “even though the identity of the individual interrogators changed … 
there is no question that throughout his ordeal Binyam Mohamed was being held at the behest of 
the United States.” 
194
 Id. at 57–60. 
195
 Id. (Improvements included being able to bathe weekly, as opposed to never, being kept in the 
dark for 12 hours a day versus 23, and being given 5 minutes per week to spend outdoors versus 
none.) 
                                                                                                                                                  
196
 Id. at 62.  
197
 696 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (re: Musa’ab Omar Al Madhwani).  
198
 Id. at 3.  
199
 Id. at 6.  
200
 Id.  
201
 Id. at 3. The court noted that a medical report indicated that the petitioner — who is five feet 
five inches tall and weighed 104 pounds six days before he was transferred to Guantánamo — 
had a diastolic blood pressure of 36, a sign of severe dehydration that ordinarily requires 
hospitalization. Id. at 18. 
202




 677 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).  
205
 Id. at 12.  
206
 Id. at 11. 
207
 Id. at 10.  
208
 Id. at 12.  
209
 The circuit court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision because subsequent circuit 
court decisions were “inconsistent with several of the district court’s legal premises.” Hatim v. 
Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The circuit court’s decision, however, did not discuss 
the district court’s factual determinations. 
210
 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) (re: Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman).  
211
 Id. at 15  
212
 Id. The district court’s memorandum opinion was reversed and remanded by the circuit court 
with instructions to deny petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 
402 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The circuit court’s opinion discussed only whether the government’s 
evidence, based on a functional approach, indicated that petitioner more likely than not was part 
of Al Qaeda. Id. at 402, 407. The circuit court did not disturb the district court’s findings that 
statements from certain witnesses were unreliable because they were the product of torture. See 
id. at 404 n.5. 
213
 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2010) (re: Yasein Khasem Mohammad Esmail).  
214
 Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010).  
215
 Id. at 7 
216
 Id. at 7, 16. The district court’s grant of habeas grant was later overturned by the D.C. Circuit, 
but its factual conclusions were not.  
 APPENDIX 2 
                                                 
1
 Interview, Dick Cheney, Meet the Press (Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html 
2
 Interview, Cofer Black, Frontline (Mar. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/interviews/black.html 
3
 [Presidential] Military Order, Detention Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm  
4
 Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) & John C. Yoo (Deputy 
Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, DOD), Possible Habeas 
Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20011228.pdf  
5
 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al 
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf  
6
 James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention 
Operations 80 (Aug. 2004) (Schlesinger Report), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf 
7
 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020119.pdf 
8
 PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: DECEPTION, CRUELTY, AND THE PROMISE OF LAW 39 
(2008); Transcript of interview with Thomas Romig (Nov. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/interviews/thomas_romig.html  
9
 Memorandum from William H. Taft IV (Legal Adviser, DOS) to John C. Yoo (Deputy Ass’t 
Att’y Gen., OLC), Your Draft Memorandum of January 9 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020111.pdf 
10
 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales (White House Counsel) to President George W. Bush, 





 Notes by William H. Taft IV (Legal Adviser, DOS) (Feb. 2, 2002), reproduced in KAREN 
GREENBERG & JOSHUA DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (2005). 
13
 Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects of Harsh Tactic’s in 9/11’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/us/12psychs.html; Katherine Eban, Rorshach 
and Awe, VANITY FAIR (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/07/torture200707; Jody Warrick & Peter Finn, 
Interviews Offer Look at Roles of CIA Contractors During Interrogation, WASH. POST (July 19, 
2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071802065.html; Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (110th 
Cong.), Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody 6–7 (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter 
Levin Report], available at http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf 
                                                                                                                                                  
14
 ALI SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS 393–95 (2011) (Soufan refers to the CIA contract 
psychologist as “Boris” but multiple, credible press accounts have confirmed that it is Mitchell, 
e.g., Warrick & Finn, supra note 13).  
15
 Michael Isikoff, “We Could Have Done This the Right Way,” NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/24/we-could-have-done-this-the-




 SOUFAN, supra note 14, at 422–23 (FBI agent Steve Gaudin remained slightly longer, but his 
superiors eventually ordered him not to return); DOJ, Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of 
the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantánamo Bay, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0910.pdf 
17
 Rodriguez does not identify Soufan by name in his book, but comparing his description to other 
sources makes clear that Soufan is the FBI agent in question.  
18
 JOSE RODRIGUEZ & BILL HARLOW, HARD MEASURES 77–78 (2012).  
19
 Id. at 70. 
20
 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 169 (2010).  
21
 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee (Ass’t Att’y Gen., OLC) to John Rizzo (Acting Gen. Counsel, 
CIA), Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Aug. 1 
Interrogation Methods Memo], available at 
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf 
22
 ICRC, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 29–30 
(Feb. 2007), available at http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf 
23
 Id. at 11, 15. 
24
 Senate Intelligence Comm., Testimony of Michael Hayden (Mar. 5, 2008).  
25
 Memorandum from  Steven G. Bradbury (Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) to John A Rizzo 
(Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA), Application of U.S. Obligations Under Article 16 of CAT to 
Certain Techniques that May Be Used in Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (May 
30, 2005), available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf 
26
 Adam Goldman & Kathy Gannon, Salt Pit Death: Gul Rahman, CIA Prisoner, Died of 
Hypothermia in Secret Afghanistan Prison, HUFFINGTON POST (AP) (Mar. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/28/salt-pit-death-gul-rahman_n_516559.html; Adam 
Goldman & Kathy Gannon, CIA Victim Said to Have Rescued Future Afghan President, Fox 
News (AP) (April 7, 2010), available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/06/cia-victim-
said-rescued-future-afghan-pres; Dana Priest, CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment, WASH. 
POST (March 3, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2576-
2005Mar2.html 
27
 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, At CIA, Grave Mistakes, Then Promotions, WASH. TIMES 
(AP) (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/9/ap-cia-
grave-mistakes-then-promotions 
28
 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Joint Study On Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the 
Context of Countering Terrorism 59–68 (Feb. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf 
                                                                                                                                                  
29
 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.2d 1071 




 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2009). 
32
 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 (D.D.C. 2009). 
33 Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2005), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html; Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, 
Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html 
34
 Task Force staff interview with Khalid al-Sharif (Sept. 2, 2012). 
35
 HUM. RTS. WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS 48–50 (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf 
36
 Id. at 4.  
37
 Declaration of Mohamed Farag Ahmed Bashmilah (Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan) (Dec. 5, 
2007), available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/declarationofbashmilah.pdf 
38
 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse But Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html 
39 Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta Jr. & Amy Waldman, Threats and Responses: 
Interrogations; Questioning Terror Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/09/world/threats-responses-interrogations-
questioning-terror-suspects-dark-surreal-world.html 
40
 RICARDO S. SANCHEZ WITH DONALD T. PHILLIPS, WISER IN BATTLE 149–50 (2008). 
41
 Task Force staff interview with Rear Admiral James McPherson (Dec. 13, 2011). 
42
 Id.  
43
 KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTÁNAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 55–59, 62–
63 (2009). 
44
 Task Force staff interview with Colonel Terry Carrico (May 19, 2011).  
45
 Gerry G. Gilmore, Rumsfeld Visits, Thanks Troops at Camp X-Ray in Cuba, AM. FORCES 
PRESS SERV. (Jan. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43817 
46
 SANDS, supra note 8, at 51. 
47
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 38–39, 43–47, 51–53. 
48
 Id. at 61–62, 65. 
49
 Id. at 62. 
50
 Julian Borger, “Soft” Guantánamo Chief Ousted, GUARDIAN (UK) (Oct. 16, 2002), available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/16/usa.afghanistan 
                                                                                                                                                  
51
 Memorandum from Lt. Col. Diane Beaver to Gen. James T. Hill, Legal Review of Aggressive 





 SANDS, supra note 8, at 77. 
54
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 66–70. 
55
 Id. at 70. Beaver has stated that she asked requested Dalton’s assistance for her own review, but 
did not receive any. SANDS, supra note 8, at 77. 
56
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 71. 
57
 Memorandum from William J. Haynes II (Gen. Counsel, DOD) to Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary 
of Defense), Counter-Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), signed with handwritten note by 
Rumsfeld on Dec. 2, 2002, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc5.pdf 
58
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 96. 
59
 Id. at 60.  
60
 Letter from T.J. Harrington (Deputy Ass’t Dir., FBI Counterterrorism Div.) to Major General 




 DOD, Interrogation Log, Detainee 063 (Nov. 23, 2002 to Jan. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf 
62
 Id. at 27. 
63
 Randall Schmidt and John Furlow, Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation Into FBI 
Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Detention Facility (Apr. 2005) 
[hereinafter Schmidt-Furlow Report], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf; Levin Report, supra note 13, at 73–
90. 
64
 Schmidt-Furlow Report, supra note 63, at 1, 20. 
65
 Bob Woodward, Guantánamo Detainee Was Tortured, Says Official Overseeing Military 
Trials, WASH. POST, (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html 
66
 Memorandum from Alberto Mora (Navy Gen. Counsel) for Navy Inspector General, Statement 
for the Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7, 2004) 
[hereinafter Mora Statement for the Record], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf 
67
 Id.  
68
 Id.  
69
 Id. at 7–8. 
70
 Id. at 4–15. 
71
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 120–21. 
                                                                                                                                                  
72
 DOD, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism 86–
87 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/d20040622doc8.pdf 
73
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 131 
74
 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) to Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20030416.pdf 
75
 Id.  
76
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 137–38. 
77
 Schmidt-Furlow Report, supra note 63, at 24–25. 
78
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 139–40.  
79
 Id. at 140–41. 
80
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 141; Jess Bravin, The Conscience of the Colonel, WALL 
STREET J. (Mar. 31, 2007).  
81
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 143–46. 
82
 Email from [Redacted] to Valerie Caproni (FBI Office of Gen. Counsel) (forwarding email 
from [redacted] to [redacted], GITMO) (Aug. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.5053.pdf 
83




 Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html 
85
 Office of the Armed Forces Med. Examiner, Final Report of Postmortem Examination (Dec. 8, 
2003) (Habibullah autopsy), available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/autopsy-
report-mullah-habibullah-bagram-collection-point-afghanistan-homicide-0134-02 
86
 Task Force staff interview with Angela Birt (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter Birt Interview].  
87
 Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Inmates, Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html 
88
 U.S. Army Crim. Investigative Div., File No. 0134-02-CID369-23 (sworn statement of Ali 




 Task Force staff interview with Joshua Claus (July 13, 2011).  
90
 Birt Interview, supra note 86. 
91
 Timothy Golden, Years After 2 Afghans Died, Abuse Case Falters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/national/13bagram.html 
92





                                                                                                                                                  
95
 Transcript from United States v. Brand at 87–88 (Testimony of Marianne Plummer), available 
at http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2008/06/04/14/Brand-9a.source.prod_affiliate.91.pdf 
96
 Id. at 91. 
97
 Bagram CID file, Sworn Statement of Maj. Jeff A. Bovarnick, at 9 (May 26, 2004). 
98
 Id. at 9–15. 
99
 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE (2007). 
100
 Bagram CID file, Sworn Statement of Col. David L. Hayden, 16 (June 18, 2004). 
101
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 115. 
102
 Bagram CID file, Sworn Statement, Sgt. Jennifer N. Higginbotham, 28 (Aug. 1, 2004), but see 
id. at 12. 
103
 Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld (May 7, 2004). 
104
 HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO BLOOD, NO FOUL: SOLDIERS’ ACCOUNTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE IN 
IRAQ 7 (July 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0706web.pdf 
105
 Id. at 13. 
106
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 159–61. 
107
 Id. at xiv, 170. 
108
 Id. at 176–78.  
109
 Id. at 179. 
110
 Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Testimony of Steve Kleinman at 189 (Sept. 25, 2008). 
111
 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 247 (2008); Levin Report, supra note 13, at 186. 
112
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 193–94.  
113
 Stuart Herrington, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter 
Herrington Report] [on file with The Constitution Project].  
114
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 163. 
115
 U.S. Army Office of Inspector Gen., Interview of Col. Stuart Herrington at 5 (Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Herrington Army OIG Interview].  
116
 Herrington Report, supra note 113, at 7. 
117
 Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In Secret Unit’s “Black Room,” A Grim Portrait of U.S. 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/middleeast/19abuse.html 
118
 Herrington Report, supra note 113, at 7. 
119
 Herrington Army OIG Interview, supra note 115, at 9–10. 
120
 NO BLOOD, NO FOUL, supra note 104, at 14–15. 
121
 Id. at 15–16. 
122
 Birt Interview, supra note 86. 
123
 Schmitt & Marshall, supra note 117. 
                                                                                                                                                  
124 Memorandum from Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, DIA) to Stephen Cambone 
(Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence), Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 6-26 Personnel 
(June 25, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/t2596_0297.pdf 
125
 Memorandum from Stephen Cambone to William Boykin (June 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2006/03/19/international/19abuse_CA0ready.html 
126
 DOD Office of Inspector Gen., Review of DOD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse 16 
(Aug. 25, 2006). 
127
 John McChesney, Documents Shed Light on Abu Ghraib Death, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 28, 
2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4979183; Jane Mayer, 
A Deadly Interrogation, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/11/14/051114fa_fact 
128
 U.S. Army Crim. Investigative Div., File No. 0237-03-CID259-61219 at 47–48 [hereinafter 
Jamadi CID file], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOACID009482.pdf; Mayer, A Deadly 








 Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 127. 
133
 McChesney, supra note 127. 
134




 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Steve Stormoen, Former CIA Official, Under Scrutiny in Abu 




 DOJ Press Release, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation 
into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-1067.html 
138
 U.S. Army Crim. Investigative Div., Interview of Charles Graner, at 247 [on file with The 
Constitution Project]. 
139
 Id. at 273–74. 
140
Abu Ghraib MP logbook at 23 [on file with The Constitution Project]; Graner interview, supra 
note 138, at 272–73. 
141
 Abu Ghraib MP logbook, supra note 140, at 16. 
142
 Id. at 24. 
143
 Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, supra note 127. 
144
 Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade 27 (May 
2004) (Taguba Report), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
145
 George Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and the 205th 
Military Intelligence Brigade 44–45 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Fay Report], available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf  
146
 Jamadi CID file, supra note 128, at 96. 
147










 Jon Sarche & Dan Elliott, CIA Role Remains a Mystery at Army Court Martial, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 22, 2006), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0122-08.htm; 
Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, 118–21 (Testimony of unidentified witness). 
152
 Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 151. 
153
 Id. at 134–36 (Testimony of Jerry Loper). 
154
 Id. at 53–54 (Testimony of Jefferson Williams). 
155
 Id. at 101–02 (Testimony of Todd Sonnek). 
156
 Id. at 177 (Testimony of Lewis Welshofer). 
157
 GEORGE TENET & BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 
388 (2007). 
158
 Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 151. 
159
 Office of the Armed Forces Med. Examiner, Autopsy Report No. ME03-571 (Dec. 18, 2003) 




 Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 151, at 52–54, 64–66, 69–74, 
104–05. 
161 Record of Article 32 Investigation, United States v. Williams, Sommer, and Loper at 51–52, 
available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/84994/02795_041202_001.pdf 
162
 Court-Martial Record, United States v. Welshofer, supra note 151, at 93. 
163
 Death of a General, CBS News (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18560_162-1476781.html?pageNum=3 
164
 Office of the Armed Forces Med. Examiner, Autopsy Report No. ME04-14 (Apr. 30, 2004) 
(Abdul Jameel autopsy), available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/autopsy-
report-47-year-old-male-al-asad-iraq-homicide-0009-04-cid679-83486-death 
165
 Detainee Autopsy Summary (Sept. 23, 2004), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/get/2041/78954/02668_040923_002.pdf. “OGA,” an abbreviation for 
“Other Government Agency,” usually refers to the CIA. In this case, though, the CID 
                                                                                                                                                  
investigation into Abdul Jameel’s death shows that he was interrogated by Operational 
Detachment Alpha (ODA) 525, of the 5th Special Forces Groups, and “OGA” may be a mistaken 
transcription of “ODA”. However, there is a press report of possible CIA involvement in Jameel’s 
death, and several pages of the CID file are absent as they are “civilian agency records.” U.S. 
Army Crim. Investigative Div., File No. 009-04-CID679-83486 at 392 [hereinafter Jameel CID 
file], available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/cid-report-death-009-04-cid679-
83486 
166
 The hyoid bone is located in the neck, and is frequently fractured in homicides caused by 
strangulation. 
167
 Jameel CID file, supra note 165, at 119. 
168
 Id. at 59, 67. 
169
 Id. at 99 (medical examiners stated that detainee had an unhealthy heart), at 101 (witness 
believed detainee to be “at least seventy years old and emotionally unsound”), at 123 (description 
of detainee as an “old man”), at 301 (detainee told medical screeners that he was diabetic and had 
high blood pressure). 
170




 Id. at 5, 9. 
173
 Id. at 326. 
174
 Id. at 9. 
175
 Id. at 95. 
176
 U.S. Army CID Press Release, Army Criminal Investigators Outline 27 Confirmed or 
Suspected Detainee Homicides for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom (Mar. 
25, 2005), available at http://www.cid.army.mil/Documents/OIF-OEF%20Homicides.pdf.  
177
 Richard Formica, Article 15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention 
Operations 46–48 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Formica Report], available at 
http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/dod054971.pdf 
178
 Id.  
179
 Bybee Aug. 1 Interrogation Methods Memo, supra note 21. 
180
 Formica Report, supra note 177, at 48–49, 72–73. 
181
 Interview with detainees (conducted by Task Force staff member Katherine Hawkins and co-








 Joshua E.S. Phillips & Michael Montgomery, What Killed Sergeant Gray, Am. Radio Works 
(Jan. 2010), available at http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/vets/transcriptb.html 
186
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 166–67. 
187
 Id. at 169–70. 
                                                                                                                                                  
188
 Id. at 191–97. 
189
 SANCHEZ, supra note 40, at 266. 
190
 Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Testimony of Col. Marc Warren (May 19, 2004).  
191
 Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Military Disputed Protected Status of Prisoners Held in 
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/reach-
war-prisoners-us-military-disputed-protected-status-prisoners-held-iraq.html 
192
 Levin Report, supra note 13, at 203–04. 
193
 Id. at 204–05. 
194
 DICK CHENEY, IN MY TIME 420 (2011). 
195
 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 195 (2006). 
196
 CHRISTOPHER GRAVELINE & MICHAEL CLEMENS, THE SECRETS OF ABU GHRAIB REVEALED: 
AMERICAN SOLDIERS ON TRIAL 283 (2010).  
197
 Id. at 121–22. 
198
 PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (2008). 
199
 TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE, supra note 99. 
200
 Fay Report supra note 145, at 89. 
201
 ICRC, Report on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected 
Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment, and Interrogation 13 
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/us/doc/icrc-prisoner-report-feb-
2004.pdf 
202
 Id. Detainees’ psychological problems may not have resulted solely from abuse. The MPs 
have consistently reported that some hard site detainees were mentally disturbed, and were sent to 
Tier 1B from less secure areas of the prison as a disciplinary measure. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & 
MORRIS, supra note 198, at 144–45. 
203
 For additional accounts of Forward Operating Base Tiger, see NO BLOOD, NO FOUL, supra 
note 104, at 25–37. 
204
 Id. at 38–45. See also Peter Graff, British Lawyer: U.S. Torture in Iraq Spread to Mosul, 
REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0914-
20.htm; TONY LAGOURANIS & ALLEN MIKAELAN, FEAR UP HARSH 78–80 (2007). 
205
 Ian Fishback, A Matter of Honor, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/27/AR2005092701527.html; 
Hum. Rts. Watch, Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the 
U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division (Sept. 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/09/22/leadership-failure 
206
 See generally JOSHUA E.S. PHILLIPS, NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE (2011). 
207
 Phillips & Montgomery, supra note 185. 
208
 Id.  
                                                                                                                                                  
209
 Thomas E. Ricks & Ann Scott Tyson, Troops at Odds With Ethics Standards, WASH. POST 
(May 5, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050402151.html 
210
 General Charles C. Krulak & General Joseph P. Hoar, It’s Our Cage, Too, WASH. POST (May 




ACP — American College of  Physicians
ACR — Armored Calvary Regiment
ACS — Afghan Corrections System
ADX — United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility (Supermax) (Florence)
AIHRC — Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission
ANSF — Afghan National Security Forces
APA — American Psychological Association
APPG — All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition
AQ — Al Qaeda
AUMF — Authorization for Use of  Military Force
AZ — Abu Zubaydah
BCP — Bagram Collection Point
BHA — Brigade Holding Area
BIFS — Brigade Internment Facilities
BOP — Bureau of  Prisons (DOJ)
BSCT — Behavioral Science Consultation Team (“Biscuit”)
BTIF — Bagram Theater Internment Facility
CAT — U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment
546
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
CID — (1) Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading [Treatment or Punishment]) 
(2) U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
CIL — Customary International Law 
CITF — Guantánamo Criminal Investigative Task Force
CJIATF-435 — Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–435
CJTF-180 — Combined Joint Task Force–180 (or -7, etc)
CNSD — Committee on National Security and Defense (Lithuania)
COIN — Counter-Insurgent Strategy
CPT — European Committee for the Prevention of  Torture
CRS — Congressional Research Service
CSRT — Combatant Status Review Tribunal
DCHC — Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DIA)
DFIP — Detention Facility in Parwan
DHS — Department of  Homeland Security
DIA — Defense Intelligence Agency (DOD)
DIFs — Division Internment Facilities 
DOD — Department of  Defense
DOJ — Department of  Justice
DOS — Department of  State
DRB — Detainee Review Board
DTA — Detainee Treatment Act 
DUC — Detained Unlawful Combatant
ECCC — Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of  Cambodia
ECHR — European Court of  Human Rights
ECRB — Enemy Combatant Review Board




EO — Executive Order
FISA — Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FM — Army Field Manual
FOIA — Freedom of  Information Act
GAO — Government Accountability Office
GCI — First Geneva Convention
GCII — Second Geneva Convention
GCIII — Third Geneva Convention
GCIV — Fourth Geneva Convention
GIRoA — Government of  the Islamic Republic of  Afghanistan
GTMO — Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp
GWOT — Global War on Terrorism
HIG — High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group
HUMINT — Human Intelligence
HVD — High-Value Detainee
ICC — International Criminal Court
ICCPR — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICE — Guantánamo’s Interrogation and Control Element 
ICRC — International Committee of  the Red Cross
ICTR — International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY — International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IED — Improvised Explosive Device
IG — Inspector General (various agencies)
IHL — International Humanitarian Law
ISAF — International Security Assistance Force
ISG — Iraq Survey Group
548
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
ISN — Internment Serial Number
JAG — Judge Advocate General
JIDC — Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
JPRA — Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JSOC — Joint Special Operations Command
JTF-GTMO — Joint Task Force Guantánamo
KFOR — Kosovo Force (NATO)
KSM — Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
LIFG — Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LLEC — Low Level Enemy Combatants
LOAC — Law of  Armed Conflict 
LTTE — Liberation Tigers of  Tamil Eelam
MCA — Military Commissions Act
MEP — Member of  the European Parliament
MI — Military Intelligence 
MOU — Memorandum of  Understanding
MP — Military Police
MRE — Meal, Ready to Eat
NCIS — Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NCO — Noncommissioned Officer
NDS — National Directorate of  Security (Afghanistan)
NGO — Nongovernmental Organization
NSA — National Security Agency
NSC — National Security Council
NSD-77 — National Security Directive 77




OEF — Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA — Other Government Agency (the CIA, as referred to by the military)
OGC — Office of  General Counsel (various agencies)
OIG — Office of  Inspector General (various agencies)
OLC — Office of  Legal Counsel (DOJ)
OMS — Office of  Medical Services (CIA)
OPR — Office of  Professional Responsibility (DOJ)
ORNISS — National Registry Office for Classified Information (Romania) 
OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI — Open Society Institute
OTSG — Office of  the Surgeon General 
PENS — APA Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security
PFT — Pouring, Flicking or Tossing (Water)
PHR — Physicians for Human Rights
POW — Prisoner of  War
PR — Personal Representative
PRB — Privilege Review Board 
PKK — Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
PTSD — Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PUC — Person Under Control
SAP — Special Access Program
SCIF — Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SERE — Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
SOP — Standard Operating Procedure
SSCI — Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSD — State Security Department (Lithuania)
550
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
TCP — The Constitution Project
TF — Task Force
TJAG — The Judge Advocate General
(U) — unclassified
UCMJ — Uniform Code of  Military Justice
UDHR — Universal Declaration of  Human Rights
UECRB — Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board 
UNAMA — United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USFOR-A — U.S. Forces, Afghanistan
WCA — War Crimes Act
WMA — World Medical Association
551The Constitution Project
Index
“24” (TV series), 253, 258, 335–36
519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 63, 70, 104, 107
A
Aamer, Shaker, 47–48
Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk (“underwear bomber”), 265, 
319
Abu Ghraib, 105–8
see also al-Jamadi, Manadel; Fay Report; Miller Report; 
Taguba Report
changes after Abu Ghraib, 114–16
effect on U.S. policy, 7
England, Lynndie, 106
     Frederick, Ivan, 106, 108
     Graner, Charles, 95–96, 106–9





ICRC and Christophe Girod, 51–55
setup of interrogation operations, 104–5
Abu Zubaydah (Zayn Al-Abedin Muhammed Al-Husayn)
CIA’s psychological assessment, 142
interrogation techniques
and medical professionals’ role, 206–11, 216–17
and veracity/value of intelligence gained, 248–53, 
260–61
legal action on behalf of, 197
Lithuania, interrogation in, 192
OLC memo on interrogation of, 144–45
Poland, interrogation in, 182–85
Thailand, interrogation in, 177–82
Addington, David, 36, 44, 131–32, 142, 144, 148, 153, 268
Afghanistan, 57–84
BSCTs, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams
counterinsurgent strategy, development of, 75–81
Detention Facility at Parwan (DFIP), 76–77, 81, 82–84
early setup, 62–64
“fog of war,” 59–62
future of detention and U.S. role, 81–84
as gateway to Guantánamo, 33–35, 65–68
National Directorate of Security (NDS), 23, 83, 276, 
322–26
rendition, role in, 173–74
black sites, 72–74, 172–73, 177–79
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), 24, 81, 83, 322, 324, 326
Afifi (Nik Abd-al Rahman bin Mustapha), 255
Agiza, Ahmed, 165, 172, 175, 196, 200
Ahmed, Ibrahim Saeed, see al-Kuwaiti
al-Ani, Ibrahim Khalid Samir, 87–88
al-Asad, Mohammed, 194, 198
Al Farooq (training camp), 60
al-Faruq, Omar, 178
al-Ghuraba, see Ghuraba cell
al-Hajj, Sami, 40, 47, 64, 69, 227–28, 288, 291
al Hawsawi, Mustafa, 169
Al-Husayn, see Abu Zubaydah
al-Jamadi, Manadel (“Ice Man”), 95–97, 179–80
responses to death of, 21, 101, 330–31
al-Kuwaiti, Abu Ahmed (Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed), 245–47
Allbright, Ben, 111, 277
Allen, John, 326
Allen, Mark, 272
al-Libi, Abu Faraj, 188, 245–46
al-Libi, Ibn al-Shaykh, 172, 174, 178, 194, 261–62, 264
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition 
(UK), 198–99, 268
al-Nashiri, Abd al-Rahim, 48, 169, 177, 181–85, 188, 197, 
210, 217
Al Qaeda, application of Geneva Conventions to, 134–38
al Qahtani, Mohammed, 39–40, 41, 221–22, 241, 245–46
al-Rawi, Bisher, 178, 196–97, 284–85, 287, 290, 292, 294
Al Saadi, Sami, 169, 172, 197, 268, 272–73
Al Shabab, 194–95, 321, 329–30
al-Sharif, Khalid, 178–79, 270, 273–75
al-Shoroeiya, see Shoroeiya
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 168
Alzery, Muhammed, 165, 172, 175, 200
American College of Physicians
ethical obligations toward detainees, 234, 236, 238
552
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
American Medical Association (AMA)
ethical obligations toward detainees, 230, 234, 235, 
237–38
American Psychiatric Association
ethical obligations toward detainees, 234, 236–37
American Psychological Association (APA) and PENS report
ethical obligations toward detainees, 234, 238–40
American Taliban, see Lindh, John Walker
Amin, Mohammad Farik, see Zubair
Anusauskas, Arvydas, 189–92
Appendix M, see Army Field Manual on Interrogation
Arar, Maher, 169–70, 172, 196, 201, 262, 285, 332
Army Field Manual on Interrogation, 23, 46, 63, 70, 75, 103, 
105, 265, 313, 326, 329, 342
Appendix M, 23, 265, 327–28
Asad, see al-Asad, Mohammed
Ashcroft, John, 142, 146–48, 150, 196
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 79, 130, 
132–33, 138–39
B
Bagram Air Base, 4, 6, 8, 62–66, 68–72, 74–78, 81, 84, 107, 
173, 177–78, 195–96, 251, 261, 276, 328
Baheer, Ghairat, 179
Baker, Sean, 40
Balad (Iraq), 100–101, 102, 113
Banna, see el-Banna
Barak, Aharon, 266
Bashmilah, Mohamed, 177, 196
Battlefield Interrogation Facility (Camp Nama), 87–94
Beaver, Diane, 37–39, 90, 221, 258
Begg, Moazzam, 65–66, 281, 283, 284, 285, 290, 292, 294, 
309
Behavioral Science Consultant Teams (BSCTs)
at Guantánamo, 37–38, 55, 219–24
in Iraq and Afghanistan, 224–25
Surgeon General’s determination re BSCTs, 235
Belhadj, Abdel Hakim, 172, 181, 197–98, 268, 270–72, 273
Bellinger, John, 131, 141, 156, 199, 200
Belmar, Richard, 197
Biden, Joe, 168
bin al Shibh, Ramzi, 169, 177, 183, 188, 192–93, 250–51, 333
bin Arshad, Masran, 254–55
bin Attash, Hassan, 178, 251
bin Attash, Walid, 48, 183, 184, 188, 216
bin Laden, Osama, 59–60, 269
Library Tower plot, 250, 254, 256, 257
meeting with Al Saadi, 272
meeting with Belhadj, 271
value of EITs in capturing, 11, 245–47
Zero Dark Thirty, 245, 335–36
bin Lep, Bashir (“Lillie”), 181, 255, 257
bin Mustapha, see Afifi
Birt, Angela, 71, 91
biscuits, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams (BSCTs)
black sites, 177–96








Salt Pit, see Salt Pit
Somalia, 195–96
Thailand, 180–82
Blacksmith Hotel, 97, 109
Blair, Dennis, 244, 265, 314
Blair, Tony, 199, 272
Bloche, M. Gregg, 225, 237, 258–59
Boumediene v. Bush, 50, 157
Boykin, William, 92
Bradbury, Steven, 149, 153–57, 160, 167, 213–15, 232, 
248–49, 252–53, 335
Brand, William, 71–72
Brant, David, 41, 42, 222
Breasseale, Todd, 21, 80
Brennan, John, 314, 343–44
Britel, Abou Elkassim (Kassim el-Britel), 192–93, 196, 
281–82, 291
Bryson, Jennifer, 276
BSCTs, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams (BSCTs)
Bumgarner, Mike, 47
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 228–31, 280
Burney, Paul, 219–22
Bush, George W., 3, 4, 7, 33, 36, 41, 48, 62, 130, 156, 166, 
175, 177, 207–8, 250–51, 253–54, 261, 267–68, 
314, 315, 320, 342–43
“Bush Six”
criminal complaint against, 267–68
Bybee, Jay, 131, 135–36, 138–42, 144–47, 150–52 , 157–60, 
208, 268




Camp Bondsteel (Kosovo), 193–94
Camp Bucca (Iraq), 115, 116–17, 276
Camp Cropper (Iraq), 87–88, 90
Camp Delta (Guantánamo), 29–30, 35, 47
Camp Iguana (Guantánamo), 48
Camp Nama, see Battlefield Interrogation Facility
Camps 5, 6 & 7 (Guantánamo), 48–49, 224
Camp X-Ray (Guantánamo), 29–30, 37, 289
Canada
rendition, role in, 172
Carrico, Terry, 36–37
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
high-value detainees’ accounts of CIA interrogation 
program, 215–18
Inspector General Report, 21, 97, 149, 184, 209–11, 215, 
217, 331





medical professionals’ role in treatment of prisoners in 
CIA custody, 205–16
Office of Medical Services (OMS), 154, 209, 242
guidelines on medical treatment of detainees, 212–15, 
235
Red Cross findings on CIA interrogation program, 215–18
Rendition Group, 166–67, 194
response to allegations of abuse, 101–4
Salt Pit, see Salt Pit
and Special Forces in Iraq, 87–104
suspicious deaths, 94–100
Cheney, Dick, 4, 131–32, 268, 319, 336, 342
Church Report, 63, 74–76, 113, 225
CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency
civilian court system
use of by Obama Administration, 317–20
Clarke, Richard, 166
Claus, Joshua, 66, 68–70, 72
Clinton, Bill, 2, 17, 59, 131, 165–66, 320
Colvin, Richard, 323, 325
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), 34–35, 47, 211, 
217, 295
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs)
CJTF-7, 91, 105, 179
CJTF-180, 63, 72, 75, 79
Common Article 3, see Geneva Conventions
Conboy, Ken, 256–57
confessions
efficacy of torture/EITs, see torture
false confessions, danger of, 258–62
Congress, role of, 337–46
historical perspective, 346–46
reactions to post–Sept.11 abuses, 339–44
consequences of U.S. policies, 267–94
detainees, impact upon, 279–94
detention operations, 267–75
international legal consequences, 267–68
international political consequences, 269–75
operational consequences for U.S. military, 275–79
impact on relationship with foreign militaries, 278–79
impact on U.S. personnel, 276–78
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 20
Constitution of the U.S.
application to detainee treatment, 123
Constitution Project Task Force, see TCP Task Force on 
Detainee Treatment
Convention Against Torture (CAT), 126–29, 323, 325, 330
applicability to rendition, 140, 170–72
and CIA IG report, 149
and Obama administration, 320
and OLG memos, 142–46, 152, 155, 313
and TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 16–17









Dark Prison (Afghanistan), 172–73, 177–79
Dayton, Keith, 87, 105
deaths in custody, 21, 22, 48, 49, 61–62, 66, 68–72, 69, 71, 




see also specific subject headings
Criminal Investigation Task Force, 41, 219
differences of opinion re interrogation, 41–46
medical personnel, applicability of professional ethics, 
234–36
TCP Task Force statement, findings and 
recommendations, 7, 15, 16, 18–21
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 92, 174, 329
re-engagement data, see recidivism
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 20–21
Deghayes, Omar, 197, 284–85, 288–89, 292, 294
Delahunty, Robert, 132–33, 135, 147, 157–58, 175
Department of, see other part of name
Detainee Abuse Task Force, 113–14
Detainee Interrogation Working Group, 43
Detainee Review Boards (DRBs), 78–81
detainees
see also specific topics and names
effect on, 279–94
long-term effects of detention and abuse, 287–94
mental effects, 289–94
physical effects, 287–89
release, practical issues upon, 280–87
economic hardship, 282–85
limited mobility, 285
procedures, establishment of, 286–87
stigma, 281–82
Detainee Treatment Act, 155–56
detention, see specific subject headings
Diaz, Walter, 95–97, 179–80
Diego Garcia base, 199
Dilawar
death of (at Bagram), 66, 68–72, 278
diplomatic assurances, 169–70
and Obama administration, 201, 320–21
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 16–17
DiRita, Larry, 93
disclosing abuse
medical professionals’ role, 225–27
Djibouti
black sites, 194–95
lawsuits against, 198, 268
doctors, see medical professionals’ role
Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 34, 60–62
Drumheller, Tyler, 166–67, 170, 173–74, 177
Dunlavey, Michael, 37–38, 66, 219, 222
Durbin, Richard, 341–42
554
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Durham, John, 74, 180, 330–31
E
economic hardship
impact on released detainees, 282–85
efficacy of torture/EITs, see torture
Egypt
rendition, role in, 174–75
el-Banna, Jamil, 178, 197
el-Gaddafi, Muammar, 6, 59, 169
and consequences of U.S. policy, 269–75
el-Gaddafi, Seif al-Islam, 273
Elite LLC, 190
El-Mashad, Sherif, 40, 283–85
El-Masri, Khaled, 21, 172–74, 179, 196–99, 268, 285, 292–93
Emanuel, Rahm, 314–15, 319
Emmerson, Ben, 197
England, Lynndie, 106
enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)
see also interrogation; torture; specific techniques
OPR Report, see Office of Professional Responsibility
Ervin, Clark Kent, 170
Ethics,,medical, see medical professionals’ role
European Court of Human Rights, 171, 174, 184, 188, 192, 
197, 266, 268
European Parliament reports, 167, 169, 175–76, 182–83, 188, 
192
European Union
rendition, European Parliament report, 175–76
executive authority, see specific departments and offices
extraordinary rendition, see rendition
F
Fallon, Mark, 222, 266
Faruq, see al-Faruq
Fast, Barbara, 90





Flanigan, Timothy, 131, 142
Foggo, Kyle “Dusty,” 187, 252
force-feeding, see hunger strikes
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 132, 157–58






Franks, Tommy, 36, 62, 134, 136
Frederick, Ivan, 106, 108
Frost, Jeffrey, 95–96




Gelles, Michael, 41, 219–23, 235, 240, 241
Geneva Conventions, 123–26
3rd Geneva Convention, 125
4th Geneva Convention, 125–26
Al Qaeda and Taliban, application of Conventions to, 
134–38
Common Article 3, 10, 123–25, 130, 137, 155–56, 313, 
334–35, 342–43
congressional role, 342–43
evolution of interrogation techniques, 36–38
and hunger strikes, 47–48
initial responses after Sept. 11, 62, 134–38
Iraq, application to, 88–89, 104–5, 111–13
OLC memos, 141, 147–48, 160–62
PENS Report, 240
Red Cross inspections, 328
and rendition, 170–72
role in future, 334
and SERE training, 205
TCP Task Force statement, findings and 
recommendations, 4, 7, 10, 14, 16
and War Crimes Act, 129–30
Germany
rendition, role in, 173–74
ghost detainees, 21, 86, 96–97
Ghul, Hassan, 246–47
Ghuraba cell, 255–57
Gibson Inquiry (UK), 198
Girod, Christophe, 51–55
Goldsmith, Jack, see Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
Gonzales, Alberto
criminal complaint against “Bush Six,” 267–68
diplomatic assurances, 169
evolution of legal advice, 146–58
hospital visit to Ashcroft, 147–48
interrogation-techniques meetings, 141–42
memos by
1/18/02, on nonapplicability of Geneva, 136–38
OLC memos to, see Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
“War Council,” 131–32
Goss, Porter, 169, 340
Graham, Lindsey, 84, 155, 319, 342–43




Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility, 25–55
Afghanistan as gateway, 33–35, 65–68
BSCTs, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams
Camp Delta, 29–30, 35, 47
Camp Iguana, 48
Camps 5, 6 & 7, 48–49, 224
Camp X-Ray, 29–30, 37, 289
current state, 48–51
detention at, generally, 25–55





evolution of techniques, 36–46
Pentagon, opinions within, 41–46
as only option, 35–36
profiles
Albert Shimkus, 27–32
Red Cross and Christophe Girod, 51–55
suicides, 47–48
Guantánamo Criminal Investigative Task Force, 39
Guantánamo Review Task Force, 315, 318
Gunawan, Rusman (“Gun Gun”), 255–56
Gutierrez, Gita, 28
H
habeas review, 6, 35, 47–48, 50–51, 66, 68, 134, 138, 157, 
169, 195, 199, 209, 320, 332, 342–43
see also Boumediene v. Bush; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld;  
Rasul v. Bush
Habibullah, Mullah
death of (at Bagram), 68–72
Hajj, see al-Hajj
Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin), 181, 216, 254–58
Hamdan, Salim, 264, 280
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 135, 156, 313, 334, 342–43
Hammarberg, Thomas, 188
Harlow, Bill, 93, 251
Harman, Sabrina, 95, 107–8
Harris, Harry, 48
Hawsawi, see al Hawsawi
Hayden, Michael, 167–68, 181, 245, 247, 253, 279, 336
Haynes, William “Jim,” 35–36, 39, 42–46, 131, 147, 268
OLC memos to, see Office of Legal Counsel
Herrington, Stuart, 67, 88, 90–91, 109, 113, 263–65, 327–28, 
336
Hicks, David, 64, 280
high-value detainee accounts of CIA interrogation program, 
215–18
High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), 265
Holbrooke, Richard, 76
Holder, Eric, 74, 96, 180, 314, 318–19, 330
Hollander, Nancy, 169
Hong Kong
rendition, role in, 172
Hood, Jay, 40, 47–48, 229
Hubbard, Kirk, 205–6, 209–11, 263
Huber, Keith, 81
hunger strikes and force-feeding
at Guantánamo, 47–49, 227–32, 288, 293
management by physicians, 232–33
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 19–20
Husayn, see Abu Zubaydah
Hussein, Saddam, 174, 261
I
Ice Man, see al-Jamadi, Manadel
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 196
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),              
see Red Cross
International Convention for Protection of All Persons 
Against Enforced Disappearances
applicability to rendition, 170–71
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
Against Enforced Disappearances, 16, 24
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16, 130, 
170, 175
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
130
applicability to rendition, 170
interrogation
see also torture; specific subject headings
Army Field Manual, see Army Field Manual on 
Interrogation
effective interrogation without torture, 263–66
evolution of techniques at Guantánamo, 36–46
medical professionals’ role, see medical professionals’ 
role
OLC memos and letters, see Office of Legal Counsel
policy, establishment of, 138–46
separation, see separation of detainees
Interrogation and Transfer Policy Task Force, 201
Iraq, 85–117
Abu Ghraib, see Abu Ghraib
Bagram, see Bagram Air Base
Balad, 100–101, 102, 113
Battlefield Interrogation Facility, see Battlefield 
Interrogation Facility (Camp Nama)
black sites, 179–80
BSCTs, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams
Camp Buca, 115, 116–17, 276
Camp Cropper, 87–88, 90
CIA Special Forces, 87–104
conventional military forces, 104–16
abuses, 105–13
 (see also Abu Ghraib)
rules of engagement, 104–5
FOBs, see Forward Operating Bases
former detainees’ accounts, 116–17




Isamuddin, Riduan, see Hambali
Italy
rendition, role in, 174–75
J
Jacoby Report, 64, 75, 92




Jeppesen Dataplan, 183, 188, 193, 196, 282, 332
Jessen, Bruce, 205–6, 208, 210–11, 236, 241, 258, 263
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), 88–90, 141, 208, 
220, 225, 258
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) task forces, 39, 
109, 177, 219, 220, 221, 329
556
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
response to allegations of abuse, 101–4
suspicious deaths, 94–100
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 21
treatment of detainees in Iraq, 87–100
Joint Task Forces (JTFs)
see also Combined Joint Task Forces
JTF-160, 39
JTF-170, 37, 39, 219, 221
JTF-GTMO, 39–40, 48–50, 66
Jordan
rendition, role in, 174
Justice Department (DOJ)
Bureau of Prisons, see Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
Office of Legal Counsel, see Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
Office of Professional Responsibility, see Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR)
K
Karzai, Hamid, 62, 68, 77, 82–84
Kellenberger, Jacob, 49, 55
Kenner, Jason, 95
Khadr, Omar, 276, 318–19
Khalid, Asadullah, 83, 325–26
Khan, Majid, 217, 255, 257
Kiriakou, John, 332
Kleinman, Steven, 88–90, 206, 258–59, 263–64, 336
Koenig, Lyle, 88, 101–2
Koh, Harold Hongju, 159, 183, 201, 316, 318, 320–21
Kosovo
black sites (Camp Bondsteel), 193–94
KSM, see Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh
L
Lady, Robert, 196–97
Latif, Adnan, 49, 293–94
Layton, Christopher, 99
Leahy, Patrick, 1, 24, 46, 138, 339
learned helplessness, 205–6, 210, 259
Ledford, Andrew, 96
legal issues, 119–62
see also Constitution of the U.S.; Convention Against 
Torture (CAT); Geneva Conventions; Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC)
initial response to September 11, 130–38
“War Council,” 35–36, 131–32, 148
interrogation policy, establishment of, 138–46
rendition
applicable law, 170–72
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 14–15
Lehnert, Michael, 36
Leso, John, 219–22, 241
Levin, Carl, 102, 247, 341
Levin, Daniel, see Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
Libi, see al-Libi
Library Tower plot, 253–58
Libya
political consequences of U.S. detention policy, case 
study, 269–75
rendition, role in, 172
Lieber Code, 161–62
Lieberman, Joseph, 341–42
Lillie, see bin Lep




Project No. 2, 190, 192




rendition, role in, 173–74
Malmedy Massacre, 345–46
Manchester Manual, 49–50, 69–70, 205
Margulies, Joseph, 51, 332–33
Markevicius, Jonas, 189
Marty, Dick, 175, 187, 200–201, 279, 287, 290
Mashad, see El-Mashad
Masri, see El-Masri
Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 34
Mauritania
rendition, role in, 174
McCain, John, 112, 155, 339, 341–43
McChrystal, Stanley, 63, 77–78, 82, 101–4
McRaven, William, 329
medical professionals’ role, 203–42
Abu Ghraib, 224–26
abuse, medical personnel failure to report, 225–27
Abu Zubaydah, 206–11, 216–17
BSCTs, see Behavioral Science Consultant Teams
CIA detainees, 205–16
ethical obligations toward detainees, 233–42
DOD and CIA medical personnel, applicability of 
professional ethics, 234–36
professional guidelines
American College of Physicians, 234, 236, 238
American Medical Association (AMA), 230, 234, 
235, 237–38
American Psychiatric Association, 234, 236–37
American Psychological Association (APA) and 
PENS report, 234, 238–40
World Medical Association, 19–20, 230, 233, 
238–39
state boards, complaints against individual 
practitioners, 241
hunger strikes, see hunger strikes and force-feeding
learned helplessness, 205–6
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 18–20
Mendez, Juan, 171, 330
mental effects of detention and abuse, 289–94
mental health professionals, see medical professionals’ role
Merkel, Angela, 174, 198
Meyer, Gerry, 101










Obama administration use of, 317–20
Military Commissions Acts, 156, 312, 318, 343
Millantz, Jonathan, 113
Miller, Geoffrey, 39–40, 53, 105, 114, 222, 223
see also Miller Report
Miller, Lenny, 89
Miller, Leszek, 182, 184–86
Miller Report, 39–40, 225
Mitchell, James, 205–11, 236, 241, 258, 263
mobility issues faced by released detainees, 285
Mohammed, Binyam, 172–73, 178, 192–93, 196, 197, 199–
200, 248, 292, 310
Mohammed, Faiz, 67
Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 48, 184, 188, 216, 245–57, 260, 
318–19
Mora, Alberto, 41–46, 158, 222–23, 278–79
Morocco
rendition, role in, 172–74
black sites and proxy detention, 192–93
Mosul (Iraq), 95, 109–11, 227
Moulton, Randy, 88–90
Mowhoush, Abed Hamed, 97–99
medical record-keeping, 226–27
responses to the death of, 21
Mubanga, Martin, 197
Mueller, Robert, 207, 244, 314
Muhammed, Noor Uthman, 63




National Directorate of Security (NDS) (Afghanistan), 23, 83, 
276, 322–26
National Emergencies Act, 130
National Security Directive 77 (NSD-77), 165
Navarro, Joe, 247, 258, 263–64
Navy Criminal Investigative Division (NCIS), 41, 48, 49, 
219, 220, 222
Navy SEALs, 95, 96, 109–10, 179
Nelson, Torin, 34, 66
Northern Alliance, 33–34, 59–62
O
Obama administration, 311–36
executive orders, 76, 158, 179, 264–65, 313, 320, 326, 334
Interrogation and Transfer Policy Task Force, 201
military commissions, civil courts, and detention without 
trial, 317–20
photos of abuse, disclosure of, 317
Red Cross, interactions with, 328–30
rendition by, 320–26
secrecy and accountability, 331–34
“separation” of detainees, actions addressing, 326–30
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations about, 
21–24
torture memos, disclosure of, 316–17
Uighurs, debate surrounding, 314–16
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
see also legal issues
initial response to September 11, 131
detainees, initial legal considerations, 134
examination of executive authority to take action, 
132–33
interrogation policy, establishment of, 138–46
memos on interrogation and torture, 44–46, 132–62, 
171–72, 316–17
personnel changes and evolution of legal advice, 146–58
Bradbury replaces Levin, 153
Goldsmith replaces Bybee, 146–50
Levin replaces Goldsmith, 150–52
rights of detainees, OLC determination of, 138–40
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 14–15, 18
Office of Medical Services (OMS), see Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
7/29/09 report investigating OLC and CIA’s EIT program, 
156, 158, 210, 249
OGA, see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Olsen, Matthew, 315
Omar, Abu, 172, 174, 196–97, 200
Omar, Mullah Mohammad, 59, 324–25
Operation Enduring Freedom, 33, 79
OPR Report, see Office of Professional Responsibility




Padilla, Jose, 139, 248–49
Paksas, Rolandas, 189, 190
Panetta, Leon, 314, 320, 326, 344
Parwan detention facility, see Afghanistan, Bagram 
Passaro, David, 74
Pelosi, Nancy, 340
PENS report (APA), 238–40
Pentagon, see Defense Department
Petraeus, David, 77
Phifer, Jerald, 37
Philbin, Patrick, 138, 144, 147–50, 153, 157
Philippine Insurrection, 344–45
Phillips, Joshua, 110, 113
physical consequences (long-term), 287–89
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), 62, 217, 227, 241, 
282–83, 287, 290–91, 293
Pillar, Paul, 166
Pinior, Jozef, 176, 182
Poland
rendition, role in, 174
black sites, 182–86
Szmany Airport, 183, 186
558
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
Powell, Colin, 55, 62, 136–37, 174, 261–62
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (1995), 165
profiles
Albert Shimkus, 27–32
Red Cross and Christophe Girod, 51–55
Project No. 2 (Lithuania), 190, 192
Prosper, Pierre-Richard, 36, 62, 67
proxy detention, 320–26
see also black sites; rendition
mental effects, 289–92
Morocco, 192–93, 281
Obama task force, 201
Somalia, 195–96
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 16–17
psychologists and psychiatrists,                                             
see medical professionals’ role
Q
Qaddafi, see el-Gaddafi
Qahtani, see al Qahtani
Qala-i-Jangi, 61
R
Rahman, Gul, 21, 74, 179, 180, 181, 330
Rasul v. Bush, 47, 61, 342
Raulušaitis, Darius, 192
Rawi, see al-Rawi
recidivism / re-engagement, 295–310
congressional report, 299–300
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data, 297–99
evaluation by NGOs, academia, and the media, 
300–301
table of individuals confirmed or suspected of re-
engagement, 302–10
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 20–21
Red Cross (ICRC)
and Abu Ghraib, 107
access to detainees, 79, 91, 97, 102, 177–78, 326–30
and BSCTs, 220, 223–24
CIA interrogation program, ICRC findings, 215–18
Geneva Conventions, interpretation, 105, 125
improved procedures to notify ICRC, 328–29
interview with KSM, 183–84
invitation to, 36
and Obama administration, 328–30
Obama executive orders, 313
profile of Christophe Girod, 51–55
rendition, report on transfer process, 168
TCP Task Force statement, findings and 
recommendations, 5, 7, 16, 24
TCP Task Force visit with, 49
visit with Al Saadi, 273
warnings and notifications to U.S., 293, 322
re-engagement, see recidivism
Reid, Richard (“shoe bomber”), 255, 261, 319
release of detainees
establishing post-release procedures, 286–87
practical issues faced, 280–87
Remes, David, 50, 293–94
rendition, 163–201
see also black sites
diplomatic assurances, see diplomatic assurances
expansion of program after Sept. 11, 166–69
and Geneva Conventions, 170–72




by Obama administration, 320–26











TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 16–18
Rendition Group (CIA), 166–67, 194
restraint chair, 229–32
Rice, Condoleezza, 46, 55, 141, 156, 173–74, 175, 198, 341
rights of detainees
see also specific rights , statutes, conventions, etc.
OLC determination of, 138–40
Rives, Jack, 43–45
Rizzo, John, 73, 101, 130, 144, 206, 209, 249, 251, 253, 259, 336
OLC memos to, see Office of Legal Counsel
Roberts, Pat, 339, 342, 344
Rockefeller, Jay, 339, 342, 344




Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, 187
Rove, Karl, 167
Rumsfeld, Donald, 4, 25, 30, 33, 36, 39, 41–43, 46, 55, 60, 
62, 69, 92–93, 104, 112, 136, 146, 223, 267–68, 
339, 343
Russell, Terrence, 88–90, 225
S
Saadi, see Al Saadi
Saidi, Laid, 178, 216




Scorpions (Iraqi paramilitary unit), 97–98
Seimas Report, 189, 191
Seligman, Martin, 205–6
separation of detainees
and Appendix. M, 265




TCP Task Force recommendations, 23
SERE program, 38, 88–89, 141, 145, 205–12, 219–20, 
224–25
and false confessions, 258–59, 263
and Geneva Conventions, 205
learned helplessness, 205–6
TCP statement, 5
Sharfstein, Steven, 224, 237
Sharif, see al-Sharif
Sheikh Abu Ahmed, see al-Kuwaiti, Abu Ahmed
Shiffrin, Richard, 35–36
Shimkus, Albert, 27–32
“shoe bomber,” see Reid, Richard
Shoroeiya, Mohammed, 178–79, 270
Siemiatkowski, Zbigniew, 181, 186
Sifton, John, 109
Slahi, Mohamedou Ould, 223, 246
sleep deprivation
and Army Field Manual, 326–27
details of tactic, 71–72, 213–14, 259–60
TCP Task Force statement, findings and 
recommendations, 4, 23
Somalia
black sites and proxy detention, 195–96





Spann, Johnny “Mike,” 61
Special Missions Unit (SMU) task force, 90
Stafford Smith, Clive, 28




Stevens, Christopher, 269–70, 271
Stevens Express Leasing Inc., 183
stigma
impact on released detainees, 281–82
Stimson, Charles “Cully,” 28
Stone, Douglas, 76–77, 80, 115–16, 276
Stormoen, Steve, 96, 101
discipline, 101
Straw, Jack, 172, 197, 199, 268, 272
stress positions
and Army Field Manual, 326–27
details of tactic, 71, 73, 108–9, 147, 339
TCP Task Force findings and recommendations, 23
suicides
at Guantánamo, 47–48
Suleiman, Omar, 165, 168
Supervielle, Manuel, 36
survival, evasion, resistance and escape, see SERE program
suspicious deaths, 94–100









rendition, role in, 172
Szmany Airport (Poland), 183, 186
T
Taft IV, William Howard, 36, 135–36, 137, 138, 344–45
Taguba Report, 40, 76, 97, 106–8
Taliban
application of Geneva Conventions to, 134–38
Task Force 20/Task Force 121/Task Force 6-26, see Joint 
Special Operations Command task forces
TCP Task Force on Detainee Treatment
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, 3–4, 9–24
consequences findings and recommendations, 20
extraordinary-rendition findings and 
recommendations, 16–18
general findings and recommendations, 9–14
legal findings and recommendations, 14–15
medical findings and recommendations, 18–20
Obama administration, findings and recommendations 
about, 21–24
recidivism findings and recommendations, 20–21
statement of the Task Force, 1–8
Tenet, George, 98, 166, 173, 196, 207, 212, 251
Thailand
rendition, role in, 172
black sites, 180–82
Udon Thani, 180–81
Tipton Three, 61–62, 307–8
torture
see also interrogation; specific subject headings
consequences, see consequences of U.S. policies
efficacy of torture and EITs, 242–67
Abu Zubaydah, 248–53, 260–61
assertions of useful information obtained through 
coercion, 245–58
capture of Osama bin Laden, value of EITs, 11, 
245–47
Library Tower plot, 253–58
OLC memos and letters, see Office of Legal Counsel
Torture Convention, see Convention Against Torture (CAT)
Torture Statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A), 10, 23, 38–39, 
119, 129, 141–44, 150–62, 215
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 152
transfer of detainees, see rendition
trial, detention without
by Obama Administration, 30, 317–20
Tyl, Waldemar, 185–86
Tyrie, Andrew, 198, 199, 268
U
Udon Thani (Thailand), 180–81
Uighurs, 48, 59, 61, 308, 310, 314–16
560
The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment
The Constitution Project
“underwear bomber,” see Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10, 38, 43, 335
United Kingdom





United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, see 
Convention Against Torture (CAT)
United Nations Human Rights Council Report (2010), 176
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 130
Usackas, Vygaudas, 191
V
veracity/value of confessions, see efficacy of torture/EITs




Walker, Mary, 43, 44, 45
“War Council,” 35–36, 131–32, 148
War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2441), 10, 23, 119, 129–30, 135, 
136, 156, 160, 162, 334, 343
Warner, John, 339–43
Warsame, Ahmed Abdulkadir, 177, 329–30
waterboarding
and death of bin Laden, , 245–47
details of tactic, 181, 183–84, 209–11, 214–16, 250–52, 
270, 273–75
and false confessions, 260–61
and Library Tower plot, 253–58
McCain assessment, 155
memos and cables concerning, 149–52, 154–55, 159–60, 
208, 210–11, 214–15, 248




TCP Task Force statement, 3
Welshofer, Lewis, 94, 97–99
West Coast plot, see Library Tower plot
Wilkerson, Lawrence, 25, 174
Wilner, Thomas, 28
Wolf, Frank, 314–15
Wolfowitz, Paul, 64, 339
Wood, Carolyn, 63, 70–72, 104–5
Woods, David, 48–50
World Medical Association
ethical obligations toward detainees, 19–20, 230, 233, 
238–39
X
Xenakis, Stephen, 217, 227, 241, 259–60
Y
Yemen
suspension of transfers to, 51
U.S. embassy, planned attack of, 261
Yoo, John, 36–46, 131–60, 208, 253, 268




Zelikow, Philip, 3, 155–56, 158
Zero Dark Thirty, 245, 335–36
Zubair (Mohammad Farik Amin), 181, 255, 257
1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1000    
Washington, DC 20036
 Tel: 202.580.6920    Fax: 202.580.6929
 Email: info@constitutionproject.org
www.constitutionproject.org     
www.detaineetaskforce.org
1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1000    
Washington, DC 20036
 Tel: 202.580.6920    Fax: 202.580.6929
 Email: info@constitutionproject.org
www.constitutionproject.org     
www.detaineetaskforce.org
